SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud: Complaint Reveals Discovery Tips

see comp-pr2010-59 SEC Complaint V GS Fraud

“The Commission seeks injunctive relief, disgorgement of profits, prejudgment interest and civil penalties from both defendants.” Editor’s Note: Here is where the rubber meets the road. This same pool of illegal fraudulent profit is also subject to being defined as an undisclosed yield spread premium due to the borrowers. Some enterprising class action lawyer has some low hanging fruit here — the class is already defined for you by the SEC — all those homeowners subject to loan documents that were pledged or transferred into a pool which was received or incorporated by reference into this Abacus vehicle)

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Litigation Release No. 21489 / April 16, 2010

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Fabrice Tourre, 10 Civ. 3229 (BJ) (S.D.N.Y. filed April 16, 2010)

The SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud In Connection With The Structuring And Marketing of A Synthetic CDO

The Securities and Exchange Commission today filed securities fraud charges against Goldman, Sachs & Co. (“GS&Co”) and a GS&Co employee, Fabrice Tourre (“Tourre”), for making material misstatements and omissions in connection with a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) GS&Co structured and marketed to investors. This synthetic CDO, ABACUS 2007-AC1, was tied to the performance of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) and was structured and marketed in early 2007 when the United States housing market and the securities referencing it were beginning to show signs of distress. Synthetic CDOs like ABACUS 2007-AC1 contributed to the recent financial crisis by magnifying losses associated with the downturn in the United States housing market.

According to the Commission’s complaint, the marketing materials for ABACUS 2007-AC1 — including the term sheet, flip book and offering memorandum for the CDO — all represented that the reference portfolio of RMBS underlying the CDO was selected by ACA Management LLC (“ACA”), a third party with expertise in analyzing credit risk in RMBS. Undisclosed in the marketing materials and unbeknownst to investors, a large hedge fund, Paulson & Co. Inc. (“Paulson”) [Editor's Note: Brad Keiser in his forensic analyses has reported that Paulson may have been a principal in OneWest which took over Indymac and may have ties with former Secretary of Treasury Henry Paulson, former GS CEO], with economic interests directly adverse to investors in the ABACUS 2007-AC1 CDO played a significant role in the portfolio selection process. After participating in the selection of the reference portfolio, Paulson effectively shorted the RMBS portfolio it helped select by entering into credit default swaps (“CDS”) with GS&Co to buy protection on specific layers of the ABACUS 2007-AC1 capital structure. Given its financial short interest, Paulson had an economic incentive to choose RMBS that it expected to experience credit events in the near future. GS&Co did not disclose Paulson’s adverse economic interest or its role in the portfolio selection process in the term sheet, flip book, offering memorandum or other marketing materials.
The Commission alleges that Tourre was principally responsible for ABACUS 2007-AC1. According to the Commission’s complaint, Tourre devised the transaction, prepared the marketing materials and communicated directly with investors. Tourre is alleged to have known of Paulson’s undisclosed short interest and its role in the collateral selection process. He is also alleged to have misled ACA into believing that Paulson invested approximately $200 million in the equity of ABACUS 2007-AC1 (a long position) and, accordingly, that Paulson’s interests in the collateral section process were aligned with ACA’s when in reality Paulson’s interests were sharply conflicting. The deal closed on April 26, 2007. Paulson paid GS&Co approximately $15 million for structuring and marketing ABACUS 2007-AC1. By October 24, 2007, 83% of the RMBS in the ABACUS 2007-AC1 portfolio had been downgraded and 17% was on negative watch. By January 29, 2008, 99% of the portfolio had allegedly been downgraded. Investors in the liabilities of ABACUS 2007-AC1 are alleged to have lost over $1 billion. Paulson’s opposite CDS positions yielded a profit of approximately $1 billion.

The Commission’s complaint, which was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, charges GS&Co and Tourre with violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77q(a), Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5. The Commission seeks injunctive relief, disgorgement of profits, prejudgment interest and civil penalties from both defendants.

The Commission’s investigation is continuing into the practices of investment banks and others that purchased and securitized pools of subprime mortgages and the resecuritized CDO market with a focus on products structured and marketed in late 2006 and early 2007 as the U.S. housing market was beginning to show signs of distress.

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36 Responses

  1. There were over 160 of these ABACUS deals put together and sold by Goldman.

  2. Hi,
    I found this posted yesterday. It is the actual offering for ABACUS 2007 AC-1. Interesting for sure! The trust my loan was in does indeed seem to be included in this as well as the Flip Book.

    http://www.scribd.com/mobile/documents/30414220

  3. Where can we find documents published for Abacus 2007-ac1? Such as certificates and whatnot.

  4. Would anybody know where to get documents published for the Abacus 2007 deal? Certificates and whatnot?

  5. Obama – Dodd – Financial bill would futher enrich Goldman-Sachs

    http://www.openmarket.org/2010/04/16/obama-dodd-financial-bill-would-futher-enrich-goldman-sachs/

  6. let’s look at the PROSPECTUS:Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Inc · 424B5 · Bear Stearns Asset Backed Certificates Series 2003-2 · On 6/30/03
    Document 1 of 1 · 424B5 · PROSPECTUS:

    . Assignment of the Mortgage Loans; Repurchase At the time of issuance of the certificates, the depositor will cause the mortgage loans, together with all principal and interest due with respect to such mortgage loans after the cut-off date to be sold to the trust. The mortgage loans in each of the mortgage loan groups will be identified in a schedule appearing as an exhibit to the pooling and servicing agreement with each mortgage loan group separately identified. Such schedule will include information as to the principal balance of each mortgage loan as of the cut-offdate, as well as information including, among other things, the mortgage rate,the borrower’s monthly payment and the maturity date of each mortgage note. In addition, the depositor will deposit with Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, National Association, as custodian and agent for the trustee, the following documents with respect to each mortgage loan: (a) except with respect to a MOM loan, the original mortgage note, endorsed without recourse in the following form: “Pay to the order of JPMorgan Chase Bank, as S-40——————————————————————————–
    trustee for certificateholders of Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-2 without recourse,” with all intervening endorsements, to the extent available, showing a complete chain of endorsement from the originator to the seller or, if the original mortgage note is unavailable to the depositor, a photocopy thereof, if available, together with a lost note affidavit; (b) the original recorded mortgage or a photocopy thereof, and if the related mortgage loan is a MOM loan, noting the applicable mortgage identification number for that mortgage loan; (c) except with respect to a mortgage loan that is registered on the MERS(R) System, a duly executed assignment of the mortgage to “JPMorgan Chase Bank, as trustee for certificateholders of Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-2, without recourse;” in recordable form, as described in the pooling and servicing agreement; (d) originals or duplicates of all interim recorded assignments of such mortgage, if any and if available to the depositor; (e) the original or duplicate original lender’s title policy or, in the event such original title policy has not been received from the insurer, such original or duplicate original lender’s title policy shall be delivered within one year of the closing date or, in the event such original lender’s title policy is unavailable, a photocopy of such title policy or, in lieu thereof, a current lien search on the related property; and (f) the original or a copy of all available assumption, modification or substitution agreements, if any. In general, assignments of the mortgage loans provided to the custodian on behalf of the trustee will not be recorded in the appropriate public office for real property records, based upon an opinion of counsel to the effect that such recording is not required to protect the trustee’s interests in the mortgage loan against the claim of any subsequent transferee or any successor to or creditor of the depositor or the seller, or as to which the rating agencies advise that the omission to record therein will not affect their ratings of the offered certificates. In connection with the assignment of any mortgage loan that is registered on the MERS(R) System, the depositor will cause the MERS(R) System to indicate that those mortgage loans have been assigned by EMC to the depositor and by the depositor to the trustee by including (or deleting, in the case of repurchased mortgage loans) in the computer files (a) the code in the field which identifies the trustee and (b) the code in the field “Pool Field” which identifies the series of certificates issued. Neither the depositor nor the master servicer will alter these codes (except in the case of a repurchased mortgage loan). A “MOM loan” is any mortgage loan as to which, at origination, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. acts as mortgagee, solely as nominee for the originator of that mortgage loan and its successors and assigns. S-41——————————————————————————–
    The custodian on behalf of the trustee will perform a limited review of the mortgage loan documents on or prior to the closing date or in the case of any document permitted to be delivered after the closing date, promptly after the custodian’s receipt of such documents and will hold such documents in trust for the benefit of the holders of the certificates. In addition, the seller will make representations and warranties in the pooling and servicing agreement as of the cut-off date in respect of the mortgage loans. The depositor will file the pooling and servicing agreement containing such representations and warranties with the Securities and Exchange Commission in a report on Form 8-K following the closing date. After the closing date, if any document is found to be missing or defective in any material respect, or if a representation or warranty with respect to any mortgage loan is breached and such breach materially and adversely affects the interests of the holders of the certificates in such mortgage loan, the custodian, on behalf of the trustee, is required to notify the seller in writing. If the seller cannot or does not cure such omission,defect or breach within 90 days of its receipt of notice from the custodian, theseller is required to repurchase the related mortgage loan from the trust fund at a price equal to 100% of the stated principal balance thereof as of the date of repurchase plus accrued and unpaid interest thereon at the mortgage rate to the first day of the month following the month of repurchase. In addition, if the obligation to repurchase the related mortgage loan results from a breach of the seller’s representations regarding predatory lending, the seller will be obligated to pay any resulting costs and damages incurred by the trust. Rather than repurchase the mortgage loan as provided above, the seller may remove such mortgage loan from the trust fund and substitute in its place another mortgage loan of like characteristics; however, such substitution is only permitted within two years after the closing date. With respect to any repurchase or substitution of a mortgage loan that is not in default or as to which a default is not imminent, the trustee must have received a satisfactory opinion of counsel that such repurchase or substitution will not cause the trust fund to lose the status of its REMIC.

    Do you see the prospectus in my case is clear as to how the loans are to be packaged…. Through the means of discovery which they produced to me…. My loan was not properly executed, I believe that it was a concert of action and it was known that the were not the true owner and it was one of these” NO ONE WILL EVER KNOW” I have every document to prove my loan was a breach to the securities.. and intended fraud…

  7. Dan,
    Wow…that is absolutley Mind boggling! I’m just waiting to see who files. I have tons of issues (Tila and more) where the statute has run out so they can only be brought with a counter claim. I only know about First Franklin a Division of National City Bank of In, MERS,SPS,First Franklin Financial Corp,FFMLT Series 2006 FF14. SPS says an “unnamed International Investor”.

    Still looking for an Attorney in Cincinnati, Ohio.

  8. Here is the flip book that is part of the Goldman Sachs SEC Fraud Charge:

    http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2010/04/goldman-sachs-abacus-2007-flipbook/

  9. Teri,
    In my case and from what I have seen it is almost always the servicer claiming Power of Attorney or Attorney in Fact for the securitization Trustee (US Bank, Deutche Bank, etc).

    In my case:
    Beneficiary on Deed of Trust: MERS

    Trustee on Deed of Trust: Mitchell Heffernan

    Beneficiary claimed when Notice of Default issued: US Bank as Trustee by Residential Funding Company, LLC FKA Residential Funding Corporation Attorney in Fact (this is Wells Fargo)

    Party performing the substitution of Trustee: Wells Fargo Bank, attorney in fact for US Bank as Trustee

    Assignment from Originator (MLN) to US Bank as Trustee by Residential Funding Company FKA Residential Funding Corporation Attorney in Fact performed by: MERS as Nominee for Originator (MLN)
    (so they actually assignmed my Deed of Trust to Wells Fargo Bank as attorney in fact)

    The assignment was performed by Chief Counsel of a law firm hired by the servicer (as attorney in fact) to foreclose. This lawyer claimed to be an assistant secretary for MERS when he executed the assignment.

    So MERS was allegedly the original beneficiary, then the attorney in fact for US Bank as Trustee was the beneficiary when the Notice of Default was issued, then the attorney in fact for US Bank as Trustee substituted in a new Trustee, then MERS performed an assignment as nominee for the originator.

    So MERS was the alleged original beneficiary, then the Attorney in Fact for US Bank as Trustee was allegedly the beneficiary, then MERS was the alleged beneficiary.

    Of course none of these entities was ever the beneficiary at any time.

    And the beat goes on …

    Dan Edstrom
    dmedstrom@hotmail.com

  10. Is the Goldman matter likely the tip of the iceberg??? [Has FNMA changed its eviction policy?]

    Two days ago I was doing a search of the public records, and came across several foreclosures involving Wells Fargo. I did some further investigation. What I discovered about the post-foreclosure process is disturbing and not representative of my understanding publicly announced policy regarding FHA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac.

    By way of brief background,

    (i) Wells advertises property as attorney in fact, on an FHA insured mortgage,
    (ii) The foreclosure date passes, (at this time the public record does not reflect any action nor any assignment by Wells to any party)
    (iii) Subsequently, the resident is notified by letter that FNMA is owner of the property.
    (iv) FNMA sends a realtor to the property,
    (v) The realtor leaves a flyer, notifies the resident, of imminent eviction,
    (vi) Resident then is served papers showing that FNMA has filed dispossessory proceedings against him, and notice of a court date,
    (vii) The public record still does not reflect the foreclosure, nor any assignment from Wells to any other party
    (viii) The court hearing proceeds,
    (ix) I am told that no argument was permitted
    (x) Court rules the house is to be vacated in the next two weeks.
    (xi) A post-hearing review of the public record indicates documents to have been presented for recording, but not posted and therefore available for public review until late the afternoon the day before the dispossessory hearing.
    (xii) The documents indicate Wells foreclosed, bought the property, then immediately thereafter sold the property to Fannie Mae, then (in separate documents) Wells also sold the same property to Freddie Mac – all with no transfer tax paid.
    (xiii) Notably, none of the recorded documents indicate FHA as a party to any part of the transaction.

    Comment/Question:
    1.Is anyone aware that FNMA has begun to by real property, rather than act as a secondary market for mortgages?
    What purpose is served by Wells selling property to itself on the courthouse steps, then immediately resale the property to a GSE?
    I understood Wells to be a financial institution who received taxpayer bailout funds?

  11. Thanks for your replies Dan. I guess it’s back to SEC reading. They do an excellent job of hiding things there…
    I guess there is still time as no one has foreclosed yet…last payment 1/09. No calls or letters either??? Thankfully I am here in Ohio so they have to LMK about court proceedings.
    Very curious as to WHO will try and foreclose since the “lender” of record did not loan us anything and MERS is nominee…

  12. Goldman News Summary:

    Clear narrative:
    Wall Street sold you a gasoline-soaked house, bought insurance against it, THEN TORCHED IT WITH YOUR MONEY!

    Let’s tell this narrative TEN THOUSAND TIMES after all it is the TRUTH.

  13. Here’s Gretchen Morganstern’s take (and scoop) on this…

    April, 16, 2010

    S.E.C. Accuses Goldman of Fraud in Housing Deal
    By LOUISE STORY and GRETCHEN MORGENSON

    Goldman Sachs, the Wall Street powerhouse, was accused of securities fraud in a civil lawsuit filed Friday by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which claims the bank created and sold a mortgage investment that was secretly intended to fail.

    The move was the first time that regulators had taken action against a Wall Street deal that helped investors capitalize on the collapse of the housing market.

    The suit also named Fabrice Tourre, a vice president at Goldman who helped create and sell the investment.

    In a statement, Goldman called the commission’s accusations “completely unfounded in law and fact” and said it would “vigorously contest them and defend the firm and its reputation.”

    The focus of the S.E.C. case, an investment vehicle called Abacus 2007-AC1, was one of 25 such vehicles that Goldman created so the bank and some of its clients could bet against the housing market. Those deals, which were the subject of an article in The New York Times in December, initially protected Goldman from losses when the mortgage market disintegrated and later yielded profits for the bank.

    As the Abacus portfolios in the S.E.C. case plunged in value, a prominent hedge fund manager made money from his bets against certain mortgage bonds, while investors lost more than $1 billion.

    According to the complaint, Goldman created Abacus 2007-AC1 in February 2007 at the request of John A. Paulson, a prominent hedge fund manager who earned an estimated $3.7 billion in 2007 by correctly wagering that the housing bubble would burst. Mr. Paulson is not named in the suit.

    Goldman told investors that the bonds would be chosen by an independent manager. In the case of Abacus 2007-AC1, however, Goldman let Mr. Paulson select mortgage bonds that he believed were most likely to lose value, according to the complaint.

    Goldman then sold the package to investors like foreign banks, pension funds and insurance companies, which would profit only if the bonds gained value. The European banks IKB and ABN Amro and other investors lost more than $1 billion in the deal, the commission said.

    “Goldman wrongly permitted a client that was betting against the mortgage market to heavily influence which mortgage securities to include in an investment portfolio,” Robert Khuzami, the director of the commission’s enforcement division, said in a written statement.

    The lawsuit could be a sign of a revitalized Securities and Exchange Commission, which has been criticized for early missteps in assessing the causes of the financial crisis. The agency appears to be tracing the mortgage pipeline all the way from the companies like Countrywide Financial that originated home loans to the raucous trading floors that dominate Wall Street’s profit machine.

    At a conference in New Orleans on Friday, Mr. Khuzami indicated that he was scrutinizing other deals involving mortgage securities. “We’re looking at a wide range of products,” he said at a news conference. “If we see securities with similar profiles, we’ll look at them closely.”

    Shares of Goldman Sachs plunged more than 10 percent in just the first half-hour of trading after the suit was announced Friday morning. They closed down 13 percent, at $160.70, wiping away more than $10 billion of the company’s market value.

    Investors sold other bank stocks, as well, as rumors swirled about which other firms might become embroiled in the commission’s investigation. Next to Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank’s American shares had the steepest decline, falling 7 percent.

    Goldman issued a second statement after the market closed saying that the firm had lost money on the deal in the S.E.C. case and that it provided investors with extensive disclosure on the deal. The firm said the losses in the deal came from the overall collapse of the mortgage market, not from the way the deal was structured.

    The accusations amount to a black eye for the once-untouchable Goldman Sachs, a money machine that is the epicenter of Wall Street power. For decades, its platinum reputation has attracted top investors and stock underwriting deals.

    Several of its former chief executives have gone on to high public office, among them Henry M. Paulson Jr., the former Treasury secretary, and Jon Corzine, the former New Jersey governor. (Henry Paulson and John Paulson are not related.)

    In recent months, Goldman has been defiant in the face of criticism, repeatedly defending its actions in the mortgage market, including its own bets against it. In a letter published last week in Goldman’s annual report, the bank rebutted criticism that it had created, and sold to its clients, mortgage-linked securities that it had little confidence in.

    “We certainly did not know the future of the residential housing market in the first half of 2007 any more than we can predict the future of markets today,” Goldman wrote. “We also did not know whether the value of the instruments we sold would increase or decrease.”

    The letter continued: “Although Goldman Sachs held various positions in residential mortgage-related products in 2007, our short positions were not a ‘bet against our clients.’ ” Instead, the trades were used to hedge other trading positions, the bank said.

    Goldman was one of many Wall Street firms that created complex mortgage securities — known as synthetic collateralized debt obligations — as the housing wave was cresting. At the time, traders like Mr. Paulson, as well as those within Goldman, were looking for ways to bet against the overheated market.

    For months, S.E.C. officials have been examining mortgage bundles like Abacus that were created across Wall Street. The commission has been interviewing people who structured Goldman mortgage deals about Abacus and similar instruments. The commission advised Goldman that it was likely to face a civil suit in the matter, sending the bank what is known as a Wells notice several months ago.

    The S.E.C. action is a civil complaint, but it could be referred to criminal prosecutors who would have to prove that individuals intended to defraud investors.

    The S.E.C. focused on only one Abacus deal in its complaint, but Mr. Khuzami said in a conference call on Friday that the commission continued to look at the rest. All told, $10.9 billion of Abacus investments were sold.

    Mr. Tourre, the Goldman vice president named in the lawsuit, was one of the firm’s top workers running the Abacus deals, selling the investment to investors across Europe. Mr. Tourre was raised in France and moved to the United States in 2000 to earn his master’s degree in operations at Stanford. The next year, he began working at Goldman, according to his profile on the LinkedIn social network.

    He rose to prominence working on the Abacus deals under a trader named Jonathan M. Egol. Mr. Egol, who is now a managing director at Goldman, is not named in the S.E.C. suit.

    Goldman structured the Abacus portfolios with a sharp eye on the credit ratings assigned to the mortgage bonds contained in them, the S.E.C. said. In the Abacus deal cited in the S.E.C. complaint, Mr. Paulson pinpointed those mortgage bonds that he believed carried higher ratings than the underlying loans deserved.

    Goldman placed insurance on those bonds — called credit-default swaps — inside Abacus, allowing Mr. Paulson to bet against the bonds while clients on the other side of the trade wagered that they would make money.

    But when Goldman sold shares in Abacus to investors, the bank and Mr. Tourre disclosed only the ratings of those bonds and did not disclose that Mr. Paulson was on the other side, betting those ratings were wrong.

    Mr. Tourre at one point complained to an investor who was buying into Abacus that he was having trouble persuading Moody’s to give the deal the rating he desired, according to the investor’s notes, which were provided to The Times by a colleague who asked for anonymity.

    In seven of Goldman’s Abacus deals, the bank went to the American International Group for insurance on the bonds. Those deals have led to billions of dollars in losses at A.I.G., which received a $180 billion taxpayer rescue. The Abacus deal in the S.E.C. complaint was not one of them.

    That deal was managed by ACA Management, a part of ACA Capital Holdings, which changed its name in 2008 to Manifold Capital.

    Goldman told investors the mortgage bond portfolio would be “selected by ACA Management,” according to the deal’s marketing document, which was given to The Times by an Abacus investor. That document says Goldman may have long or short positions in the bonds. It does not mention Mr. Paulson.

    ACA was not named in the suit. That firm was led to believe that Mr. Paulson was positive on mortgages, not negative, and so it did not see a problem with his involvement, the S.E.C. said. Mr. Tourre was aware of ACA’s misconception, the commission said.

    In February 2007, Mr. Tourre met with both ACA and Mr. Paulson, and he sent an e-mail message to a Goldman colleague acknowledging the awkwardness of the situation. “This is surreal,” Mr. Tourre wrote.

    Nine days later, a Goldman colleague wrote Mr. Tourre and said, “the C.D.O. biz is dead. We don’t have a lot of time left.”

    The Abacus deals deteriorated rapidly when the housing market hit trouble. For instance, in the Abacus deal in the S.E.C. complaint, 83 percent of the mortgage bonds underlying it were downgraded by rating agencies just six months later, and 99 percent had been downgraded by early 2008, according to the S.E.C.

    It takes time for such mortgage investments to pay out for investors who make bets against them. Each deal is structured differently, but generally, the bonds underlying the investment must deteriorate to a certain point before those who bet against the bonds get paid. By the end of 2007, Mr. Paulson’s credit hedge fund was up 590 percent.

    Michael J. de la Merced contributed reporting.

  14. Now let’a get to the fraud.This is securities Fraud, background info first. 1st… Mers was named nominee on the mortgage and filed at the Register Of Deeds in ( county, state) . Supposedily according to a lost note affidivat the original lender ABC sold the note and according to MERS servicer ID the loan was transfered off of the MERS system and MIN# deactivated . NO ASSIGNMENT WAS RECORDED.Now the new owner DEF sold the loan to Bear Stearns which deposited into the Asset Backed Securites which did an assignment/sell to JP MORGAN CHASE as trustee. Now there has been a foreclosure started on the loan in March 2009 by The Bank as successor trustee for JP MORGAN CHASE who claims to be the real party in interest and hold the note. By way Of an assignment which was recorded at the ROD after the LIS-PENDENS and after the filing of complaint.Here is more fraud because the assignment was from MERS on behalf of the original lender ABC (which is defunct and has been since 2005) to the THE BANK . MERS has no authority to do an assignment because the loan was transferred off in 2002 and Mers was Longer the mortgagee as nominee of record.Now are you with me( no chain of title) the BANK produced in discovery to me an allonge ABC to DEF along with the lost note affidivat. DEF showed an allonge to JP MORGAN CHASE which skipped BEAR STEARNS. BEAR STEARNS was the depositer into the securities. First let start with the allonges: according to the UCC an allonge is only used when there is NO ROOM ON THE ORIGINAL NOTE FOR ENDORSEMENT and must be firmly attached as to become a part of AN ALLONGE cannot be used to transfer interest and is invalid if there is room on the note for endorsements and is invalid it not attached. A lost note and two allonges that were not signed and not dated and even skipped BEAR STEARNS that desposited it into the securities is the purported chain of title , now let’s look at the PROSPECTUS:Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Inc · 424B5 · Bear Stearns Asset Backed Certificates Series 2003-2 · On 6/30/03
    Document 1 of 1 · 424B5 · PROSPECTUS:

    . Assignment of the Mortgage Loans; Repurchase At the time of issuance of the certificates, the depositor will cause the mortgage loans, together with all principal and interest due with respect to such mortgage loans after the cut-off date to be sold to the trust. The mortgage loans in each of the mortgage loan groups will be identified in a schedule appearing as an exhibit to the pooling and servicing agreement with each mortgage loan group separately identified. Such schedule will include information as to the principal balance of each mortgage loan as of the cut-offdate, as well as information including, among other things, the mortgage rate,the borrower’s monthly payment and the maturity date of each mortgage note. In addition, the depositor will deposit with Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, National Association, as custodian and agent for the trustee, the following documents with respect to each mortgage loan: (a) except with respect to a MOM loan, the original mortgage note, endorsed without recourse in the following form: “Pay to the order of JPMorgan Chase Bank, as S-40——————————————————————————–
    trustee for certificateholders of Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-2 without recourse,” with all intervening endorsements, to the extent available, showing a complete chain of endorsement from the originator to the seller or, if the original mortgage note is unavailable to the depositor, a photocopy thereof, if available, together with a lost note affidavit; (b) the original recorded mortgage or a photocopy thereof, and if the related mortgage loan is a MOM loan, noting the applicable mortgage identification number for that mortgage loan; (c) except with respect to a mortgage loan that is registered on the MERS(R) System, a duly executed assignment of the mortgage to “JPMorgan Chase Bank, as trustee for certificateholders of Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-2, without recourse;” in recordable form, as described in the pooling and servicing agreement; (d) originals or duplicates of all interim recorded assignments of such mortgage, if any and if available to the depositor; (e) the original or duplicate original lender’s title policy or, in the event such original title policy has not been received from the insurer, such original or duplicate original lender’s title policy shall be delivered within one year of the closing date or, in the event such original lender’s title policy is unavailable, a photocopy of such title policy or, in lieu thereof, a current lien search on the related property; and (f) the original or a copy of all available assumption, modification or substitution agreements, if any. In general, assignments of the mortgage loans provided to the custodian on behalf of the trustee will not be recorded in the appropriate public office for real property records, based upon an opinion of counsel to the effect that such recording is not required to protect the trustee’s interests in the mortgage loan against the claim of any subsequent transferee or any successor to or creditor of the depositor or the seller, or as to which the rating agencies advise that the omission to record therein will not affect their ratings of the offered certificates. In connection with the assignment of any mortgage loan that is registered on the MERS(R) System, the depositor will cause the MERS(R) System to indicate that those mortgage loans have been assigned by EMC to the depositor and by the depositor to the trustee by including (or deleting, in the case of repurchased mortgage loans) in the computer files (a) the code in the field which identifies the trustee and (b) the code in the field “Pool Field” which identifies the series of certificates issued. Neither the depositor nor the master servicer will alter these codes (except in the case of a repurchased mortgage loan). A “MOM loan” is any mortgage loan as to which, at origination, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. acts as mortgagee, solely as nominee for the originator of that mortgage loan and its successors and assigns. S-41——————————————————————————–
    The custodian on behalf of the trustee will perform a limited review of the mortgage loan documents on or prior to the closing date or in the case of any document permitted to be delivered after the closing date, promptly after the custodian’s receipt of such documents and will hold such documents in trust for the benefit of the holders of the certificates. In addition, the seller will make representations and warranties in the pooling and servicing agreement as of the cut-off date in respect of the mortgage loans. The depositor will file the pooling and servicing agreement containing such representations and warranties with the Securities and Exchange Commission in a report on Form 8-K following the closing date. After the closing date, if any document is found to be missing or defective in any material respect, or if a representation or warranty with respect to any mortgage loan is breached and such breach materially and adversely affects the interests of the holders of the certificates in such mortgage loan, the custodian, on behalf of the trustee, is required to notify the seller in writing. If the seller cannot or does not cure such omission,defect or breach within 90 days of its receipt of notice from the custodian, theseller is required to repurchase the related mortgage loan from the trust fund at a price equal to 100% of the stated principal balance thereof as of the date of repurchase plus accrued and unpaid interest thereon at the mortgage rate to the first day of the month following the month of repurchase. In addition, if the obligation to repurchase the related mortgage loan results from a breach of the seller’s representations regarding predatory lending, the seller will be obligated to pay any resulting costs and damages incurred by the trust. Rather than repurchase the mortgage loan as provided above, the seller may remove such mortgage loan from the trust fund and substitute in its place another mortgage loan of like characteristics; however, such substitution is only permitted within two years after the closing date. With respect to any repurchase or substitution of a mortgage loan that is not in default or as to which a default is not imminent, the trustee must have received a satisfactory opinion of counsel that such repurchase or substitution will not cause the trust fund to lose the status of its REMIC.
    I’m not a MOM loan the loan transferred off of MERS, Mers no longer tracked the assignments and let’s not forget I HAVE IN MY POSSESSION THE ORIGINAL NOTE STAMPED FULLY PAID AND SATISFIED NEGOTIATED TO ME FROM ABC. The note is date stamped Month 2002 and has been in my possession since 2004 along with a letter from them stating the loan is fully paid and satisfied address to me which is the declaritory letter. Come on let’s put these people where they belong…. Federal prison.

  15. How can you have defrauded investors without defrauded borrowers?? Long ago contacted Congress regarded hedge funds and subprime mortgages. Pockets are deep.

  16. Dan Edstrom, thanks for putting that up. Did you notice WFB? Over 29% of this garbage is Wells Fargo. I’m telling you guys, the next investor class case you will read about will involve Wells Fargo as the named defendant. This is the tip of the iceberg. Remember when you were telling your friends about your mortgage and the fraud and the investors and the appraisals and…and…. and they looked at you like you had three heads? Next time you see them they will treat you like Nostradamus!

  17. BANKSTERS BEHIND BARS! one by one…..
    email Senator Carl Levin or fax him at Fax (202) 224-1388
    with your request for an entire investigation of ALL the FRAUD by ALL the BANKS.
    you can email him from here http://levin.senate.gov/contact/index.cfm
    then email your own senator and congressman. keep the momentum going.

  18. Goldman Sachs’ ‘Fraud’ Explained: How They Pulled Off The Alleged Scheme

    Goldman Sachs defrauded investors by failing to disclose a conflict of interest on mortgage investments it sold as the housing market went sour, according to the civil complaint filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission on Friday.

    Goldman allegedly failed to disclose to investors that it was betting against subprime mortgage investments it pushed on clients. Essentially, according to the complaint, Goldman pushed a product designed to fail.

    How did Goldman do that? We broke down the case step-by-step. Check it out:

    In 2007 Goldman Sachs created what is known as a “synthetic collateralized debt obligation,” or CDO, called “ABACUS 2007-AC1,” which we’ll call Abacus. It was one of many.

    Goldman invited its clients to invest in Abacus, explaining in marketing materials that the $2 billion CDO was based on 90 bonds derived from subprime mortgage loans made over the previous 18 months.

    If people whose mortgages make up the bonds in Abacus keep up with their house payments, then folks who invest in Abacus — typically banks, insurance companies, and pension fund managers — will make money.

    The financial industry jargon for those investors’ position is that they are “long.” They’re optimistic that the underlying borrowers won’t default.

    Goldman told investors the securities in Abacus had been chosen by ACA Management LLC, a firm managing 22 CDOs with assets of $15.7 billion.

    The Securities and Exchange Commission says this is where Goldman lied. According to the SEC’s complaint, the underlying portfolio was put together by John Paulson, a hedge fund manager who hand-picked the worst possible assets in hopes that they would default. He rightly anticipated that the housing market would soon crash, and that people put into mortgages they couldn’t afford would default when they lost the ability to simply refinance based on rising home values.

    But Paulson wasn’t simply gambling. He analyzed the underlying criteria of recent mortgage-backed bonds before making his picks.

    “Paulson’s selection criteria [for Abacus] favored [residential mortgage-backed securities] that included a high percentage of adjustable rate mortgages, relatively low borrower FICO scores, and a high concentration of mortgages in states like Arizona, California, Florida and Nevada that had recently experienced high rates of home price appreciation,” the complaint says. “Paulson informed [Goldman Sachs] that it wanted the reference portfolio for the contemplated transaction to include the RMBS it identified or bonds with similar characteristics.”

    John Paulson picked those lousy underlying assets for the Abacus CDO so that he could bet against them by purchasing “credit default swaps” — insurance policies that pay out if borrowers default.

    Paulson’s position is called “short.” He set up a CDO that would be perfect to short (short is both a noun and a verb).

    Goldman Sachs also shorted the CDO, according to the SEC.

    “[Goldman Sachs] arranged a transaction at Paulson’s request in which Paulson heavily influenced the selection of the portfolio to suit its economic interests,” the SEC’s complaint says, “but failed to disclose to investors, as part of the description of the portfolio selection process contained in the marketing materials used to promote the transaction, Paulson’s role in the portfolio selection process or its adverse economic interests.”

    Fabrice Tourre, the Goldman executive who helped set up Abacus, emailed a friend in January 2007:

    “More and more leverage in the system, The whole building is about to collapse anytime now…Only potential survivor, the fabulous Fab…standing in the middle of all these complex, highly leveraged, exotic trades he created without necessarily understanding all of the implications of those monstruosities!!!”

    Hedge fund manager John Paulson paid Goldman Sachs $15 million in April 2007 to set up and market the Abacus CDO, according to the SEC.

    Within a year, 99 percent of the underlying assets in Abacus had been downgraded by ratings agencies, costing investors $1 billion and earning Paulson $1 billion.

    How does this affect the rest of us? Per the New York Times, the “creation and sale of synthetic C.D.O.’s helped make the financial crisis worse than it might otherwise have been, effectively multiplying losses by providing more securities to bet against.”

    “When you buy protection against an event that you have a hand in causing,” said a structured finance expert, “you are buying fire insurance on someone else’s house and then committing arson.”

    Goldman denies the allegations: “The SEC’s charges are completely unfounded in law and fact and we will vigorously contest them and defend the firm and its reputation.”

    As HuffPost’s Shahien Nasiripour points out, the Goldman Scandal could be just the beginning. Phil Angelides, the chairman of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, said the allegations are central to the “very trustworthiness of the marketplace.”

    Janet Tavakoli, a derivatives expert (and HuffPost blogger) told Nasiripour that the scandal is “related to activity of aiding and abetting fraudulent mortgage lending, creating phony securitizations and mis-selling them. Massive damage came from the massive risk of massively leveraging securities that could only go down in value, because [banks] created those bad securities. It was malicious mischief.”

    Steven K. Kop
    Attorney at Law
    bluejaylaw@gmail.com

  19. I saw this earlier, so what took them so long to figure this one out. I can’t imagine they are alone on this one. There will be one

    more lie covering up yeat another fraud, as we figure them out.

    What does the Govt think these companies were going to do? Popular Inc My ground zero mortgage company. They used it for

    commissions. they seem to forget there were families and individuals to say the

    I have only heard a few news pieces and have read very little.But in what I have seen there is a Glaringly obvious missing peice of

    the story. Come on, they are saying they were causing them tio fail and “isn’t this illegal,? one anchor said to the other, ah the

    answer often to that question is , well not when you se it on a homeowner. This has been many of our complaint to begin with.

    Last week I started calling all of the Govt Agencies again, like I did in 2007, I thought I might have a more interested response. I

    haven’t called the FBI yet but the FTC OCC etc Back then, no one could help, The FBI could not help either, but they encouraged

    me a lot, way back when.

    I don’t understand why so many people react as they should, alarmed by this GS behaviour, but often the attitide is… well the

    mortgagee should have known better, The many double standards.

    They put my and yours and so many mortgages in place in this muddy pool unsafe RISK RISK RISK, or is it, they knew the pool

    would fail and your house with it. Just think, and I can only speak for myself but if I made the overly inflated monthly payment and

    money was no object and I had never realized the whole thing was a travesty, the damage still would be done. The Pool was meant

    to fail. I have known that, and the party trying to foreclose on me, a former, now present??? Subsidiary of my Mortgage company

    with MERS foreclosing and it was sold again, no one seemed to know this at Equity One, the foreclosing party did not seem to

    know who owned it, now Popular says, and they certify pfheeh… their statement, I guess that means they are telling the trugh Huh,

    what a releiv..
    It’s crazy to think that despite the fraud and the forged signatures and the fabribaced application, and on and on, well also I just

    confirmed my question on the surface I have,had, a conventional fixed 30 mortgage, and I knew it was not but it looked like an ARM

    loan. It is a variable loan. Set to go up in 2008. However I rescinded.

    But let me ask anyone who might be interested, I am concerned about something, ok I am assuming that so many of the banks

    involved in this have and maybe continue to do so. Popular Inc is my Mortgage co I know several other banks involved, who

    knows if they really are involved or it is bait for me from them, just to go down the wrong path for a while.

    We have this huge packet of funny money going to Fanny Mae, and what’s his face, and their daughter, all that money, what do

    you think they are preparing for? One by one , my theory, the banks will drop like flies, then fanny freddie and the kid, the child

    company I can’t think of the name. They will come to the rescue..

    I just have to say it one more time, the news castor said, “the Government has discovered that Goldman Sachs is defrauding the

    investers of SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LOANS!!!!”

    Yeah we know, what about us, over here the little guys, but there are so many of us. I am not saying I want a bail out, I do not. I

    just want the LAW to word for me and my pool mates the way it does for the banks if the Govt? If they choose to pursue this

    legally, what do we look like chopped liver? They lied to the investor, they lied to the homeowner. But how is it that the party

    invests the money and did one individual of the many.

    Neil is always a step or two ahead of those G Men.
    Thanx for that Neil.

    Juli

  20. Tony,
    I am just reporting relevant information that everyone should be aware of. I see this as another avenue to send in your crminal complaint and/or any other notice that you would send to the FTC, the SEC, the OTS, the FDIC, etc. Will it mean anything? Who knows. Even if they do take something seriously, what power will they have?

    Dan Edstrom
    dmedstrom@hotmail.com

  21. Sorry dan no disrepect intended , bullshit… it is another way to divert public attention. Just as the loan modification was a way to reestablish a loan. The paper trail… Loan Mod sets everything back into play…
    new loan papers, reestablishes note, mortgage etc

  22. Department of Justice
    Office of Public Affairs

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEFriday, April 16, 2010
    Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force Launches StopFraud.gov

    President Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force today announced the launch of StopFraud.gov. StopFraud.gov is a one-stop shop for the American people to learn how to protect themselves from fraud and to report it wherever – and however – it occurs. It will also serve as a hub of information about the task force’s work.

    President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general, and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources.

    “The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force is the broadest coalition of law enforcement, investigatory and regulatory agencies ever assembled to combat fraud, but one of our best partners in the fight is a vigilant, informed public,” said Robb Adkins, Executive Director of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. “Throughout government there are resources to help hardworking, honest Americans protect themselves from fraud and report fraud, and StopFraud.gov will connect the public with those valuable tools.”

    StopFraud.gov combines resources from a wide range of federal agencies on ways consumers can protect themselves from fraud and report fraudulent activity. It also features access to the latest announcements, press releases, speeches and information regarding the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.

    The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes.

    Dan Edstrom
    dmedstrom@hotmail.com

  23. Teri,
    Thats right. And what website does Bank of America have that lists all of the “deals” in which they are a Trustee?

    Dan Edstrom
    dmedstrom@hotmail.com

  24. And the beat goes on ….

    Goldman rallies for Obama in Wall Street “reform”

    http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columns/Goldman-rallies-for-Obama-in-Wall-Street-_reform_-90957879.html

  25. Bank of America absorbed LaSalle.

  26. This CDO deal is a private deal and you would need to get permission to see the data on this deal. LaSalle is the Trustee, but who now owns LaSalle? What website lists the deals for the new owner of LaSalle?

    Dan Edstrom
    dmedstrom@hotmail.com

  27. Teri,
    These are “preliminary” listings of the holdings and may or may not actually be in the deal. My understanding is that they “probably” are, but you would need the other documents to make that determination. Also, I don’t fully understand how this works, but my guess is that this CDO purchased securities from each of the listed “deals”. This means (to me) that if your loan is in one of those “deals” (FFML2006 FF14 for instance), your loan would still be in the original “deal”. This CDO is effectively an investor in your deal (they purchased certificates issued from each of the trusts listed in the final “Reference Portfolio”.

    Alina,
    These are the HEAT’s that are listed (they are further down in the document). You would have to look them up to determine that, but you may already know from the deal name (i.e. HEAT 2006-3, etc).

    HEAT 2006-3 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 437084UZ7 BBB+ Baa2 BBB+ 3.5 3/30/2006 7/25/2036 SPS

    HEAT 2006-5 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 437096AQ3 BBB+ Baa2 BBB+ 3.8 6/25/2006 10/25/2036 WFB

    HEAT 2006-6 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 437097AP3 A- Baa2 A- 4.0 8/1/2006 11/25/2036 SPS

    HEAT 2006-7 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 43709NAP8 BBB+ Baa2 BBB+ 4.2 10/3/2006 1/25/2037 SPS

    HEAT 2006-8 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 43709QAP1 BBB Baa2 BBB+ 4.4 12/1/2006 3/25/2037 SPS

    Dan Edstrom
    dmedstrom@hotmail.com

  28. Dan,

    Are the HEATs you listed Credit Suisse? thanks.

  29. Dan,
    Are those the holdings of Abacus 2007 that you posted? I think my loan is( or was) FFML2006 FF14. I found the exact specifics with no loan # on SEC this morning…after weeks of mind numbing SEC research.
    Does this mean anything? If our loan may be in there? I am currently waiting to be foreclosed on so I can defend myself and counter claim. Still looking for the right Attorney…

  30. The charts in the GS document provide some information on what made up the offering.

    http://documents.nytimes.com/goldman-mortgage-document

  31. I am having difficulty understanding the second YSP theory. Can someone please explain how the homeowner is entitled to a cut from secondary market gains on the sale of securities? From what I understand this case is about GS’s failure to disclose material information to investors, not homeowners. What am I missing here?

  32. Some Info from the ABACUS 2007-AC1 FlipBook dated 2/26/2007 (found on scribd)

    Issuer: ABACUS 2007-AC1, Ltd [what a surprise, incorporated in the Cayman Islands]

    Co-Issuer: ABACUS 2007-AC1, Inc. [a Delaware Corp]

    Portfolio Selection Agent: ACA Management, L.L.C.
    – ACA – Senior Management Team:

    Name and Title with Experience
    Alan Roseman
    Chief Executive Officer
    • Ambac, Capital Re, ACE
    • 25 Years of Industry Experience

    Edward Gilpin
    Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer
    • MBIA, Prudential
    • 22 Years of Industry Experience

    James Rothman
    Senior Managing Director & Head of Structured Credit
    • GE Capital, Deutsche Bank, Paine Webber
    • 13 Years of Industry Experience

    Peter Hill
    Executive Vice President & Head of Public Finance
    • JPMorgan
    • 20 Years of Industry Experience

    Joseph Pimbley
    Executive Vice President & Head of Institutional Risk Management
    • Sumitomo Mitsui, FGIC, Moody’s, Citigroup
    • 13 Years of Industry Experience

    Laura Schwartz
    Senior Managing Director & Head of CDO Asset Management
    • Merrill Lynch, New York Life
    • 22 Years of Industry Experience

    Initial Purchaser: Goldman, Sachs & Co.

    Protection Buyer: Goldman Sachs Capital Markets, L.P., an affiliate of the Purchaser

    Trustee/Issuing & Paying Agent: LaSalle Bank NA (Trustee for the Class A through Class [C] Notes; Issuing & Paying Agent for the Class [D] Notes)

    Issuance Shelves:

    FFML – 10%
    MSAC – 8.9%
    LBMLT – 7.8%
    SVHE – 6.7%
    HEAT – 6.7%
    CMLTI – 6.7%
    CARR – 6.7%
    SASC – 3.3%
    SABR – 3.3%
    NHELI – 3.3%
    MLMI – 3.3%
    MABS – 3.3%
    JPMAC – 3.3%
    ABSHE – 3.3%
    OOMLT – 2.2%
    FMIC – 2.2%
    FHLT – 2.2%
    ACE – 2.2%
    ABFC – 2.2%
    Other -12.2%

    Servicer Diversification:

    WFB – 28.9%
    OOMC – 13.3%
    SPS – 7.8%
    WMB – 6.7%
    CWHL – 5.6%
    AURA – 4.4%
    ALS – 4.4%
    WCC -3.3%
    JPM – 3.3%
    HSC – 3.3%
    NCMC – 2.2%
    FREM – 2.2%
    AQMC – 2.2%
    Other – 12.2%

    Initial Reference Portfolio (As of Febrary 26, 2007, Goldman Sachs neither represents nor provides any assurances that the actual Reference Portfolio on the Closing Date or any future date will have the same characteristics as represented here. See the final Offering Circular for the Initial Reference Portfolio):

    Security, Type, Notional Amt, CUSIP, Fitch, Moody’s, S&P, Base WAL (yrs), Dated Date, Legal Final, Servicer

    ABFC 2006-OPT1 M8 Subprime 22,222,222 00075QAM4 BBB Baa2 BBB 3.9 8/10/2006 9/25/2036 OOMC
    ABFC 2006-OPT2 M8 Subprime 22,222,222 00075XAP2 BBB Baa2 BBB 4.1 10/12/2006 10/25/2036 OOMC
    ABSHE 2006-HE3 M7 Subprime 22,222,222 04541GXK3 BBB Baa2 BBB 3.8 4/17/2006 3/25/2036 OOMC
    ABSHE 2006-HE4 M7 Subprime 22,222,222 04544GAP4 BBB Baa2 BBB 3.8 4/28/2006 5/25/2036 SPS
    ACE 2006-FM2 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 00442CAN9 Baa2 BBB 4.5 10/30/2006 8/25/2036 WFB
    ACE 2006-OP2 M9 Subprime 22,222,222 00441YAP7 Baa2 BBB- 4.3 10/30/2006 8/25/2036 WFB
    ARSI 2006-W1 M8 Subprime 22,222,222 040104RQ6 BBB+ Baa2 BBB+ 3.8 2/7/2006 3/25/2036 AQMC
    CARR 2006-FRE1 M9 Subprime 22,222,222 144538AN5 BBB+ Baa2 A 3.8 6/28/2006 7/25/2036 FREM
    CARR 2006-FRE2 M8 Subprime 22,222,222 14454AAN9 Baa2 BBB+ 4.2 10/18/2006 10/25/2036 FREM
    CARR 2006-NC1 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 144531FF2 BBB Baa2 BBB+ 3.6 2/8/2006 1/25/2036 NCMC
    CARR 2006-NC2 M8 Subprime 22,222,222 14453FAM1 BBB Baa2 BBB 3.8 6/21/2006 6/25/2036 CARR
    CARR 2006-NC3 M9 Subprime 22,222,222 144528AN6 BBB- Baa2 BBB- 4.0 8/10/2006 8/25/2036 NCMC
    CARR 2006-OPT1 M8 Subprime 22,222,222 144531FV7 BBB+ Baa2 A- 3.6 3/14/2006 2/25/2036 OOMC
    CMLTI 2006-AMC1 M8 Subprime 22,222,222 17309PAL0 Baa2 BBB 4.1 9/28/2006 9/25/2036 AQMC
    CMLTI 2006-NC1 M8 Subprime 22,222,222 172983AN8 Baa2 BBB 3.8 6/29/2006 8/25/2036 WFB
    CMLTI 2006-WFH2 M9 Subprime 22,222,222 17309MAN3 Baa2 BBB- 4.0 8/30/2006 8/25/2036 WFB
    CMLTI 2006-WMC1 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 17307G2F4 A- Baa2 BBB+ 3.7 1/31/2006 12/25/2035 WFB
    CMLTI 2007-WFH1 M9 Subprime 22,222,222 17311CAM3 Baa2 BBB- 4.5 2/9/2007 1/25/2037 WFB
    CWL 2006-24 M8 Subprime 22,222,222 23243HAN1 Baa2 BBB 4.9 12/29/2006 5/25/2037 CHLS
    FFML 2006-FF11 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 32028PAP0 BBB Baa2 BBB 3.9 9/6/2006 8/25/2036 WFB
    FFML 2006-FF12 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 32027GAN6 BBB Baa2 BBB 4.2 8/25/2006 9/25/2036 ALS
    FFML 2006-FF14 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 32027LAP0 BBB Baa2 BBB 4.2 9/25/2006 10/25/2036 AURA
    FFML 2006-FF15 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 32028GAP0 BBB Baa2 BBB 4.3 10/25/2006 11/25/2036 AURA
    FFML 2006-FF16 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 320275AN0 Baa2 BBB+ 4.3 11/30/2006 12/25/2036 NCHL
    FFML 2006-FF17 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 32028KAP1 BBB Baa2 BBB 4.4 11/25/2006 12/25/2036 ALS
    FFML 2006-FF7 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 320277AP1 BBB Baa2 BBB 3.6 5/31/2006 5/25/2036 WFB
    FFML 2006-FF9 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 320276AP3 BBB+ Baa2 BBB+ 3.7 7/7/2006 6/25/2036 WFB
    FHLT 2006-A M7 Subprime 22,222,222 35729RAN6 BBB+ Baa2 BBB 3.9 5/10/2006 5/25/2036 WFB
    FHLT 2006-B M8 Midprime 22,222,222 35729QAN8 BBB+ Baa2 BBB 4.4 8/3/2006 8/25/2036 WFB
    FMIC 2006-2 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 31659EAM0 Baa2 BBB+ 4.1 7/6/2006 7/25/2036 WFB
    FMIC 2006-3 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 316599AN9 Baa2 BBB 4.4 10/27/2006 11/25/2036 WFB
    GSAMP 2006-FM2 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 36245DAN0 Baa2 BBB+ 4.0 9/29/2006 9/25/2036 WFB
    HEAT 2006-3 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 437084UZ7 BBB+ Baa2 BBB+ 3.5 3/30/2006 7/25/2036 SPS
    HEAT 2006-5 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 437096AQ3 BBB+ Baa2 BBB+ 3.8 6/25/2006 10/25/2036 WFB
    HEAT 2006-6 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 437097AP3 A- Baa2 A- 4.0 8/1/2006 11/25/2036 SPS
    HEAT 2006-7 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 43709NAP8 BBB+ Baa2 BBB+ 4.2 10/3/2006 1/25/2037 SPS
    HEAT 2006-8 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 43709QAP1 BBB Baa2 BBB+ 4.4 12/1/2006 3/25/2037 SPS
    IXIS 2006-HE3 B2 Midprime 22,222,222 46602UAM0 BBB Baa2 BBB 4.8 9/29/2006 1/25/2037 WFB
    JPMAC 2006-CW2 MV8 Midprime 22,222,222 46629BBA6 BBB Baa2 BBB 4.3 8/8/2006 8/25/2036 CWHL
    JPMAC 2006-FRE1 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 46626LFV7 BBB Baa2 BBB 3.6 1/27/2006 5/25/2035 JPM
    JPMAC 2006-WMC3 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 46629KAP4 BBB Baa2 BBB 4.3 9/14/2006 8/25/2036 JPM
    LBMLT 2006-11 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 542512AN8 Baa2 BBB 4.7 12/14/2006 12/25/2036 WMB
    LBMLT 2006-4 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 54251MAN4 Baa2 A- 3.9 5/9/2006 5/25/2036 WMB
    LBMLT 2006-6 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 54251RAN3 BBB+ Baa2 BBB+ 4.2 7/26/2006 7/25/2036 WMB
    LBMLT 2006-7 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 54251TAN9 BBB+ Baa2 A- 4.2 8/30/2006 8/25/2036 WMB
    LBMLT 2006-WL1 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 542514RD8 Baa2 BBB 3.1 2/8/2006 1/25/2036 LBMC
    MABS 2006-HE5 M9 Subprime 22,222,222 576455AN9 Baa2 BBB- 4.5 12/28/2006 11/25/2036 WFB
    MABS 2006-NC2 M9 Subprime 22,222,222 55275BAP2 BBB Baa2 BBB- 4.2 9/28/2006 8/25/2036 WFB
    MABS 2006-WMC4 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 57645MAP7 Baa2 BBB+ 4.6 11/30/2006 10/25/2036 WFB
    MLMI 2006-WMC1 B2A Midprime 22,222,222 59020U4H5 Baa2 BBB+ 3.6 2/14/2006 1/25/2037 WCC
    MSAC 2006-HE7 B2 Subprime 22,222,222 61750MAP0 Baa2 BBB 4.9 10/31/2006 9/25/2036 CWHL
    MSAC 2006-HE8 B2 Midprime 22,222,222 61750SAP7 Baa2 BBB 5.1 11/29/2006 10/25/2036 WFB
    MSAC 2006-NC4 B2 Subprime 22,222,222 61748LAN2 BBB Baa2 BBB 4.5 6/23/2006 6/25/2036 WFB
    MSAC 2006-NC5 B3 Midprime 22,222,222 61749BAQ6 Baa2 BBB- 5.3 11/28/2006 10/25/2036 CWHL
    MSAC 2006-WMC1 B2 Midprime 22,222,222 61744CXV3 BBB+ Baa2 A- 4.2 1/26/2006 12/25/2035 JPM
    MSAC 2006-WMC2 B2 Midprime 22,222,222 61749KAP8 BBB Baa2 BBB 4.7 6/28/2006 7/25/2036 WFB
    MSAC 2007-NC1 B2 Subprime 22,222,222 617505AN2 Baa2 BBB 5.3 1/26/2007 11/25/2036 CWHL
    MSC 2006-HE2 B2 Midprime 22,222,222 617451FD6 BBB Baa2 BBB+ 4.5 4/28/2006 3/25/2036 WFB
    MSIX 2006-2 B2 Midprime 22,222,222 617463AM6 Baa2 BBB 5.0 11/28/2006 11/25/2036 SAX
    NHEL 2006-5 M8 Subprime 22,222,222 66988YAN2 Baa2 BBB+ 4.0 9/28/2006 11/25/2036 NOVA
    NHELI 2006-FM1 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 65536HCF3 Baa2 BBB+ 3.3 1/30/2006 11/25/2035 WFB
    NHELI 2006-FM2 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 65537FAN1 BBB+ Baa2 BBB+ 4.1 10/31/2006 7/25/2036 WFB
    NHELI 2006-HE3 M8 Subprime 22,222,222 65536QAN8 BBB+ Baa2 BBB+ 4.0 8/31/2006 7/25/2036 WFB
    OOMLT 2007-1 M8 Subprime 22,222,222 68400DAP9 Baa2 BBB 4.3 1/24/2007 1/25/2037 OOMC
    SABR 2006-FR1 B2 Midprime 22,222,222 81375WJY3 BBB+ Baa2 A- 4.6 2/23/2006 11/25/2035 HSC
    SABR 2006-FR3 B2 Subprime 22,222,222 813765AH7 BBB+ Baa2 BBB 5.0 8/3/2006 5/25/2036 HSC
    SABR 2006-HE2 B2 Subprime 22,222,222 81377AAM4 BBB+ Baa2 BBB 4.1 9/28/2006 7/25/2036 HSC
    SAIL 2006-4 M7 Subprime 22,222,222 86360WAM4 BBB Baa2 BBB 4.1 6/25/2006 7/25/2036 ALS
    SASC 2006-EQ1A M8 Subprime 22,222,222 86360RAN3 Baa2 BBB 5.2 7/17/2006 7/25/2036 AURA
    SASC 2006-OPT1 M7 Subprime 22,222,222 86359UAN9 BBB Baa2 BBB 3.7 4/25/2006 4/25/2036 AURA
    SURF 2007-BC1 B2 Subprime 22,222,222 84752BAQ2 Baa2 BBB 4.9 1/24/2007 1/25/2038 WCC
    SVHE 2006-EQ2 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 83611XAM6 BBB Baa2 BBB 4.6 12/28/2006 1/25/2037 OLS
    SVHE 2006-OPT1 M7 Subprime 22,222,222 83611MMF2 BBB+ Baa2 BBB 3.6 3/10/2006 3/25/2036 OOMC
    SVHE 2006-OPT2 M7 Subprime 22,222,222 83611MMT2 Baa2 A- 3.6 4/7/2006 5/25/2036 OOMC
    SVHE 2006-OPT3 M7 Subprime 22,222,222 83611MPR3 Baa2 BBB 3.7 5/12/2006 6/25/2036 OOMC
    SVHE 2006-OPT5 M8 Subprime 22,222,222 83612CAN9 Baa2 BBB 4.2 6/19/2006 7/25/2036 OOMC
    ABSHE 2006-HE7 M9 Subprime 22,222,222 04544QAP2 BBB- Baa2 BBB- 4.4 11/30/2006 11/25/2036 SPS
    BSABS 2006-HE9 M9 Subprime 22,222,222 07389MAP2 Baa2 BBB- 4.4 11/30/2006 11/25/2036 EMC
    CMLTI 2007-AMC1 M8 Subprime 22,222,222 17311BAL7 Baa2 BBB 4.6 3/9/2007 12/25/2036 CWHL
    FFML 2007-FF1 B2 Midprime 22,222,222 32028TAN7 Baa2 BBB 4.8 1/26/2007 1/25/2038 HLS
    HASC 2006-HE2 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 44328BAP3 BBB+ Baa2 BBB+ 4.3 12/5/2006 12/25/2036 CMB
    HEAT 2007-1 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 43710LAN4 BBB Baa2 BBB+ 4.5 2/1/2007 5/25/2037 SPS
    LBMLT 2006-8 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 54251UAN6 Baa2 A- 4.4 9/21/2006 9/25/2036 WMB
    LBMLT 2006-9 M8 Midprime 22,222,222 54251WAN2 Baa2 BBB+ 4.4 10/12/2006 10/25/2036 WMB
    MLMI 2006-HE6 B3 Subprime 22,222,222 59023XAN6 Baa2 BBB- 4.6 12/28/2006 11/25/2037 WCC
    MLMI 2006-OPT1 B2 Subprime 22,222,222 59022VAN1 Baa2 BBB 3.9 9/26/2006 8/25/2037 OOMC
    MSAC 2007-HE1 B2 Subprime 22,222,222 617526AP3 Baa2 BBB 5.2 1/26/2007 11/25/2036 SM
    OOMLT 2006-3 M9 Subprime 22,222,222 68389BAM5 Baa2 BBB- 4.0 10/27/2006 2/25/2037 OOMC
    SASC 2006-WF3 M9 Subprime 22,222,222 86361EAP6 BBB- Baa2 BBB- 4.3 9/25/2006 9/25/2036 ALS
    SVHE 2006-OPT4 M7 Subprime 22,222,222 83611YAM4 Baa2 BBB+ 3.6 5/26/2006 6/25/2036 OOMC

    Dan Edstrom
    dmedstrom@hotmail.com

  33. Here is the copy of the complaint posted on CNBC.com…

    SEC’s Goldman Sachs Complaint

  34. Where can we find the info on what loans went into this scheme. Can’t find this on secinfo.

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