A SHORT COURSE IN SECURITIZED HOME LOANS

FROM ANONYMOUS

Assuming all was valid – which it was not – it was the originator that “underwrote” the loans – who then sold the loans to the Depositor – who sells certificates to “security underwriter. Note – a mortgage originator underwriter is not the same as a security underwriter. (emphasis supplied by editor)

All of this simply means that the security underwriter’s parent corporation purchased the whole loans for the purpose of securitization (removable of their receivables from balance sheet). Mortgage Loan Purchase agreements include a Repurchase Agreement with a laundry list of stipulations in which the originator – who sold the loans – must repurchase the loans. If you examine this laundry list – every loan originated – should have been repurchased – and, of course, the note was then “with recourse” – not “without recourse.”

Repurchases were a major trigger for the mortgage crisis meltdown – and what fundamentally shut down many of the now defunct originators – New Century, Ameriquest, Countrywide, Fremont, etc. etc. As the repurchase demands became fast and furious – the originatosr could not fulfill their obligations – and, therefore, went under.

Today, since the originators are largely gone, “investors” and Fannie/Freddie, and maybe the Federal Reserve Bank of NY – who holds Maiden Lane for government, are demanding repurchase of non-compliant loans from the Depositors – who purchased the loans from the originators – and organized the Trusts that held the loans.

In effect, the Depositors owned the Trust – which was just a vehicle for pass-through of receivables to the loans. But, the whole loans were also converted to securities by the Trust organization. And, securities just meant the pass-through of the mortgage loan receivables was asset-backed – and therefore, (falsely) rated Triple A.. The certificates to Trusts were then sold to security underwriters – to market the tranches – or keep them for themselves for CDOs and other derivatives.

In most securitizations, the Depositor – and the security underwriter – were subsidiaries of the same Wall Street Bank – the ultimate party who actually purchased the loans from originators – and the only party who reported financial statements and balance sheets. Also, the only party to remove receivables from on- to off balance sheets – and the only party to now take those off-balance sheets back onto their balance sheets.

Occasionally, there were securitizations in which Depositor was not a a subsidiary of the Wall Street bank – and appeared to be a subsidiary of the originator. These securitizations were simply fronts – for actual party who purchased the loans – since an originator could not sell loans to “itself.” It is possible that these securitizations were directly related to Fannie/Freddie – but many of the other securitizations were also “Deals” or “Wraps” between Wall Street and Fannie/Freddie..

Now, many of the repurchases were executed – returned to originator – but this will NEVER be disclosed. In this case, the originator would sell the repurchased loans to hedge funds/scratch and dent buyers/distressed debt buyers who would then synthetically market the repurchases as “securities” (not really securities) to investors. But, the foreclosure mills will still claim the loan remained in the original trust – which is false..

If loans now in default were not repurchases – then they have likely been removed and sold by now anyway. – unless they are not salable – in which case they still remain with Wall Street Bank – or Fannie/Freddie.

For those entities/investors that are now demanding repurchases – this demand is, in effect, a demand for compensation related to the “bad” loans that were sold by originators – to depositors – to security underwriters – with receivables passed-through to security investors (never the creditor according to TILA Amendment and Fed Res Opinion (now rule).. It is the security underwriters parent that these entities/investors are now going after. That is, as we all should know by now – Wall Street – the big banks that owned the Depositors, the security underwriters, and who orchestrated the whole fiasco.

I am just amazed that these repurchase demands are occurring – and years later – when repurchases are not even broached in courts of law for foreclosures (nor is the laundry list for repurchase broached). Not one case I have seen deals with this issue. But is huge – and, as I state above – a big cause of the meltdown – and a big issue today.. Investors are way ahead of us in court – and, these investors are only demanding restitution for investments lost – they are not the party who benefit from foreclosure recovery.

The advantage “investors” have over us is BIG law firms on their side – because the law firms will make a hefty commission. No law firm reaps a big profit by single foreclosure defense.

It is all about money – always has been – always will be. We only have advantage – we are large in number. We have to use that advantage to our best ability.

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24 Responses

  1. I was just seeking this info for a while. After 6 hours of continuous Googleing, finally I got it in your website. I wonder what is the lack of Google strategy that don’t rank this kind of informative sites in top of the list. Normally the top web sites are full of garbage.

  2. loans, mortgage, credit card,

    Believe you are right – looked up wrong series –

    It is Lehman Brothers – who has their “goodies?”

    424B5 1 d410121.htm AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SECURITIES LLC
    Supplement dated December 16, 2005 to supplement dated October 24, 2005, to supplement dated April 22, 2005, to supplement dated March 31, 2005 to prospectus supplement dated December 17, 2004 (to prospectus dated December 17, 2004)

    $550,442,000
    (Approximate)

    American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4
    Issuer

    American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc.
    (formerly known as Columbia National, Incorporated)
    Master Servicer

    American Home Mortgage Securities LLC
    Depositor

    American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4,
    Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2004-4

    Lehman Brothers

  3. If I looked up correct trust, sure you know that Bears Stearns was lead security underwriter – that says a lot about this Trust. Maiden Lane now has much of BS’s goodies.

  4. FKA

    That is right – and SEC said it was Okay. Thank deregulation – passed through – OH – just about when the mortgage fraud starting escalating.

  5. Most of these Trusts file a form 15d. SEC rules state that if there are less than 300 investors that they do not have to file public updates anymore. This is useful when ripping off your investors…taking it all off the books and public record…

    There are still public records! Google search with the CUSIP # that is listed for the Trust. Everything you can find that will dispute what your Plaintiff says will be helpful. It is good to know the answer to the question before you ask it!

    I am not a lawyer…just a homeowner in foreclosure.

  6. I have recently discovered that GS filed a 15d( suspension of reporting to the SEC) a few months after it created the GSR Trust. The 15d form states only 15 holders. Can anybody please enlighten on what the significance of the filing and the number of holders is?

  7. Is there a federal law , TILA, or RESPA violation that pertains to a mortgage company selling an individual a piece of property that was suppose to be a land home combo but wasn’t due to the title to the home still being active at the time of the sale in which they( mortgage company lied about canceling it to the state) but two in half years later canceled under under our names which it should have never been filed under our name since the mobile home was classified as real property 4 years before our purchase. Is it legal and can I sue them for this/

    I wanted to know if anyone knew of a case in Alabama that pertained to a lender lying about canceling a title to a manufactured home that was purchased as a land home combo to the state but really didn’t . Instead waited two years later to cancel it.

  8. Mr. Garfield has a post, today, which is very important.

    He discusses how the loans remained with the originator – who were already paid, and how only receivables were passed through to security investors. However, courts do not seem to care. Reasoning by courts is that you owe the money – and too bad. The problem with this is that you have a right to know WHO you owe the money to, you also have a right to know how much the collection rights to debt was purchased for – as I believe this should affect government mandates for loan modification (no one should be making a huge profit on loan mods). Most of the originators are gone and the SPVs dissolved or torn apart. – “dismantled.”

    My question is why investors who are claiming fraud are being given attention in court – and the subject victims of the fraud do not get the same attention. There are numerous investor lawsuits ongoing. A very informative one is Plumber & Pipefitters v J.P. Morgan Acceptance.

    There is a new focus on investors, insurers, and Repurchase Agreements. If courts are going to claim “You owe the debt” and rely on faulty and fraudulent assignments/endorsements, we have to show – that none of the intermediaries in the securitization chain have a right to collection. And, that it is likely, the mortgage loan was, or is now, removed from the process. And, that the note is not negotiable because it was not unconditionally endorsed – which is required for negotiability. This challenges “Holder in Due Course.”

    There is case, not exactly on point – but discusses note negotiability and “conditions” render the note – not-negotiable:

    AMERITRUST COMPANY, N.A., a national banking association, Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellant, Cross Appellee, v. C.K. WHITE, Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellee, Cross Appellant.

    No. 94-8370

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

    73 F.3d 1553; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1597; 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1277; 75 A.L.R.5th 725; 9 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 818

    END

    from me – as discussed, the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreements contained numerous conditions for Repurchase (which is part of the purchase agreement), and investors and others are in process of examining loans to demand repurchase. You have to also remember that when the loan crisis hit , the banks immediate reaction was to activate repurchase demands to the originator. This was major cause for shut-down of the originators – they could not meet the demand. Question then is, was the loan in question ever repurchased, or subject to a repurchase – deeming it “conditional.”

    Bloomberg article regarding current repurchase investigation – which was likely already posted on this blog::

    Sept. 15 (Bloomberg) — The regulator overseeing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac said his agency’s review of subpoenaed records doesn’t mean it is “pursuing anybody” for selling bad loans to the U.S.-backed mortgage giants before the credit crisis.
    The Federal Housing Finance Agency’s review of documents sought by 64 subpoenas in July is simply looking for errors or omissions that could compel lenders to bear losses, Edward J. DeMarco, the regulator’s acting director, told a House Financial Services subcommittee at a Washington hearing today.
    “The losses are extraordinary and we owe it to the American taxpayer to find out where these losses are coming from,” said DeMarco, whose agency has overseen Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac since they seized in September 2008 amid a financial crisis that pushed them to the brink of collapse.
    Regulators are under pressure from lawmakers to stem losses for taxpayers and recoup money from banks that sold faulty loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac without hindering the housing market’s recovery. DeMarco and Michael Barr, the Treasury Department’s assistant secretary for financial institutions, were called to testify today about the progress they’ve made since the companies came under government control.
    Congress and the Obama administration are weighing the future of the two companies as part of an overhaul of the U.S. housing finance system. Fannie Mae, based in Washington, and Freddie Mac, based in McLean, Virginia, lost $166 billion on guarantees of single-family mortgages from the end of 2007 through the second quarter, according to the FHFA. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner has promised a comprehensive proposal by January.
    ‘Biggest Problem’
    “The biggest problem in the economy is that we have 3 or 4 million too many homes,” said Chris Kotowski, a banking analyst at Oppenheimer & Co. The solution “will take another two or three years to work,” he said.
    The clean-up effort includes seeking refunds from lenders who sold loans based on false or misleading information, and the two government-backed firms aren’t the only ones demanding buybacks. The Federal Reserve, private mortgage investors and mortgage insurers are combing through loan documents for faulty appraisals, inflated borrower incomes and missing documentation that would support a refund request.
    As of the end of the second quarter 2010, Fannie Mae had $4.7 billion in outstanding repurchase requests, and Freddie Mac had $6.4 billion in outstanding repurchase requests. DeMarco said that outstanding repurchase requests continue to be “of concern.”
    Misrepresentations
    The FHFA in July issued 64 subpoenas to firms that sold mortgage-backed securities to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, trying to determine whether misrepresentations or omissions might require issuers to repurchase the loans. Lawsuits tied to faulty mortgages were filed against lenders or underwriters by bond insurers such as MBIA Inc. and by at least three Federal Home Loan Banks, according to analysts.
    Lenders are resisting some buyback demands, with Bank of America Corp., the biggest U.S. lender and largest servicer of Fannie Mae’s loans, calling negotiations a battle that it’s fighting “loan-by-loan.” Among those lodging claims, Chief Executive Officer Dominic Frederico at Assured Guaranty Ltd. said last month that the talks are “like Chinese water torture. They’re very painful, have taken a long time.”
    Assured, based in Hamilton, Bermuda, has asked federal and state banking and insurance regulators to intervene in the disputes, Frederico told analysts during a conference call.
    Barney Frank
    Representative Barney Frank, the Massachusetts Democrat who leads the Financial Services Committee, has urged the Obama administration to ensure FHFA uses its full legal authority to recover money from banks. Frank endorsed a letter signed by lawmakers including Paul Kanjorski, the Pennsylvania Democrat who led today’s subcommittee hearing.
    Bankers have faced more queries from analysts during this month’s round of investor presentations, and some companies have begun breaking out data. Repurchase demands are running at about $1 billion a quarter at JPMorgan Chase & Co., Chief Executive Jamie Dimon, 54, said yesterday at a Barclays Capital investor conference in New York.
    “It’s expensive,” said Dimon, whose New York-based bank ranks second by assets after Bank of America. “I think that will continue the rest of this year, next year and maybe a little bit longer.”
    Repurchases have cost the four biggest U.S. lenders $9.8 billion, according to Credit Suisse Group AG. The total could exceed $179 billion for 11 of the largest lenders, according to Chris Gamaitoni, an ex-senior financial analyst at Fannie Mae who now works at Compass Point Research and Trading LLC, a Washington-based investment bank.
    The Association of Financial Guaranty Insurers, a trade group for companies that provide private insurance for defaulted mortgages, said Bank of America may owe its members $10 billion to $20 billion alone for breaches of representations and warranties, as the buyback guarantees are called.
    Limited Damage
    The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which wouldn’t say how much it was seeking in buybacks, has $69.1 billion in mortgage and other assets it took on when it helped rescue American International Group Inc. and Bear Stearns Cos. in 2008.
    Bank of America has paid $3.86 billion related to buybacks since the third quarter of 2008, according to an investor presentation in New York yesterday. The Charlotte, North Carolina-based company still faces $11 billion in unresolved requests and insurers have sought files on $9.8 billion more, according to regulatory filings.
    The bank has reserves of $3.9 billion to cover mortgage buybacks and has called the losses manageable, according to yesterday’s presentation by CEO Brian T. Moynihan, 50.
    Requests Denied
    Bankers say that not all requests become claims, and not all claims translate into actual buybacks. About half the requests don’t survive scrutiny, according to Credit Suisse, and as for valid claims, losses are typically less than the stated amount of the loans. That’s because loans are typically backed by collateral and covered by reserves, according to bankers. Loss estimates from analysts range from 35 percent to 60 percent.
    Kotowski at Oppenheimer estimates $7.4 billion of losses over the next year for six of the biggest U.S. banks, including Bank of America and New York-based Citigroup Inc. and JPMorgan. That’s one of the lower forecasts among Wall Street analysts.
    “Just because people are bringing suits doesn’t mean they have merit, doesn’t mean they’re going to get everything they want,” Kotowski said.
    –With assistance from Jody Shenn in Washington, Michael Moore in New York, David Mildenberg in Charlotte. Editors: Rick Green, David Scheer.

  9. What is PACER?

  10. ANONYMOUS,

    I want to Thank You so much for this info. If I were to make an argument in my court case between Originator and Lender, It almost appears that any Lender is a “Ghost”!

  11. ANONYMOUS – Can u provide any case cites or plaintiff-defendants in these investor suits? I’d like to look up their pleadings on PACER.

  12. ANONYMOUS

    Thanks for the post. I always enjoy reading your input. If we have no power then we redefine power. This is why I state and urge to all “Be a Patriot and stop your Mortgage Payment” Number we are powerful Billions are better.. I suggest a National STOP MORTGAGE PAYMENT MONTH. Better yet 90 DAYS. It is that simple. This include every US HOME OWNER.

    Be a Patriot Stop Your Mortgage payment It is the only way to shut down these usurious bastards and wake up the idiots on Capital Hill.

  13. As you know I have little to contribute .But learned alot.
    Many thank to all. What about Trust / trustee substitution ? or substituting beneficial interest once given to MERS ?
    The shell game continues on this end.

  14. Sunday 19 September 2010

    David:

    To your idealized world of “ifs”…If a frog had wings, it would fly. “Ifs” are a silly premise for hindisght “solutions,” even trying to move them forward.

    What has happened over the last several years, re foreclosures, happened before in the 1930s, only the farmlands were foreclosed upon. These events, those from the 1930s and those current, are symptoms of the corporate federal govenment that favors those entities that produce money on the backs of the populace and keeps the beast alive.

    There is no disconnect between these two major events, yet people fail to recognize or address it.

    What comes to mind is the movie, “While You Were Sleeping.” The de facto corporate federal government has been practicing deceit since Congress was disbanded, sine die, when the South walked out and left the Republic with no lawful quorum.
    Lincoln placed the country under martial law and the rule by Executive Order, by-passing Congress and the House of Representatives, under which this country has existed ever since. This country is under martial law, but most are totally in the dark.

    What is the point?

    The Republic was gutted and replaced by a democracy, and people are unaware of being unaware that they are unaware. And so, the portion of deceit perpetrated in the area of forelcosure is something many can feel and relate to, but it is only a small part of the elephant.

    The system is rotten and has been for well over 150 years. What makes this fraud any different? None, really, except that when people realize they are being used and taken advantage of, they deal with symptoms that are well advanced and beyond their comprehension.

    “I am losing my house!!!”

    Not a peep about all the rights they have lost as they were turned onto 14th amendment citizens. It does not affect their daily lives…seemingly.

    If a frog had wings it would fly. If life were fair none of this would have happened. If people paid attention to what has been going on for the past 150 years….if, only if.

    Then there is reality.

  15. There is no idealized world.

  16. David C Breidenbach,

    Give me your email.

  17. In my idealized world, if a claimant violated the statute of frauds, it would be a crime, not a mere defense. And lawyers could never bind clients to a settlement that the client agreed to in writing–all of it.

    typo–that the client HAD NOT agreed to in writing–all of it !-that is no claimant should be able to that he “had a deal” with the defendant’s atty–that should bind the defendant.

  18. Simon in Fla.
    You Fla folks appear to be among the most knowledgable and aggressive in the country. This derives at least in part because you were systematically bilked by originators and securitizers who pumped the prices up on all homes in the state. Evry Fla resident that remained so —-that is did not cash out and run–is sitting with purchase cost in excess of unpumped value.

    As I look at the many stories of abuse and, as Anonomous states, follow the money, and investigate closely the drivers for the conduct, I continue to search for aspects of the entire process that lead to the balloon and subsequent abuses. There are several items that I have noted that could be made better or worse by legislation or regulation. my fear is that the predatory banks will take their battle to the states to lock in advantages that they enjoy or want to extend. One clear example is free pursuit of deficiency judgments. Some like Speaker Pelosi’s California dont allow puruit on a residence deficiency as I understand the law. Thus if you lose your job in California, you are free to go anywhere in the country to pull your life together. Your deficiency will follow you only as a credit score. Federal bankruptcy courts will honor that state law. If your residence is in, say, Ohio for example and you attempt the same thing, you will be pursued to your grave for the same type deficiency. The bankruptcy rules were changed so that you could not escape the deficiency if you continue to have a half-way decent replacement job in your destination state.

    Thus, if you lose your job in rust belt Ohio, even if you are employable thereafter in California or Texas or Washington DC., you are forced to pay on the deficiency for 5 years even under bankruptcy. If you dont file, they grab your paycheck to force it. Then you are trapped –all disposable income into the banks maw. If you come from California you get a new chance at life. The banking industry drove the changes in bankruptcy law to take advantage of the laws in states that allow the deficiencies. Now one might ask
    : what might be the bank lobby’s target be in states? Extension of the deficiency rule-or relief from it? Rhetorical question.

    For those who speak in general terms about the philosophy of regulation: more? or less? I note the following; I have seen many rules ignored or broken–in fact there seems to be a pattern; break one, break them all !

    Thiose of us that may assert a need for more regulation in this particular area need to listen very carefully to their fellows that say ; 1st enforce what is on the books, before adding more political “feel good” unenforced rules. Rules without enforcement are of little practical benefit. What good is a rule that says if an ant is stepped upon by a elephant and injured by that elephant, the ant has a right to sue the elephant for some paltry defined amount set by regulations. It is tough for a crushed ant to raise the money to sue an elephant -if the ant even understands that it was just stepped on by an elephant.

    Thus springs the argument that there must be more regulation ——with real teeth. The govt has a role to play when elephants dance—to protect the ants.

    I have seen instances of conduct that contributed to the feeding frenzy;
    –unsolicited refi contacts
    –appraisals by entities affiliated with originators
    –“contracts” that do not benefit the borrower
    –closings where exotic loans are dumped on unsuspecting borrowers by the pound
    –misleading and contradictory terms in the “dump” closings
    –failure of securitizers to follow the most basic provisions in the trust documents
    –failure of the sponsors to file loan lists that would enable all stake-holders to know what is in and what is out
    –failure of the trustees to assure that the securitizations continue to file in the future
    –failure by SEC to even look at filings in respect of financial institutions, in contrast to attention focused on tech companies for example
    –power in the servicer to profit by controlling investments of the proceeds of foreclosure and retain all income while amounts are held in suspense or as float on collection accounts

    If entities are allowed to perform these actions with only a civil cause of action by a fractured group of largely impoverished homeowners–there is no real bar to misconduct. So I agree with all of you: too much regulation is adverse: mandated discosures of huge amounts of detail simply confuses people and lulls them into a false sense of security. Unenforced regulations also lead to a false sense of security–and as a practical matter actually give a green light to perps that nobody really cares. By the same token, we know the “regulation” if you can call it that, which occurred [or didnt ] for at least the last decade was inadequate–or I wouldnt have had such a long list above. And we wouldnt be locked in a global depression. So regulation that is understandable and enforced can be good–maybe necessary to hold monopolists in check. Today, we all enjoy the benefit of hindsight, except maybe Greenspan who says he still doesnt understand what happened or why.

    With the benefit of hindsight what are the failings that would have been prevented if rules were enforced?

    With the benefit of hindsight what new rules that we intend to be enforced would we suggest are necessary to prevent recurrence?

    I would start with a limit on discrimination in federal bankruptcy law as between citizens of different states, on the basis that it violates the Constitutional right to Freedom of Movement between states.

    I would add a fee on banks or on loan transactions to fund state/local defense programs that will operate in the courts when the state AGs cant or wont.

    I would add a rule that states if a lender cannot prove his right to the proceeds of foreclosure, at any time in the process, the state escheat laws go into effect, and the moneys from foreclosure go into trust in the possession of the state. The claimant must then sue the state to recover the money. Let the elephant fight somebody his own size.

    In my mythical world, there would be no right by a claimant on a consumer debt to request or impose a confidentiality clause or non-disparagement clause in any settlement agreement. These impair the 1st amendment in a way that harms the individual’s right to speak and the publics right to hear. These provisions are against public policy at multiple levels.

    In my idealized world, if a claimant violated the statute of frauds, it would be a crime, not a mere defense. And lawyers could never bind clients to a settlement that the client agreed to in writing–all of it.

  19. Q. Should both the notes and mortgages be filed with local county records. I”m in a foreclosure in FL and only the mortgage is filed with County Clerk. There is no record of a note. What does this mean?

  20. My fear in all of this, both here in Florida as well as nationally at the federal level, is centered on the legislative end of things. Eventually, the pretender lenders will have laws passed that will royally screw us over and benefit the pretender lenders.

    We saw it attempted last year in Florida with a bill to turn this state into a non-judicial state. That was beat back, but they will try again I am sure.

  21. Sunday 19 September 2010

    Good comments, David, and excellent questions. My question is a simple one, given that it derives from a simple mind.

    My mortgage was not securitized into a trust. This was August 2006. Accredited Home Lenders was the originator….a table-funding process. How do I go about finding out who was the actual lender?

    AHL went BK in 2009. In talking to the attorney handling the BK affairs for AHL, I learned that AHL sold the loan to USBank, Sep 06. The loan was repurchased by AHL in Feb 2007, for non-payment default. The loan was then supposedly sold to CITIGROUP in March 2007.

    I never paid a penny on the Note because AHL refused to acknowledge that they in fact made a loan to me, and until they would offer proof, I refused to pay. How could a non-performing loan be sold?

    In Dec 2009, SAXON claims to be servicer for Morgan Stanley Capital Holdings for my loan…not that any of this matters.
    What is laughable is that my property was allegedly sold at auction, this past February, and BK AHL was the “buyer.” Their forclosuremill representation withdrew their motion to confirm sale once they read my challenge and exposed the fact their plaintiff had filed BK a year earlier and had no activity related to the loan since August of 2007.

    My question remains, how do I get back to the SOURCE of the lender that provided the ability for AHL to “fund” the mortgage in what should be a simple table-funding procedure, sans any securitization mechanics?

    Anonymous, you are right that “we,” I am guessing you mean the individuals collectively facing foreclosure, are large in number, but fragmented, disorganized, and without the requisite skills, for the most part, to oppose Goliath.

    I keep maintaining that the way to defeat the opponent is once case at a time. That is how MERS is tumbling down. One case here, one case there…decisions that go against them and expose their lack of standing, and the one-case-here-one-case-there has snowballed into an avalanche against MERS.

    How did that happen? Using law against them. Something defendants have not been able to do in the past.

    That is the importance of this blog, and Matt Weidner’s, who is doing outstanding work in Florida and posting important cases, not only against MERS, but other lenders that are losing.

    These are the blueprints for individuals to use, and that is the clarion call to all who read these blogs. Take these successes and create your own defenses.
    Use the information being provided by Mr Gartman, Anonymous’ studied information on exposing the process used by trusts, servicers, et al, Weider’s cases and make your own court cases against these foes.

    If only 10% of people facing foreclosure would step up with defenses copied from other wins, the courts would be choking on the developing backlog…just 10%! The numbers do not have to be that great, but they need to be effective.

    My thanks to all who contribute here. I have learned quite a lot and have become an even more dangerous opponent in the courtroom, without an attorney, of course.

    Cheers, all…

  22. Hi David C Breidenbach,

    An absolute nightmare.

    If I looked up correct trust, sure you know that Bears Stearns was lead security underwriter – that says a lot about this Trust. Maiden Lane now has much of BS’s goodies.

    METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION

    Subject to the terms and conditions set forth in an underwriting agreement dated December 17, 2004, the Depositor has agreed to sell, and Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc. has agreed to purchase 80.00% and Lehman Brothers Inc.,
    Citigroup Global Markets Inc. and UBS Investment Bank have each agreed to purchase approximately 6.67% of each of the Class I-A, Class II-A, Class III-A, Class M-I, Class VI-A, Class VI-M-1, Class VI-M-2, Class VI-M-3, Class VI-B-1, Class VI-B-2 and Class VI-B-3 Notes.D

  23. In reference to Anonomous;
    “Occasionally, there were securitizations in which Depositor was not a a subsidiary of the Wall Street bank – and appeared to be a subsidiary of the originator. These securitizations were simply fronts – for actual party who purchased the loans – since an originator could not sell loans to “itself.” It is possible that these securitizations were directly related to Fannie/Freddie”

    One apparent example of this particular comment relates to a securitized trust supposedly sponsored by American Home Mortgage–now in bankruptcy, such that investors ostensibly have little to pursue. In one trust sponsored by the burn company, The trail was as follows: AHM Acceptance Inc, a wholly-owned sub of the AHM REIT group, “originated” home-owner loans of about $3 billion principal in 2004. Acceptance then supposedly transferred the homeowner notes, secured by mortgages, to its sister subsidiary, AHM Securities LLC. “Securities” then is represented to have “deposited” the notes and mortgages securing them to a purported trust American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4. The trust supposedly issued $3.5 billion in mortgage backed securities [MBS] described as “Notes”. These notes were returned to “Securities” in exchange for the conveyance of the homeowner notes/mortgages. Depositor “Securities” then allegedly “sold” the trust “Notes” to Lehman etc. who as underwriters that resold the notes to investors around the world. The series of steps would was a way for AHM to lend money to homeowners using short-term warehouse borrowings and paying off the warehouse lender with proceeds of sales of MBS to investors. The final speps in the series theoretically took the home-owner loans off the assets side of the AHM group and the proceeds of “sale” to investors of AHMIT 2004-4 IOUs off the liability side of the AHM group. The overall effect of the transactions was an apparent attempt by AHM to take the transactions off its balance sheet. However, as Anonomous rightly points out the entire series of transactions described in the securitization documents appears to have been a smoke-screen for off balance sheet activities by the BIG BANK that actually was “behind” all of this. In this particular case, that was Bank of New York. BNY was the named Indenture Trustee for AHMIT 2004-4. That means, its BNY that is the named plaintiff in a foreclosure action on behalf of the purported trust.
    AHM CEO Strauss signed the Sarbannes Oxley certification in the 10K EOY 2004 for that trust. In a curious twist Strauss stated that in making the Sarbannes oxley filing that he relied on representations by BNY. BNY was more than a passive Indenture Trustee. BNY employees signed and presumably filed the 8Ks. These are truly noteworthy. The Prospectus stated that several classes of the off-balance sheet investor notes [MBS] would add to $3.5 as noted above. The amounts of each class was set out in the 8Ks prepared by BNY, there is a column of these amounts in each of 11 filings. The last filing was a delisting of all MBS in the trust as being owned by a single investor? However, the columns of tranche note face amounts of the MBS simply do not add up to the amount inserted by BNY–roughly twice the amount of the numbers being added. The $3.5 seemingly grew to over $7 billion in the BNY-source filings. Strauss caveat in the 10K re reliance on BNY and the BNY filings which seem to mistate the amounts of the tranches, suggest that BNY was at all points involving securitization “in charge”. Further, the trust has no mortgage loan schedule on file with SEC and no list filed with the Delaware UCC although both actions were represented in the securitization documents. For you legal experts out there a question: If BNY was the person in control as Strauss and the 8Ks suggest, who was the real issuer? And if the Indenture Trustee never filed the key documents entrusting the purported trust with assets, does the trust own those assets? Does a disembodied trust lacking a corpus exist? If it was created for the purpose of concealing the interest of the true owner? or other misdeeds? Any caselaw?

    Another key element, the trust is stuffed with predatory loans -especially in the group I loans. 4-option ARMS with negative amortization and a teaser rate good until the 1st payment. This fact pattern seems to support all of Anonomous contentions and suggests that the bad loans should be put back to BNY –not a bankrupt AHM.

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