For assistance with presenting a case for wrongful foreclosure, please call 520-405-1688, customer service, who will put you in touch with an attorney in the states of Florida, Tennessee, Georgia, California, Ohio, and Nevada. (NOTE: Chapter 11 may be easier than you think).
Editor’s Comment and Practice Tips: There are two things you should know going into foreclosure defense. One is that the best decisions on the trial and appellate level came from cases where both sides were institutional in nature. So if the adversaries were both banks, or one was a managed fund, or perhaps a Homeowners or Condominium Association, the Court was a lot more receptive to the same arguments they routinely rejected from Borrowers. That alone suggests some strategies both for investors and homeowners (particularly those hard hit by the mortgage meltdown). The second is that an increasing number of courts are, in the words of one judge who WAS ruling routinely against borrowers, “getting tired of the sloppiness” with which the loan deals were originated, allegedly transferred and claimed as owned by one of a number of parties. They are entering more orders requiring proof of loss, proof of payment and proof that any financial transaction took place in which the forecloser was either the recipient (payee) or the payor of actual money that exchanged hands.
We have seen how the same homeowner with the same property has been assaulted by two completely different “holders”, neither of whom were creditors, each claiming to be producing the original note — and there it was in all its glory, two “original” notes both of which had been printed the previous day on a very good printer. We have seen how the appraisals went further and further off the reservation under pressure from the banks and how the applications were changed under pressure from the banks to close the deal regardless of outcome or viability of the loan.
Strategically I have been encouraging practicing attorneys to pay close attention to the dozens of lawsuits filed against the banks by institutional plaintiffs — pension funds that bought bogus mortgage bonds, government agencies whose findings might be incorporated as fact in your case (especially if the case settled), HOA’s and banks fighting over priority of liens. The facts alleged are fairly uniform — all leading to the conclusion that the loans were neither underwritten in conformity with industry standards (leading to fraud or breach of contract actions) nor supported by documentation that is enforceable (i.e., the mortgage lien was never perfected and the note was incorrectly fabricated and executed without consideration from the named payees or nominees.
The latest rumble over the lack of prosecution on this mortgage mess has produced the resignation of the guy at DOJ who was supposed to be prosecuting these cases. Maybe the change will come. But by this time int he Savings and Loan scandal of the 1980″s there were more than 800 people sitting behind bars with others on probation. The PBS piece “Untouchables” has kicked up a fore storm over the issue of criminal prosecution. Those cases too should be watched carefully and your wording in your pleading ought to be as close to their wording in their lawsuits especially where they have already survived the usual motion to dismiss.
Robert Schiller the economist who created the black letter basis for measuring economic data relating to the housing industry says we are far from done with the damages and debris left by the mortgage meltdown. And out of 105 economists who participated in an independent survey very few had anything good to say about housing or the economy — with the two inextricably entwined. Fixing housing is not merely about stopping foreclosures or increasing modifications. At the heart of the mortgage meltdown was fraud.
And fraud comes in two flavors — civil and criminal. Both require receivers and restitution if prosecuted properly. Investors and homeowners alike are entitled to receive as much restitution as possible that can be clawed back by properly appointed court receivers. Both were decided by appraisal fraud, by deceptive disclosures in which the actual lender was intentionally concealed so that the investment bank could claim ownership and buy insurance payable to the bank instead of the investors, buy credit default swaps with the same result, and apply for Federal bailout with the same result.
Housing won’t be fixed until the corruption of title caused by a nominee on the mortgage and nominee on the note is fixed and settled. The economy won’t be fixed until investors get their share of the insurance and bailouts. The consumer sector won’t be fixed until all that is done, because it is only after the money is allocated to the investors that we can know the actual balance due, if any, on any of the loans.
One thing we know at this point is that most foreclosures (at least 65% according to the San Francisco study) are initiated by “strangers to the transaction” who were not creditors, holders or anything else that would entitle them to enforce the closing documents on a loan that came not from the named payee but from another source entirely. We know that the “credit bid” submitted at auction was pure fiction and fraud and should be corrected in the property records. And we know that the the proceeds of insurance, credit default swaps and federal bailout should be applied to the receivables owed to the investors. Lastly, we know that when those monies are allocated the balance due on those receivables will be far less than what has been or will be demanded from borrowers in past, present and future foreclosures.
Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud Tagged: | Deny and Discover, discovery, HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS, institutional investors, Morgan Stanley, Schiller