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It Makes No Sense

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We received so many calls from my post on Friday asking me to write more on the Burden of Proof that I decided to write a supplement. See The Burden of Proof Must be Changed: BofA Slammed Again

IT MAKES NO SENSE

“Your Honor this is a simple foreclosure on an ordinary mortgage.” Those words, uttered by most foreclosure attorneys are very misleading. Because the attorneys don’t have the information I have, the attorney might actually think the words he or she is speaking are true. But they are not true in most cases.

  • If this was an ordinary loan with an ordinary loan closing why did the banks engage in fraudulent behavior in foreclosure cases — robo-signing, forgery, fabrication and even foreclosing on loans that were neither delinquent nor properly declared in default?
  • If it was so ordinary why are the trial and appellate courts dealing with the issue of jurisdictional standing — because the owner of the loan is in doubt, to say the least?

As for securitization they are right — if it was done right. If you start with the proposition that the intent was for the brokers on Wall Street to create residential loans and give their clients a slightly higher yield from a portfolio of loans than the other bonds the investors were buying, and that ordinary underwriting practices had been employed in approving loans, then

  • why are the Banks so reluctant to allege and prove the identity of the lender?
  • Why have so many studies concluded that the foreclosers are mostly “strangers” to the transaction (San Francisco and Baltimore Study) or that at least half the loan documents were destroyed or lost?
  • Why would a lender or purchaser of loans destroy cash equivalent notes unless they had something to hide?
  • Why do they employ professional “testifiers” instead of actual employees or officers of the creditors?
  • Why are so many foreclosures failing because they failed to prove their case (a rising number with each passing month)?

None of it makes sense. These banks have been dealing with paper instruments for hundreds of years. The plan is laid out in the PSA.

  • Why were the loan settlement documents not delivered to the Depository for the alleged REMIC trust? Why is there no evidence of the Trust actually buying the loan within the cutoff period in the PSA?
  • What were the brokers doing with the investors money while the investors thought the money had gone to the trust in exchange for the mortgage bonds issued and sold by the trust?
  • What were the brokers doing with the closing paperwork after using the investor’s money, without disclosure to anyone, to either buy or originate loans without specifically and expressly protecting the bond buyers in written instruments that were properly and timely recorded?

I submit that there are no GOOD reasons or GOOD answers to those questions. I submit that if you start with the premise that the brokers started with the intent to steal the money and steal the loans, then everything DOES make sense.

  • It makes sense that the loans were nearly all table-funded which is predatory per se according to Reg Z. But it doesn’t make sense if the brokers wanted clean loans with total transparency as required by law. It makes sense that they were concealing the actual source of funds (the investors directly instead of through the REMIC trust). And it makes sense that the Wall Street brokers and the web they spun of multiple layers of multiple companies were collecting and keeping undisclosed compensation that was largely an instant loss to the investors.
  • It makes sense that the money was not deposited into a Trust account where a real trustee would have control over the funds and make sure that the terms of the trust were followed. If they had given the money to the trust, then the brokers would not have been able to play with that money as if it were their own.
  • It makes sense that the investors’ money was used directly, instead of the coming from the trust because if it came directly from a trustee for the trust, then the trust would have had to get the settlement documents deposited with the depository and the required documents for instant ownership of the loan for which the investors’ money was used. By using the investors money under the illusion of a REMIC trust it makes it appear as though a trust is involved when in fact it is the broker who is controlling the transaction, not disclosing to the investors the real nature of the loans that were being approved, and leaving the buyers of those bogus mortgage bonds either without any disclosure to alert them that something was wrong or barred from finding out because of restrictions on inquiries contained in the PSA.
  • And if makes sense that they used multiple layers of nominees without the slightest actual interest or risk in the loan to divert ownership of the loan away from the investors to the broker’s trading desk. By diverting the transaction away from the Trust and the Trust Beneficiaries they were able to create the illusion of a sale of the actual loan with an interest rate of 9% as though it was a 5% loan. That makes sense because the brokers were able to claim a “profit” on that Sale” — a 5% loan sells at twenty times earnings. So the broker sold the loan on its proprietary trading desk for nearly twice the loan amount — bequeathing an instant 50%-70% loss to the investors who thought their money was going through a carefully monitored trustee process and scrutiny.
  • And it makes sense that they kept paying the investors even though the loan portfolio was collapsing, reporting loans as performing when the borrowers were not paying. If they didn’t do that — with a reserve created out of the investors money — then bond buyers would stop buying.
  • And it makes sense that they would seek foreclosure as their first goal because that is the only way to create the illusion of clearing title. If they don’t foreclose as many loans as possible, the whole plan blows up because in a workout of the loan terms the brokers would be required to account for the profits and compensation and losses attributable to their plan. They would be required to refund or repurchase all the crazy loans they made that were made to fail.
  • It makes sense that the brokers, controlling the servicers, would engage in a policy of luring the borrowers into “default” by stating that that the borrower would get a modification only if they are at least 3 months behind on their payments. If they didn’t engage in policies and practices designed to cause foreclosures to be filed, then their story about the crisis being related to loan defaults,falls apart. It would become obvious that the crisis occurred because the brokers took 20%-120% out the money flow created by investments from bond buyers.
  • It makes sense that they don’t have a designated person at trial or can actually testify to each step in each transaction and whether the trust exists and what actual figures are shown on the books of account for the real creditors — the bond purchasers — as to the existence of a default and the principal balance due.

I guess I could go on forever. But you get the point. Start with the premise that the brokers set out on an illegal enterprise and everything falls into place. Start with premise that they were just doing their job according to law, and everything falls apart and MAKES NO SENSE.

How the Banks Literally “Made” Money Out of Nothing

For the last few weeks I have been harping on the concepts of holder in due course, holder with rights of enforcement, and holder. They are all different. The challenge in court is to get them treated as different in Court as they are in the statutes.

The Banks knew through their attorneys that the worst paper in the world could be turned into real value if they could dress up junk paper and sell it to an unsuspecting innocent third party. They did it with junk bonds, and then they did it again when they created a strategy of creating junk bonds that looked like investment grade securities, got the Triple A rating from the agencies and even got them insured as though they were the highest quality and lowest risk investment — thus enabling stable managed funds to buy them despite restrictions on what such fund managers could buy as investments for their pension fund, retirement fund etc.

The reason they were able to do it is that regardless of the defective nature of the loan closing, including the lack of any loan of money by the “lender”, the law protects and presumes the validity of the paper, subject to defenses of the borrower that might defeat that value. The one exception that the Banks saw as an opportunity to commit fraud and get away with it is if they could manage to sell the unenforceable mortgage documents to an innocent third party who was acting in good faith, paid real value for the loan, and knew nothing about the predatory nature of the loans, lack of consideration, and other defenses of the borrower, then the paper, no matter how bad, could still be enforced against the person who signed it. It doesn’t matter if there was a real contract, or if the transaction violated Federal and state laws or anything else like that.

Such an innocent third party is called a holder in due course. And the reason, like it or not, is that the legislatures around the country and the Federal statutes, favor the free flow of “negotiable instruments” if they qualify as negotiable instruments. If you sign a note in exchange for a loan you never received (and especially if you didn’t realize you didn’t received a loan from someone other than the “lender”) you are taking a risk that the loan documents will be enforced against you successfully even though you could have defeated the original lender easily.

The normal process, which the Banks knew because they invented the process, was for a “closing” to take place in which the loan documents, settlements statements, note, mortgage and other papers are signed by the borrower, and then the loan is funded usually after final review by the underwriters at the lender. But in the mortgage meltdown there was no real underwriting but there was someone called an aggregator (e.g. Countrywide, ABn AMRO et al) who was approving loans that qualified to be approved for sale into investment pools. And in the mortgage meltdown you signed papers but never received a loan of actual money from the party in whose favor you signed the papers. They were unenforceable, illegal and possibly criminal, but those signed papers existed.

All the Banks had to do was to claim temporary ownership over the loans and they were able to sell the “innocent” pension fund managers on buying bonds whose value was derived from these worthless loan papers. If they didn’t know what was going on, they had no knowledge of the borrower’s defenses. If they were not getting kickbacks for buying the bonds, they were proceeding in good faith. That is the classic definition of a Holder in Due Course who can enforce the loan documents despite any real defenses the the homeowner might possess. The homeowner is the maker of the note and should have had a lawyer at closing who would insist on seeing the wire transfer receipt and wire transfer instructions to the escrow agent.

No lawyer worth his salt would allow his client to sign papers, nor would he allow the escrow agent to retain such signed papers, much less record them, if he knew or suspected that the documents signed by his client were going to create a problem later. The delivery of the note to a party who had NOT made the loan created two debts — one to the source of the loan money which arises by operation of law, and the other to whoever ended up with the paper even though there was a complete lack of consideration at closing and no money exchanged hands in the assignment or transfer of the loan, debt, note or mortgage.

Since the paperwork went into the equivalent of a food processor, the banks were able to change various data points on each loan, and create sales and disguised sales over and over again on the same loan, the same loan pool, the same mortgage bonds, the same tranche, or the same hedges. Now they even the the technology to deliver  what appears to be an “original” note to as many people as they want. Indeed we have seen court cases where both foreclosing parties tendered the “original” note to the court as part of the foreclosure process, as is required in Florida.

Thus borrowers are stuck arguing that it is not the debt that cannot be enforced, it is the paper. The actual debt was never documented making it appear as though the allegation of 4th party funding seem ludicrous — until you ask for the wire transfer receipt and instructions, until you ask for the way the participating parties booked the transaction on their own financial statements, and until you ask for the date, amount and people involved in the transfer or assignment of the worthless paper. The reason why clerical people were allowed to sign away note and mortgages that appeared to be worth billions and trillions of dollars, is that what they were signing was toxic waste — worse than unenforceable it carried huge liabilities to both the borrower and all the people who were scammed into buying the same worthless paper over and over again.

The reason the records custodian of the Bank or servicer doesn’t come into court or at least certify the “business records” as an exception to hearsay as permitted under Florida statutes and the laws of other states, is that no records custodian is going to risk perjury. The records custodian knows the documents were faked, never delivered, and not in the possession of the foreclosing party. So they get a professional witness who testifies he or she is “familiar with the record keeping” at one servicer, but upon voir dire and cross examination they know nothing in their personal knowledge and are therefore only giving voice to what is contained on the reports he brought to trial — classic hearsay to be excluded from evidence every time.

Like the robo-signors and “assistant secretaries”, “signing officer,” (and other made up names) these people who serve as professional witnesses at trial have no actual access to any of the raw data contained in any record keeping system. They don’t know what came in, they don’t know what went out, they don’t know who paid any money into the pool because there are so many channels of money being paid on these loans (directly or indirectly), they don’t even know if the servicer paid the creditors the amount that was due under the creditors’ part of the loan contract — the prospectus and PSA.

In fact, there is no production of any information to show that the REMIC trust was ever funded with the investor’s money. If there was such evidence, we never would have seen forgery, fabrication and robo-signing. It wouldn’t have been necessary. These witnesses might suspect they are lying, but since they don’t know for sure they feel insulated from prosecutions for perjury. But those witnesses are the first people to be thrown under the bus if somehow the truth comes out.

Thus the banks literally created money out of thin air by taking worthless, fraudulently obtained paper (junk) and then treating it at some point as though it was negotiable paper that was sold to an Innocent holder in due course. Under the law if they claimed status as Holder in Due Course (or confused a court into believing that is what they were alleging), the paper suddenly was enforceable even though the borrowers’ defenses were absolute.

BUT THAT TRANSACTION NEVER OCCURRED EITHER. Numbers don’t lie. If you take $100 million from an investor and put it on the closing tables for the origination or acquisition of loans, then you can’t ALSO put the money in the REMIC trust. Thus the unfunded trust has no money to transaction ANY business. But once again, in the illusion of securitization, it looks real to judges, lawyers and even borrowers who feel guilty that fighting the bank is breaking some moral code.

Amazingly, it is the victims who feel guilty and shamed and who are willing to pay even more money to intermediary banks whose fees and profits passed unconscionable 10 years ago. I’m not sure what word would apply as we look at the point of unconscionability in our rear view mirror.

And they sold it over and over again. The reason why there was no underwriting standards applied was that it didn’t matter whether the borrower paid or not. What mattered is that the Banks were able to sell the junk paper multiple times. Getting 100 cents on the dollar for an investment you never made is very lucrative — especially when you do it over and over again on each loan. It sure beats getting 5%. The reason the servicer made advances was that they were not using their own money to make payments to the investors. It is the perfect game. A PONZI scheme where the investors continue to get paid because the reserve fund and incoming investors are contributing to that reserve fund, such that the servicer has access to transmit funds to the investors as though the trust owned the loan and the loans were all performing. Yet as “servicers” they declared a default because the borrower had stopped paying (sometimes even if the borrower was paying).

And the Banks sprung into action claiming that the failure of the borrower to make a payment is the only thing that mattered. The Courts bought it, despite the proffer of proof or the demand for discovery to show that the creditor — the investors — were actually showing a default. I didn’t make this up. This is what the investors are alleging each time they present a claim or file suit for fraud against the broker dealer who did the underwriting on the mortgage bonds issued by the REMIC trust who should have received the money from the sale of the bonds. In all cases the investors, insurers, government guarantors, and other parties have alleged the same thing — fraud and mismanagement of funds.

The settlements of fines and buy backs and damages to this growing list of claimants on Wall Street is growing close to $1,000,000,000,000 (one trillion dollars). In all the cases where I have submitted an expert witness declaration or have given testimony the argument was not whether what I was saying was right, but were there ways they could block my testimony. They never offered a competing declaration or any expert who would contradict me in over 7 years in thousands of cases. They have never offered an explanation of how I am wrong.

The Banks knew that if they could fool the fund managers into buying junk bonds because they looked like they were high rated bonds, they could convince Judges, lawyers and even borrowers that their case was hopeless because the foreclosing party would be treated as a Holder in Due Course — even if they never said it — and even if they were the holders of junk paper subject to all of the borrower’s defenses. So far they have pillaged our economy with 6 million foreclosures displacing 15 million  families on loans that were paid in full long before the origination or acquisition of the loan.

And here is their problem: if they start filing suit against homeowners for the money advanced on behalf of the homeowners (in order to keep the investments coming), then they will be admitting that most foreclosures are being filed for the sake of the intermediaries without any tangible benefit to the investors who put up the money in the first place. The result is like an old ribald joke, the Wolf of wall Street screws the investors, screws the borrowers, screws the third party obligors (including the government) takes the pot of gold and leaves. Only to add insult to injury they claimed non existent losses that were actually suffered by the investors who trusted the banks when the junk mortgage bonds were sold. And they were paid again.

Another Short Treatise on Securitization

Patrick Giunta brought this article to my attention. He practices in South Florida and I co-counsel cases with him. Although there are some errors in facts and I have some differences of opinion with the writer, I think the article is a MUST-READ for anyone effected by “securitization” — especially foreclosure defense attorneys. If nothing else there is corroboration of what I have said all along. The entire thing is the emperor’s new clothes — see article I wrote about 7 years ago. If you don’t understand that, then you don’t know how to cross examine the “corporate representative” at trial.

The following is an excerpt from the article, and the link to the entire article is below:

“A serious problem with modern securitization is that it destroys “privity.” Privity of contract is the traditional notion that there are two parties to a contract and that only a party to the contract can enforce or renegotiate that contract. Put simply, if A and B have a contract, C cannot enforce B’s rights against A (unless A expressly agrees or C otherwise shows a lawful agency relationship with B). The frustration for Joe is that he cannot find the other party to his transaction. When Joe talks to his “bank” (really his Servicer) and tries to renegotiate his loan, his bank tells him that a mysterious “investor” will not approve. He can’t do this because they don’t exist, have been paid or don’t have the authority to negotiate Joe’s loan.

“Joe’s ultimate “investor” is the Fed, as evidenced by the trillion of MBSs on its balance sheet. Although Fannie/Freddie purportedly now “own” 80 percent of all U.S. “mortgage loans,” Fannie/Freddie are really just the Fed’s repo agents. Joe has no privity relationship with Fannie/Freddie. Fannie, Freddie and the Fed know this. So they are using the Bailout Banks to frontrun the process – the Bailout Bank (who also have no cognizable connection to the note and therefore no privity relationship with Joe) conducts a fraudulent foreclosure by creating a “record title” right to foreclose and, when the fraudulent process is over, hands the bag of stolen loot (Joe’s home) to Fannie and Freddie.”

http://butlerlibertylaw.com/foreclosure-fraud/

Hooker Case Flirts With Reality – 9th Circuit

SEE AMICUS BRIEF AT END OF ARTICLE

It is interesting to watch the evolution of thought in the Courts. But it is also infuriating. They treat false claims of securitization as a novel issue; but in fact, there is nothing novel about Ponzi Schemes, and other types of fraud. Yet the Court continue to ponder the issue, probably wondering how they could possibly explain their prior decisions, the millions of foreclosures that have already occurred, and the 15 million people who were ejected from homes and lifestyles, jobs, and even lives (murder-suicides).

This is not rocket science despite the layers upon layers of paper that Wall Street throws at the issue. The simple facts and law governing loans, and secured loans in particular, need only be applied as they were written and interpreted for centuries.

If I loan you money, you must pay it back. If I don’t loan you money then I have no reason to demand you pay it “back” because I never loaned you money in the first instance. If I purchase a real loan for real money, then you owe the money to me. If I don’t purchase the loan, then I have no right to your money.

If some other person gives the loan you were looking for then that is a matter between you and them — not you and me. Whether I race to the courthouse or not, I cannot collect, get a judgment or foreclose unless you fail to contest it. The only way I could ever obtain a judgment against you on a false claim is if you don’t answer it. That isn’t because it is right that I should have a judgment against you and for me, it is just because the rules work that way. But even after that you still have some options to set aside the judgment or action on the alleged debt that doesn’t really exist.

Possessing an assignment from a party who never owned the loan has never been considered as conferring some right on the assignee. And Faulty, notes, mortgages, indorsements and assignments have very clear laws and precedent. The defective ones are thrown out. Why? Because the object is to identify REAL transactions in which real value exchanged hands. And because the object is to ignore documentation that REFERS to a transaction that never took place.

It is one thing to have an executed note or some other testimony of proffered evidence of a loan, and another to show the Court the actual canceled check in which you advanced the money. One document talks about the transaction while the other IS the transaction. It is the difference between talking the talk and walking the walk. Talking about Paris doesn’t get you there.

You might have received a loan from someone at closing but the odds are that you didn’t get it from the Payee on the note, the mortgagee on the mortgage, the nominee, the beneficiary on the deed of trust or any of the other parties that were disclosed.

Finally the Courts are asking about the reality that Judge Shack in New York and Judge Boyco in Ohio were talking about 6 years ago, which was picked up by a number of Judges that were suddenly rotated out of the position to hear foreclosure cases. Politics frequently trumps the law, at least for a while. And politics is all about money. And if it is about money, then the banks are the obvious place to look.

I commend to your reading, the short Hooker Case (Link below) and the Amicus Brief (link below) submitted by laymen for your review and study. While not exactly what we would like to see both provide compelling evidence of a movement on the bench toward reality and away from the smoke and mirrors of the largest economic crime in human history.

The implications for both pleading and discovery are, I believe, self evident. HINT: I have it on good authority that the IRS form mentioned in the Amicus Brief is feared by Wall Street as the lynchpin of their position: once pulled the whole thing falls apart as it becomes obvious that the “trusts” neither received funds from the investors nor did they receive loans from the aggregators. That Amicus Brief also contains the only valid diagram of the actual practice of securitization in existence (other than the ones I have drawn in seminars). Notice how different it is from the diagrams of securitization that trace the wording of the securitization documents. it is the simple difference between truth (what happened) and fiction (what they say happened and why you shouldn’t be allowed to ask what really happened).

Hooker v Northwest Trustee Services 11-35534

Wells-Fargo-v-Erobobo-Amicus-Brief_1-14

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Use of Factual Findings of Servicer Advances

It is important that the content of the report dealing withservicer advances be argued strenuously.Servicer advances have been received by the creditor, thus reducing the amount the creditor is expecting to be paid. Hence there should be reduction in the amount that is due from the borrower — to the extent thatactual payments have been received by that creditor on this account whether the borrower was the source of those payments or not.The servicer has agreed to make the payments to the creditor regardless of whether the Borrower paid or not and has continued to make payments apparently right up through the present. The Title and Securitization report says that.

Hence there could have been no default. The acceleration was a breach of contract, the amount due for reinstatement was wrong, the amount due in the Notice of Default was wrong, and the amount due as claimed in the lawsuit is wrong. simply stated, there is no basis for a foreclosure lawsuit or even a suit on the note.

The servicer is trying to convert a hypothetical claim against the borrower fro advancing payments into a claim by the creditor. It is masking the fact that the creditor has been paid and that the servicer wants to recover the amounts advanced in lieu of payments from the borrower.

That would, at best, be an action for unjust enrichment, if they were able to prove the elements and it would not be secured by the mortgage.

The mortgage only secures indebtedness on the note — not to a claim outside of the note where a third party either as volunteer or intermeddler made the payments. The note is evidence of a debt owed by borrower (debtor) to the creditor. The creditor is the Trust according to their own pleadings.

Hence the creditor is not alleged to have a default on its books and records because it has been paid. The mortgage only secures THAT debt to THAT creditor. If it were otherwise, off record transactions would cloud the title on  virtually every mortgage loan creating uncertainty in the marketplace where no lender would make loans because they could never be sure whether some off record activity had occurred and that the payoff of the previous “lender” had included the money due to the secured party. Such a subsequent lender might inadvertently be placing itself in a  position of liability to the borrower for an overpayment to the creditor.

I provide litigation assistance and expert witnesses with real credentials who will corroborate this in expert declarations, affidavits and live testimony, if the facts match what is stated above. call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688.

 

Glaski Court refuses to “depublish” decision, two judges recuse themselves.

Corroborating what I have been saying for years on this blog, the Supreme Court of the state of California is reasserting its position that if entity ABC wants to collect on a debt in California, then that particular entity must own the debt. This is basic common sense and simply follows article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. If a court were to adopt the position of the banks, then a new industry would be born, to wit: spying on people to determine whether or not they are behind on any payment to anyone and then beating the real creditor to court, filing a complaint and getting a judgment without the real creditor even knowing about it. The Supreme Court of the state of California obviously understands this.

This is not really complicated although the words used are complicated. If you find out that your neighbor is behind in payments on their credit cards, it is obvious that you cannot serve your neighbor and collect. You don’t own the debt because you never loaned any money and because you never purchased the debt. If you are allowed to sue and collect on the credit card debt, you and the court would be committing a fraud on the actual creditor. This is why it is absurd for lawyers or judges to say “what difference does it make who they owe the debt to?  They stopped making payments and they are clearly in default.”  Any lawyer or judge makes that statement is wrong. It lacks the foundation of the factual determinations required to establish the existence of the debt, the current balance of the debt after deductions for all payments received from all parties on this account, and the ownership of the debt.

In the first year of law school, we learned that the note is not the debt.  The note is evidence of the debt and the terms of repayment but it is not a substitute for the actual transaction documents. Those transaction documents would have to include proof of transfer of consideration, which in this case would mean wire transfer receipts and wire transfer instructions. The banks don’t want to show the court this because it will show that the originator in most cases never made any loan at all and was merely serving as a sham nominee for an undisclosed lender. The banks are attempting to use this confusion to make themselves real parties in interest when in fact they were never more than intermediaries. And as intermediaries that misused their positions of trust to misrepresent and create fraudulent “mortgage bond” transactions with investors that led to fraudulent loans being made to borrowers.

The banks diverted or stole money from investors on several different levels through multiple channels of conduit sham entities that they called “bankruptcy remote vehicles.” The argument of “too big to fail” is now being rejected by the courts. That is a policy argument for the legislative branch of government. While the bank succeeded in scaring the executive and legislative branches into believing the risk of “too big to fail” most of the people in the legislative and executive branches of government on the federal and state level no longer subscribe to this myth.

There are dozens of other courts on the trial and appellate level across the country that are also grasping this issue. The position of the banks, which is been rejected by Congress and the state legislatures for good reason, would mean  the end of negotiable paper. The banks are desperate because they know they are not the owner of the debt, they are not the creditor, they have no authority to represent the creditor, and their actions are contrary to the interests of the creditor. They are pushing millions of homeowners into foreclosure, or luring them into an apparent default and foreclosure with false promises of modification and settlement.

The reason is simple. Without a foreclosure sale at auction, the banks are exposed to an enormous liability for all the money they collected on the alleged defaulted loans. The amount of the liability is vastly in excess of the entire principal of the loans, which is why I say that the major banks are publishing financial statements that are based on fictitious assets and fictitious income. Nobody can ignore the fact that the broker-dealers (investment banks) are getting sued by investors, insurers, counterparties on credit default swaps, government agencies who have already paid for alleged “losses”, and government agencies that have paid on guarantees for mortgages that did not conform to the required industry-standard underwriting practice.

This latest decision in which the Glaski court, at the request of the banks, revisited its prior decision and then reaffirmed it as a law of the land in the state of California, is evidence that the courts are turning the corner in favor of the real creditors and the real debtors. The recusal by two judges on the California Supreme Court is interesting but at this point there are no conclusions that can be drawn from that.

This opens the door in the state of California for people to regain title to their property or damages for the loss of title. It also serves to open the door to discovery of the actual money trail in order to trace real transactions as opposed to fictitious ones based upon fabricated documentation which often contain forgery, backdating, and are signed by people without authority or people claiming authority through a fictitious power of attorney.

Glaski Court Reaffirms Law of the Land In California: If you don’t own the debt, you cannot collect on it.

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