Michigan Appellate Court Dismisses BOA Foreclosure for Lack of Standing — but for the wrong reason?

CHASE-WAMU MERGER CONSIDERED IN MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS AS NOT AN ASSIGNMENT.  BOA FORECLOSURE DISMISSED AND REMANDED FOR LACK OF STANDING.

And next is an interesting favorable decision in the State of Michigan entered June 6, 2013 but not yet published. Sobh-v-Bof-A, Chase et al

Bank of America was found to LACK STANDING to Foreclose. So far so good. But the reasoning of the Court leads me to question whether the right record was in front of them. They ASSUME that the Chase-Wamu merger transferred the loans only because, as I see it, nobody read the merger agreement. The receiver, as I pointed out in prior posts, acting on behalf of the FDIC, the trustee in WAMU bankruptcy, Chase and WAMU executives were sort of playing fast and loose with the rules.

It turns out that Chase never paid for anything. While it could be argued that they assumed the liability on billions of dollars in deposits, they also got the money that was on deposit. The agreement says the consideration is zero in no uncertain language. In fact, later on in the agreement and then again outside the agreement, they slipped in a provision wherein Chase was putting up $1.9 billion, but getting more than $2 billion back out of a tax refund owed to WAMU, so they had negative consideration and there is no recital of any net loss they were taking when they assumed the deposits of WAMU.

It also turns out that, straight from the receiver’s lips, if you are looking for an assignment, you won’t find one because there isn’t one. And the merger and assumption agreement specifically does NOT include the bogus mortgage loans and other liabilities (put back) in the securitization scheme which is most of all loans originated by WAMU. Chase didn’t want to buy the loans because they correctly perceived that the liabilities on those loans and the liabilities to alleged REMIC structures that never received an interest in the loans, and the liabilities to insures, counterparties on credit default swaps and to the Federal government and Federal Reserve might vastly exceed the nominal value of mortgages originated by WAMU. Then there was also the liability for predatory or fraudulent loan practices. Altogether, Chase didn’t want to be saying it owned ALL the loans. It just wanted to be able to say it some of the time when they had an uncontested foreclosure and they could get a free house.

So Chase got an affidavit from the receiver that said that Chase owned the loans by operation of law because of the merger. That affidavit has been used hundreds if not thousands of times in foreclosures where Chase perceived the risk to be low. Thus in uncontested cases, Chase alleged it owned the loans even if they were “securitized” and got away with it because, well, there was nobody to say otherwise.

A good thing that the Michigan court said was that the Chase had the burden of proving the chain of ownership which was the history of the piece of property. A bad thing that the Court said was that Chase “acquired” the loans but that the foreclosures were voidable because the assignment was never recorded. In Michigan the absence of a recorded assignment is deadly so they ran with that idea and decided fro the borrower and against Chase who will no doubt now enter into a settlement or modification for which they have no authority to even talk about because they do not now nor did they ever own the loans.

Just because the loans were considered a hot potato and nobody wanted them doesn’t mean that anyone can claim them. But that is exactly the plan of engagement adopted by Chase. So all that happened here was that Chase was chased out of Court with permission to come back when it had the assignment recorded. tricky business there. Will they fabricate that instrument or will they simply settle with the borrower for what they can get? Whatever they get, it is free money because at no time in the history of the loan has Chase ever been at risk unless, now that they are acting as though they have control over the loan portfolio, a court decides that if you fake it or made it. Greed has no bounds. If Chase had simply left the loan portfolio to wallow in its own crud, no argument could be made against Chase for all the chicanery that went on with the borrowers and investors. Now that they have led courts to believe they have apparent authority, maybe they have apparent liability as well.

Big Banks Headed For Break-Up

“What policy makers are starting to realize is that the absence of prosecutions and regulatory action against these banks has produced a profound loss of confidence not only in the financial markets but in the leader of the financial markets (the United States) to control itself and its own participants in finance. It’s not just fair to enforce existing laws and regulations against the banks who so flagrantly violated them and nearly destroyed all the economies of the world, it’s the only practical thing to do.” — Neil F Garfield, livinglies.me
If you are seeking legal representation or other services call our Florida customer service number at 954-495-9867 (East Coast) and for the West coast the number remains 520-405-1688. Customer service for the livinglies store with workbooks, services and analysis remains the same at 520-405-1688. The people who answer the phone are NOT attorneys and NOT permitted to provide any legal advice, but they can guide you toward some of our products and services.
The selection of an attorney is an important decision  and should only be made after you have interviewed licensed attorneys familiar with investment banking, securities, property law, consumer law, mortgages, foreclosures, and collection procedures. This site is dedicated to providing those services directly or indirectly through attorneys seeking guidance or assistance in representing consumers and homeowners. We are available to any lawyer seeking assistance anywhere in the country, U.S. possessions and territories. Neil Garfield is a licensed member of the Florida Bar and is qualified to appear as an expert witness or litigator in in several states including the district of Columbia. The information on this blog is general information and should NEVER be considered to be advice on one specific case. Consultation with a licensed attorney is required in this highly complex field.

Editor’s Comment: There is an old expression that says “At the end of the day, everybody knows everything.” The question of course is how long is the “day.” In this case the day for the bank appears to be about 10-12 years. The foibles of their masters, the conduct of their policies, and the arrogance of their behavior has led them into the position where the once unthinkable break-up of the bank oligopoly and their control, over our government is coming to a close.

The titans of Wall Street have thus far avoided criminal prosecution because of the misguided assumption — promulgated by Wall Street itself — that such prosecutions would destroy the economic systems all over the world (remember when Detroit arrogance reached its peak with “what’s good for GM is good for the country?”). But the Dallas Fed are joining the ranks of of once lone voices like Simon Johnson stating that Too Big to Fail is not a sustainable model and that it distorts the markets, the marketplace and our society.

It is virtually certain now that the mega banks are going to literally be cut down to size and that some form of Glass-Steagel will be revived. As that day nears, the images and facts pouring out onto the public and the danger to the American taxpayer facing deficits caused by the banks in part because they siphoned out the life-blood of liquidity from the American marketplace will overwhelm the last vestiges of resistance and the same lobbyists who were the king makers will be the kiss of death for re-election of any public official.

As they are cut down, the accounting and auditing will start and it will take years to complete. What will emerge is a pattern of theft, deceit, fraud, forgery, perjury and other crimes that are most easily seen in the residential foreclosures that now appear to be mostly illusions that have caused nightmare scenarios for millions of Americans and people in other countries. Those illusions though are still with us and they are still taken as real by many in all branches of government. The thought that the borrower should never have been foreclosed and that the amount demanded of them was wrong is not accepted yet. But it will be because of arithmetic.

Investment banks sold worthless bonds issued by empty creatures that existed only on paper without any assets, money or value of any kind. The banks then funded mortgages of increasingly obvious toxicity to people who might have been able to afford a normal mortgage or who couldn’t afford a mortgage at all but were assured by the banks that the deal was solid. Both investors and homeowners were taken to the cleaners. Neither of them has been addressed in any bailout or restitution.

It is the bailout or restitution to the investors and homeowners that is the key to rejuvenating our economy. Trust in the system and wealth in the middle class is the only historical reference point for a successful society. All the rest crumbled. As the banks are taken apart, the privilege of using “off-balance sheet” transactions will be revealed as a free pass to steal money from investors. The banks took the money from investors and used a large part of it to gamble. Then they covered their tracks with lies about the quality of loans whose nominal rates of interest were skyrocketing through previous laws against usury.

For those who worry about the deficit while at the same time remain loyal to their largest banking contributors, they are standing with one foot upon the other. They can’t move and eventually they will fall. The American public may not be filled with PhD economists, but they know theft when it is revealed and they know what should happen to the thief and the compatriots of the thief.

For the moment we are still rocketing along the path of assuming the home loans, student loans, credit cards, auto loans, furniture loans et al were valid loans wherein the lenders had a risk of loss and actually suffered a loss resulting from the non payment by the borrower. As the information spreads about what really happened with all consumer debt, housing included, the people will understand that their debts were paid off by the investment banks, the insurance, companies and the counterparties on hedge products like credit default swaps.

A creditor is entitled to be repaid the money loaned. But if they have been repaid, the fact that the borrower didn’t pay it does not create a fact pattern under which the current law allows the creditor to seek additional payment from the borrower when their receivable account is zero. Yet it is possible that the parties who paid off the debt might be entitled to contribution from the borrower — if they didn’t waive that right when they entered into the insurance or hedge contract with the investment banks. Even so, the mortgage lien would be eviscerated. And the debt open to discussion because the insurers and counterparties did in fact agree not to pursue any remedies against the borrowers. It’s all part of the cover-up so the transactions look like civil matters instead of criminal matters.

Thus far, we have allowed windfall after windfall to the banks who never had any risk of loss and who received federal bailouts, insurance, and proceeds of credit default swaps and multiple sales of the same loan — all without crediting the investors who advanced all the money that was used in the mortgage maelstrom.

The practical significance of this is simple: the money given to the banks went into a black hole and may never be seen again. The money given BACK to (restitution) investors will result in fixing at least partly the imbalance caused by the bank theft. It will also decrease the loss suffered by the lenders in the loans marked as home loans, auto loans, student loans etc. This in turn reduces the amount owed by the borrower. Their is no “reduction” of principal there is merely a “deduction” or “correction” to reflect payments received by the investors or their agents.

The practical significance of this is that money, wealth and income will be  channeled back to the those who are in the middle class or who belong there but for the trickery of the banks and the economy starts to hum a little better than before.

It all starts with abandoning the Too Big To Fail hypothesis. What policy makers are starting to realize is that the absence of prosecutions and regulatory action against these banks has produced a profound loss of confidence not only in the financial markets but in the leader of the financial markets to control itself and its own participants in finance. It’s not just fair to enforce existing laws and regulations against the banks who so flagrantly violated them and nearly destroyed all the economies of the world, it’s the only practical thing to do.

Big Banks Have a Big Problem

http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/big-banks-have-a-big-problem/

We The Taxpayers Are On The Hook For Mortgages, Student Loans, Banks

http://lonelyconservative.com/2013/03/we-the-taxpayers-are-on-the-hook-for-mortgages-student-loans-banks/

Documentary Co-Produced by Broker Exposes Foreclosure Devastation, Housing System Flaws, in Low-Income Hispanic Neighborhood of Phoenix

http://rismedia.com/2013-03-13/documentary-co-produced-by-broker-exposes-foreclosure-devastation-housing-system-flaws-in-low-income-hispanic-neighborhood-of-phoenix/

Housing advocates accuse Wells Fargo of damaging communities through foreclosures

http://www.scpr.org/blogs/economy/2013/03/13/12908/housing-advocates-accuse-well-fargo-damaging-commu/

 

The Truth Keeps Coming: When Will Courts Become Believers?

If you are seeking legal representation or other services call our Florida customer service number at 954-495-9867 (East Coast) and for the West coast the number remains 520-405-1688. Customer service for the livinglies store with workbooks, services and analysis remains the same at 520-405-1688. The people who answer the phone are NOT attorneys and NOT permitted to provide any legal advice, but they can guide you toward some of our products and services.
The selection of an attorney is an important decision  and should only be made after you have interviewed licensed attorneys familiar with investment banking, securities, property law, consumer law, mortgages, foreclosures, and collection procedures. This site is dedicated to providing those services directly or indirectly through attorneys seeking guidance or assistance in representing consumers and homeowners. We are available to any lawyer seeking assistance anywhere in the country, U.S. possessions and territories. Neil Garfield is a licensed member of the Florida Bar and is qualified to appear as an expert witness or litigator in in several states including the district of Columbia. The information on this blog is general information and should NEVER be considered to be advice on one specific case. Consultation with a licensed attorney is required in this highly complex field.

Editor’s Comments and Practice Suggestions: On the heels of AG Eric Holder’s shocking admission that he withheld prosecution of the banks and their executives because of the perceived risk to the economy, we have confirmation and new data showing the incredible arrogance of the investment banks in breaking the law, deceiving clients and everyone around them, and covering it up with fabricated, forged paperwork. And they continue to do so because they perceive themselves as untouchable.

Practitioners should be wary of leading with defenses fueled by deceptions in the paperwork and instead rely first on the money trail. Once the money trail is established, each part of it can be described as part of a single transaction between the investors and the homeowners in which all other parties are intermediaries. Then and only then do you go to the documentation proffered by the opposition and show the obvious discrepancies between the named parties on the documents of record and the actual parties to the transaction, between the express repayment provisions of the promissory note and the express repayment provisions of the bond sold to investors.

Practitioners should make sure they are up to speed on the latest news in the public domain and the latest developments in lawsuits between the investment banks, investors and guarantors like the FHA who have rejected loans as not conforming to the requirements of the securitization documents and are demanding payment from Chase and others for lying about the loans in order to receive 100 cents on the dollar while the actual loss was incurred by the investors and the government sponsored guarantors.

Another case of the banks getting the money to cover losses they never had because at all times they were mostly dealing with third party money in funding or purchasing mortgages. It was never their own money at risk.

Three “deals” are now under close scrutiny by the government and by knowledgeable foreclosure defense lawyers. For years, Chase, OneWest and BofA have taken the position that they somehow became the owner of mortgage loans because they acquired a combo of WAMU and Bear Stearns (Chase), IndyMac (OneWest), and a combo of Countrywide and Merrill Lynch (BofA).

None of it was ever true. The deals are wrapped in secrecy and even sealed documents but the truth is coming out anyway and is plain to see on some records in the public domain as can be easily seen on the FDIC site under the Freedom of Information Act “library.”

The naked truth is that the “acquiring” firms have very complex deals on those mortgage loans that the acquiring firm chooses to assert ownership or authority. It is  a pick and choose type of scenario which is neither backed up by documentation nor consideration.

We have previously reported that the actual person who served as FDIC receiver in the WAMU case reported to me that there was no assignment of loans from WAMU, from the WAMU bankruptcy estate, or the FDIC. “if you are looking for an assignment of those loans, you are not going to find it because there was no assignment.” The same person had “accidentally” signed an affidavit that Chase used widely across the country stating that Chase was the owner of the loans by operation of law, which is the position that Chase took in litigation over wrongful foreclosures. Chase and the receiver now take the position that their prior position was unsupportable. So what happens to all those foreclosures where the assertions of Chase were presumed true?

Now Chase wants to disavow their assumption of all liabilities regarding WAMU and Bear Stearns because it sees what I see — huge liabilities emerging from those “portfolios” of foreclosed properties that were foreclosed and sold at auction to non-creditors who submitted credit bids.

You might also remember that we reported that in the Purchase and Assumption Agreement with the FDIC, wherein Chase was acquiring certain operations of WAMU, not including the loans, the consideration was expressly stated as zero and that the bid price from Chase happened to be a little lower than their share of the tax refund to WAMU, making the deal a “negative consideration” deal — i.e., Chase was being paid to acquire the depository assets of WAMU. Residential loans were not the only receivables on the books of WAMU and the FDIC receiver said that no accounting was ever done to figure out what was being sold to Chase.

Each of the deals above was complicated by the creation of entities (Maiden Lane LLCs) to create an “off balance sheet” liability for the toxic loans and bonds that had been traded around as if they were real.

Nobody ever thought to check whether the notes and mortgages recorded the correct facts in their content as to the cash transaction between the borrower and the originator. They didn’t, which is why the investors and the FDIC both now assert that not only were the loans not subject to underwriting rules compatible with industry standards, but that the documents themselves were not capable of enforcement because the wrong payee is named with different terms of repayment to the investors than what those lenders thought they were buying.

In other words, the investors and the the government sponsored guarantee organizations are both asserting the same theory, cause of action and facts that borrowers are asserting when they defend the foreclosure. This has been misinterpreted as an attempt by borrowers to get a free house. In point of fact, most borrowers simply don’t want to lose their homes and most of them are willing to enter into modifications and settlements with proceeds far superior to what the investor gets on foreclosure.

Borrowers admit receiving money, but not from the originator or any of the participants in what turned out to be a false chain of securitization which existed only on paper. The Borrowers had no knowledge nor even access to the knowledge that they were actually entering into a loan transaction with a stranger to the documents presented at the loan “closing.” This pattern of table funded loans is branded by the Truth in Lending Act and Reg Z as “predatory per se.” The coincidence of the money being received by the closing date was a reasonable basis for assuming that the originator was not play-acting, but rather actually acting as lender and underwriter of the loan, which they were certainly not.

The deals cut by Chase, OneWest and BofA are models of confusion and shared losses with the FDIC and other investors who participated in the Maiden Lane excursion. The actual creditor is definitely not Chase, OneWest nor BofA. Bank of America formed two corporations that merely served as distractions — Red Oak Merger Corp and BAC Home Loans and abandoned both after several foreclosures were successfully concluded by BAC, which owned nothing.

As we have previously shown, if the mortgage securitization scheme had been a real financial tool to reduce risk and increase lending, the REMIC trust would have ended up on the note and mortgage, on record in the office of the County Recorder. There would have been no need to establish MERS or any other private database in which trades were made and “trading profits” were booked in order to siphon off a large chunk of the money advanced by investors.

The transferring of paper does not create a transaction wherein a loan is proven or established in law or in fact. There must be an actual transaction in which money exchanged hands. In most cases (nearly all) the actual transaction in which money exchanged hands was between the borrower and an undisclosed third party entity.

This third party entity was inserted by the investment bankers so that the investment bank could claim ownership (when legally the loans already were owned by the investors) and an insurable interest in the loans and bonds that were supposedly backed by the loans. This way the banks could assert their right to proceeds of sale, insurance, and credit default swaps leaving their investor clients out in the cold and denying the borrowers the right to claim a reduction in the liability for their loan.

In litigation, every effort should be made to force the opposition to prove that the investor money was deposited into the a trust account for the REMIC trust and that the REMIC trust actually paid for the loans. Actually what you will be doing is forcing an accounting that shows that the REMIC was never funded and was never the buyer of the loans. Hence nobody in the false securitization chain had any ownership of the debt leading to the inevitable conclusion that for them the note was unenforceable and the mortgage was a nullity for lack of consideration and a lack of a meeting of the minds.

Once you get to the accounting from the Trustee of the Trust, the Master Servicer and the subservicer, you will uncover trades that involve representations of the investment bank that they owned the loans and in fact the mortgage bonds which were clearly pre-sold to investors before the first application for loan was ever received.

Thus persistent borrowers who litigate for the actual truth will track the money and then show that the cash transactions differ from the documented transactions and that the documented transactions lacked consideration. The only way out for the banks is to claim that they embraced this convoluted route as agents for the investors, but then that still means that money received in federal bailouts, insurance and credit default swaps would reduce the receivable of the actual creditors (investors) and thus reduce the amount payable by the actual borrowers (homeowners).

The unwillingness of the Department of Justice to enforce long standing laws regarding fraud and deceit, identity theft and other crimes, tends to create an atmosphere of impunity a round the banks and a presumption that the borrowers are merely technical objections of a certain number of documents not having all their T’s crossed and I’s dotted.

From a public policy perspective, one would have to concede that protecting the banks did nothing for liquidity in the marketplace and nothing for the credit markets in particular. Holder’s position, which I guess is also Obama’s position, is that it is better to allow average Americans to sink into poverty than to hold the banks and bankers accountable for their white collar crimes.

Legally, if the prosecutions ensued and the cases were proven, restitution would be ordered based not on some back-room deal but on approval of the Court. Restitution would clawback much of the capital of the mega banks who are holding that money by virtue of illegal transactions. And restitution would provide the only stimulus to the economy that would be fundamentally sound. Investors and borrowers would both share in the recovery of at least part of the wealth lost to the banks during the mortgage maelstrom.

I have no doubt that the same defects will appear in auto loans, student loans and other forms of consumer loans especially including credit card loans. The real objection of the banks is that after all this effort of stealing the money and the homes they might be forced to give it all back. The banks perceive that as a “loss.” I perceive it as simple justice applied every day in the courtrooms of America.

JPM: The Washington Mutual Story

http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2013/03/jpm-wamu/

Bear Stearns, JPMorgan Chase, and Maiden Lane LLC

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_bearstearns.htm

Mistakenly Released Documents Reveal Goldman Sachs Screwed IPO Clients

http://news.firedoglake.com/2013/03/12/mistakenly-released-documents-reveal-goldman-sachs-screwed-ipo-clients/

Curious and Shocking Failure to Follow the Law: BofA, Chase and OneWest

If you are seeking legal representation or other services call our Florida customer service number at 954-495-9867 and for the West coast the number remains 520-405-1688. Customer service for the livinglies store with workbooks, services and analysis remains the same at 520-405-1688. The people who answer the phone are NOT attorneys and NOT permitted to provide any legal advice, but they can guide you toward some of our products and services.
The selection of an attorney is an important decision  and should only be made after you have interviewed licensed attorneys familiar with investment banking, securities, property law, consumer law, mortgages, foreclosures, and collection procedures. This site is dedicated to providing those services directly or indirectly through attorneys seeking guidance or assistance in representing consumers and homeowners. We are available to any lawyer seeking assistance anywhere in the country, U.S. possessions and territories. Neil Garfield is a licensed member of the Florida Bar and is qualified to appear as an expert witness or litigator in in several states including the district of Columbia. The information on this blog is general information and should NEVER be considered to be advice on one specific case. Consultation with a licensed attorney is required in this highly complex field.

Editor’s Announcement: Based upon current information and direct interviews with participants I have come to three broad conclusions:

  1. Bank of America never acquired any loans from Countrywide.
  2. Chase never acquired any loans from Washington Mutual
  3. OneWest never acquired the Indy Mac loans but instead entered into a loss sharing arrangement wherein the FDIC would absorb 80% of the loss and OneWest would receive the proceeds from foreclosure.

BofA never merged with BAC home Loans and the entity created to merge with Countrywide was Red Oak Merger Corp. which like the REMIC trusts was completely ignored. Neither Countrywide, red Oak BAC nor Bank of America ever paid one cent to acquire the loan balances. Hence the paperwork showing “for value received” is a lie.

Chase Bank acquired the banking operations of WAMU for  consideration that is expressly stated as zero. No assignment of WAMU loans exist, according to the FDIC receiver for WAMU. In most cases neither  WAMU nor  Chase ever spent one nickle funding or acquiring loans.

OneWest was capitalized with less than $2 billion and even that is not confirmed inasmuch as there doesn’t seem to be any transaction in which money was moved into a OneWest bank account. Like the above, neither Indy Mac nor One West ever paid for the loans.

All of that means is that they are not injured parties if the borrower doesn’t pay nor are they responsible parties if the investor is not paid. Their claim of agency just doesn’t cut it. For purposes of collecting insurance and proceeds from credit default swaps and federal bailouts, they claim ownership and then after payment, they claim agency so they can chase the foreclosure too, in addition to being paid several times over. But for purposes of sharing in the bounty of betting against the same mortgage bonds as they were selling to the investors the banks consider that proprietary trading and insist on the investors (lenders) taking the loss.

Practice hint: dig deeper and follow the money trail and don’t think that the note is part of the money trail. It isn’t. Only a cancelled check or wire transfer receipt, or ACH confirmation or check 21 confirmation would be proof of ownership (proof of payment) and proof of loss (entitling them to submit a credit bid at the auction of the property). Stick with this strategy and you won’t be sorry. The failure to come up with evidence of an actual injury to an actual party is deadly not only on the facts but for jurisdictional purses of standing.

The banks have cleverly steered the conversation in court to why they should not be required to produce the actual records of actual transactions affecting the loan or the loan pool claiming an interest in the pool. They only want the  court to look at the note and mortgage and the fabricated “allonges”, endorsements, transfers, sales, assignments, all of which are evidence and carry certain presumptions. But he story told by those documents turns out to be a fiary tale when you look at where and when money exchanged hands and between what parties.

The banks are avoiding the obvious: that they claim a REMIC trust exists and was funded (both of which are probably untrue), and that the REMIC trust acquired the loan by buying it (without any evidence of a money exchange) backdated to when the loan was “closed” [note it is our position that none of these loans were closed, since they have yet to be completed].

If the Trust DID own the loan, then what effect does a fabricated assignment have from the originator, aggregator or anyone else other than the trust? The pretender lenders can’t have it both ways. They can’t say they transferred the loan into the trust in 2006 and then claim that an assignment in 2011 from Countrywide to Bank of America conveyed anything.

F-Bomb on Display on PBS Piece on Fraud by the Banks


http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/untouchables/

“To hear some on Wall Street tell it, no one saw the financial crisis coming. As Jamie Dimon, the chairman and CEO of JPMorgan Chase, explained to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, “In mortgage underwriting, somehow we just missed … that home prices don’t go up forever.”

Others were less confident. In fact, well before the housing bubble burst, alarm bells were starting  to sound among key players in the mortgage industry: due diligence underwriters.

Due diligence underwriters are paid by banks to assess the risk of buying mortgage portfolios. In the run-up to the crisis, they were among the first to suspect that loosening loan standards could pose a potentially catastrophic threat to the economy.

Several due diligence underwriters — most speaking publicly for the first time — told FRONTLINE correspondent Martin Smith that it wasn’t uncommon to see school teachers claiming salaries of $12,000 a month on their mortgage applications, or electricians moving from $500 a month in rent to homes worth $650,000. The only problem — their supervisors didn’t seem to want to hear about it.

“Fraud in the due diligence world, fraud was the F-word or the F-bomb,” said Tom Leonard. “You didn’t use that word,” — Jason Breslow, PBS

VIDEO: Fraud Was the F-Word as Contract Hourly Workers Toiled into the Night

Editor’s Comment: Most of the questions and answers are over and they lead straight to the top of the mega banks. If there was any actual risk of loss as opposed to the illusion of a risk of loss, most of the loans would not have been approved.

Since the banks were playing with investor money and essentially stealing it they had created a labyrinth of paperwork that was vague enough to enable them to claim plausible deniability and even the outright lie that Jamie Dimon told when he said that they never saw the meltdown coming because they too thought the market would always go up.

They stacked and compounded the risk elements such that the banks would be paid, the investors would lose their entire investment and the homeowners would be lured into deals that could not possibly work — especially when you factor in the known fact that the prices were spiked higher than anytime in the history of record keeping relative to actual value and the median income required to pay the mortgages. At the heart was fraud: fraud in the appraisal, fraud in the “underwriting,” fraud in the ratings, and fraud in the way the money chain and document chains were handled.

What has escaped most media analysts is that the higher the risk, the more money the banks made. By increasing the risk elements as high as they could go, the nominal interest rate on the loan was as high as it could go. By increasing the interest rate, less money was funded for loans than what was expected by the investors.

In order to achieve the expected return of $50,000 per year, the loan could have been a 5% loan, which is what the investors expected, and the Principal funded would be $1 million. If the interest rate was 10%, meaning the probability of repayment was low at best, then the funding goes down to $500,000 creating the illusion of satisfying the goal of $50,000 per year. If the interest rate was 15%, meaning there was no likelihood at all that the loan would survive, then the funding would have been $333,000.

But in both the 10% loan and the 15% loan, the investor advanced $1 million expecting the loan to be a safe loan to a credit worthy person on a piece of property that was truly worth more than the loan.  Thus a yield spread was created and the premium on that yield spread would have been $500,000 for the 10% loan, and $667,000 for the 15% loan. Where did the money go? Into the profits of the banks as proprietary trading activity that were all fictitious transactions.

The banks were supposed to provide triple-A rated bonds backed by good performing loans in which the viability of the deal had been underwritten, verified and confirmed as to income, value of the property etc. — and not just on the first day of the loan where the borrower paid a teaser rate.

Ask any banker doing conventional loans whether he or she would have approved any of the loans taken at random from the piles at Countrywide or WAMU. The answer is NO. I know because I did ask. Real loans have real risk. These were neither real loans nor did they carry any risk of loss to the purported players who were mere intermediaries violating the blueprint set forth in the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreement.

The mega banks, knowing that the loans were completely void for a variety of reasons, and knowing that the banks would some day need to create the illusion of an accounting, needed a state document (deed on foreclosure) to close the book or else the investors and borrowers would end up owning the bank.

But they went further. Having tasted the red meat of astonishing profit  margins they sought to increase their gains to astrophysical levels. They bought insurance and credit default swaps betting against the the very same loans they had underwritten and the very same bogus mortgage bonds they had underwritten and sold.

The results are well known. Banks collected 100% on the dollar repeatedly on the same loans and bonds even though none of the loans or bonds confirmed to the requirements of the disclosures to both the investors and the borrowers.

From http://www.pbs.org—–by Jason M. Breslow

One of Leonard’s peers, Eileen Loiacono, saw much of the same.

“You couldn’t say the word ‘fraud’ because we couldn’t prove that it was fraud. … Even if we suspected, we had to say, ‘This appears to be incorrect.’ You would never say, ‘This looks fraudulent.’”

In The Untouchables, premiering tonight, FRONTLINE examines why not one Wall Street executive has been prosecuted for fraud tied to the sale of bad mortgages. Through interviews with prosecutors, government officials and industry whistleblowers, the film raises new questions over whether senior bankers either ignored or contributed to fraud while inflating the bubble through the purchase and securitization of shoddy loans.

The Untouchables airs tonight on most PBS stations, (check your local listings here) or you can watch it online, starting at 10 pm EST.

Chase Reliance on Bogus Affidavit and “operation of law”

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Chase clearly has a problem, as set forth in the recent Michigan Supreme Court decision. There is no “operation of law” by which the loan could have been transferred. The purchase and assumption agreement do not transfer the loans —- especially and obviously the loans that WAMU had already sold. The FDIC receiver has stated that no document exists assigning the loans. And no document exists that gives Chase the right to service the loans, but that would probably not be a strong point. If they assert agency for servicing and everyone accepted the assertion by conduct, it would be hard to achieve anything attacking their status as a servicer. But that doesn’t mean they are a creditor.

Without an assignment, the loan, even if the loan documents are valid (highly questionable), would still be in the estate of WAMU, which technically doesn’t exist unless something is reopened — the receivership, the bankruptcy etc. What is required here is clarity on who the principal is since Chase cannot claim subrogation without showing proof of payment, which they don’t have.

Perhaps there should be some discussion as to a declaratory action seeking injunctive and supplemental relief.  The homeowner is in doubt as to who is on first: Chase asserts ownership but has produced neither an assignment nor proof of payment. WAMU doesn’t exist any more but we don’t have any evidence that the loan was transferred. The FDIC receiver has stated that  more than 2/3 of all loans originated by WAMU were sold into the secondary market where they were subject to claims of securitization.

The documents for securitization, if they exist, may well follow the standard operating procedure of the securitization participants of attempting to assign a loan in default in violation of the prospectus and PSA. And the attempted transfer is generally far outside the 90 day window allowed by the PSA and the REMIC statute, both of which prohibit acquisition of new mortgages.

Hence the probabilities, as per the FDIC receiver is that the loan was packaged for sale and “Securitization” but neither the sale nor the securitization occurred, thus leaving the loan within the WAMU estate, which has been closed.

Nonetheless the REMIC trust that could be asserted to own the loan has not been disclosed, leaving three potential claimants — Chase, which has neither assignment nor proof of payment, the WAMU estate which has been closed, and the REMIC trust that was in all probability used to assert claims of sale, transfer and securitization of the loan.

A fourth category of claimant, the investors who advanced money to purchase fractional shares in the REMIC trust would emerge if the securitization claims were unsupported.

Arguments of standing apply for jurisdictional purposes because there is no proof or evidence (or even an allegation) on record that the owner of the loan receivable (one of the possibilities mentioned above) was not paid by a party waiving subrogation (a standard provision in all insurance contracts and credit default swaps) protecting the value of the bond.

Standing aside, the identity of the principal owning the loan receivable as evidenced by origination, assignment and proof of payment must be established before any party can  submit a “credit bid.” in lieu of cash at auction. Further, a complete accounting from WAMU, Chase and any parties involved in securitization or sale into the secondary market especially including the Master Servicer who would know the actual balance of the receivable after deduction for insurance and credit default swaps receipts.

This would have an effect on the redemption rights of the borrower, the ability of the borrower to modify, and whether a default actually existed at the time of the notice of default and notice of sale which in all likelihood contained a demand for an amount far in excess of the loan receivable after proper allocation of deductions are made.

The review process, as farcical as it is turning out to be is thus corrupted from the start. Although Chase is communicating with the borrower on the review process, there is no evidence that they have any right to do so. A letter should be sent back to Chase saying that based upon the information available thus far, there is a question as to whether they are the authorized servicer, and if so, how that happened. Secondly, there is a question as to the party for whom they are performing the review process as the creditor. They should be asked in the letter, for the identity of the creditor — i.e., the party who can show assignment and proof of payment.

MIchigan Supreme CT: $3.75 Billion of Chase WAMU Mortgages Are Voidable

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MCL 600.3204(3) states:

“If the party foreclosing a mortgage by advertisement is not the original mortgagee, a record chain of title shall exist prior to the date of sale under section 3216 evidencing the assignment of the mortgage to the party foreclosing the mortgage.”

Editor’s Comment and Analysis: We are getting closer and closer as the Judges are seeing past the veil of fabricated paperwork and looking directly into the transactions checking whether there was offer, acceptance and consideration. All three are arguably not present in any of the so-called securitized mortgages because the offer made to the lender/investor is different from the offer made to the homeowner/borrower and the party seeking to assert ownership on the loan never funded the origination nor the purchase of the loan.

In this case the court in Michigan had a specific statute that merely states the obvious: if you are not the original mortgagee, you must prove up chain of title prior to the date of sale. In other words, without that, the “credit bid” is “voidable” which means that it is void if you challenge it. The court didn’t go all the way to saying the foreclosure sale was void, which I would have preferred.

I have personally spoken with the receiver for WAMU and I have read the Purchase and Assumption agreement between Chase, WAMU, the FDIC and the Trustee and noting could be clearer that their was no assignment of loans in that document. The receiver said he was mistaken when he signed the affidavit that Chase is using to say it acquired the WAMU loans “by operation of law.” Nothing could be further from the truth and the behavior of Chase, selecting loans to foreclose, shows that they themselves do not assert ownership over ALL the loans.

The receiver told me in no uncertain terms that if we were looking for an assignment of loans we would not find one because none exists either individually for each loan nor as a group. The purchase and assumption agreement together with other events (sharing in a tax refund) explains why the agreement says the consideration paid by Chase was zero. They “bid” $1.9 Billion but received more than that as their share of a tax refund due WAMU — a tax refund that had nothing to do with mortgages.

The story in the link below is the tip of the iceberg. The final ruling from the Michigan State Supreme Court rested on the specific statute quoted above. But that statute is inherently included in the recording requirement in all the states. Altogether the total of mortgages affected is, according tot he FDIC receiver is around $700 Billion.

While Chase can try to get or fabricate an assignment, the spotlight is on this transaction and it seems unlikely that anyone is going to sign anything from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court or the FDIC. Of course WAMU, now defunct, is unable to execute anything.

Analysis and Practice Tips: This case should definitely be used. But be careful. If it looks like you are knocking out Chase with no other creditor on the scene judges are going to act to prevent a windfall to homeowners. Somehow they will justify their decision unless, as the case progresses, you are able to show (through Deny and Discover) that the money for funding the purchase of $700 Billion in loans was never paid, which would technically mean that the estate of WAMU would need to be reopened to include the loans — which is impossible because of the claim of securitization in which WAMU reportedly sold all of those loans.

To whom and where were the loans sold and in what transaction? What was the consideration paid to WAMU. Answer: Nothing because they didn’t fund the origination of the loans to begin with. They had neither the capital nor available deposits with which they could make those loans.

So educating the Judge means leaving him/her with the notion that there IS a creditor that Chase tried to cheat — the lender/investors whose rights might be equitable or legal, possibly subject to a receiver being appointed and possibly subject to subrogation to prevent Chase from receiving windfall.

The measure of the right to subrogation is whether the claiming party is asserting rights that diminish the value of other claimants. Chase, who received hundreds of billions from insurance and credit default swaps and trillions in Federal bailout programs has no loss on any loan receivable — which is why an accounting from the MASTER SERVICER, Trustee and the other active participants needs to be produced to follow the money trail from investors to all the different places it went, breaking every rule in the book, to the extreme detriment of investors, the financial system, homeowners, workers, and consumers.

Here the investors put up the money, Chase put up nothing, WAMU probably put up nothing, which means the investors are owed the principal due on the loans — if there is any balance due because of payment of insurance, credit default swaps and federal bailouts.

Since the money trail does not lead to the REMIC, there is a high probability of double taxation against the investors because their agents diverted the money and the documents from the investors and their “REMIC” and did the transaction “off record.” That leaves the investors with a claim but no security since the mortgage is not likely to be considered subject to subrogation in favor of the investors — although that is a possibility.

The main point of this and recent articles published in the latest Florida Bar Journal is that in considering subrogation or any other equitable remedy, the claimant must prove “clean hands,” which is going well nigh impossible for nearly all the claimants on these mortgages. The Court is looking for who is REALLY out of the money and who is really going to lose money and how much that loss is going to be because subrogation will not support enhancing the position of the alleged subrogatee.

AND THAT is why Deny and Discover is such a powerful weapon to use against the banks. By challenging the offer, acceptance and consideration starting with the origination and all the way through the assignments you can force them to either fess up to the fact that no money exchanged hands on ANY of their deals. As the proxy for the borrower the investment banks invited investors to advance the money but the offer to the investors was substantially different than the one offered to the prospective borrower. They then named the payee incorrectly which should have been the investors or the REMIC if the money had actually come from a REMIC trust account designating that particular REMIC as the owner of the bank account.

This was done intentionally, fraudulently and improperly for one simple reason. They were going to claim the obvious impending losses as their own, thus depriving the investor of the protection they were promised through insurance and credit default swaps, and enabling the investment bank to retain the difference as “trading profits.”

When all is said and done, Chase can’t prove up any actual loss on these loans because they don’t have any losses. The Michigan court saw the opportunity for moral hazard in Chase’s argument and rejected it. So should the courts in all 50 states.

It is these facts that make the impending “settlements” so insignificant and hopeless for the millions of people who have been foreclosed and evicted on loans whose balances were either non-existent or a small fraction of what was demanded.

Euihyung Kim v. JPMorgan Chase B[1] (1)

Notice of Violation Under California Bill of Rights

“If we accept the Bank’s argument, then we are creating new law. Under the new law a borrower would owe money to a non-creditor simply because the non-creditor procured the borrower’s signature by false pretenses. The actual lender would be unable to retrieve money paid to the fake lender and the borrower would receive credit for neither his own payments nor any payment by a third party on the borrower’s behalf.” Neil F Garfield, livinglies.me

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Barry Fagan submitted the Notice below.

Editor’s Notes: Fagan’s Notice gives a good summary of the applicable provisions of the Bill of Rights recently passed by California. The only thing I would add to the demands is a copy of all wire transfer receipts, wire transfer instructions or other indicia of funding or buying the loans. everything I am getting indicates that in most cases they can’t come up with it.

If you went into Chase and applied for a loan and they approved your application but didn’t fund it, you wouldn’t expect Chase to be able to sue you or start foreclosure proceedings for a loan they never funded. It’s called lack of consideration.

If you actually got the loan from BofA but they forgot to have you sign papers, you would still owe the money to them but it wouldn’t be secured because there was no mortgage lien recorded in their name. And BofA would have a thing or two to say to Chase about who is the real creditor — either the one or advanced the money or the one who got documents fraudulently or wrongfully obtained.

So then comes the question of whether Chase could assign their note and lien rights to BofA. If TILA disclosures had been made showing the relationship between the two banks, it might be possible to do so. But in these closings, the actual identity of the creditor (source of funds) was actively hidden from the borrower.

Thus we have a simple proposition to be decided in the appellate and trial courts: can a party who obtains signed loan documentation including a note and mortgage perfect the lien they recorded in the absence of any consideration. The floodgates for fraud would open wide if the answer were yes.

If the answer is NO, then the origination documents and all assignments, indorsements, transfers and allonges emanating from the original transaction without consideration are void. AND if each assignment or transfer recites that it is for value received, and they too had no money exchange hands thus producing lack of consideration, then they cannot even begin to assert themselves as a BFP (Bona Fide Purchaser for value without notice). The part about “without notice” is going to be difficult to sustain in proof since this was a pattern of table funded loans deemed “predatory per se” by Reg Z.

The reason they diverted the document ownership away from the creditor who actually advanced the money was to create the appearance of third party ownership (and transfers, which was why MERS was created) in the documentary chain arising out of the original of the non-existent loan (i.e., no money exchanged hands pursuant to the recitals on the note and mortgage as between the payor and payee). They needed the appearance of ownership was to create the appearance of an ownership and insurable interest.

Thus even though the money did not come from the originator, the aggregator or even the Master Servicer or Trustee of the pool, affiliates of the investment bank who underwrote and sold bogus mortgage bonds, were able (as “owners”) to purchase insurance, credit default swaps, and receive bailouts because they could “document” that they had lost money even though the reality was that the the third party source of funding, and the real creditors were actual parties suffering the loss.

Had those windfall distributions been applied to balances due to the owners of the mortgage bonds, the balance due from the bond would have been correspondingly reduced. AND if the balance due to the creditor had been reduced or paid in full, then the homeowner/borrower’s obligation to that creditor would have been extinguished entitling the homeowner to receipt of a note paid in full and a release of the mortgage lien (or at least cooperation in nullification of the imperfect mortgage lien).

PRACTICE TIP: Don’t just go after the documents that talk about the transaction by which they claim a liability exists from the borrower to one or more pretender lenders. Push for proof of payment in discovery and don’t be afraid to deny the debt, the note or the mortgage.

In oral argument before the Judge, when he or she asks whether you are contesting the note and mortgage, the answer is yes. When asked whether you are contesting the liability, the answer is yes – and resist the temptation to say why. The less said the better. This is why it is better preempt the pretender lenders with your own suit — because all allegations in the complaint must be taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss.

Don’t get trapped into disclosing your evidence in a motion to dismiss. If it is set for a motion to dismiss the sole question before the court is whether your lawsuit contains a short plain statement of ultimate facts upon which relief could be granted and all allegations you make must be assumed to be true. When opposing counsel starts to offer facts, you should object reminding the Judge that this is a motion to dismiss, it is not a motion for summary judgment and there are no facts in the record to corroborate the proffer by opposing counsel.

From Barry Fagan:

Re:  Notice of “Material Violations” under California’s Newly Enacted Homeowners Bill of Rights pursuant to California Civil Code sections, 2923.55, 2924.12, and 2924.17.
See attached and below

Reference is made to Wells Fargo’s (“Defendant”) December 13, 2012 response to Barry Fagan’s (“Plaintiff”) October 25, 2012 request for copies of the following:

(i)           A copy of the borrower’s promissory note or other evidence of indebtedness.

(ii)         A copy of the borrower’s deed of trust or mortgage.

(iii)       A copy of any assignment, if applicable, of the borrower’s mortgage or deed of trust required to demonstrate the right of the mortgage servicer to foreclose.

(iv)        A copy of the borrower’s payment history since the borrower was last less than 60 days past due.

Please be advised that I find Defendant’s response to be woefully defective. This letter is being sent pursuant to my statutory obligation to “meet and confer” with you concerning the defects before bringing an action to enjoin any future foreclosure pursuant to Civil Code § 2924.12.

Defendant’s are in violation of both the notice and standing requirements of California law, and the California newly enacted Homeowner Bill of Rights (“HBR”). In July 2012, California enacted the Homeowner Bill of Rights (“HBR”). Among other things, the HBR authorizes private civil suits to enjoin foreclosure by entities that record or file notices of default or other documentsfalsely claiming the right to foreclose. Civil Code § 2923.55 requires a servicer to provide borrowers with their note and certain other documents, if the borrowers request them.

Civil Code § 2924.17 requires any notice of default, notice of sale, assignment of deed of trust, or substitution of trustee recorded on behalf of a servicer in connection with a foreclosure, or any declaration or affidavit filed in any court regarding a foreclosure, to be “accurate and complete and supported by competent and reliable evidence.” It further requires the servicer to ensure it has reviewed competent and reliable evidence to substantiate the borrower’s default and the right to foreclose.

Civil Code § 2924.12 authorizes actions to enjoin foreclosures, or for damages after foreclosure, for breaches of §§ 2923.55 or 2924.17. This right of private action is “in addition to and independent of any other rights, remedies, or procedures under any other law.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter, limit, or negate any other rights, remedies, or procedures provided by law.” Civil Code § 2924.12(h). Any Notice of Default, or Substitution of Trustee recorded on Plaintiffs’ real property based upon a fraudulent and forged Deed of Trust shall be considered a “Material Violation”, thus triggering the injunctive relief provisions of Civil Code § 2924.12 & § 2924.17(a) (b).

I therefore demand that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. provide Barry Fagan with the UNALTERED original Deed of Trust along with the ORIGINAL Note, as the ones provided by Kutak Rock LLP on October 13, 2011 to Ronsin Copy Service were both photo-shopped and fraudulent fabrications of the original documents, thus not the originals as ordered to be produced by Judge Tarle under LASC case number SC112044. Attached hereto and made a part hereof is the October 13, 2011 Ronsin Copy Service Declaration with copies of the altered and photo-shopped Note and Deed of Trust concerning real property located at Roca Chica Dr. Malibu, CA 90265.

Judge Karlan under LASC case number SC117023 “DENIED” Wells Fargo’s Request for Judicial Notice of the very same Deed of Trust, Notice of Default, Substitution of Trustee and the Notice of Rescission concerning real property located at Roca Chica Dr. Malibu, CA 90265.
Attached hereto and made a part hereof is the relevant excerpt of Judge Karlan’s October 23, 2012 Court Order along with a copy of Wells Fargo’s Request for Judicial Notice of those very same documents. Court Order: REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE “DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IS DENIED AS TO EXHIBITS A, B, C, D, K, L, & M.” 

As a result of the above stated facts, please be advised that the fraudulently altered deed of trust and photo-shopped Note that you claim to have been previously provided to Barry Fagan shall not be considered in compliance with section 2923.55 and therefore Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. has committed a “Material Violation” under California’s Newly Enacted Homeowners Bill of Rights pursuant to Civil Code sections, 2923.55, 2924.12, and 2924.17 (a) (b).

Please govern yourselves accordingly.

Regards,

/s/Barry Fagan

Barry S. Fagan Esq.

Thank you.

Barry S. Fagan Esq.
PO Box 1213, Malibu, CA 90265-1213
[T] +1.310.717.1790 – [F] +1.310.456.6447

Whistleblower Bangs BofA for $14.5 million in Mortgage Case

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Editor’s Comment:

Countrywide Financial Inflated Appraisals 

For people in law enforcement this is a time when it gets to be fun going after the big guys.  Being arrogant to the highest degree going into this mortgage mess you can only imagine the ego of the Titans of Wall Street after making trillions of dollars in turning the entire mortgage process on its head and reversing all common sense criteria in underwriting loans.

The rats are leaving the ship by the thousands, whether they want to or not.  There is hardly a day that goes by that some former employee of Countrywide, Bank of America, Chase, Citi or Wells Fargo does not reveal that they were under instructions to violate regulations and law.

The inflation of appraisals of the securities and the inflation of the homes themselves was the key to the success of the Wall Street plan.  This plan was devoted to sucking out as much o the liquidity in the marketplace as they could possibly achieve.  This in itself is a reversal of even the purpose of allowing Wall Street to exist.  Wall Street’s mandate is to provide liquidity in the marketplace and not taking it away.  Instead they took the equivalent of the gross domestic product of several countries combined (including the United States) and converted the proceeds to “trading profits”.

It is good that these whistleblowers are appearing and it’s even good they are making so much money.  This will encourage other whistleblowers and will encourage those attorneys who thought mortgage litigation was beneath them.  As these cases proceed we will see more and more understandable facts emerge that explain the tragic reversal of our financial model and the historic consequences to most of the major countries of the world.

Bank of America Whistleblower Receives $14.5 million in Mortgage Case

By Rick Rothacker

(Reuters) – A former home appraiser will receive $14.5 million as part of a whistleblower lawsuit that accused subprime lender Countrywide Financial of inflating appraisals on government-insured loans, his attorneys said Tuesday.

Kyle Lagow’s lawsuit sparked an investigation that culminated in a $1 billion settlement announced in February between Bank of America Corp (BAC.N) and the U.S. Justice Department over allegations of mortgage fraud at Countrywide, his attorneys said in a news release. Bank of America bought Countrywide in 2008.

Lagow’s suit was one of five whistleblower complaints that were folded into the $25 billion national mortgage settlement that state and federal officials reached with Bank of America and four other lenders this year. His suit was unsealed in February, but the amount of his settlement had not been disclosed.

Gregory Mackler, a whistleblower who challenged Bank of America’s handling of the government’s HAMP mortgage modification program, has also finalized a settlement, said Shayne Stevenson, an attorney with the Hagens Berman law firm, which represented both whistleblowers. Stevenson declined to comment on Mackler’s settlement amount.

The complaints were brought under a whistleblower provision in the U.S. False Claims Act, which allows private individuals with knowledge of wrongdoing to bring suits on behalf of the government and share in the proceeds of any settlement.

Both Lagow and Mackler lost their jobs after raising concerns about practices at their companies and faced difficult times awaiting settlements, Stevenson said. Lagow, who worked in a Countrywide appraisal unit, filed his suit in 2009; Mackler, who worked at a firm called Urban Lending Solutions, brought his case in 2011.

“These guys are inspirational,” Stevenson said. “They both did the right thing. They should inspire other people to come forward.”

Bank of America declined to comment. A spokesman for the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of New York, which handled the Bank of America settlement, also declined to comment.

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Banks Slammed for Misrepresenting Themselves as Owners of the Loan

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2008 Legal Memo at BKR Conference

Cautions Banks and Lawyers Against Lying About Ownership

A legal compendium of cases published by the American Bankruptcy Institute establishes a pattern of conduct by Ameriquest, Wells Fargo and Chase dating back before 2008 in which these and other banks have intentionally misrepresented themselves to the court as owners of the note, entitled to foreclose and seeking to lift the automatic stay in bankruptcy court under “color of title” arguments. The link to the entire article is below.

What I see is not just wrongful conduct in court but a continuous pattern of lying, fabricating, forging and cheating that has left millions of homeowners without possession of their rightful homes. The ONLY REMEDY in my opinion is to restore these homes to the bankruptcy estate and that the debtor’s be allowed to assert claims attacking the supposed mortgage liens that were based upon false identification of the lender, false and predatory figures used in borrowing and servicing and a large shroud thrown over the entire fictitious securitization process as a place to hide an illegal scheme to issue multiple securities in which the borrower was the issuer of the promissory note under false pretenses and the REMIC was carefully constructed to issue bogus mortgage bonds.

In both cases, the issuer and the investor were dealing with participants in the securitization chain who had no intention of allowing them to keep or recover their investment. In both cases, the instrument was a security that did NOT fall under the exemptions previously used to protect the banks. The borrower as issuer was induced to enter into a securities transaction in which he purchased a loan product under the false assumption created and promoted by the Banks that the real estate market never went down and would always go up, thus allaying the borrowers’ fear that the loan was not affordable. In fact that loan was not affordable and would violate the affordability guidelines in TILA and RESPA if it was classified as a residential mortgage loan. The REMIC that issued the bonds did so without any assets, and even though the disclosure was in the prospectus buried in parts where one would not be looking for that risk, that fact alone removes the REMIC issuance as a REMIC under the Internal Revenue Code, and removes the issuance of the mortgage bond from the cover of exemption under the 1998 Act.

We have all seen Wells Fargo, BOA, Chase, US Bank, Ameriquest and others banged repeatedly fro misrepresenting themselves in court as the owner of the loan when in fact they were not the owner of the loan, never loaned the money to begin with and never purchased the loan obligation from anyone because no money exchanged hands. Even if they tried, the only party who could sell or release claims to the receivable from the “borrower” (issuer) would have been the partnership or individuals or as a group pooled their money into leaky, fictitious entities created for the express purpose of deceiving the pension funds and other investors.

The bottom line is that when it suits them (when they want the property, in addition to the unearned insurance payments, proceeds of credit default swaps and proceeds from other credit enhancements and federal bailouts) these banks assert falsely that they are the creditor, claiming the losses that trigger payments to them rather than the investor. When it does not suit them, like when they abandon the property, or are subject to imposition of fees, sanctions or fines or attorney fees, then they finally fess up and state that they are not the owner of the loan in order to avoid paying appropriate costs, fines, fees, penalties and fees.

Here are some of the notable quotes from the piece written by Catherine V Eastwood, Esq., of Partridge, Snow and Hahn, LLP. At some point the lawyers must be subjected to the same sanctions knowing in the public domain that these practices exist as a pattern of conduct. see Consumer_Sept_2008_NE08_Messing_Mortgages_Cases

QUOTES FROM ARTICLE:

Make Sure Your Pleading Contains Accurate Information Regarding The Identity Of The Real Party In Interest
[AMERIQUEST FINED $250,000, LAW FIRM FINED $25,000, WELLS FARGO FINED $250,000 FOR A TOTAL OF $525,000] On April 25, 2008, Judge Rosenthal issued an memorandum of decision regarding an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed in the matter of Nosek v. Ameriquest Mortgage Company, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1251 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008). Ameriquest had maintained throughout a prior adversary proceeding and bankruptcy case that it was the “holder” of the note and mortgage. When the debtor filed a second adversary proceeding requesting trustee process from two Chapter 13 Trustees to collect payment on the judgment issued in the prior case, Ameriquest argued that it was merely the servicer of the loans and that it was not the owner of the funds sought to be collected. The court noted that Ameriquest and its attorneys had made misrepresentations to the court throughout the prior proceedings regarding its status as noteholder. Wells Fargo, NA as Trustee for Amresco Residential Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 1998-2 was the real holder of the note. The Court issued a Notice to Show Cause why sanctions should not be imposed

Make Sure Your Pleading Contains Accurate Financial Information or Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011 May Be Imposed: Judge Bohm asked counsel why a motion from relief from stay was being withdrawn. The lawyer’s answer resulted in the judge issuing two show cause orders in In re Parsley, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 593 (Bankr. S.D. Texas 2008). The real answer should have been that the motion for relief was filed in error on account of an erroneous payment history. Unfortunately, counsel misrepresented to the court that it was a “good motion” and that set off an explosion, leading to evidence of other misrepresentations…. Testimony also revealed that the payment histories were prepared by paralegals and were not reviewed by any attorneys. Countrywide did not review the loan histories either. No one was catching the errors under this system. Judge Bohm wrote “what kind of culture condones its lawyers lying to the court and then retreating to the office hoping that the Court will forget about the whole matter.”

[$75,000 Sanction against Law Firm] In an earlier matter, also in the Southern District of Texas, the Court sanctioned a law firm in the amount of $75,000 for filing an objection to plan and subsequent withdrawal of the objection that was deemed to be “gibberish.”    In re Allen, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2063 (Bankr. S.D. Texas 2007). It was clear to the Court that the pleadings were not being reviewed by an attorney after being generated by a computer as the objection listed reasons that were completely unrelated or blatantly opposite of the contents of the Chapter 13 plan filed by the debtor.

[Chase required to pay legal fees of debtor] On April 10, 2008, Judge Morris, a bankruptcy court judge for the Southern District of New York, issued a decision in the case of In re Schuessler, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1000 (Bankr. S.D. NY. 2008) regarding an order to show cause why Chase Home Finance, LLC should not be sanctioned for submitting pleadings that were misleading and that had no factual support.

Standing Challenges: Make Sure The Company Bringing The Action Has The Legal Right To Do So
[RELIEF FROM STAY DENIED RETROACTIVELY ON DEBTOR'S MOTION] In re Schwartz, 366 BR 265 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) that parties who do not hold the note or mortgage and who do not service the mortgage do not have standing to pursue motions for relief or other actions arising out of the mortgage obligation. In Schwartz the creditor was seeking relief to pursue an eviction action following a foreclosure sale. The assignment of mortgage into the foreclosing mortgagee was executed four days after the foreclosure sale took place. The Court stated that while the term “mortgagee”, as used in M.G.L. c. 244 §1, “has been defined to include assignees of a mortgage, there is nothing to suggest that one who expects to receive the mortgage by assignment may undertake any foreclosure activity.” Id. at 269. The motion for relief was denied.
While not a bankruptcy court case, a United States District Court case worthy of inclusion in this section is In re Foreclosure Cases, 2007 WL 3232430 (N.D. Ohio 2007). The District Court issued an order covering numerous foreclosure cases that were pending in the state. The creditor was ordered by the Court to produce evidence that the named plaintiff was the holder and owner of the note and mortgage as of the date the foreclosure complaint was filed. The court dismissed the foreclosure complaints when the lenders were unable to produce the assignments.
How Many Times Can A Lender Continue a Foreclosure Sale?
In re Soderman, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 384 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008). In Soderman the court recited the “one-time” postponement blessing in order to seek relief from stay but that repeated continuances may be a violation of the automatic stay.    The repeated continuances will be deemed a violation of the stay if the postponements are made in order to harass the debtor, gain an advantage for the creditor or renew the financial strain that led the debtor to file for bankruptcy protection. Id.    One month after the decision in Soderman was released, Judge Hillman also ruled that repeated continuances of a foreclosure sale was a violation of the automatic stay. In re Lynn-Weaver, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1101 (Bankr. D. Mass 2008).
Challenging the Assessment of Mortgage Fees to a Loan and the United States Trustee’s Office’s Investigation of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
In an unprecedented move, Judge Agresti of the Pennsylvania Bankruptcy Court, in April 2008, approved the Justice Department’s further investigation of Countrywide due to widespread allegations that the lender is filing false or inaccurate claims, misapplying funds, assessing unreasonable fees to borrowers’ accounts or ignoring the discharge injunction and other court orders. Countrywide Homes Loans, Inc. f/k/a Countrywide Funding Corp., 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1023 (Bankr. W.D. PA. 2008).
This matter was precipitated by a Standing Chapter 13 Trustee in Pennsylvania originally filing for sanctions against Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. due to her experience with the lender
The Pennsylvania matters have led the United States Trustee’s Office to file similar suits in Georgia1 and Ohio2 seeking to investigate the servicing practices of Countrywide. Various subpoenas have also been served by the United States Trustee’s office upon Countrywide in Florida regarding the assessment of fees on borrower’s accounts.

1 The United States Trustee’s Office filed a complaint on February 28, 2008 styled as Walton v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,08-06092-mhm in the Northern District of Georgia. The related bankruptcy case is In re Atchley, 05- 79232-mhm. In Atchley, the homeowners eventually sold their home to avoid foreclosure but believe the payoff amount cited by Countrywide contained excessive fees and that Countrywide continued to accept trustee payments after the loan paid off.
2    The United States Trustee’s Office filed a complaint on February 28, 2008 styled as Fokkena v. Countrywide Homes Loans, Inc., 08-05031-mss in the Northern District of Ohio. The related bankruptcy case is In re O’Neal, 07- 51027. In O’Neal, Countrywide filed a proof of claim and objection to plan when it had already accepted a short sale on the property prior to the bankruptcy filing.

ALL LENDERS ARE FAIR GAME
[Forensic Audits Suggested --- $10,000 damages, $12,350 Legal Fees, Wells Fargo sanctioned $5000] in the matter of In re Dorothy Stewart Chase, Docket 07-11113, Chapter 13 (Bankr. E.D. LA 2008), Judge Magner issued a 49 page decision on April 10, 2008 which ordered Wells Fargo to audit every proof of claim it filed in the district since April 13, 2007 and to provide a complete loan history on every account. If the audits reveal additional concerns, the judge reserved the right to appoint experts to do forensic accountings at the expense of Wells Fargo. She also ruled that Wells Fargo was negligent in the loan servicing of Ms. Chase’s loan and assessed damages of $10,000, legal fees of $12,350 and sanctioned Wells Fargo $5,000 for filing a consent order that did not reflect the agreement of the parties and for filing erroneous proofs of claim.
[Wells sanctioned $67,202.45] The decision in Chase was on the heels of Judge Magner’s earlier decision in In re Jones, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2984 (Bankr. E.D. LA. 2007). In Jones, Judge Magner sanctioned Wells Fargo $67,202.45 for violating the order of confirmation and the automatic stay by improperly assessing the debtor’s loan with fees in the amount of $16,852.01 and diverting payments made by the Chapter 13 trustee and the Debtor to satisfy fees that had not been authorized by the Court. The judge stated that the Jones case would provide guidance in the post-petition administration of home mortgage loans to a degree that, until this decision issued, had been lacking in the industry.

Class Action — Chase Accused of Brazen Bankruptcy Fraud

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“Through the use of fabricated assignments, endorsements and affidavits that purport to transfer deeds of trust, notes and the rights to all monies due under the terms of tens of thousands of non-negotiable promissory notes (the ‘MLNs’); Chase has demonstrated a pattern and practice of playing ‘hide-and-seek’ with debtors, judges and other bankruptcy players,” the complaint states.

Class Action Chase Accused of Brazen Bankruptcy Fraud

Read the Complaint at

http://www.scribd.com/doc/78562631/JPMorgan-Class-Action

By MATT REYNOLDS

LOS ANGELES (CN) – JPMorgan Chase routinely fabricated documents to deceive bankruptcy judges, going so far as to Photoshop documents to “create the illusion” of standing “in tens of thousands of bankruptcy cases,” according to a federal class action.
Lead plaintiff Ernest Michael Bakenie claims that Chase’s “pattern and practice of playing ‘hide-and-seek’ with debtors, judges and other bankruptcy players” bore rich fruit: that Chase secured motions for relief of stay and proofs of claim in 95 percent of its cases.
“Through the use of fabricated assignments, endorsements and affidavits that purport to transfer deeds of trust, notes and the rights to all monies due under the terms of tens of thousands of non-negotiable promissory notes (the ‘MLNs’); Chase has demonstrated a pattern and practice of playing ‘hide-and-seek’ with debtors, judges and other bankruptcy players,” the complaint states.
“Chase intentionally conceals the identity of the true parties in interest entitled to enforce the tens of tens of thousands of residential non-negotiable promissory notes (the ‘MLNs’) for its own financial benefit, at the expense of the class and to the detriment of the integrity of the bankruptcy system.”
Bakenie says Chase used a network of attorneys to file more than 7,000 motions for relief from automatic stay in bankruptcy cases in the Central District of California, “wherein they falsely claim to be the party entitled to monies due under the terms of MLNs.”
Chase rewards attorneys based on how quickly they can secure the stays, and uses fabricated documents to establish chain of title on loans, according to the complaint.
“Rather than incur the cost of ‘proving up’ its own standing or the standing of its principal Mortgage Backed Security Trust, Chase systemically misrepresents Chase or a designated MBST to be a creditor in tens of thousands of bankruptcy cases by utilizing manufactured documents,” the complaint states.
“As a direct result of this practice, over 95 percent of Chase’s motions for relief of stay and proofs of claim are granted without objection

Read more at
http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/01/17/43098.htm


http://www.scribd.com/doc/78562631/JPMorgan-Class-Action

 

OCC Issuing Alert to Consumers About Independent Foreclosure Reviews

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SEE FULL ARTICLE ON MORTGAGENEWSDAILY.COM

The OCC is rolling out its first public service announcements to alert consumers about the Independent Foreclosure Review announced by it, the Fed, and the OTS in early November.  The campaign follows the distribution of over 4 million letters to potentially eligible borrowers which include forms for submitting requests and instructions on how to use them.

The public service materials include a feature story and two 30-second radio spots in English and Spanish.  These will be distributed to 7,000 small newspapers and 6,500 radio stations throughout the U.S. The announcements inform consumers of the specifics of the program which lets borrowers who faced foreclosure during 2009 or 2010 request reviews of their cases if they believe errors in the procedures used by servicers pursuing foreclosure actions caused them to suffer financial loss. 

The parameters for determining eligibility are explained and borrowers are directed to a starting point for their requests.  Over 20 of the largest servicing companies are mandated to offer and process the reviews:  America’s Servicing Company, Aurora Loan Services, Bank of America, Beneficial, Chase, Citibank, CitiFinancial, Citi Mortgage, Country-Wide, EMC, EverBank/Everhome, Freedom Financial, GMAC Mortgage, HFC, HSBC, IndyMac Mortgage Ser vices, MetLife Bank, National City, PNC, Sovereign Bank, Sun-Trust Mortgage, U.S. Bank, Wachovia, Washington Mutual, and Wells Fargo.

Fitch cuts Ratings on Goldman, Deutsche, five other large banks

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EDITOR’S COMMENT: Why would regulatory challenges be a threat to the financial viability of the Banks? answer: because the challenges they are talking about drive a stake though the heart of lies perpetuated by those Banks. the result is that they could be required to tell the truth. If they tell the truth, then they have a double whammy — (1) they don’t actually have the assets they report on their balance sheet which would immediately put them in violation of reserve requirements causing the immediate takeover and dissolution of those Banks and (2) they have a huge liability which is also not properly reflected on their balance sheet for damages and buybacks and potentially punitive damages for lying to investors and borrowers. Overstated assets and understated liabilities would place the Banks in negative net worth position and that would cause them to collapse.

This would actually be more of a change in our political system than in our financial system, notwithstanding the scare tactics of TBTF (too big to fail), which is nothing more than a living lie. Dissolution of the mega banks would shift Market power back to the more than 7,000 OTHER banks, and cut the amount of Bank money in politics by about 95% thus breaking the Bank oligopoly. A more decentralised Banking system would result in more intelligent loans being available to credit worthy start-ups and expansion of small businesses, who account for more than 70% of all U. S. Employment. Employment would rise because new jobs would be created. As more people went back to work, more taxes would be paid, thus giving Federal, State and local governments desperately needed tax revenue.

So overall the rating agencies are in agreement: the Mega Banks may be in for hard times. The only reason it isn’t a certainty is they don’t know if the public has the political will to kick the incumbents out of office and restore “order” to our political and economic system.

Fitch cuts Goldman, Deutsche, five other large banks

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/16/us-banks-ratings-fitch-idUSTRE7BE2AO20111216?rpc=71&feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews
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NORRIS: LAWSUITS AGAINST AUDITORS ARE COMING AND THEY WILL BE HUGE

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CLASS ACTION LAWYERS SHOULD LOOK AT A HOMEOWNER SUITS AGAINST MEGABANK AUDITORS

AUDIT STANDARDS REQUIRE A HEALTHY DEGREE OF “SKEPTICISM”

 

EDITOR’S NOTE: 4 years ago, I spoke with some people in the big SEC auditing firms that give “clean” letters to public companies stating that the financial statements are a fair representation of the financial condition and operations during the period covered by the statements. Those of us who studied auditing, or like me who have taught auditing, know that those clean statements have not been true for decades, including most notably the absence of a caveat regarding the viability of the companies that were engaged in questionable and in some cases unfathomable transactions involving exotic financial instruments. If Alan Greenspan couldn’t understand it, then how could the auditor write a letter like that for JPM, Citi, BOA, Wells Fargo, Chase, et al?

Like the false appraisals by a rating agencies for these exotic instruments, and like the false appraisals coming from lenders who hired appraisers to “come in” at the necessary fair market value of the underlying property in order to close the deal so they could quickly take their fees and toss the risk onto investors and homeowners, the absence of the auditors screams out for justice. What would have happened if the auditors said flat out that the viability of these megabanks was in question in the event these exotic instruments imploded,, and that there was no way for them to accurately confirm the value that management had placed on them nor anyway to confirm that they were tier 1, 2 or 3 assets?

The question answers itself. Without a clean letter, the companies would have been forced into a policy of reporting that was transparent which, after all, is the reason for the audit — so the investors, prospective investors and customers and vendors of the company can accurately assess their risk in doing business with these megabanks. What would have happened? We all know. If the statements showed what we know today to have been the truth all along, the entire securitization illusion would have collapsed even as it began, and the Great Recession would never have occurred, the housing market would never have gone thorough the gyration that now effect virtually 100% of all Americans, directly or indirectly, and the life-styles and in some cases the lives of depressed people who took the lives of their families and then themselves would never have in the history books or on the media — because they would have been non-existent.

 

Troubled Audit Opinions

By

On one side is an assessment of a company with a clean audit opinion from the Toronto office of Ernst & Young, and with bonds rated just below investment grade by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. It has raised billions in capital markets.

On the other is an investment research firm using the name Muddy Waters Research. It says the company, the Sino-Forest Corporation, is a fraud, and that its shares are worthless.

As this is written, there is no definitive answer as to who is right. But the initial reaction of the markets seemed to be that they had more trust in the short-seller — a company whose Web site gives no address — than in the auditor’s opinion.

The shares, traded in Toronto, lost more than 70 percent of their value in two days, shaving $3 billion off its valuation. Bond prices also plunged. Prices had to fall sharply before speculators could be found who were willing to bet that the financial statements really did, in the boilerplate words of the auditor’s letter, “present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of Sino-Forest Corporation.”

If there was a fraud, there is no doubt that Ernst & Young will be sued, and there is even less doubt that it will deny responsibility. After all, its letter did make clear that management was responsible for the internal controls needed to assure the statements are “free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error.”

To the auditing industry, the fact that investors tend to blame auditors when frauds go undetected reflects unrealistic expectations, not bad work by the auditors. The rules say auditors are supposed to have a “healthy degree of skepticism,” but not to detect all frauds.

“There is a significant expectations gap between what various stakeholders believe auditors do or should do in detecting fraud, and what audit networks are actually capable of doing, at the prices that companies or investors are willing to pay for audits,” stated a position paper issued in 2006 by the chief executives of the six largest audit networks.

Note that last part. They suggested that if investors were really worried about fraud, they should consider paying more for a “forensic audit” that would have a better — but not guaranteed — chance of spotting fraud. Don’t like our work? Pay us more.

There is no doubt that some companies are easier to audit than others, and that Sino-Forest falls on the harder side. While it has headquarters in Toronto and Hong Kong, its operations are — or at least are claimed to be — spread out over much of China. The company says it manages nearly two million acres in forest plantations across China. Muddy Waters says that is a lie, and that its actual operations are much smaller.

Investors trying to decide whether to believe the Muddy Waters report, with its detailed assertion that the company’s claims are contradicted by Chinese records, would love to know just what Ernst did to check. What records did it inspect? Which tree plantations did it visit? Who did the work? Was it people from Ernst’s Toronto office, which signed the report, or people from a Chinese affiliate? How many auditors did the work, over what period of time?

Ernst’s audit opinion does not say, which is no surprise. Virtually every audit opinion in the world says almost the same thing, with no details about the company being audited. Auditors are paid millions of dollars to produce a report that no one thinks is worth reading.

On June 21, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, which regulates auditors in the United States, plans to ask for public comments on whether to require auditors to do more and say more.

One idea the board is expected to consider is requiring auditors to disclose more about what they did, and did not, do. Ideally, auditors would point to things that they could not audit. There are a lot of them now, and sometimes they are crucial.

“The foundation” of the Sino-Forest fraud, stated the Muddy Waters report, “is its convoluted structure whereby it runs much of its revenues through ‘authorized intermediaries.’ ” Those organizations supposedly process tax payments owed to China on wood production, the report said, thereby assuring the company “leaves its auditors far less of a paper trail.”

Auditors could be called upon to specify where they thought fraud was most likely in a given company or industry, and what they did to confront the risk. Investors could have a chance then of comparing the work of differing audit firms, as one firm disclosed it had checked something other auditors did not mention.

If an audit was expected to call attention to possibly critical information that was not available to the auditors, perhaps there might be pressure from investors on companies to make that information available. In any case, investors could better understand what the auditors knew — and did not know — in reaching their conclusions.

The problems with audits now go well beyond questions of fraud. A critical element for many banks is the valuation of securities that trade infrequently, if at all. There may be a wide range of possible estimates, and the auditor now must simply conclude the estimates are within that range. If so, it signs off.

To make things worse, the estimates may have come not from the company being audited, whose work the auditor can examine, but from a pricing service that views its models as proprietary, making them virtually impossible to audit. That fact is something investors should know, but now do not.

Nor do auditors disclose information about how reasonable an estimate is. In some cases, a wide range might be defensible, and investors have no way to know whether a company was particularly conservative or aggressive in its estimates. The oversight board may consider asking that companies disclose what they deem to be the range of reasonable estimates, and why they chose the one they did. Then the auditors could comment on that.

If auditors enforced some consistency on ranges, then financial statements of different companies might be more comparable, even though they chose different estimates.

The accounting oversight board is also expected to ask if it is time to end the “one grade fits all” audit model, in which every company is deemed to “fairly” present its results. Perhaps a second grade could be added, like “presents adequately,” for companies that push the envelope but do not violate the rules.

In addition, auditors could be called upon to discuss the risks the company was taking. They could also be asked to call attention to some of the most critical disclosures in the footnotes, something that French auditors already do.

If much of that happened, audit opinions could become a lot more interesting to read. Investors might actually learn something, and they might be able to form opinions about differences in audit firms.

Another long-overdue change would be to have the lead partner on an audit sign the opinion in the annual report. Now, the firm signs, and investors have no way of knowing who was responsible. If an audit signed by a certain partner later blew up, that could be devastating to his or her career if investors shied away from any companies whose audits he later signed. Would that make auditors more careful? Perhaps.

This week, as the controversy over Sino-Forest raged, Canadian regulators began an investigation and the company indignantly defended itself. “I have spent 17 years building Sino-Forest and I can promise investors we are not guilty of the charges levied against us,” said Allen Chan, the chairman. “Our financial statements have been audited by Ernst & Young a leading international audit firm….”

Its board appointed a special committee of three directors, all Canadians who served on the company’s audit committee and including a former Ernst partner, to investigate. The committee hired PricewaterhouseCoopers, another member of the Big Four.

Investors seemed confused. After the plunge of last week, the shares bounced around on extremely heavy volume this week. They rose a bit on Thursday to 5.15 Canadian dollars ($5.26), but were still down 72 percent from the price of 18.21 Canadian dollars just before the charges were aired last week.

Moody’s said it will review its ratings and “seek to assess the veracity of the claims” made by Muddy Waters. It gave details of what it would check.

But Ernst was mute, unwilling to either defend its work or discuss how it had reached its now-questioned conclusion that the financial statements “present fairly” the company’s condition. Investors who relied on the audit will just have to wait.

“It would be inappropriate to make any comment while the work of the special committee is ongoing,” said Amanda Olliver, a spokeswoman for the audit firm in Toronto. “In any event,” she added, “our professional obligations prevent us from speaking about client matters.”

Another Failed Bank: 45th this Year — MegaBank Failure on the Way

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“MEGABANKS IN STATE OF UNDISCLOSED FAILURE

Fortune has examined dozens of court records that corroborate the
employee’s testimony. And if Countrywide’s mortgage securitizations
systematically failed as it appears they did, Bank of America’s
potential liability dwarfs its shareholder equity, as the
Congressional Oversight Panel points out.

Field is referencing Countrywide v. Kemp, and the sworn testimony of
Linda DeMartini, a top official at BofA. She acknowledged on the
record in a deposition that Countrywide never conveyed the mortgages
to the trusts, and that Countrywide notes “weren’t endorsed except on
a case-by-case basis generally long after securitization ostensibly
occurred.” This would mean that the mortgage-backed securities
composed of Countrywide loans are, in fact, non-mortgage-backed
securities. And Field did the grunt work of looking at the court
records, which back up DeMartini’s claim. None of the 104 Countrywide
notes she looked at in two New York counties were endorsed originally.
Read the whole story, it’s a good one.  [cont'd.]

EDITOR’S NOTE: 45 BANKS HAVE BEEN SEIZED BY THE FDIC. BUT THAT IS ONLY 1% OF THE STORY. THE REST OF THE STORY IS THAT ANY BANK HOLDING “MORTGAGE-BASED ASSETS” HAS ALREADY FAILED BUT IT ISN’T DECLARED. And with the Federal Reserve getting ready to raise reserve requirements, the situation is going to get worse for the MegaBanks until their auditors can’t stand the suspense any more.

Just as the GDP is misstated by the reports of the megabanks with their trading activity being the largest source of “revenue” and the trading being a cover for repatriating money stolen during the mortgage meltdown, the illusion of activity, revenue and profits is being dispelled by questions among auditors as to how to treat the mortgage-based assets. The auditing firms stand to lose a lot if they don’t  take action in a way that  shields them from potential liability. When these Mega Banks finally tumble, they will take the auditing firms and potentially others with them.

By my reckoning and the analysis offered by others who are recognized experts, BOA, Citi, Chase, Morgan, Wells Fargo and others are already failed banks. A large part of their balance sheet is based upon assets that do not exist, never existed, and cannot be brought to life, much less onto a balance sheet as a true asset. Title analysis and securitization analysis shows clearly that each closing of each of more than 80 million residential real estate transactions shows the following, for each loan that was claimed to be part of a securitized transaction:

  1. The party identified as “lender,” “mortgagee”, or beneficiary was either a non-lending institution or an institution who could have loaned the money but didn’t. The pattern of conduct was table-funded transactions, which according to the Truth in Lending Act and Reg Z are presumptively predatory loans. They are considered predatory because by depriving the borrower of important information concerning the identity of the actual lender/creditor, the borrower was prevented from knowing facts that went into the decision about whether to execute the documents. It was fraud in the inducement. The failure to disclose the table-funded nature of the transaction, hidden fees paid to the party identified as the originating lender were withheld from the disclosure statements given to the borrower. Thus, by not knowing who he/she was dealing with and by not knowing about all the extra fees distributed in the feeding frenzy, the borrower was not alerted to the fact that excessive fees were being paid to everyone concerned, including the mortgage broker and the appraiser. Failing to know this, the borrower was unaware that by shopping further, the truth about the price of the loan, the loan appraisal, and the viability of the loan were not only withheld from the borrower, but were used against him/her. This in turn gives rise to rights of rescission which have been often declared by the borrower but ignored by the servicer and the securitizers, as well as causes of action for fraud that could easily exceed the nominal balance of the mortgage stated on the closing documents.
  2. Each documented transaction then creates an unresolvable defect: the party identified on the closing documents was neither the source of funding nor the creditor in any sense of the word. They were acting in most cases as an unregistered unregulated mortgage broker and straw-man for an undisclosed creditor. The effect of this is that the note names a payee based upon a loan from that payee that the payee never funded. The note therefore while appearing real on its face is actually a nullity (void) because it describes a transaction that never in fact took place. Like wise, the mortgage purports to secure the named lender for collection of the balance due on the note. The balance due under the note is zero because the transaction described never took place. While it is possible to reconstitute the mortgage and maybe even the note, it would take a lawsuit filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, in which the Plaintiff pleads and proves a case that there was a scrivener’s error in the identification of the lender and payee. This is why the notes were never actually transferred and why it is necessary for the Banks to fabricate and forge documents to make it appear that their was a transfer of the note and mortgage when the underlying transaction did not exist. While the courts have largely fallen for this ploy, more and more Judges are realizing that the paperwork does not add up.
  3. Each monetary transaction dubbed “mortgage loan”  is undocumented and unsecured. The investor-lender was the source of funds and either the investors lenders should have been described, as they are now, as “certificate holders” (a euphemism because the certificates were never issued either) or if the pool was actually created and a trustee or manager appointed as authorized agent, the Trustee or agent should have been named as a payee on a note and the secured party on a mortgage. The presence and identity of the presumed creditor was already known (but withheld from borrower)  at closing, although possibly not known by the title agent or escrow agent. The proper parties were not named in the closing documentation and even if they were, the money trail shows that the funds taken from the investor were not used in the manner expected or desired by the investor, with special emphasis on those instances in which the investment bank took as much as 50% or more of the investor funds and claimed them as profits, which were secreted off-shore, and which are gradually being repatriated  to create the illusion of trading profits when in fact the profits are not real nor legal. The absence of documentation for the actual monetary transaction means that none of these transaction are secured.
  4. While the true source of the funds for the loan were the investor-lenders, the only documentation received by the true creditors was executed by parties other than the homeowner-borrower. Those documents refer to the documented transaction with the straw-man lender and not the actual monetary transaction. Hence the investor-lender does not have a signed note, mortgage or any agreement with the homeowner-borrower. In all cases in which a different agreement with different parties is attempted to be used as evidence of the obligation, the case fails. Thus the assets claimed by any alleged “owner” of the mortgage documentation are worthless because the documents describe a transaction that is fictitious while those same documents scrupulously avoid describing the real transaction. 
  5. While every state has a procedure to correct, modify or reform documentation that is prepared in error, the facts show that these documents were intentionally prepared with defects. The party to bring such an action to straighten out the paperwork is the investor-lender or the authorized agent who brings such a lawsuit naming the disclosed principal(s) for whom the action is filed. 
  6. The investor lenders have chosen NOT to file such actions and NOT to pursue the homeowners for collection. There are economic and legal reasons for the investors avoiding any attempt to collect from the homeowners. The economic reason is that the best the investor can hope for is that out of the money that was advanced by the investor only part was used to fund mortgages, and the only part of the advance that could ever be claimed against a homeowner is not the larger amount advanced to the investment banker but the smaller amount advanced to the homeowner or on the homeowner’s behalf. Thus in order to make the claim and recover theoretically in full, the investor would have to name BOTH the homeowner and the securitizers (including the investment banks, whom the investors ARE suing for payment in full) to reach all the potential claims for all the money advanced. The investors in short have elected their remedy and have sued the investment bank. The second economic reason for the investors’ decision to not pursue the homeowner is that they are looking at collateral  that was overstated at the time of closing, and now obviously showing its true value at a fraction of the amount that was funded for the loan, which fraction is lower than the amount allocatable as advanced by the investor for making the loan. Thus for every $1 originally advanced to the investment bank, the investor is, for the most part, looking at a maximum recovery of at best 30 cents. But by suing the investment bank, the investor gets the benefit of claiming 100 cents on the dollar because it includes all money advanced to the securitizers, whether deployed for mortgage funding or not, and incorporates the appraisal fraud at closing.
  7. The legal reason why the investors do not want to pursue homeowners, is that they would be “owning” the homeowners’ affirmative defenses and counterclaims which if fully adjudicated could easily exceed the balance due under the loan, which is unsecured as described above. 
  8. Since none of the securitizers were the actual source of funding for any of the loans, the only theoretical asset they hold is a mortgage bond they are holding because they got stuck with it before they could sell it off to unsuspecting clients. But the mortgage bond is based upon (a) a transaction that did not exist (see above) and (b) even if the transaction did exist, the transfer into the pool never occurred, thus rendering the mortgage bond worthless or less than worthless if the bond was subject to tranche counterparty indebtedness. 

Hence the asset on the books of the securitizers related to mortgage “interests” is an illusion. And the failure of the auditors to make a statement regarding the questionable nature of these assets is actionable. But more importantly, the assets claimed on the securitizers balance sheets constitutes a large portion of their total assets. Wipe those out and the bank is suddenly smaller and out of compliance with the reserve requirements of the Federal Reserve and any other agency regulating the activities of a lending institution. Unless they suddenly repatriate the hidden fees from the mortgage meltdown which I estimate to be around $2 trillion, the bank is in the state of undeclared failure. And if they do repatriate the money all at once, they will have a lot of questions to answer including why they needed a bailout.

Failed Bank Tally Reaches 45 in 2011

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

WASHINGTON (AP) — Regulators on Friday shut a small bank in South Carolina, the 45th bank failure this year.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation seized Atlantic Bank and Trust, based in Charleston, S.C., with $208.2 million in assets and $191.6 million in deposits. First Citizens Bank and Trust, based in Columbia, S.C., agreed to assume its assets and deposits.

The F.D.I.C. and First Citizens Bank agreed to share losses on $141.8 million of Atlantic Bank’s assets. The bank’s failure is expected to cost the deposit insurance fund $36.4 million.

MARY COCHRANE UNRAVELS CHASE MANAHATTEN MORTGAGE CORPORATION

COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE

Pay Attention Please very important to many consumers: ‘CMMC’

Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation
(Parent JPM)

in Agreements with Norwest Corp in 1996 its newly acquired affiliate, largest producer of non-conforming mortgage products…. Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV’s) joint ventures …

As related to
Norwest Asset Acceptance Corp (no 10K’s)
Filings by: Wells Fargo Asset Securities (no 10K’s)
Formerly: Norwest Asset Securities Corp 7/17/96 and 6/11/1996
7485 New Horizon Way
Frederick MD 21703
Jurisdiction: DE
IRS 52-2049703
Asset Backed Securities SIC Code 6189

c/o Norwest Mortgage, Inc.
Formerly Known As:
Directors Asset Conduit Corp 7/31/97
343 Thornall Street, 5th Floor
Edison, NJ 08837
(908) 906-3909
(6) SEC FILINGS 7/31/97 to 5/13/98
Similar:
Norwest Asset Acceptance Corp Ass Bked Cert Ser 1998-He1 Tr
(Filer) (Owner)

Filing Agent: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan 1/6/94 to 5/11/11

Norwest Bank as Master Servicer of Mortgage Loans under PSA SERVICING
and is obligated to make payments of principal and interest on any Mortgage Loans to the extent in the PSA (Reconstituted Servicing Agreement)


http://www.secinfo.com/dReJe.8A5.htm#zi7

Norwest Asset Securities Corp
and Structured Asset Securities Corp

WFC and JPM – who controlled real estate industry thru? Structured Asset Securities Corp?

Norwest Asset Securities Corp, a DE corp, proposes to issue and sell as UNDERWRITER certificats … issued under PSA, as depositor, Norwest Bank Minnesota NA, as Master Servicer and as Trustee.

Norwest Asset Securities Corp – Certificate of Incorporation
The purpose for which the Corporation is organized is (a) to
purchase or otherwise acquire, own, hold, sell, transfer, assign, pledge,
finance, refinance and otherwise deal with (i) mortgage loans, certificates or
other securities issued or guaranteed by the Government National Mortgage
Association, (ii) mortgage loans, certificates or other securities issued or guaranteed by the Federal National Mortgage Association,
(iii) mortgage loans, certificates or other securities issued or guaranteed by
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, (iv) deeds of trust, mortgage loans,
mortgage participations, mortgage pass-through certificates or collateralized
mortgage obligations issued by any person or entity or other types of mortgage-
related securities including residual interests, (v) direct obligations of, and
obligations fully guaranteed by, the United States of America or any agency or
instrumentality of the United States the obligations of which are backed by the
full faith and credit of the United States of America, (vi) certificates
representing interests in the principal and/or interest payable on any of the
foregoing and (vii) such other securities and investments as may be permitted by
or acceptable to the applicable nationally-recognized statistical rating agency
or agencies referred to in subsection (b) of this Article 3; and (b) to issue,
offer, sell and own one or more series of mortgage pass-through certificates,
collateralized mortgage obligations, mortgage-backed bonds or other debt or
equity securities (the “Securities”) representing ownership interests in, or
collateralized by, any of the foregoing, related property and/or collections and
proceeds in respect thereof; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that the acts and activities and
exercise of any powers permitted in subsections (a) and (b) of this Article 3
shall be limited solely to matters (1) related to the Securities or (2) related
to such other similar transactions which do not result in a downgrade by the
nationally-recognized statistical rating agency or agencies which will rate,
upon issuance, each series of the Securities of the ratings accorded to such
series of the Securities; and (c) to engage in any activity and to exercise any
powers permitted to corporations under the laws of the State of Delaware that
are incident to the foregoing and necessary or convenient to accomplish the
foregoing.

(h) The Corporation shall not form, or cause to be formed, any subsidiaries.

(i) The Corporation shall act solely in its corporate name and
through its duly authorized officers or agents in the conduct of its business,
and shall conduct its business so as not to mislead others as to the identity of
the entity with which they are concerned

Corporation to have a perpetual existence


http://www.secinfo.com/dRqWm.95ph.c.htm

Incorporator: Stephen D Morrison 1/28/98 As Signatory (Director, Officer, Attorney, Accountant, Banker, Agent, etc.)
“Stephen D. Morrison” has been a Signatory for/with the following 2 Registrants:
Norwest Integrated Structured Assets Inc [ formerly Norwest Structured Assets Inc ]
Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corp [ formerly Norwest Asset Securities Corp ]

Norwest Integrated Structured Assets Inc.
Formerly:
Norwest Structured Assets Inc. 12/12/96
c/o Norwest Bank Minnesota NA
11000 Broken Land Parkway
Columbia MD 21044

Mailing Address:
c/o Norwest Structured Assets Inc.
5325 Spectrum Dr
Frederick MD 21703
Jurisdiction: DE IRS 52-2009776

AW – Withdrew from SEC above

Left active for 25,839 SEC Filings 3/10/98 to 5/4/11 including Sequoit Mortgage Trust 2011-1
as Filder, as Owner as Filing Agent

Norwest Asset Sec Corp Mort Ps Thr Cert Ser 1998-1 Trust – Registrant
c/o Norwest BGank Minnesota NA
1100 Broken Land Parkway
Colbumia MD 21703
NO IRS#
Incorporated IN NY and yet there is no business entity for this ‘Issuing Entity’ transactions flow through. (1) 10K 3/25/1999
Form 15-D filed
Suspension of Duty to File Report

REDACTED: DJL Commercial Mortgage 1998-cf1

Administrative Action You Can Use: F.D.I.C. Sues WAMU (now Chase) Ex-Chief

COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary SEE LIVINGLIES LITIGATION SUPPORT AT LUMINAQ.COM

conformedcomplaint

“They focused on short-term gains to increase their own compensation, with reckless disregard for WaMu’s long-term safety and soundness,” the agency said in the 63-page complaint. “The F.D.I.C. brings this complaint to hold these highly paid senior executives, who were chiefly responsible for WaMu’s higher-risk home lending program, accountable for the resulting losses.”

EDITOR’S NOTE: READ THE COMPLAINT. In my opinion it constitutes an administrative finding by the lead federal agency that lending practices were fatally defective. In my opinion this constitutes enough, through judicial notice, to shift the burden of proof onto the other side as to most of your defenses, affirmative defenses and counterclaims. In fact, if you look at ANY complaint filed by an administrative agency, I believe it can be used as prima facie finding of wrong-doing. To the extent that a complaint from an administrative agency states that it has performed an investigation and affirmatively alleges that a particular defendant did something wrong as specifically set forth in that complaint, it is my opinion that through judicial notice, this constitutes a final finding of fact by an official agency which MUST be taken as a prima facie case.

PRACTICE NOTE: It won’t carry the same weight as a written decision following an administrative hearing, but the same law can be applied and it will carry a lot of weight.

F.D.I.C. Sues Ex-Chief of Big Bank That Failed

By ERIC DASH

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation sued the former chief executive of Washington Mutual and two of his top lieutenants, accusing them of reckless lending before the 2008 collapse of what was the nation’s largest savings bank.

The civil lawsuit, seeking to recover $900 million, is the first against a major bank chief executive by the regulator and follows escalating public pressure to hold bankers accountable for actions leading up to the financial crisis.

Kerry K. Killinger, Washington Mutual’s longtime chief executive, led the bank on a “lending spree” knowing that the housing market was in a bubble and failed to put in place the proper risk management systems and internal controls, according to a complaint filed on Thursday in federal court in Seattle.

David C. Schneider, WaMu’s president of home lending, and Stephen J. Rotella, its chief operation officer, were also accused of negligence for their roles in developing and leading the bank’s aggressive growth strategy.

“They focused on short-term gains to increase their own compensation, with reckless disregard for WaMu’s long-term safety and soundness,” the agency said in the 63-page complaint. “The F.D.I.C. brings this complaint to hold these highly paid senior executives, who were chiefly responsible for WaMu’s higher-risk home lending program, accountable for the resulting losses.”

In addition, the complaint says that Mr. Killinger and his wife, Linda, set up two trusts in August 2008 to keep his homes in California and Washington out of the reach of the bank’s creditors. Months earlier, in the spring of 2008, Mr. Rotella and his wife, Esther, made similar arrangements. The F.D.I.C. is seeking to freeze the assets of both couples and named the wives as defendants in the lawsuit.

In unusually vigorous denials, Mr. Killinger and Mr. Rotella came out swinging against the F.D.I.C. Mr. Killinger said the agency’s claims were “baseless and unworthy of the government” and its legal conclusions were “political theater.” Mr. Rotella said the action “runs counter to the facts about my relatively short time at the company,” calling it “unfair and an abuse of power.” He said the trust was for normal estate planning purposes and was set up before the bank’s downfall. Mr. Schneider, who is represented by the same lawyer as Mr. Rotella, did not release a public statement.

Although the F.D.I.C. is mainly known for its role in shuttering failed lenders, the agency has a legal obligation to bring lawsuits against former directors and officers when it finds evidence of wrongdoing.

So far, the F.D.I.C. has brought claims against 158 individuals at about 20 small banks that failed during the recent crisis. The agency is seeking a total of more than $2.6 billion in damages. But the $900 million case against the former WaMu officials is its biggest and most prominent action to date.

Federal regulators have come under fire for failing to hold executives responsible for their involvement in the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Last fall, the Securities and Exchange Commission reached a settlement with Angelo R. Mozilo, the former chief executive of Countrywide Financial, to pay a $22.5 million penalty over misleading investors about the financial condition of the giant mortgage lender.

The New York attorney general’s office has brought a civil suit against Kenneth D. Lewis over improper disclosures related to the 2008 rescue of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America, of which he was chief executive.

But several investigations into the actions of executives at the American International Group, Lehman Brothers and other financial firms have stalled — especially criminal cases, which have a much higher burden of proof.

The F.D.I.C., meanwhile, has been under intense pressure to recoup as much money as possible on behalf of Washington Mutual bondholders, who were outraged over its sale in September 2008. Critics said the agency moved too quickly to seize the troubled bank, and then allowed JPMorgan Chase to snap up its assets and branches for a mere $1.8 billion. Ever since, they have unleashed a wave of litigation and asked lawmakers to hold hearings about the controversial rescue.

In his statement, Mr. Rotella suggested the lawsuit was a way for the F.D.I.C. to extract a windfall from directors’ and officers’ insurers, which would want to settle any claims.

The F.D.I.C. complaint says that Mr. Killinger and his top lieutenants took “extreme and historically unprecedented risks” as the savings bank plunged headlong into risky mortgage lending near the height of the housing boom. As experienced bankers, they should have tempered this growth strategy and improved risk management systems to reduce potential losses if the real estate market fell, according to the complaint.

Instead, according to the complaint, they ignored the warnings of the bank’s risk managers and sank deeper into the risky subprime lending and hot real estate markets, like Florida and California. Indeed, the complaint lists more than 26 areas in which they acted recklessly, including a failure to put adequate limits on the concentration of mortgages and employee compensation programs that encouraged high loan volume at the expense of loan quality. The complaint quotes Washington Mutual’s own chief risk officer as telling Mr. Killinger, just weeks before it was seized, that the “risk chromosome” was missing from the bank’s DNA.

In lengthy statements, Mr. Killinger and Mr. Rotella disputed the basic thrust of the F.D.I.C.’s case and reiterated their belief that Washington Mutual was prematurely and unfairly seized. They also insisted that they behaved prudently, acted with constant oversight of banking regulators and took strong action to shore up the bank’s finances when market conditions worsened in late 2007 and early 2008.

“Those initiatives — once applauded by the regulators as diligent and responsible management — have, through the alchemy of Washington, D.C., politics been turned into allegations of gross negligence,” Mr. Killinger said in a statement.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNDERWATER: TIME TO CORRECT PRINCIPAL BALANCES

COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary

We now have a growing group of unlikely bedfellows — investors, homeowners and local governments who were all duped and whose claims are being treated as though each one was unique when in fact the entire plan was a highly organized crime. Add the Federal government to that group who has also demanded “buy-back” of fake mortgages and fake mortgage bonds, although it is highly probable that the government was complicit, certainly in the BUSH administration when the Government and the Fed started all these bailout programs whose total seems to exceed the total of ALL credit that was extended in the original transactions!?!

MY QUESTION IS WHETHER DIMON IS RIGHT: DOES HE LIVE IN A COMPLETELY RISK-FREE ENVIRONMENT OR ARE WE GOING TO APPLY THE LAW TO HIM? GOD HELP US IF HIS ASSUMPTION IS CORRECT.

THE MORE IMPORTANT QUESTION IS WHETHER WE ARE FINALLY GOING TO MAKE THE OBVIOUS CORRECTION OF AN OBVIOUS LIE ABOUT THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES AND THE ELABORATELY CONSTRUCTED ILLUSION OF “GROWTH” ? IT ISN’T “PRINCIPAL REDUCTION” TO CUT IT DOWN TO THE REAL FIGURE THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN USED — IT’S PRINCIPAL CORRECTION.

STATES, COUNTIES, CITIES, TOWNS, INVESTORS AND HOMEOWNERS CAN ONLY GET OUT FROM UNDER THE ILLUSION OF DEBT BY ACKNOWLEDGING THE OBVIOUS — IT ISN’T REALLY THERE IF YOU APPLY THE LAW. IT’S ONLY THERE IF YOU APPLY UNBOUNDED POWER.

EDITOR’S COMMENT: Time for local government to start seeking debt relief and doing those securitization reports and research. Whether they received money from the banks or not, officials in local government are being forced to face the reality that they are presiding over the collapse of our social system for lack of money.

They are in debt — and the amount of debt so vastly exceeds their ability to pay or any prospect to pay that defaults are inevitable — including strategic defaults and bankruptcies where the debt is modified downward. In other words, they are in the same boat as the homeowners.

Actually they are worse off because Wall Street had the nerve to sell local governments triple-A rated mortgage bonds that were worthless, putting them both in the same boat as homeowners and the same boat as other investors.

And if you dig deeper you will connect the dots — the appraisal fraud and other misleading information led these municipalities, towns and counties into planning and for phenomenal growth in demand for services over wider geographical areas, each local government believing that their revenue stream and population would grow at a rate that was both unprecedented and unsupported by any economic fundamentals. They are now stuck with debt to pay for services, they won’t deliver, roads they won’t build, and buildings that are being abandoned or sold.

In plain language, the argument that the crisis grew from greedy homeowners must also be extended to greedy politicians who intentionally bankrupted their cities and towns in the misguided attempt to make a fast buck. Few people will argue whether people are greedy, whether they are homeowners or politicians, but the argument that they would intentionally put themselves in a position of drowning in debt is absurd. There is only one reason this all happened — Wall Street sales machine went to work selling people on “concept” and funding it with other people’s money to create a vast illusion for which we are all paying whether we  participated or not.

The astonishing reversal of fortune for virtually all Americans (except a select few who continue to lie about what they did and when they knew what they were doing) and all their societal structures, governments and government services (police, fore, medical, education etc) is in stark contrast to the massive profits and bonuses that continue to be reported and paid on Wall Street. The entire country has been tilted past the tipping point, so that everything of value went from the the nation as a whole to Wall Street.

In a NY Times Magazine article on Jamie Dimon he continues the BIG LIE strategy that Moynihan over at BofA is using: we had didn’t realize the extent of the lying on stated income loans. He’s staying on message because it is working. As a group, most of us still want to believe and do believe that our system will not break down, but it IS breaking down. The process is already underway. Dimon’s current lie is intended to distract us from considering that the lie was created by him and his officers and employees. The lie works because you must take the time away from your job-hunting and ask yourself how all those applications were filled with bad information without anyone knowing about it. “Due diligence,” a term coined on Wall Street for inspecting the chicken before you buy it, is NEVER overlooked.

Countrywide, Chase, Citi, Goldman and others lied about the quality of the loans and the values of the real property and the documentation of the loans, notes and mortgages because they could. They controlled the entire apparatus. The sheer size made it look “institutionalinstead of organized crime. Of course they knew, but they were acting in a totally risk-free environment because they were using other people’s money — investors to whom they lied with the same lies that were told to borrowers — we have reviewed the application, verified the data, verified the value of the property, and the loan meets with underwriting standards. The loan is approved. Or in the case of local government, the bond is approved, the underwriting and selling of it shall begin.

We now have a growing group of unlikely bedfellows — investors, homeowners and local governments who were all duped and whose claims are being treated as though each one was unique when in fact the entire plan was a highly organized crime. Add the Federal government to that group who has also demanded “buy-back” of fake mortgages and fake mortgage bonds, although it is highly probable that the government was complicit, certainly in the BUSH administration when the Government and the Fed started all these bailout programs whose total seems to exceed the total of ALL credit that was extended in the original transactions!?!

MY QUESTION IS WHETHER DIMON IS RIGHT: DOES HE LIVE IN A COMPLETELY RISK-FREE ENVIRONMENT OR ARE WE GOING TO APPLY THE LAW TO HIM? GOD HELP US IF HIS ASSUMPTION IS CORRECT.

THE MORE IMPORTANT QUESTION IS WHETHER WE ARE FINALLY GOING TO MAKE THE OBVIOUS CORRECTION OF AN OBVIOUS LIE ABOUT THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES AND THE ELABORATELY CONSTRUCTED ILLUSION OF “GROWTH” ? IT ISN’T PRINCIPAL REDUCTION TO CUT IT DOWN TO THE REAL FIGURE THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN USED — IT’S PRINCIPAL CORRECTION.

STATES, COUNTIES, CITIES, TOWNS, INVESTORS AND HOMEOWNERS CAN ONLY GET OUT FROM UNDER THE ILLUSION OF DEBT BY ACKNOWLEDGING THE OBVIOUS — IT ISN’T REALLY THERE IF YOU APPLY THE LAW. IT’S ONLY THERE IF YOU APPLY UNBOUNDED POWER.

LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL

Mounting State Debts Stoke Fears of a Looming Crisis

By MICHAEL COOPER and MARY WILLIAMS WALSH

The State of Illinois is still paying off billions in bills that it got from schools and social service providers last year. Arizona recently stopped paying for certain organ transplants for people in its Medicaid program. States are releasing prisoners early, more to cut expenses than to reward good behavior. And in Newark, the city laid off 13 percent of its police officers last week.

While next year could be even worse, there are bigger, longer-term risks, financial analysts say. Their fear is that even when the economy recovers, the shortfalls will not disappear, because many state and local governments have so much debt — several trillion dollars’ worth, with much of it off the books and largely hidden from view — that it could overwhelm them in the next few years.

“It seems to me that crying wolf is probably a good thing to do at this point,” said Felix Rohatyn, the financier who helped save New York City from bankruptcy in the 1970s.

Some of the same people who warned of the looming subprime crisis two years ago are ringing alarm bells again. Their message: Not just small towns or dying Rust Belt cities, but also large states like Illinois and California are increasingly at risk.

Municipal bankruptcies or defaults have been extremely rare — no state has defaulted since the Great Depression, and only a handful of cities have declared bankruptcy or are considering doing so.

But the finances of some state and local governments are so distressed that some analysts say they are reminded of the run-up to the subprime mortgage meltdown or of the debt crisis hitting nations in Europe.

Analysts fear that at some point — no one knows when — investors could balk at lending to the weakest states, setting off a crisis that could spread to the stronger ones, much as the turmoil in Europe has spread from country to country.

Mr. Rohatyn warned that while municipal bankruptcies were rare, they appeared increasingly possible. And the imbalances are so large in some places that the federal government will probably have to step in at some point, he said, even if that seems unlikely in the current political climate.

“I don’t like to play the scared rabbit, but I just don’t see where the end of this is,” he added.

Resorting to Fiscal Tricks

As the downturn has ground on, some of the worst-hit cities and states have resorted to fiscal sleight of hand to stay afloat, helping them close yawning budget gaps each year, but often at great future cost.

Few workers with neglected 401(k) retirement accounts would risk taking out second mortgages to invest in stocks, gambling that the investment gains would be enough to build bigger nest eggs and repay the loans.

But that is just what Illinois, which has been failing to make the required annual payments to its pension funds for years, is doing. It borrowed $10 billion in 2003 and used the money to invest in its pension funds. The recession sent their investment returns below their target, but the state must repay the bonds, with interest. The solution? Illinois sold an additional $3.5 billion worth of pension bonds this year and is planning to borrow $3.7 billion more for its pension funds.

It is the long-term problems of a handful of states, including California, Illinois, New Jersey and New York, that financial analysts worry about most, fearing that their problems might precipitate a crisis that could hurt other states by driving up their borrowing costs.

But it is the short-term budget woes that nearly all states are facing that are preoccupying elected officials.

Illinois is not the only state behind on its bills. Many states, including New York, have delayed payments to vendors and local governments because they had too little cash on hand to make them. California paid vendors with i.o.u.’s last year. A handful of other states, worried about their cash flow, delayed paying tax refunds last spring.

Now, just as the downturn has driven up demand for state assistance, many states are cutting back.

The demand for food stamps has been rising significantly in Idaho, but tight budgets led the state to close nearly a third of the field offices of the state’s Department of Health and Welfare, which take applications for them. As states have cut aid to cities, many have resorted to previously unthinkable cuts, laying off police officers and closing firehouses.

Those cuts in aid to cities and counties, which are expected to continue, are one reason some analysts say cities are at greater risk of bankruptcy or are being placed under outside oversight.

Next year is unlikely to bring better news. States and cities typically face their biggest deficits after recessions officially end, as rainy-day funds are depleted and easy measures are exhausted.

This time is expected to be no different. The federal stimulus money increased the federal share of state budgets to over a third last year, from just over a quarter in 2008, according to a report issued last week by the National Governors Association and the National Association of State Budget Officers. That money is set to run out next summer. Tax collections, meanwhile, are not expected to return to their pre-recession levels for another year or two, given that the housing market and broader economy remain weak and that unemployment remains high.

Scott D. Pattison, the budget association’s director, said that for states, next year could be “the worst year of this four- or five-year downturn period.”

And few expect the federal government to offer more direct aid to states, at least in the short term. Many members of the new Republican majority in the House campaigned against the stimulus, and Washington is debating the recommendations of a debt-reduction commission.

So some states are essentially borrowing to pay their operating costs, adding new debts that are not always clearly disclosed.

Arizona, hobbled by the bursting housing bubble, turned to a real estate deal for relief, essentially selling off several state buildings — including the tower where the governor has her office — for a $735 million upfront payment. But leasing back the buildings over the next 20 years will ultimately cost taxpayers an extra $400 million in interest.

Many governments are delaying payments to their pension funds, which will eventually need to be made, along with the high interest — usually around 8 percent — that the funds are expected to earn each year.

New York balanced its budget this year by shortchanging its pension fund. And in New Jersey, Gov. Chris Christie deferred paying the $3.1 billion that was due to the pension funds this year.

It is these growing hidden debts that make many analysts nervous. States and municipalities currently have around $2.8 trillion worth of outstanding bonds, but that number is dwarfed by the debts that many are carrying off their books.

State and local pensions — another form of promised debt, guaranteed in some states by their constitutions — face hidden shortfalls of as much as $3.5 trillion by some calculations. And the health benefits that state and large local governments have promised their retirees going forward could cost more than $530 billion, according to the Government Accountability Office.

“Most financial crises happen in unpredictable ways, and they hit you when you’re not looking,” said Jerome H. Powell, a visiting scholar at the Bipartisan Policy Center who was an under secretary of the Treasury for finance during the bailout of the savings and loan industry in the early 1990s. “This one isn’t like that. You can see it coming. It would be sinful not to do something about this while there’s a chance.”

So far, investors have bought states’ bonds eagerly, on the widespread understanding that states and cities almost never default. But in recent weeks the demand has diminished sharply. Last month, mutual funds that invest in municipal bonds reported a big sell-off — a bigger one-week sell-off, in fact, than they had when the financial markets melted down in 2008. And hedge funds are already seeking out ways to place bets against the debts of some states, with the help of their investment banks.

Of course, not all states are in as dire straits as Illinois or California. And the credit-rating agencies say that the risk of default is small. States and cities typically make a priority of repaying their bond holders, even before paying for essential services. Standard & Poor’s issued a report this month saying that the crises that states and municipalities were facing were “more about tough decisions than potential defaults.”

Change in Ratings

The credit ratings of a number of local governments have improved this year, not because their finances have strengthened somewhat, but because the ratings agencies have changed the way they analyze governments.

The new higher ratings, which lower the cost of borrowing, emphasize the fact that municipal defaults have been much rarer than corporate defaults.

This October, Moody’s issued a report explaining why it now rates all 50 states, even Illinois, as better credit risks than a vast majority of American non-financial companies.

One reason: the belief that the federal government is more likely to bail out a teetering state than a bankrupt company.

“The federal government has broadly channeled cash to all state governments during recent recessions and provided support to individual states following natural disasters,” Moody’s explained, adding that there was no way of being sure how Washington would respond to a bond default by a state, since it had not happened since the 1930s.

But some analysts fear the ratings are too sanguine, recalling that the ratings agencies also dismissed the possibility that a subprime crisis was brewing. While most agree that defaults are unlikely, they fear that as states struggle with their growing debts, investors could decide not to buy the debt of the weakest state or local governments.

That would force a crisis, since states cannot operate if they cannot borrow. Such a crisis could then spread to healthier states, making it more expensive for them to borrow, if Europe is an example.

Meredith Whitney, a bank analyst who was among the first to warn of the impact the subprime mortgage meltdown would have on banks, is warning that she sees similar problems with state and local government finances.

“The state situation reminded me so much of the banks, pre-crisis,” she said this fall on CNBC.

There are eerie similarities between the subprime debt crisis and the looming municipal debt woes. Among them:

¶Just as housing was once considered a sure bet — prices would never fall all across the country at the same time, conventional wisdom suggested — municipal bonds have long been considered an investment safe enough for grandmothers, because states could always raise taxes to pay their bondholders. Now that proposition is being tested. Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania, considered bankruptcy this year because it faced $68 million in debt payments related to a failed incinerator, which is more than the city’s entire annual budget. But officials there have resisted raising taxes.

¶Much of the debt of states and cities is hidden, since it is off the books, just as the amount of mortgage-related debt turned out to be underestimated. States and municipalities often understate their pension liabilities, in part by using accounting methods that would not be allowed in the private sector. Joshua D. Rauh, an associate professor of finance at Northwestern University, and Robert Novy-Marx, an assistant professor of finance at the University of Rochester, calculated that the true unfunded liability for state and local pension plans is roughly $3.5 trillion.

¶The states and many cities still carry good ratings, and those issuing warnings are dismissed as alarmists, reminding some analysts of the lead up to the subprime crisis.

Now states are bracing for more painful cuts, more layoffs, more tax increases, more battles with public employee unions, more requests to bail out cities. And in the long term, as cities and states try to keep up on their debts, the very nature of government could change as they have less money left over to pay for the services they have long provided.

Richard Ravitch, the lieutenant governor of New York, is among those warning that states are on an unsustainable path, and that their disclosures of pension and health care obligations are often misleading. And he worries how long it can last.

“They didn’t do it with bad motives,” he said. “Ninety-five percent of them didn’t understand what they were doing. They did it because it was easier than taxing people or cutting benefits. We’re getting closer and closer to the point where we can’t do that anymore. I don’t know where that is, but I know we’re close.”

Fla Ct Finds JP Morgan Intentionally and Knowingly Committed Fraud on The Court

SERVICES YOU NEED

As basis for the legal case, WaMu had submitted an assignment of mortgage, which however the court just found never actually belonged to WaMu, and instead was carried on the books of Fannie Mae.”

EDITOR’S NOTE: It’s an old story to us but it’s news to everyone else. Yes it IS fraud, and all you have to do is look, inquire and aggressively press the opposition.

Just like Wells Fargo in Massachusetts, GMAC now in 23 states so far, the story is always the same — the lawyer doesn’t know who he/she represents and doesn’t care, the documents submitted are fabricated and forged and the representation that the would-be forecloser is a creditor is a plan and simple lie — only revealed AFTER they are pressed to support their claim of standing, real party in interest, holder of the note etc.

ALL the foreclosures and notices of sale, motions to lift stay, motions for summary judgment start the same way. Some party picked at random from the securitization chain comes in and starts a foreclosure sale (non-judicial) or a foreclosure lawsuit after documents are fabricated showing a chain of title that never happened and doesn’t exist.

MOST of the time borrowers and the Courts are intimidated by the presence of a “Bank” (which is neither acting as a bank nor was it the lender, creditor, or payee at any point in the process of the closing of the transaction between the homeowner as borrower and the investor as lender).

SOME of the time, borrowers are successful in their challenges to the foreclosure. The reason is not that the rest of the foreclosures are proper, right, legal or equitable. The reason is that in those cases where the borrower is successful they managed to get the Judge to pause long enough to actually look at the documents being presented and to allow the borrower to inquire as to their authenticity and authority. If there is such an inquiry the borrower wins. If there is no such inquiry, the borrower loses.

ALL of the proceedings in which foreclosures were initiated in both non-judicial and judicial states are fatally defective and has resulted in a pile of debris called “title” when in fact no title has been transferred, no credit bid was ever submitted and no deed was issued with authority from a party who possessed the right to convey title.

Each day an angry judge realizes he/she has been duped for years by these antics of people he knew and trusted. Criminal acts, contemptuous of the law and the Courts have been committed in millions of foreclosures.

None of the agencies that are charged with responsibility to regulate the activities of these banks, institutions or companies has lifted a finger to impose existing rules and regulations that were designed to prevent this behavior and punish it when it occurs. None of the Courts want to apply clear Federal law on the subject in the Truth in Lending Act and the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act. Because when it comes right down to it, the facts unfolding in the lead news stories and in the court orders being entered are downright unthinkable.

We have now come to that fork in the road where we must stop anyone who asks”why would they lie?” and simply admit that it has ALL been a BIG LIE and we have been living this lie for 10 years, hence the name of this blog.

So there is no mistake about it I am stating the opinion that NONE of the foreclosure sales on residential property in which the loan was originated as part of a securitization scheme are valid. They are void. If you think you lost your home you’re wrong no matter what anyone tells you. Any lawyer who studies this instead of responding from a knee-jerk “I remember that issue from law school” will come to the same conclusion — the title chain is not just clouded, it is fatally defective. That means the foreclosures were void according to existing law. It is the same effect as if I signed a warranty deed conveying title to YOUR home now. Such a document might LOOK good, but it is fraudulent, because I don’t have the title to convey much less warrant that it is good title. But if Judge won’t let you speak or won’t even consider the possibility that I would flat out lie and file a totally fraudulent deed, I’ll win and you’ll lose. That’s what is happening.

JPMorgan Brings Foreclosure Case In Mortgage In Which It Was Just A Servicer, Court Finds Bank Committed Fraud

Tyler Durden's picture

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 09/16/2010 16:37 -0500

An interesting development out of Jean Johnson, Circuit Judge in Duval Country, Florida, where in a case filed by JPMorgan/WaMu, as Plaintiff, and law firm of Shapiro and Fishman, attempted to evict defendants Hank and Marilyn Pocopanni. As basis for the legal case, WaMu had submitted an assignment of mortgage, which however the court just found never actually belonged to WaMu, and instead was carried on the books of Fannie Mae.

Once this was uncovered is where this case gets really interesting: In point 5 of the filing we read that the “plaintiff predecessor counsel made “clerical errors” when it represented to the Court that the plaintiff was the owner and holder of the note and mortgage rather than the servicer for the owner.”  Which means that only Fannie had the right to foreclose upon the Pocopannis, yet JPM, as servicer, decided to take that liberty itself.

And here the Judge got really angry: “The court finds WAMU, with the assistance of its previous counsel, Shapiro and Fishman, submitted the assignment when [they] knew that only Fannie Mae was entitled to foreclose on the Mortgage, and that WAMU never owned or held the note and Mortgage.” And, oops, “the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that WAMU, Chase and Shapiro & Fishman committed fraud on this Court” and that these “acts committed by WAMU, Chase and Shapiro amount to a “knowing deception intended to prevent the defendants from discovery essential to defending the claim” and are therefore fraud.

While the Judge in this case did not also find declaratory damages against the plaintiff, and while the case of the defendants is unclear (we would expect Fannie to file a foreclosure act on its own soon enough), the question of just how pervasive this form of “fraud” in the judicial system is certainly relevant. Because if JPM takes the liberty of foreclosing on mortgages as merely servicer, when it has no legal ground for such an action, who knows how many such cases the legal system is currently clogged up with. The implications for the REO and foreclosures track for banks could be dire as a result of this ruling, as this could severely impact the ongoing attempt by banks to hide as much excess inventory in their books in the quietest way possible.

Our advice to any party caught in a foreclosure process is to immediately go to http://www.fnma.com and use the Lookup Tool to see if Fannie is still mortgage owner of record, if a foreclosure suit has been brought up by a plaintiff other than the GSE. (Editor’s Note: He’s not exactly right here. All you will know is that FNMA claims on its site that it is the owner. The “owner of record” is the party who shows up in the title search of the only place that counts — the county recording office — which is why we tell everyone to get that from us or another party. 99 times out of 100 the “owner of record” is the originating lender who is often out of business — and THAT is why I insist on repeating that these loans are not and never were secured and that no security instrument has ever or could be filed for perfecting a lien on the home.)

We are confident quite a few other such cases will promptly appear.

Rep. Alan Grayson of Florida asks Fla Supreme Court to halt all foreclosures

SERVICES YOU NEED

* How Serious is the GMAC Problem? Pretty Serious and Not Just GMAC – 09/21/2010 – Yves Smith
* Steve Keen: Deleveraging With a Twist – 09/21/2010 – Yves Smith

Monday, September 20, 2010

Grayson Calls on Florida Supreme Court to Halt Foreclosures

Representative Alan Grayson of Florida has asked the Florida Supreme Court to halt all foreclosures in the state in light of an investigation by its attorney general into allegations of pervasive foreclosure fraud by so-called “foreclosure mills”.

Text below:

September 20, 2010

Chief Justice Charles T. Canady
Florida Supreme Court
500 South Duval Street
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1900

Dear Chief Justice Canady,

I am disturbed by the increasing reports of predatory ‘foreclosure mills’ in Florida. The New York Times and Mother Jones have both recently reported on the rampant and widespread practices of document fraud and forgery involved in mortgage assignments. My staff has spoken with multiple foreclosure specialists and attorneys in Florida who confirm these reports.

Three foreclosure mills – the Law Offices of Marshall C. Watson, Shapiro & Fishman, and the Law Offices of David J. Stern – constitute roughly 80% of all foreclosure proceedings in the state of Florida. All are under investigation by Attorney General Bill McCollum. If the reports I am hearing are true, the illegal foreclosures taking place represent the largest seizure of private property ever attempted by banks and government entities. This is lawlessness.

I respectfully request that you abate all foreclosures involving these firms until the Attorney General of the state of Florida has finished his investigations of those firms for document fraud.

I have included a court order, in which Chase, WAMU, and Shapiro and Fishman are excoriated by a judge for document fraud on the court. In this case, Chase attempted to foreclose on a home, when the mortgage note was actually owned by Fannie Mae.

Taking someone’s home should not be done lightly. And it should certainly be done in accordance with the law.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

Alan Grayson
Member of Congress

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