Articles of Deception: PSA and Reynaldo Reyes Affidavit for Deutsch Bank as Trustee

WITHOUT CONFUSION AND OBFUSCATION, COMBINED WITH STONEWALLING, THERE WOULD BE NO FORECLOSURE OF ANY DEBT SUBJECT TO CLAIMS OF SECURITIZATION —- NEIL GARFIELD, WWW.LIVINGLIES.ME

For further information please call 954-495-9867 and 520-405-1688

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Hat tip to Carol Molloy who sent me the affidavit

See Reynaldo Reyes Affidavit New Jersey Union County 2010 CCF11162014

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Reynaldo Reyes, AVP of Deutsch Bank said to a borrower, in a taped interview, that the whole scheme was “counter-intuitive.” In plain language that means that nothing is what it appears to be. And THAT in turn means that disclosures” were deceptive or “counter-intuitive.” And THAT means that the disclosures at closing were also “counter-intuitive” or deceptive. Reyes in a sworn affidavit drafted many times and edited by various top level attorneys for the banks has submitted an affidavit on behalf of Deutsch Bank but which will be used by Banks to try to legitimize their deceptive tactics. Again, to put it simply, they were lying to everyone — investors, borrowers, regulators, law enforcement, Congress, and the President.

Witness the following paragraph from Reyes’ affidavit. Here he says in the affidavit in Paragraph 1, that the Trustees serve the Trust. But then he takes it all back by saying that the Servicers perform all the functions of administering the loans — not on behalf of the Trustee, but rather on behalf of the Trust. THAT can only mean that the named Trustee, is not the Trustee. It means that the power of administering the Trust assets is with the servicers. Does that mean the servicers should be sued for wrongful foreclosures? Then why is the Trust named or the Trustee named?

So the beginning of the PSA, which designates a Trustee, is merely window dressing to give the impression that Deutsch Bank is the Trustee with all the powers of a Trustee, when in fact, the servicer is the one who performs most or all of the functions of a Trustee. But they do so giving the impression that they must go back to the Trustee or the “investor” when in fact they assert the power to do everything. In their circular reasoning, they could say to the court that they must get approval from the investor and then leave the court room. Then they speak for the investors, according to the servicers. So now they come back to the homeowner or homeowner’s counsel and say the application for modification or settlement has been declined. Whether that assertion turns out to be true after analysis in court is another story.

This is contrary to the position taken by U.S. Bank and Deutsch Bank and BONY Mellon in foreclosure cases where they sue for foreclosure in their own name as Trustee for the REMIC Trust. It also accounts for why they sometimes sue as Trustees for the certificate holders, and sometimes even get away with saying they are trustees only for the certificates delivered to the investors. This of course makes no sense, since they are neither holding nor asserting ownership over the certificates.

Paragraph 7: No entity services loans on behalf of the trustees. The trustees and the loan services that are appointed by the the PSA’s each perform their designated functions on behalf of the trusts. In other words, loan servicers to service mortgage loans that have been pooled and sold into a securitization trust are performing services on behalf of the trusts, not on behalf of the trustees.

Then we get to Paragraph 10 which admits that the Trustee has neither any accounts nor any information or business records of its own. According to this paragraph 10, the Trustee receives loan level data from the servicers “to facilitate certain payments to bondholders.” But wait here comes the language that takes all THAT away: “However, for a number of trusts” [unspecified, but probably all of them] “a party other than the Trustee handles those payments responsibilities.” And then the rest is taken away by his statement that “With respect to the Trusts for which the Trustees serve as a Trustee but not as securities administrators, the Trustee do not receive loan level data.”

Get it? Just like the PSA, Reyes’ affidavit says one thing and then takes it all away in the next breath. The fact is that in virtually no case is the Trustee the securities administrator. And that, Reyes, says means that the Trustee neither gets loan level data, nor does it make payments to the bondholders. “Other parties” perform those functions. Who? The servicer who is according to Reyes the party with the actual powers of the Trustee. So why is Deutsch claiming to be a Trustee.

The answer is very simple — MONEY. The sellers of mortgage bonds pay Deutsch to rent their name to underwriters to make it appear as though an independent fiduciary is handling the money, the purchase or origination of loans, and the enforcement or modification of loans. This is meant to deceive the investors into a false sense of complacency. The same is true for borrowers, although at this point “complacency” would hardly be the word.

Everyone believed the wording at the beginning of the PSA and practically nobody read the PSA from end to end to see that the beginning was sales material and the end was a hodgepodge of obfuscation to make it difficult if not impossible to determine the identity of the players or what they were doing. This analysis can certainly NOT be done without reference to the underlying transaction in which we see who actually sent money to originate the loans, from whom they received the money etc.

The fact is that that while most people think the Trusts acquired the loans by sale of the loans into the trust, the evidence shows that practically none of them were sold to the Trust. The only logical conclusion from the facts at hand is that the investors’ money was pooled in an entirely different scheme while hiding behind claims of securitization.

The investors money was used directly, without their knowledge or consent, to fund origination of loans like the toxic Pick a Pay, reverse amortization, payment increase cap (usually 7.5%) that results in what appears to be affordable payments, but also results in uncontrolled liability.

A $139,000 loan that I recently analyzed, indicates the eventual liability could be nearly $4 million — all at the end of 30 years of payments, resulting in an undisclosed hidden balloon payment in the 13th payment and every payment thereafter which thanks to the miracles of compounding interest and an adjustable rate that could go as high as over 12% APR process an obligation that looks affordable but is infinitely not affordable. The interest alone on the new principal (original balance + deferred interest on negative amortization loan) could exceed $24,000 per month on a $139,000 loan.

Then you get to paragraph 11: Here the affidavit produces more obfuscation by referring to the Master Servicer who might (or might not) be responsible for performing any duties. But in the PSA you see the ultimate authority for virtually everything lies with the Master Servicer, who also turns out to be the the underwriter and seller of mortgage bonds. And since we now know that the Trustee had neither trust accounts nor any control or responsibility for the accounts, THAT makes it impossible for the Trustee to have received any proceeds from the sale of bonds issued by the Trust.

Since a Trust cannot operate except through the Trustee by law (see New York law and the law of your state for more information) it is an inevitable conclusion that there were no accounts established for the Trust in the manner expected by the investors who bought the mortgage bonds. And since there was no money in the Trust, the Trust could not have originate or purchased any loan documents, regardless of whether or not there was in fact an underlying loan transaction at the base of the chain relied upon by these parties when they foreclose.

Then Reyes gets to the meat of why he submitted the affidavit. BONY Mellon did the same thing by a lawsuit and so have hundreds of investors, insurers, guarantors, holders of loss mitigation hedge contracts, whose cases have been quietly settled. Reyes states that “the Trustee would not be in the best position to address further inquiries by the Court concerning any possible ‘irregularity in the handling of foreclosure proceedings.’” So to put it simply, Reyes is disclaiming any role in foreclosures and trying to distance Deutsch bank from wrongful foreclosures [i.e. most or nearly all of them] despite its APPARENT AUTHORITY.

Examination of the PSA reveals deep within its pages, prohibitions and restrictions against either the Trustee or the bond purchasers (“trust beneficiaries”) from knowing or even inquiring about anything involving the business of the trust, which we already know never existed because the trust never received its IPO (bond sale) money. This is why servicers assert control over the settlement and modification process. This is why they say the investor declined the modification or settlement because they never contacted the investor or the trust or the Trustee.

The truth is that the servicers assert, in the final analysis, the right to speak for the investors even thought they have a patent CONFLICT OF INTEREST RESULTING FROM SERVICER ADVANCES. A true servicer would be required to mitigate the damages and minimize the losses. Servicers have no interest in doing that because they can make a ton of money for having advanced the principal and interest payment to the creditors from an account that contained the investors money and that would count, as stated in the PSA, as payment in full to the creditor — so the creditor could not declare a default against the servicer.

And THAT is why these foreclosures are pushed through, among other reasons, [avoiding workouts, modifications and settlements] to wit: the foreclosures proceed even though the creditors (investors) are being paid right through the date of foreclosure. The reason is the banks want to “recover” those “advances” (paid from money stolen from the investors) not from the borrower and not from the creditors, who have already been paid, but through a claim against the final liquidation of the property to a third party “innocent” purchaser. BY controlling the foreclosure process, the servicer gets paid a lot of money and protects the banks against claims for refunds and damages arising out of the improper loan practices, loan processing by the servicer, and wrongful foreclosures.

So far the servicers have fooled the courts into thinking that their claim to recover servicer advances is somehow secured. It isn’t. In order to do that the court would be required to issue a declaratory judgment specifying the breakup of the mortgage lien on a continual basis for each servicer advance or find that the total advanced by the servicer from the underwriter’s controlled slush fund, is subject to an equitable mortgage lien. Equitable liens are not accepted in virtually any court because ti would require the buyer of property to make exhaustive investigation into matters that a re not contained on the face of the note or mortgage.

PRACTICE NOTE FOR LAWYERS:

You might want to get the court to take judicial notice of the affidavit and just to be on the safe side get a certified copy of it. You might want to file a motion for involuntary dismissal based upon the affidavit of Reyes who was THE person in charge of the trustee “program.” Think also about a subpoena for Reyes to appear at trial, if there is one.

Reyes is saying that only the servicer can enforce. And he is saying that when the servicer acts, it does so for trust NOT THE TRUSTEE. So the Trustee, according to him is not a proper party to bring the action. The inference corroborates what I have been saying all along. It is that the investors are the real parties in interest and the servicer is acting in a representative capacity — IF IT IS THE TRUSTEE NAMED IN THE TRUST INSTRUMENT (THE PSA).

Why You Need an Expert Witness and Why You Should be Aggressive in Discovery

MISSION STATEMENT: I believe that the mortgage crisis has produced manifest evil and injustice in our society. I believe our recovery will never reach the majority of struggling Americans until we restore equal protection for all citizens and especially borrowers in our debt-ridden society. LivingLies is the vehicle for a collaborative movement to provide homeowners with sufficient resources to combat bloated banks who are flooding the political market with money. We provide thousands of pages of free forms, articles and discussion of statutes, case precedent and policy on this site. And we provide paid services, books and products that enable us to maintain an infrastructure to provide a voice to the victims of Wall Street corruption.

For further information on donations, services and assistance, please call 954-495-9867 nor 520 405 1688.

There are three central strategies that need to be pursued with vigor. The Banks have once again moved the goal posts because they are starting to lose cases with increasing frequency when confronted with the requirement that they actually prove their case with facts instead of presumptions. They are attacking the need for discovery, the need for an expert witness, and the need for foundation of fabricated documents by leveraging certain legal presumptions to achieve results that were never intended to be used to win a case that they would lose if they had to prove their case with actual facts from a witness who has personal knowledge.
Yet that is exactly what is happening. It happens almost automatically in non-judicial foreclosures and it happens most of the time in judicial states. “Legal presumptions” are being manipulated to win an unwinnable case. Those presumptions are for expedience and not to slant cases in favor of a litigant who is wrong.
In Discovery it is important to set a hearing on the blanket objections that are commonly filed by the Banks without any obligation on their part to set those objections for hearing. So it is up to the borrower to set the objections for hearings. Lawyers are finding that they must also file a motion to compel and that without a compelling memorandum of law supporting discovery or supporting the need for an expert witness, the banks will control the narrative by maintaining the impression that laws and presumptions about negotiable instruments are the only issues.For the Judge, the real issues are hidden from view, so you must reveal them. The latest iteration the the Bank tactics is the “Self-authenticating” document which is the subject of another article.
The central theme is always the same. The Banks can’t win on the actual facts, so they are relying upon and leveraging certain rules of evidence that allow certain documents to be admitted into evidence, where the contents of those documents are taken as true (despite the fact that they are barred by the hearsay rule) and the Judges are treating the contents as true over the objection of counsel for the borrower. Like Judicial notice, such documents might be admissible for the limited purpose of acknowledging their existence, but their contents are very much in issue.
However, many judges disregard the notion that the contents are at issue unless the borrower produces compelling evidence that the facts in the document are false. In my opinion, it is wrong to require a defendant who has no access to the actual facts — the money trail — to bear the burden of proof and doubly wrong when the borrower has asked for exactly that information through statutory, formal, informal and discovery requests only to be met with stonewalling.
My thought is that this is an opportunity to educate the judge — against what he or she wants to hear. It is an opportunity to get him to hear YOUR narrative twice. Iadvise lawyers to file a memorandum in opposition to objections and file a motion to compel to make your record. Present a credible argument for the need for the borrower to get information that either lies solely in the hands of theforecloser or in the hands of others who are co-venturers with theforecloser.The need for an expert is evident from the section of the PSA which is entitled “Definitions” which uses words, concepts, business processes, lending and practices that are outside of the statutory scheme for the transfer of loans. The same arguments exist for enforcing discovery. Attach a copy of the PSA Definitions section to your memo. Despite the current trend of the Banks toward introducing the PSA as an exhibit at trial, they continue to argue that the borrower has no standing to contest whether the procedures and restrictions of the PSA are relevant in a foreclosure case. Many judges agree. I believe they are wrong and that this is an evasion of the truth with the help of the Court.

They may seem unrelated but they are identical — only the other side has or does not have the actual evidence of the transactions that are presumed to exist by virtue of some document they are producing like an assignment, a mortgage, a note, or a notice. To the extent that they are responsive to discovery, the need for an expert diminishes or is reduced.

The plaintiff is alleging that a trust owns the mortgage and that various parties have authority to service, receive documents and pay for the the origination of acquisition of loans. It is only the PSA that establishes the right of the Plaintiff forecloser or beneficiary under a deed of trust to pursue foreclosure.

The very essence of the defense is that the Plaintiff does not own the loan, is not a holder with rights to enforce and is not a holder in due course because the plan laid out by the PSA, was never followed. That starts with the conclusion that the trust was never funded and therefore could not have the resources to pay for the origination or acquisition of loans. The defense theory is that based upon the pleadings and proof of the Plaintiff, it is a stranger to the loan transaction despite a snow storm of paper creating appearances to the contrary.

The Plaintiff has not alleged it is a holder in due course. Thus by law they are subject toall of the potential defenses of the borrower starting with the processes that began in the application stage for the loan, the presence of an assignment and assumption agreement that governed theactual events that occurred at closing — includingthe fact that the named party identified as “lender” was not the source of the loan and had no rights under the agreement with third parties toperform any act with respect to the loan except topermit their name to be used as a nominee.This was a table funded loan in which an undisclosed third party funded the loan. The importance of that is that the third party should have been identified on the note and mortgage and the mortgage should not have been executed, delivered or recorded. It is ONLY with the help of an expert who understands the terms and processes that are outside the norm of conventional lending — which is already so complex that Federal law requires that summaries and good faith estimates and disclosure are required to be delivered to the borrower prior to closing.

The plaintiff is taking two opposite positions at the same time — first that they have a trust that exists, that has engaged in business pursuant to the requirements of the PSA and who has paid for the origination or acquisition of the loan. Second, that it doesn’t matter whether the trust exists or owns the loan because they are a holder, and they want this court to presume that being a holder creates a presumption under state law that as such, they have the rights to enforce. Hence they want presumption to triumph over fact.
Theirposition is that they can close the matter of refunds and repurchasing obligations with the creditors by foreclosing the mortgage and getting a judgment on the note. Both the investors and the borrowers think otherwise.The defense theory of the case is that the trust was never funded nor used in this transaction and thus should not be allowed to enforce a loan that it never owned, funded, originated or acquired. The initial proof lies in the pleading of the Plaintiff in judicial cases. They never assert that they are a holder in due course, the elements of which are payment of value for the loan, acting in good faith and without knowledge of the borrower’s defenses. Through aggressive and relentless pursuit of truth in discovery (which only requires the possibility that it might lead to admissible evidence) you can easily establish that they are not claiming that the Trust was acting in bad faith or with knwoeldge fo the borrower’s defenses (although in some situations that might also be in issue). That leaves the single element of payment for the loan.

Each PSA sets forth the elements of a holder in due course for the loan to be accepted by the trustee. If the allegation is onlythat that there is a holder, or even a holder with rights to enforce, the only conclusion, from their own pleadings is that the trust has not paid for this loan. If it has not paid for the origination or acquisition of the loan, the Trust has no reasonable basis for claiming any interest in it. Hence it shouldn’t be suing for collection or foreclosure. And the allegation that the Trust or representative is a holder is contrary to the presumption underlying court proceedings that the Trust has paid money and will lose money if the loan is not enforced. The truth is that the investors will lose money if the loan IS enforced.The defense theory of the case is that there is a direct debtor-creditor relationship between the investors, as creditors and who should have been on the note and mortgage but were not, in order to create the illusion of a veil in which the investors would not be liable for fraudulent, deceptive or shady lending practices.

And the defense theory of the case is that the securitization plan under which the investors were supposedly parties through the Trust and the PSA never occurred and that therefore the mortgage was defective on its face for naming the wrong lender and for not disclosing, as required by Federal and Florida law all the parties to the transaction and all the intermediaries were were receiving compensation and profits arising from the origination of the loan. — since it was the investor funds that were used in the origination or acquisition of the loan.

Since we can presume that the distance of the Trust from theactual origination eliminates any questionas to whether they were proceeding in good faith IF they accepted the note and mortgage, we must then presume that were acting in good faith and without notice of the borrower’s defenses. Those are two out of three of the elements for a holder in due course.By alleging that the Trust owns the loan, that would by definition mean that that if the PSA was followed the Trust was intended to be a holder in due course — having paid value for the loan in good faith and without knowledge of the borrower’s defenses.

That would mean that the PSA requires the Trust to be a holder in due course, because that would prevent the borrower from raising most defenses against the Trust when it seeks to enforce the loan. If it is not a holder in due course, the Trust provisions bar acceptance of the loan. Hence any allegation to the contrary is void under New York State law.

Thus the plaintiff is trying to slip by on two conflicting theories — that the trust owns the loan and that the trust can enforce it just by alleging it is a holder despite the fact that the trust is a stranger to the loan transaction and never transacted any business in which it acquired ownership of the loan. This leaves the actual creditor — a group of investors who were in the same darkness as the borrower — without having received the truth when the transaction was proposed to either of them.
What is interesting here is that the allegation is not that the trust is a holder in due course which can only mean that the Trust never paid consideration for the ownership of the loan. And the acceptance of the loan by the trustee has not been alleged because it most likely never happened because the transfer was outside of the cutoff period.The cutoff period exists for two reasons — to get certain tax advantages for the trust beneficiaries who are the real creditors and to prevent any defective loans from coming into the trust that would have an adverse consequence to the trust and its beneficiaries.

And the fact that the Trust is governed by New York State law means that any act that is expressly prohibited by the PSA is void not voidable. So the assignment is a cover-up for what really happened.

For the loan to be included in the pool of loans that form the res of the trust, the trustee must accept the loan. That acceptance is manifest after the cutoff period when the pool is closed. After that individual acceptances based upon opinions of counsel must be documented. None of that happened.

At best it is an offer that could never be accepted by the trust — because there was no acceptance by the trustee who could not accept because it would be a void act both because of the cutoff period and the fact that it produce adverse consequences in both tax treatment and actual money paid to them to allow the late deposit of a loan that has been declared in default). See the provisions for acceptance by the Trustee.

An expert witness steeped in the language and practice of investment banking and the securitization of loans is necessary to explain how this transaction must be interpreted and the conclusion that the investors are the direct creditors — not the trust — because their money was mismanaged, as the investors have alleged in their own complaints against the underwriters.

At worst, it is, as the investor suits and the suits by government and insurers allege outright fraud in which the money and the documents were intentionally managed in a way that was to the detriment of both the creditors and the debtor and ultimately the government and society.

The second point in the defense is that the documents submitted by the Plaintiff are not supported by anything because they have refused to provide appropriate responses to discovery that would show the actual authority to represent the actual creditors, based upon the actual creditors granting them that authority.At trial documents will be admitted for the forecloser if you have failed to enforce discovery. Admission into evidence is barred if they have failed to respond even after being ordered to do so by the court — but those cases don’t go to trial. They are settled. And that is the point.

Hiring an Expert: What Are you Looking For in Foreclosure Litigation?

I have spent the last 7 years developing the narrative for an expert opinion that could be presented, believed and sustained in court. In writing to a probable new expert we will offer through the livinglies.store.com I summarized what attorneys should be looking for when they consult with an expert in structured finance (i.e., derivatives, securitization etc.).

Here  are some of the issues you want covered by the expert declaration and testimony in court. The basic rule of thumb is that the expert must have both the qualifications to testify as an expert and a persuasive narrative of why his conclusions are right. Without both, the testimony of the expert simply doesn’t matter and will be rejected.

If you are a proposed expert in structured finance, then here is what I would want to know, and what I think lawyers should ask, depending upon what fact pattern is present in each case.

One thing I need to know is whether you feel comfortable in talking about the ownership and balance of the loan.

In one example American Brokers Conduit was the payee on the note and mortgage. We alleged that they didn’t loan the money. Our narrative ran something like this: if you ask me for a loan, and I respond “Yes just sign this note and mortgage” AND THEN you sign the note and mortgage AND THEN I don’t give you a loan, ARE YOU PREPARED TO SAY THAT THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE WERE DEFECTIVE IN A BASIC WAY, TO WIT: THAT THE SIGNATURE ON THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE WAS PROCURED BY FRAUD OR MISTAKE AND THAT WITHOUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE REAL CREDITOR BOTH INSTRUMENTS ARE DEFECTIVE.

Would you, as a reasonable business person accept a note purporting to be a negotiable instrument under the UCC if you knew that the transferor neither funded the loan nor (if they purport to be a successor) paid for the assignment?

What is your opinion of your position if you found out after acceptance of the note and mortgage that there was doubt as to whether the obligation was funded or purchased for value? What would you do or suggest to a client in either of those positions — (1) knowledge [or "must have known] or (2) no knowledge [and later finding out that there is doubt as to funding and purchasing for value]?

Are you prepared to say that the fact that the borrower actually did receive money as a loan from another different party does not create a circumstance where the borrower is construed to convey any rights to anyone other than the source of funds or someone in actual privity with the lender — and that both note and mortgage are defective under normal recording statutes — and certainly not a commitment by the debtor to BOTH the source of the funds and the receiver of the signed promissory note and mortgage?

In the one case referred to above, the corporate representative conceded that ABC didn’t loan the money. He was unable to explain what was transferred by ABC to Regents and from Regents to 1st Nationwide and thence to CitiCorp by merger. He admitted that “Fannie Mae was the investor from the start.” You and I understand that neither Fannie and Freddie are lenders. They are guarantors and they serve as Master Trustee for hidden REMIC trusts. (Do you know or agree with that assertion?)

But the question is whether the note is actual “evidence of the debt” (the black letter definition of a promissory note when it contains a promise to pay) when the creditor is identified as a party who was not a lender. In the absence of disclosures of some representative capacity for an actual lender, are you prepared to testify that the note is unenforceable even if the debt is otherwise enforceable in relation to the actual source of funds?

Or would you say that it is not enforceable by the stated payee but it might still be evidence of the debt and evidence of the terms of repayment to the third party source? How does the marketplace treat such questions in valuing a note and mortgage?

The question is whether the expert actually believes and is willing to argue that these conclusions are true and correct.  The expert must earnestly believe these assertions to be true, logically and legally.
Is it acceptable to the prospective expert to see a result where the application of law and facts results in the homeowner getting his home free and clear — on the basis that the wrong party sued him or initiated foreclosure (in non judicial states), or that the notice of default, notice of acceleration, and statements of money due were wrong.
The approach is an attack on ownership and balance. The balance would be wrong, even if the ownership was established, if the payments were not applied properly. The payments include all payments received by the creditor.  That includes all servicer advances directly to trust beneficiaries, as well as insurance and loss sharing payments (i.e., from FDIC and others) paid and received on behalf of the investors directly or the trust beneficiaries.
Part of the reasoning here is that you really have an interesting problem. The Trust beneficiaries agreed to “loan” money to a REMIC trust in exchange for a complex formula of repayment under the indenture of the mortgage bond (contained in the Prospectus and Pooling and Servicing Agreement). Those terms are different than the terms signed by the homeowner.
So there are two agreements — the mortgage bond and the mortgage note. Different parties, new parties are in the PSA as insurers, servicers,servicer advances etc. all resulting in a DIFFERENT payment from an assortment of parties expected by the creditor —different than the one promised by the debtor whether you refer to the note as evidence of the debt or not.Add the complicating factor that without evidence that the Trust was ever funded (i.e., without evidence that the broker dealer sent the proceeds from the offering prospectus to the trust) how do we answer the basic contract question: was there a meeting of the minds? The expectations of the lender (investors) and the borrower (homeowner) are entirely different and the documents used are completely different.

How could the Trust have entered into any transaction for the origination or acquisition of loans without evidence of funding?

On what basis can the Trustee or servicer claim any authority if the Trust was not funded and was essentially ignored? Does the expert agree that avoiding or ignoring the trust means avoiding and  ignoring the prospectus AND the PSA, which contains the authority for ANYONE to act on behalf of the investors, who are no longer “trust beneficiaries” but just a group of investors without a vehicle for their investment?

ESSENTIAL QUESTION: Is the expert prepared to testify about this aspect of structured finance — i.e., how do you connect up the debtor and the creditor? As an expert you would be expected to be able to testify on exactly that question.

And finally there is testimony about the mortgage. If the mortgage secures the note (not the debt, necessarily), which is what is stated in the mortgage, then is the expert willing to testify that the mortgage was defective and should never have been recorded?

Would it not be true, in your estimation, that if a homeowner executes a mortgage in favor of a party posing as a lender, and that party is not a lender to the homeowner, that you could testify that the moment such a mortgage is recorded it probably clouds title?

Would you be willing to testify that based upon those facts, you would say that it is an unknown variable as to who to pay?

Would you be wiling to testify that if you don’t know who to pay, you have no basis for trusting a satisfaction of mortgage from any party including the the original mortgagee?

And lastly that if there is no basis on the face of the instruments or in recorded instruments to presume a valid creditor has been named, that no better presumptions would attach to any assignment, endorsement or other instrument of transfer?

For information concerning expert declarations, consultations and testimony from experts with appropriate credentials to be qualified as an expert, or for litigation support, please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688.

The Big Cover-Up in Our Credit Nation

Regulators have confirmed that there were widespread errors by banks but that the errors didn’t really matter. They are trying to tell us that the errors had to do with modifications and other matters that really didn’t have any bearing on whether the loans were owned by parties seeking foreclosure or on whether the balance alleged to be due could be confirmed in any way, after deducting third party payments received by the foreclosing party. Every lawyer who spends their time doing foreclosure litigation knows that report is dead wrong.

So the government is actively assisting the banks is covering up the largest scam in human history. The banks own most of the people in government so it should come as no surprise. This finding will be used again and again to say that the complaints from borrowers are just disgruntled homeowners seeking to find their way out of self inflicted wound.

And now they seek to tell us in the courts that nothing there matters either. It doesn’t matter whether the foreclosing party actually owns the loan, received delivery of the note, or a valid assignment of the mortgage for value. The law says it matters but the bank lawyers, some appellate courts and lots of state court judges say that doesn’t apply — you got the money and stopped paying. That is all they need to know. So let’s look at that.

If I found out you were behind in your credit card payments and sued you, under the present theory you would have no defense to my lawsuit. It would be enough that you borrowed the money and stopped paying. The fact that I never loaned you the money nor bought the loan would be of no consequence. What about the credit card company?

Well first they would have to find out about the lawsuit to do anything. Second they could still bring their own lawsuit because mine was completely unfounded. And they could collect again. In the world of fake REMIC trusts, the trust beneficiaries have no right to the information on your loan nor the ability to inquire, audit or otherwise figure out what happened tot heir investment.

It is the perfect steal. The investors (like the credit card company) are getting paid by the borrowers and third party payments from insurance etc. or they have settled with the broker dealers on the fraudulent bonds. So when some stranger comes in and sues on the debt, or sues in foreclosure or issues of notice of default and notice of sale, the defense that the borrower has no debt relationship with the foreclosing party is swept aside.

The fact that neither the actual lender nor the actual victim of this scheme will ever be compensated for their loss doesn’t matter as long as the homeowner loses their home.  This is upside down law and politics. We have seen the banks intervene in student loans and drive that up to over $1 trillion in a country where the average household is $15,000 in debt — a total of $13 trillion dollars. The banks are inserting themselves in all sorts of transactions producing bizarre results.

The net result is undermining the U.S. economy and undermining the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency of the world. Lots of people talk about the fact that we have already lost 20% of our position as the reserve currency and that we are clearly headed for a decline to 50% and then poof, we will be just another country with a struggling currency. Printing money won’t be an option. Options are being explored to replace the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency. No longer are companies requiring payments in U.S. dollars as the trend continues.

The banks themselves are preparing for a sudden devaluation of currency by getting into commodities rather than holding their money in US Currency. The same is true for most international corporations. We are on the verge of another collapse. And contrary to what the paid pundits of the banks are saying the answer is simple — just like Iceland did it — apply the law and reduce the household debt. The result is a healthy economy again and a strong dollar. But too many people are too heavily invested or tied to the banks to allow that option except on a case by case basis. So that is what we need to do — beat them on a case by case basis.

National Honesty Day? America’s Book of Lies

Today is National Honesty Day. While it should be a celebration of how honest we have been the other 364 days of the year, it is rather a day of reflection on how dishonest we have been. Perhaps today could be a day in which we say we will at least be honest today about everything we say or do. But that isn’t likely. Today I focus on the economy and the housing crisis. Yes despite the corruption of financial journalism in which we are told of improvements, our economy — led by the housing markets — is still sputtering. It will continue to do so until we confront the truth about housing, and in particular foreclosures. Tennessee, Virginia and other states continue to lead the way in a downward spiral leading to the lowest rate of home ownership since the 1990′s with no bottom in sight.

Here are a few of the many articles pointing out the reality of our situation contrasted with the absence of articles in financial journalism directed at outright corruption on Wall Street where the players continue to pursue illicit, fraudulent and harmful schemes against our society performing acts that can and do get jail time for anyone else who plays that game.

It isn’t just that they escaping jail time. The jailing of bankers would take a couple of thousand people off the street that would otherwise be doing harm to us.

The main point is that we know they are doing the wrong thing in foreclosing on property they don’t own using “balances” the borrower doesn’t owe; we know they effectively stole the money from the investors who thought they were buying mortgage bonds, we know they effectively stole the title protection and documents that should have been executed in favor of the real source of funds, we know they received multiple payments from third parties and we know they are getting twin benefits from foreclosures that (a) should not be legally allowed and (b) only compound the damages to investors and homeowners.

The bottom line: Until we address wrongful foreclosures, the housing market, which has always led the economy, will continue to sputter, flatline or crash again. Transferring wealth from the middle class to the banks is a recipe for disaster whether it is legal or illegal. In this case it plainly illegal in most cases.

And despite the planted articles paid for by the banks, we still have over 700,000 foreclosures to go in the next year and over 9,000,000 homeowners who are so deep underwater that their situation is a clear and present danger of “strategic default” on claims that are both untrue and unfair.

Here is a sampling of corroborative evidence for my conclusions:

Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Candid Take on the Foreclosure Crisis

There it was: The Treasury foreclosure program was intended to foam the runway to protect against a crash landing by the banks. Millions of people were getting tossed out on the street, but the secretary of the Treasury believed the government’s most important job was to provide a soft landing for the tender fannies of the banks.”

Lynn Symoniak is Thwarted by Government as She Pursues Other Banks for the Same Thing She Proved Before

Government prosecutors who relied on a Florida whistleblower’s evidence to win foreclosure fraud settlements with major banks two years ago are declining to help her pursue identical claims against a second set of large financial institutions.

Lynn Szymoniak first found proof that millions of American foreclosures were based on faulty and falsified documents while fighting her own foreclosure. Her three-year legal fight helped uncover the fact that banks were “robosigning” documents — hiring people to forge signatures and backdate legal paperwork the firms needed in order to foreclose on people’s homes — as a routine practice. Court papers that were unsealed last summer show that the fraudulent practices Szymoniak discovered affect trillions of dollars worth of mortgages.

More than 700,000 Foreclosures Expected Over Next Year

How Bank Watchdogs Killed Our Last Chance At Justice For Foreclosure Victims

The results are in. The award for the sorriest chapter of the great American foreclosure crisis goes to the Independent Foreclosure Review, a billion-dollar sinkhole that produced nothing but heartache for aggrieved homeowners, and a big black eye for regulators.

The foreclosure review was supposed to uncover abuses in how the mortgage industry coped with the epic wave of foreclosures that swept the U.S. in the aftermath of the housing crash. In a deal with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve, more than a dozen companies, including major banks, agreed to hire independent auditors to comb through loan files, identify errors and award just compensation to people who’d been abused in the foreclosure process.

But in January 2013, amid mounting evidence that the entire process was compromised by bank interference and government mismanagement, regulators abruptly shut the program down. They replaced it with a nearly $10 billion legal settlement that satisfied almost no one. Borrowers received paltry payouts, with sums determined by the very banks they accused of making their lives hell.

Investigation Stalled and Diverted as to Bank Fraud Against Investors and Homeowners

The Government Accountability Office released the results of its study of the Independent Foreclosure Review, conducted by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve in 2011 and 2012, and the results show that the foreclosure process is lacking in oversight and transparency.

According to the GAO review, which can be read in full here, the OCC and Fed signed consent orders with 16 mortgage servicers in 2011 and 2012 that required the servicers to hire consultants to review foreclosure files for efforts and remediate harm to borrowers.

In 2013, regulators amended the consent orders for all but one servicer, ending the file reviews and requiring servicers to provide $3.9 billion in cash payments to about 4.4 million borrowers and $6 billion in foreclosure prevention actions, such as loan modifications. The list of impacted mortgage servicers can be found here, as well as any updates. It should be noted that the entire process faced controversy before, as critics called the IFR cumbersome and costly.

Banks Profit from Suicides of Their Officers and Employees

After a recent rash of mysterious apparent suicides shook the financial world, researchers are scrambling to find answers about what really is the reason behind these multiple deaths. Some observers have now come to a rather shocking conclusion.

Wall Street on Parade bloggers Pam and Russ Martens wrote this week that something seems awry regarding the bank-owned life insurance (BOLI) policies held by JPMorgan Chase.

Four of the biggest banks on Wall Street combined hold over $680 billion in BOLI policies, the bloggers reported, but JPMorgan held around $17.9 billion in BOLI assets at the end of last year to Citigroup’s comparably meager $8.8 billion.

Government Cover-Up to Protect the Banks and Screw Homeowners and Investors

A new government report suggests that errors made by banks and their agents during foreclosures might have been significantly higher than was previously believed when regulators halted a national review of the banks’ mortgage servicing operations.

When banking regulators decided to end the independent foreclosure review last year, most banks had not completed the examinations of their mortgage modification and foreclosure practices.

At the time, the regulators — the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve — found that lengthy reviews by bank-hired consultants were delaying compensation getting to borrowers who had suffered through improper modifications and other problems.

But the decision to cut short the review left regulators with limited information about actual harm to borrowers when they negotiated a $10 billion settlement as part of agreements with 15 banks, according to a draft of a report by the Government Accountability Office reviewed by The New York Times.

The report shows, for example, that an unidentified bank had an error rate of about 24 percent. This bank had completed far more reviews of borrowers’ files than a group of 11 banks involved the deal, suggesting that if other banks had looked over more of their records, additional errors might have been discovered.

Wrongful Foreclosure Rate at least 24%: Wrongful or Fraudulent?

The report shows, for example, that an unidentified bank had an error rate of about 24 percent. This bank had completed far more reviews of borrowers’ files than a group of 11 banks involved the deal, suggesting that if other banks had looked over more of their records, additional errors might have been discovered.

http://www.marketpulse.com/20140430/u-s-housing-recovery-struggles/

http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Latest-News-Wires/2014/0429/Home-buying-loses-allure-ownership-rate-lowest-since-1995

http://www.opednews.com/articles/It-s-Good–no–Great-to-by-William-K-Black–Bank-Failure_Bank-Failures_Bankers_Banking-140430-322.html

[DISHONEST EUPHEMISMS: The context of this WSJ story is the broader series of betrayals of homeowners by the regulators and prosecutors led initially by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and his infamous “foam the runways” comment in which he admitted and urged that programs “sold” as benefitting distressed homeowners be used instead to aid the banks (more precisely, the bank CEOs) whose frauds caused the crisis.  The WSJ article deals with one of the several settlements with the banks that “service” home mortgages and foreclose on them.  Private attorneys first obtained the evidence that the servicers were engaged in massive foreclosure fraud involving knowingly filing hundreds of thousands of false affidavits under (non) penalty of perjury.  As a senior former AUSA said publicly at the INET conference a few weeks ago about these cases — they were slam dunk prosecutions.  But you know what happened; no senior banker or bank was prosecuted.  No banker was sued civilly by the government.  No banker had to pay back his bonus that he “earned” through fraud.

 

 

Fatal Flaws in the Origination of Loans and Assignments

The secured party, the identified creditor, the payee on the note, the mortgagee on the mortgage, the beneficiary under the deed of trust should have been the investor(s) — not the originator, not the aggregator, not the servicer, not any REMIC Trust, not any Trustee of a REMIC Trust, and not any Trustee substituted by a false beneficiary on a deed of Trust, not the master servicer and not even the broker dealer. And certainly not whoever is pretending to be a legal party in interest who, without injury to themselves or anyone they represent, could or should force the forfeiture of property in which they have no interest — all to the detriment of the investor-lenders and the borrowers.
There are two fatal flaws in the origination of the loan and in the origination of the assignment of the loan.

As I see it …

The REAL Transaction is between the investors, as an unnamed group, and the borrower(s). This is taken from the single transaction rule and step transaction doctrine that is used extensively in Tax Law. Since the REMIC trust is a tax creature, it seems all the more appropriate to use existing federal tax law decisions to decide the substance of these transactions.

If the money from the investors was actually channeled through the REMIC trust, through a bank account over which the Trustee for the REMIC trust had control, and if the Trustee had issued payment for the loan, and if that happened within the cutoff period, then if the loan was assigned during the cutoff period, and if the delivery of the documents called for in the PSA occurred within the cutoff period, then the transaction would be real and the paperwork would be real EXCEPT THAT

Where the originator of the loan was neither legally the lender nor legally a representative of the source of funds for the transaction, then by simple rules of contract, the originator was incapable of executing any transfer documents for the note or mortgage (deed of trust in nonjudicial states).

If the originator of the loan was not the lender, not the creditor, not a party who could legally execute a satisfaction of the mortgage and a cancellation of the note then who was?

Our answer is nobody, which I know is “counter-intuitive” — a euphemism for crazy conspiracy theorist. But here is why I know that the REMIC trust was never involved in the transaction and that the originator was never the source of funds except in those cases where securitization was never involved (less than 2% of all loans made, whether still existing or “satisfied” or “foreclosed”).

The broker dealer never intended for the REMIC trust to actually own the mortgage loans and caused the REMIC trust to issue mortgage bonds containing an indenture for repayment and ownership of the underlying loans. But there were never any underlying loans (except for some trusts created in the 1990′s). The prospectus said plainly that the excel spreadsheet attached to the prospectus contained loan information that would be replaced by the real loans once they were acquired. This is a practice on Wall Street called selling forward. In all other marketplaces, it is called fraud. But like short-selling, it is permissible on Wall Street.

The broker dealer never intended the investors to actually own the bonds either. Those were issued in street name nominee, non objecting status/ The broker dealer could report to the investor that the investor was the actual or equitable owner of the bonds in an end of month statement when in fact the promises in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement as to insurance, credit default swaps, overcollateralization (a violation of the terms of the promissory note executed by residential borrowers), cross collateralization (also a violation of the borrower’s note), guarantees, servicer advances and trust or trustee advances would all be payable, at the discretion of the broker dealer, to the broker dealer and perhaps never reported or paid to the “trust beneficiaries” who were in fact merely defrauded investors. The only reason the servicer advances were paid to the investors was to lull them into a false sense of security and to encourage them to buy still more of these empty (less than junk) bonds.

By re-creating the notes signed by residential borrowers as various different instruments, and there being no limit on the number of times it could be insured or subject to receiving the proceeds of credit default swaps, (and with the broker dealer being the Master Servicer with SOLE discretion as to whether to declare a credit event that was binding on the insurer, counter-party etc), the broker dealers were able to sell the loans multiple times and sell the bonds multiple times. The leverage at Bear Stearns stacked up to 42 times the actual transaction — for which the return was infinite because the Bear used investor money to do the deal.

Hence we know from direct evidence in the public domain that this was the plan for the “claim” of securitization — which is to say that there never was any securitization of any of the loans. The REMIC Trust was ignored, thus the PSA, servicer rights, etc. were all nonbinding, making all of them volunteers earning considerable money, undisclosed to the investors who would have been furious to see how their money was being used and the borrowers who didn’t see the train wreck coming even from 24 inches from the closing documents.

Before the first loan application was received (and obviously before the first “closing” occurred) the money had been taken from investors for the expressed purpose of funding loans through the REMIC Trust. The originator in all cases was subject to an assignment and assumption agreement which made the loan the property and liability of the counter-party to the A&A BEFORE the money was given to the borrower or paid out on behalf of the borrower. Without the investor, there would have been no loan. without the borrower, there would have been no investment (but there would still be an investor left holding the bag having advanced money for mortgage bonds issued by a REMIC trust that had no assets, and no income to pay the bonds off).

The closing agent never “noticed” that the funds did not come from the actual originator. Since the amount was right, the money went into the closing agent’s escrow account and was then applied by the escrow agent to fund the loan to the borrower. But the rules were that the originator was not allowed to touch or handle or process the money or any overpayment.

Wire transfer instructions specified that any overage was to be returned to the sender who was neither the originator nor any party in privity with the originator. This was intended to prevent moral hazard (theft, of the same type the banks themselves were committing) and to create a layer of bankruptcy remote, liability remote originators whose sins could only be visited upon the aggregators, and CDO conduits constructed by CDO managers in the broker dealers IF the proponent of a claim could pierce a dozen fire walls of corporate veils.

NOW to answer your question, if the REMIC trust was ignored, and was a sham used to steal money from pension funds, but the money of the pension fund landed on the “closing table,” then who should have been named on the note and mortgage (deed of trust beneficiary in non-judicial states)? Obviously the investor(s) should have been protected with a note and mortgage made out in their name or in the name of their entity. It wasn’t.

And the originator was intentionally isolated from privity with the source of funds. That means to me, and I assume you agree, that the investor(s) should have been on the note as payee, the investor(s) should have been on the mortgage as mortgagees (or beneficiaries under the deed of trust) but INSTEAD a stranger to the transaction with no money in the deal allowed their name to be rented as though they were the actual lender.

In turn it was this third party stranger nominee straw-man who supposedly executed assignments, endorsements, and other instruments of power or transfer (sometimes long after they went out of business) on a note and mortgage over which they had no right to control and in which they had no interest and for which they could suffer no loss.

Thus the paperwork that should have been used was never created, executed or delivered. The paperwork that that was created referred to a transaction between the named parties that never occurred. No state allows equitable mortgages, nor should they. But even if that theory was somehow employed here, it would be in favor of the individual investors who actually suffered the loss rather than the foreclosing entity who bears no risk of loss on the loan given to the borrower at closing. They might have other claims against numerous parties including the borrower, but those claims are unliquidated and unsecured.

The secured party, the identified creditor, the payee on the note, the mortgagee on the mortgage, the beneficiary under the deed of trust should have been the investor(s) — not the originator, not the aggregator, not the servicer, not any REMIC Trust, not any Trustee of a REMIC Trust, and not any Trustee substituted by a false beneficiary on a deed of Trust, not the master servicer and not even the broker dealer. And certainly not whoever is pretending to be a legal party in interest who, without injury to themselves or anyone they represent, could or should force the forfeiture of property in which they have no interest — all to the detriment of the investor-lenders and the borrowers.

Why any court would allow the conduits and bookkeepers to take over the show to the obvious detriment and damage to the real parties in interest is a question that only legal historians will be able to answer.

Foreclosures on Nonexistent Mortgages

I have frequently commented that one of the first things I learned on Wall Street was the maxim that the more complicated the “product” the more the buyer is forced to rely on the seller for information. Michael Lewis, in his new book, focuses on high frequency trading — a term that is not understood by most people, even if they work on Wall Street. The way it works is that the computers are able to sort out buy or sell orders, aggregate them and very accurately predict an uptick or down-tick in a stock or bond.

Then the same investment bank that is taking your order to buy or sell submits its own order ahead of yours. They are virtually guaranteed a profit, at your expense, although the impact on individual investors is small. Aggregating those profits amounts to a private tax on large and small investors amounting to billions of dollars, according to Lewis and I agree.

As Lewis points out, the trader knows nothing about what happens after they place an order. And it is the complexity of technology and practices that makes Wall Street behavior so opaque — clouded in a veil of secrecy that is virtually impenetrable to even the regulators. That opacity first showed up decades ago as Wall Street started promoting increasing complex investments. Eventually they evolved to collateralized debt obligations (CDO’s) and those evolved into what became known as the mortgage crisis.

in the case of mortgage CDO’s, once again the investors knew nothing about what happened after they placed their order and paid for it. Once again, the Wall Street firms were one step ahead of them, claiming ownership of (1) the money that investors paid, (2) the mortgage bonds the investors thought they were buying and (3) the loans the investors thought were being financed through REMIC trusts that issued the mortgage bonds.

Like high frequency trading, the investor receives a report that is devoid of any of the details of what the investment bank actually did with their money, when they bought or originated a mortgage, through what entity,  for how much and what terms. The blending of millions of mortgages enabled the investment banks to create reports that looked good but completely hid the vulnerability of the investors, who were continuing to buy mortgage bonds based upon those reports.

The truth is that in most cases the investment banks took the investors money and didn’t follow any of the rules set forth in the CDO documents — but used those documents when it suited them to make even more money, creating the illusion that loans had been securitized when in fact the securitization vehicle (REMIC Trust) had been completely ignored.

There were several scenarios under which property and homeowners were made vulnerable to foreclosure even if they had no mortgage on their property. A recent story about an elderly couple coming “home” to find their door padlocked, possessions removed and then the devastating news that their home had been sold at foreclosure auction is an example of the extreme risk of this system to ALL homeowners, whether they have or had a mortgage or not. This particular couple had paid off their mortgage 15 years ago. The bank who foreclosed on the nonexistent mortgage and the recovery company that invaded their home said it was a mistake. Their will be a confidential settlement where once again the veil of secrecy will be raised.

That type of “mistake” was a once in a million possibility before Wall Street directly entered the mortgage loan business. So why have we read so many stories about foreclosures where there was no mortgage, or was no default, or where the mortgage loan was with someone other than the party who foreclosed?

The answer lies in how these properties enter the system. When a bank sells its portfolio of loans into the system of aggregation of loans, they might accidentally or intentionally include loans for which they had already received full payment. Maybe they issued a satisfaction maybe they didn’t. It might also include loans where life insurance or PMI paid off the loan.

Or, as is frequently the case, the “loan” was sold after the homeowner was merely investigating the possibility of a mortgage or reverse mortgage. As soon as they made application, since approval was certain, the “originator” entered the data into a platform maintained by the aggregator, like Countrywide, where it was included in some “securitization package.

If the loan closed then it was frequently sold again with the new dates and data, so it would like like a different loan. Then the investment banks, posing as the lenders, obtained insurance, TARP, guarantee proceeds and other payments from “co-obligors” on each version of the loan that was sold, thus essentially creating the equivalent of new sales on loans that were guaranteed to be foreclosed either because there was no mortgage or because the terms were impossible for the borrower to satisfy.

The LPS roulette wheel in Jacksonville is the hub where it is decided WHO will be the foreclosing party and for HOW MUCH they will claim is owed, without any allowance for the multiple sales, proceeds of insurance, FDIC loss sharing, actual ownership of the loans or anything else. Despite numerous studies by those in charge of property records and academic studies, the beat goes on, foreclosing by entities who are “strangers to the transaction” (San Francisco study), on documents that were intentionally destroyed (Catherine Ann Porter study at University of Iowa), against homeowners who had no idea what was going on, using the money of investors who had no idea what was going on, and all based upon a triple tiered documentary system where the contractual meeting of the minds could never occur.

The first tier was the Prospectus and Pooling and Servicing Agreement that was used to obtain money from investors under false pretenses.

The second tier consisted of a whole subset of agreements, contracts, insurance, guarantees all payable to the investment banks instead of the investors.

And the third tier was the “closing documents” in which the borrower, contrary to Federal (TILA), state and common law was as clueless as the investors as to what was really happening, the compensation to intermediaries and the claims of ownership that would later be revealed despite the borrower’s receipt of “disclosure” of the identity of his lender and the terms of compensation by all people associated with the origination of the loan.

The beauty of this plan for Wall Street is that nobody from any of the tiers could make direct claims to the benefits of any of the contracts. It has also enabled then to foreclose more than once on the same home in the name of different creditors, making double claims for guarantee from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, FDIC loss sharing, insurance and credit default swaps.

The ugly side of the plan is still veiled, for the most part in secrecy. even when the homeowner gets close in court, there is a confidential settlement, sometimes for millions of dollars to keep the lawyer and the homeowner from disclosing the terms or the reasons why millions of dollars was paid to a homeowner to keep his mouth shut on a loan that was only $200,000 at origination.

This is exactly why I tell people that most of the time their case will be settled either in discovery where a Judge agrees you are entitled to peak behind the curtain, or at trial where it becomes apparent that the witness who is “familiar” with the corporate records really knows nothing and ahs nothing about the the real history of the loan transaction.

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