Who Has the Power to Execute a Satisfaction and Release of Mortgage?

 The answer to that question is that probably nobody has the right to execute a satisfaction of mortgage. That is why the mortgage deed needs to be nullified. In the typical situation the money was taken from investors and instead of using it to fund the REMIC trust, the broker-dealer used it as their own money and funded the origination or acquisition of loans that did not qualify under the terms proposed in the prospectus given to investors. Since the money came from investors either way (regardless of whether their money was put into the trust) the creditor is that group of investors. Instead, neither the investors or even the originator received the original note at the “closing” because neither one had any legal interest in the note. Thus neither one had any interest in the mortgage despite the fact that the nominee at closing was named as “lender.”

This is why so many cases get settled after the borrower aggressively seeks discovery.

The name of the lender on the note and the mortgage was often some other entity used as a bankruptcy remote vehicle for the broker-dealer, who for purposes of trading and insurance represented themselves to be the owner of the loans and mortgage bonds that purportedly derive their value from the loans. Neither representation was true. And the execution of fabricated, forged and unauthorized assignments or endorsements does not mean that there is any underlying business transaction with offer, acceptance and consideration. Hence, when a Court order is entered requiring that the parties claiming rights under the note and mortgage prove their claim by showing the money trail, the case is dropped or settled under seal of confidentiality.

The essential problem for enforcement of a note and mortgage in this scenario is that there are two deals, not one. In the first deal the investors agreed to lend money based upon a promise to pay from a trust that was never funded, has no assets and has no income. In the second deal the borrower promises to pay an entity that never loaned any money, which means that they were not the lender and should not have been put on the mortgage or note.

Since the originator is an agent of the broker-dealer who was not acting within the course and scope of their relationship with the investors, it cannot be said that the originator was a nominee for the investors. It isn’t legal either. TILA requires disclosure of all parties to the deal and all compensation. The two deals were never combined at either level. The investor/lenders were never made privy to the real terms of the mortgages that violated the terms of the prospectus and the borrower was not privy to the terms of repayment from the Trust to the investors and all the fees that went with the creation of multiple co-obligors where there had only been one in the borrower’s “closing.”.

The identity of the lender was intentionally obfuscated. The identity of the borrower was also intentionally obfuscated. Neither party would have completed the deal in most cases if they had actually known what was going on. The lender would have objected not only to the underwriting standards but also because their interest was not protected by a note and mortgage. The borrower  would have been alerted to the fact that huge fees were being taken along the false securitization trail. The purpose of TILA is to avoid that scenario, to wit: borrower should have a choice as to the parties with whom he does business. Those high feelings would have alerted the borrower to seek an alternative loan elsewhere with less interest and greater security of title —  or not do the deal at all because the loan should never have been underwritten or approved.

Mortgage Lenders Network and Wells Fargo Battled over Servicer Advances

It is this undisclosed yield spread premium that produces the pool from which I believe the servicer advances are actually being paid. Intense investigation and discovery will probably reveal the actual agreements that show exactly that. In the meanwhile I encourage attorneys to look carefully at the issue of “servicer advances” as a means to defeat the foreclosure in its entirety.

As usual, the best decisions come from cases where the parties involved in “securitization” are fighting with each other. When a borrower brings up the same issues, the court is inclined to disregard the borrower’s defense as merely an attempt to get out of  a legitimate debt. In the Case of Mortgage Lenders  versus Wells Fargo (395 B.K. 871 (2008)), it is apparent that servicer advances are a central issue. For one thing, it demonstrates the incentive of servicers to foreclose even though the foreclosure will result in a greater loss to the investor then if a workout or modification had been used to save the loan.

See MLN V Wells Fargo

It also shows that the servicers were very much aware of the issue and therefore very much aware that between the borrower and the lender (investor or creditor) there was no default, and on a continuing basis any theoretical default was being cured on a monthly basis. And as usual, the parties and the court failed to grasp the real economics. Based on information that I have received from people were active in the bundling and sale of mortgage bonds and an analysis of the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreements, I think it is obvious that the actual money came from the broker dealer even though it is called a “servicer advance.” Assuming my analysis is correct, this would further complicate the legal issues surrounding servicer advances.

This case also demonstrates that it is in bankruptcy court that a judge is most likely to understand the real issues. State court judges generally do not possess the background, experience, training or time to grasp the incredible complexity created by Wall Street. In this case Wells Fargo moves for relief from the automatic stay (in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition filed by MLN) so that it could terminate the rights of MLN as a servicer, replacing MLN with Wells Fargo. The dispute arose over several issues, servicer advances being one of them. MLN filed suit against Wells Fargo alleging breach of contract and then sought to amend based on the doctrine of “unjust enrichment.” This was based upon the servicer advances allegedly paid by MLN that would be prospectively recovered by Wells Fargo.

The take away from this case is that there is no specific remedy for the servicer to recover advances made under the category of “servicer advances” but that one thing is clear —  the money paid to trust beneficiaries as “servicer advances” is not recoverable from the trust beneficiaries. The other thing that is obvious to Judge Walsh in his discussion of the facts is that it is in the servicing agreements between the parties that there may be a remedy to recover the advances; OR, if there is no contractual basis for recovering advances under the category of  “servicer advances” then there might be a basis to recover under the theory of unjust enrichment. As always, there is a complete absence in the documentation and in the discussion of this case as to the logistics of exactly how a servicer could recover those payments.

One thing that is perfectly clear however is that nobody seems to expect the trust beneficiaries to repay the money out of the funds that they had received. Hence the “servicer advance” is not a loan that needs to be repaid by the trust or trust beneficiaries. Logically it follows that if it is not a loan to the trust beneficiaries who received the payment, then it must be a payment that is due to the creditor; and if the creditor has received the payment and accepted it, the corresponding liability for the payment must be reduced.

Dan Edstrom, senior securitization analyst for the livinglies website, pointed this out years ago. Bill Paatalo, another forensic analyst of high repute, has been submitting the same reports showing the distribution reports indicating that the creditor is being paid on an ongoing basis. Both of them are asking the same question, to wit:  “if the creditor is being paid, where is the default?”

One attorney for US bank lamely argues that the trustee is entitled to both the servicer advances and turnover of rents if the property is an investment property. The argument is that there is no reason why the parties should not earn extra profit. That may be true and it may be possible. But what is impossible is that the creditor who receives a payment can nonetheless claim it as a payment still due and unpaid. If the servicer has some legal or equitable claim for recovery of the “servicer advances” then it can only be against the borrower, on whose behalf the payment was made. This means that a new transaction occurs each time such a payment is made to the trust beneficiaries. In that new transaction the servicer can claim “contribution” or “unjust enrichment” against the borrower. Theoretically that might bootstrap into a claim against the proceeds of the ultimate liquidation of the property, which appears to be the basis upon which the servicer “believes” that the money paid to the trust beneficiaries will be recoverable. Obviously the loose language in the pooling and servicing agreement about the servicer’s “belief” can lead to numerous interpretations.

What is not subject to interpretation is the language of the prospectus which clearly states that the investor who is purchasing one of these bogus mortgage bonds agrees that the money advanced for the purchase of the bond can be pooled by the broker-dealer; it is expressly stated that the investor can be paid out of this pool, which is to say that the investor can be paid with his own money for payments of interest and principal. This corroborates my many prior articles on the tier 2 yield spread premium. There is no discussion in the securitization documents as to what happens to that pool of money in the care custody and control of the broker-dealer (investment bank). And this corroborates my prior articles on the excess profits that have yet to be reported. And it explains why they are doing it again.

It doesn’t take a financial analyst to question why anyone would think it was a great business model to spend hundreds of millions of dollars advertising for loan customers where the return is less than 5%. The truth in lending act passed by the federal government requires the participants who were involved in the processing of the loan to be identified and to disclose their actual compensation arising from the origination of the loan — even if the compensation results from defrauding someone. Despite the fact that most loans were subject to claims of securitization from 2001 to the present, none of them appear to have such disclosure. That means that under Reg Z the loans are “predatory per se.”

To say that these were table funded loans is an understatement. What was really occurring was fraudulent underwriting of the mortgage bonds and fraudulent underwriting of the underlying loans. The higher the nominal interest rate on the loans (which means that the risk of default is correspondingly higher) the less the broker-dealer needed to advance for origination or acquisition of the loan; and this is because the investor was led to believe that the loans would be low risk and therefore lower interest rates. The difference between the interest payment due to the investor and the interest payment allegedly due from the borrower allowed the broker-dealers to advance much less money for the origination or acquisition of loans than the amount of money they had received from the investors. That is a yield spread premium which is not been reported and probably has not been taxed.

It is this undisclosed yield spread premium that produces the pool from which I believe the servicer advances are actually being paid. Intense investigation and discovery will probably reveal the actual agreements that show exactly that. In the meanwhile I encourage attorneys to look carefully at the issue of “servicer advances” as a means to defeat the foreclosure in its entirety.

I caution that when enough cases have been lost as a result of servicer advances, the opposition will probably change tactics. While you can win the foreclosure case, it is not clear what the consequences of that might be. If it results in a final judgment for the homeowner then it might be curtains for anyone to claim any amount of money from the loan. But that is by no means assured. If it results in a dismissal, even with prejudice, it might enable the servicer to stop making advances and then declare a default if the borrower fails to make payments after the servicer has stopped making the payments. Assuming that a notice of acceleration of the debt has been declared, the borrower can argue that the foreclosing party has elected its own defective remedy and should pay the price. If past experience is any indication of future rulings, it seems unlikely that the courts will be very friendly towards that last argument.

Attorneys who wish to consult with me on this issue can book 1 hour consults by calling 520-405-1688.

ATTENTION LAWYERS: ARE SERVICER ADVANCES ARGUABLY A NOVATION

Where “servicer” advances to the trust beneficiaries are present, it explains the rush to foreclosure completely. It is not until the foreclosure is complete that the payor of the “servicer” advances can stop paying. Thus the obfuscation in the discovery process by servicers in foreclosure litigation is also completely explained. Further this would open the eyes of Judges to the fact that there may be other co-obligors that were involved (insurers, credit default swap counterparties etc.). Thus while the creditor is completely satisfied and has experienced no default, the servicer is claiming a default in order to protect the interest of the servicer and broker-dealer (investment bank). It is a lie. — Neil F Garfield, http://www.livinglies.me

This is not for layman. This is directed at lawyers. Any pro se litigant who tries doing something with this is likely to be jumping off a legal cliff so don’t do it without consultation with a lawyer. If you ARE a lawyer, you might find this very enlightening and helpful in developing a strategy to WIN rather than delay the “inevitable.”

I was thinking about this problem when the servicer advances are paid. Such advances are in an amount that satisfies the creditor. If the creditor is named as the real party in interest in a foreclosure, there is an inherent contradiction on the face of the situation. Someone other than the creditor is alleging a default when the creditor will tell you they are just fine — they have received all scheduled payments. Even though it is most likely that the money came from the broker-dealer I was thinking that this might be a novation or a failed attempt at novation.  A definition of novation is shown below. Here’s my thinking:

1.  the receipt of payment by the trust beneficiaries satisfies in full the payment they were to receive under the contract between them and the REMIC trust.

2.  if the foreclosure action is brought by the trust or the trust beneficiaries, directly or indirectly, they can’t say that they have actually experienced a default, since they have payment in full.

3. Some entity is initiating the foreclosure action and some representative capacity on behalf of of the trust or the trust beneficiaries as the creditor.  If the borrower has ceased making payments and no other payments are received by the trust or the trust beneficiaries relating to the subject loan then it is arguably true that the borrower has defaulted and the lender has experienced the default.

4.  But in those cases where the  borrower has ceased making payments but  full payment has been sent and accepted by the lender as identified in the foreclosure action, does not seem possible for a declaration of default by that lender to be valid or even true.

5. But it is equally true that the borrower has ceased making payments under an alleged contract, which the foreclosing party is alleging as a default relating to the lender that has been identified as such in the subject action.

6. In actuality the servicer advances have probably been paid by the broker-dealer out of a fund that  was permitted to be formed out of the investment dollars advanced by the investors for the purchase of the mortgage bonds. Presumably this fund would exist in a trust account maintained by the trustee for the asset-backed trust. In actuality it appears as though these funds were kept by the broker dealer. The prospectus specifically states that the investors can be repaid out of this fund which consists of the investment dollars advanced by the investors.
7. But these nonstop servicer advances are designated as payments by the servicer.

8.  And it is stated in the pooling and servicing agreement that the nonstop servicer advances may not be recovered from the servicer nor anyone else.

9.  That means that the money received by the trust beneficiaries is simply a payment of the obligation of the trust under the original agreement by which the trust beneficiaries advanced money as investors purchasing the mortgage bonds.

10. In other settings such payments would be in accordance with agreements in which subrogation of the payor occurs or in which the claim is purchased. Here we have a different problem. At no point here is the entire claim subject to any claim of subrogation or purchase. It is only the payments that have been made that is the subject of the dispute. That opens the door to potential claims of multiple creditors each of whom can show that they have attained the status of a creditor by virtue of actual value or consideration paid.

11.  But regardless of who makes payments to the trust beneficiaries or why they made such payments, the trust beneficiaries are under no obligation to return the payments. Hence the trust beneficiaries have experienced no default and the alleged mortgage bond avoids the declaration of a credit event that would decrease the value of the bond. That keeps the investors happy and the broker dealer out of hot water (note the hundreds of claims totaling around $200 billion thus far in settlements because the broker dealer didn’t do many of the things they were supposed to do to protect the investors). NOTE ALSO: The payment and acceptance of the regularly scheduled payments to the trust beneficiaries would cure any default in all events.

12.  But the entity that has initiated the foreclosure action is still going to argue that the borrower has breached the terms of the note and has failed to make the regularly scheduled payments and that therefore the borrower is in default. But they cannot say that the borrower defaulted in its obligation to the creditor since the creditor is already satisfied.

13. Even where we have successfully established that the origination of the loan occurred with the funds of the investor and not the named payee on the note or the named mortgagee on the mortgage, a debt still exists to the investors for the amount that is not paid by anyone. This debt would arise by operation of law since the borrower accepted the money and the investor lenders are the source of that money.

14. So the first issue that arises out of this complex series of transactions and a complex chain of documents (that appear to reflect transactions that never occurred), is whether the creator of this scheme unintentionally opened the door to allow a borrower to stop making payments and require the servicer or broker-dealer to continue making nonstop servicer advances the satisfying the obligation to the so-called secured creditor alleged in the initiation of the foreclosure action. If the obligation is indefinite as to duration, this might have a substantial impact on the amount due, the amount demanded and whether the original notice of default was fatally defective in stating the amount required for reinstatement and even claiming the default.

15.  I therefore come to the second issue which is that in such cases a second obligation arises when the first one has been satisfied by the payment from a third-party. The second obligation is clearly not secured unless a partial assignment of the mortgage and note has been executed and recorded to protect the servicer or broker-dealer or whoever made the payments to the trust beneficiaries under the nonstop servicer advances. This clearly did not occur. And if it did occur it would be void under the terms of the trust instrument, i.e., the pooling and servicing agreement.

16.  The only lawsuits I can imagine filed by the party who made such payments to the trust beneficiaries are causes of action against the homeowner (not to be called a “borrower” anymore) for contribution or unjust enrichment. And as I say, there could be no claims that the debt is secured since the security instrument is pledged to the trust beneficiaries and executed in favor of a third party that is different from the party that made the nonstop servicer advances to the trust beneficiaries.

17.  I am therefore wondering whether or not novation should be alleged in order to highlight the fact that the second obligation has been created. Some sort of equitable novation would also allow the Judge to satisfy himself or herself that he or she is not encouraging people to borrow money and not pay it back while at the same time punishing those who created the mad scheme and thus lost the rights set forth in the security agreement (mortgage, deed of trust etc.). Based on the definition below, it might be that the novation could not have occurred without the signature of the borrower. But  the argument in favor of characterizing the transactions as a novation might be helpful in highlighting the fact that with the undisputed creditors satisfied, that no default has occurred, and that any purported default has been waived or cured, and that we know that a new liability has been created by operation of law in favor of the party that made the payments.

18.  And that brings me to my last point. I would like to see what party it is that claims to have made the non-stop servicer payments. If the payments came from a reserve pool created out of the investment dollars funded by the investors, it would be difficult to argue that the  borrower has become unjustly enriched at the expense of the broker-dealer. The circular logic created in the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreement would obviously not be construed against the borrower who was denied access to the information that would have disclosed the existence of these complex documents and complex transactions, despite federal and state law to the contrary. (TILA and RESPA, Reg Z etc.)

COMMENTS are invited.

————
FROM WIKIPEDIA —

In contract law and business law, novation is the act of either:

  1. replacing an obligation to perform with a new obligation; or
  2. adding an obligation to perform; or
  3. replacing a party to an agreement with a new party.

In contrast to an assignment, which is valid so long as the obligee (person receiving the benefit of the bargain) is given notice, a novation is valid only with the consent of all parties to the original agreement: the obligee must consent to the replacement of the original obligor with the new obligor.[1] A contract transferred by the novation process transfers all duties and obligations from the original obligor to the new obligor.

For example, if there exists a contract where Dan will give a TV to Alex, and another contract where Alex will give a TV to Becky, then, it is possible to novate both contracts and replace them with a single contract wherein Dan agrees to give a TV to Becky. Contrary to assignment, novation requires the consent of all parties. Consideration is still required for the new contract, but it is usually assumed to be the discharge of the former contract.

Another classic example is where Company A enters a contract with Company B and a novation is included to ensure that if Company B sells, merges or transfers the core of their business to another company, the new company assumes the obligations and liabilities that Company B has with Company A under the contract. So in terms of the contract, a purchaser, merging party or transferee of Company B steps into the shoes of Company B with respect to its obligations to Company A. Alternatively, a “novation agreement” may be signed after the original contract[2] in the event of such a change. This is common in contracts with governmental entities; an example being under the United States Anti-Assignment Act, the governmental entity that originally issued the contract must agree to such a transfer or it is automatically invalid by law.

The criteria for novation comprise the obligee’s acceptance of the new obligor, the new obligor’s acceptance of the liability, and the old obligor’s acceptance of the new contract as full performance of the old contract. Novation is not a unilateral contract mechanism, hence allows room for negotiation on the new T&Cs under the new circumstances. Thus, ‘acceptance of the new contract as full performance of the old contract’ may be read in conjunction to the phenomenon of ‘mutual agreement of the T&Cs.[1]

Application in financial markets

Novation is also used in futures and options trading to describe a special situation where the central clearing house interposes itself between buyers and sellers as a legal counter party, i.e., the clearing house becomes buyer to every seller and vice versa. This obviates the need for ascertaining credit-worthiness of each counter party and the only credit risk that the participants face is the risk of the clearing house defaulting. In this context, novation is considered a form of risk management.

The term is also used in markets that lack a centralized clearing system, such as swap trading and certain over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, where “novation” refers to the process where one party to a contract may assign its role to another, who is described as “stepping into” the contract. This is analogous to selling a futures contract.

BAD FAITH: Shack Decision Unravels the Chase-Wamu Mystery -At least in Part

Shack Blasts Chase, Fannie Mae for Bad Faith on Wamu Merger

It is obvious that documents were produced for Shack to issue these rulings. The affidavits to which he refers should be obtained in their entirety. There is lots to take away from this decision, but most important, is that Chase never acquired the loans from WAMU. The loans originated or acquired by WAMU were already sold to investors, trusts and Fannie or Freddie. The issue with Fannie and Freddie of course is that they were merely fronting for “private label” securitizations hiding behind the veil of the GSE’s who were mere guarantors and not lenders. I’d like to see any agreement and transactional documents showing the alleged purchase by Fannie, but it is presumed in the Shack Order and Findings.

It is also obvious that the finding that Chase was not the owner of the debt at any time came from an admission from both a Fannie Mae representative in an affidavit from an alleged Fannie Mae representative. We should direct discovery in Chase cases to that person in Fannie Mae who says they acquired the subject debt and that Chase merely received the servicing rights in the Chase-WAMU merger.

Note that Fannie Mae is considered by Shack to have acted in bad faith, and that Fannie was less than forthcoming in its description of itself stating that they might be the owner or they might be the trustee (pursuant to the Master Trustee Agreement published in 2007) for a securitized trust. Note also that Fannie at no time was chartered as a lender. Thus it could not originate any loans and never did so. The vagueness with which Fannie Mae addresses the issue of ownership shows that the hiding and non-disclosure in bankruptcy courts and state courts continues across the country.

The admission from Fannie that they “might” be the Master trustee for allegedly securitized assets (debts arising out of fictitious transactions on paper that looked like mortgage loans) is both alarming and encouraging. The rush to foreclosure is partially explained by this chaotic pile of fraudulent paper trails.

When you take into account the non stop servicer advances, you can see what the parties are hiding — that the real creditor on those debts, has been paid all the interest they were expecting, that the principal is being paid in settlements with pennies on the dollar, and that the default alleged in notices from servicers and informing the borrower of the right to reinstate were defective, to wit: that the amount stated as required to cure the alleged default was and remains incorrect. The amount should have been reduced by third party payments including but not limited to the servicer advances which were not loans, and thus could only be characterized as PAYMENT, which is the ultimate defense against a lawsuit or any enforcement mechanism designed to collect a debt.

The dirty little secret is that they diverted title and money from the investors and converted what could have been a secured loan into an unsecured loan. The advances and payments by third parties satisfied the debt that arose when the borrower took the loan. They in turn MIGHT have claims for contribution or unjust enrichment but they are most certainly not protected by a pledge of collateral either as mortgage or assignment of rents or anything else.

Note that it could not have acquired loans except with money from what were represented as securitized trusts with Fannie as master Trustee. Therefore there are no circumstances under which Fannie or Freddie could be owners of the the debt with rights to enforce except upon the only event in which money is paid by Fannie for the loan — a guarantee payment AFTER FORECLOSURE) that is the only transaction permitted under its charter. This point was missed by Shack or ignored by him, because he had bigger fish to fry — the lawyers for Chase itself with a copy of the order to be served upon Jamie Dimon, the head of Chase.
The fact is that with the WAMU bankruptcy, seizure by OTS and appointment of FDIC, there were no assignments, agreements of sale or even a permission slip under which Chase could or did acquire loans from WAMU. But that didn’t stop Chase from claiming exactly that in tens of thousands of foreclosures.
In cases where Chase is allegedly at the root of title through the merger with WAMU, it would be appropriate to site to the Shack case, get the case documents, get a Title and Securitization report (see http://www.livingliesstore.com) and lawyers should look into a motion for summary judgment, or a motion for involuntary dismissal with prejudice. Even where Chase might allege that it is filing the foreclosure as a representative of Fannie or Freddie, the basis for that allegation needs to be in their pleading or it is not an ULTIMATE fact upon which relief could be granted. Discovery should be aimed at getting the documents upon which Chase allegedly relies in showing that it has the authority to represent Fannie — and don’t stop there. The truth is that nearly all the so-called Fannie and Freddie loans were veils for the private label securitization in which the money was diverted from the trust, as was the title, leaving Fannie and Freddie as well as the investors and the buyers holding nothing.

In cases where the statute of limitations has already run, the dismissal of the foreclosure action, is barred in most cases from ever being brought again by anyone. But the dismissal against Chase should be with prejudice in all events because it isn’t the creditor and therefore does not satisfy the statutory requirements in Florida, and I presume all other states, to submit a credit bid at auction in lieu of cash.
The Judges are beginning to understand that by applying basic contract law, they can clear their dockets. It is up to us to help them. The offer of a loan was met with acceptance by the borrower but the loan never occurred. The transfers also had offer and acceptance but again no money because the investors’ money was used (outside the trust) directly to fund the origination or acquisition of the loan. This was part of a larger scheme to defraud to investors whose money was to have been deposited into the trust and then used to fund origination or acquisition of the he loans within 90 days (the cutoff).

The investment bank fraudulently induced (see complaints filed by investors, insurers, government guarantee entities etc.) the investors to give them money for an investment into a controlled trust when in fact they diverted the money for their own purposes, taking outsized fees for themselves as the toxic loans materialized to “support” the alleged investment into loans. That is the “mismanagement” part of investors’ allegations — diversion of money into a PONZI scheme.

The investment bank fraudulently diverted title to the loans to strawman entities or were — sometimes even by name (see American Brokers Conduit) — mere conduits for undisclosed third party lenders. The argument that the parties managed to hide this from the borrower long enough for the statute of limitations to run out on TILA claims is an affront to the court system and to the statutory scheme enacted by Congress to protect borrowers from predatory lenders and “steal” deals where huge fees were taken, rather than earned, without disclosure to the Borrower.

So the first element of fraud alleged by investors is diversion of the the money. The second is diversion of the paperwork that would have protected the investors at least to some extent. In this scheme title to the loan papers was intentionally diverted from the owners of the the debt, thus rendering the so-called mortgage documents unenforceable — all alleged by investors, insurers and other co-obligors who have discovered to their chagrin that each of them paid the investment bank 100 cents on the the dollar on each loan multiple times.

And yet borrowers continue to seek modifications, which means they are not looking for free houses. Even knowing they are dealing with criminals the borrowers are willing to start paying these thieves if the terms can be adjusted to give them the benefit of the bargain that was intended at origination of the purchase money mortgage or refinancing or second mortgage or HELOC.

That leaves the servicers and their lawyers being the only ones who want Foreclosures because they want a free house and/or they want the foreclosure to recapture Servicer advances to the creditors — advances that vastly reduce the amount owed and which cure the alleged borrower default. That has now become a foreclosure folly in which the servicers and their lawyers are the only parties who want it. The investors don’t care because they are getting settlements for the fraud of the investment banks for creating unenforceable loan documents (that are frequently enforced anyway because of judicial ignorance) and diversion of investor money.

In the end, the “clean hands” that Shack talks about are clearly absent from both Servicer and government sponsored entities and as judge Shack states in his decision, wrongdoers should not be permitted to profitf or their wrongdoing. If that means a windfall to the borrower, so be it. It can be likened to the old usury laws and the current usury laws where the principal of the debt is wiped out and the fraudster is hit with a judgment for three times the principal, three times the interest or both.

Countrywide Found Guilty of Fraud, JPM Criminal Responsibility for Madoff PONZI Scheme

“The words PONZI SCHEME and FRAUD applied to the mortgage meltdown has been largely dismissed by policy makers, law enforcement and regulators. Instead we heard the terms RISKY BEHAVIOR and RECKLESSNESS. Now law enforcement has finally completed its investigation and determined that those who set the tone and culture of Wall Street were deeply involved in the Madoff PONZI scheme and were regularly committing FRAUD in the creation and sale of mortgage bonds and the underlying “DEFECTIVE” loans. The finding shows that these plans were not risky nor reckless. They were intentional and designed to deceive and cause damage to everyone relying upon their false representations. The complex plan of false claims of securitization is now being pierced making claims of “plausible deniability” RISKY and RECKLESS.

And if the loans were defective there is no reason to believe that this applies only to the loans claimed to be in default. It applies to all loans subject to false claims of securitization, false documentation for non existent transactions, and fraudulent collection practices by reporting and collecting on balances that were fraudulently stated in the first instance. At this point all loans are suspect, all loan balances stated are suspect, and all Foreclosures based on these loans were frauds upon the court, should be vacated and the homeowner reinstated to ownership of the property and possession of the property. All such loans should have the loan balance adjusted by the courts for appropriate set off in denying the borrowers the benefit of the bargain that was presented to them.

“It is now difficult to imagine a scenario where the finding of the intentional use and creation of defective mortgages will not trickle down to all mortgage litigation. The Countrywide decision is the first that expressly finds them guilty of creating defective loans. It is impossible to believe that Countrywide’s intentional acts of malfeasance won’t spread to the investment banks that used Countrywide as the aggregator of defective loans (using the proprietary desk top underwriting software for originators to get approval). The reality is coming up, front and center. And Judges who ignore the defenses of homeowners who were of course defrauded by the same defective mortgages are now on notice that bias towards the banks simply doesn’t work in the real world.” — Neil F Garfield,www.livinglies.me October 24, 2013

——————————————————

By Neil F Garfield, Esq. Tallahassee, Florida October 24, 2013. If the mortgages were defective and were used fraudulently to gain illicit profits it is not possible to avoid the conclusions that homeowners are among the victims. By using false appraisals the huge banks created the illusion of rising prices. This was manipulation of market prices just as the banks were found guilty of manipulating stated market rates for interbank lending “LIBOR” and use of the manipulated pricing to trade for further benefit knowing that the reality was different. The banks have continued this pattern behavior and are still doing it, and laying fines as a cost of doing business in the manipulation and ownership of natural resources. They are a menace to all societies on the planet. The threat of that menace must be removed In the face of a clear and present danger posed by the real world knowledge that where an opportunity arises for “moral hazard” the banks will immediately use it causing further damage to government, taxpayers, consumers and investors.

None of it was disclosed or even referenced at the alleged loan closing with borrowers despite federal and state laws that require all such undisclosed profits and compensation to be disclosed or suffer the consequence of required payment to the borrower of all such undisclosed compensation. The borrowers are obviously entitled to offset for the false appraisals used by lenders to induce borrowers to accept defective loan products.

Further, borrowers have a clear right of action for treble damages for the pattern of conduct that constituted fraud as a way of doing business. In addition, borrowers can now be scene through a clear lens — that they are entitled to the benefit of the bargain that they reasonably thought they were getting. That they were deceived and coerced into accepting defective loans with undisclosed players and undisclosed compensation and undisclosed repayment terms raises the probability now that borrowers who present their case well, could well start getting punitive damages awards with regularity. It’s easy to imagine the closing argument for exemplary or punitive damages — “$10 billion wasn’t enough to stop them, $25 billion wasn’t enough to stop of them, so you, members of the jury, must decide what will get their attention without putting them out of business. You have heard evidence of the tens of billions of dollars in profits they have reported. It’s up to you to decide what will stop the banks from manipulating the marketplace, fraudulently selling defective loans to borrowers and pension funds alike with the intention of deceiving them and knowing that they would reasonably rely on their misrepresentations. You decide.”

————————————————————————————————-

U.S. prepares to take action against JPMorgan over Madoff
In what would be an almost unheard of move when it comes to U.S. banks, the FBI and the U.S. attorney’s office are in talks with JPMorgan (JPM) about imposing a deferred prosecution agreement over allegations that the bank turned a blind eye to Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, the NYT reports.
Authorities would suspend criminal charges against JPMorgan but impose a fine and other concessions, and warn the bank that it will face indictments over any future misconduct.
However, the government has not decided to charge any current or former JPMorgan employees.
The report comes as the bank holds talks with various regulators over a $13B deal to settle claims about its mortgage practices.

Countrywide found guilty in U.S. mortgage suit
A federal jury has found Bank of America’s (BAC -2.1%) Countrywide unit liable for defrauding Fannie Mae (FNMA +22%) and Freddie Mac (FMCC +19.4%) by selling them thousands of defective mortgages.
The judge will determine the amount of the penalty – the U.S. has requested $848M, the gross loss to the GSEs as calculated by its expert witness.
The suit centered on Countrywide’s HSSL – High Speed Swim Lane – program instituted in August 2007, says the government, to keep the music playing as the property market was falling apart.

DOJ probes nine leading banks over sale of mortgage debt
The Department of Justice is reportedly investigating nine major banks over the sale of problematic mortgage bonds, although the probes are for civil infractions rather than criminal ones.
The banks are Bank of America (BAC), Citigroup (C), Credit Suisse (CS), Deutsche Bank (DB), Goldman Sachs (GS), Morgan Stanley (MS), RBS (RBS), UBS (UBS) and Wells Fargo (WFC).
The inquiries span U.S. attorney’s offices from California to Massachusetts, and come as JPMorgan tries to reach a multi-billion dollar settlement over the issue.

Only $4 Billion of JPM $13 Billion Settlement Goes for “Consumer Relief”

For assistance in understanding the content of this article and purchasing services that provide information for attorneys and homeowners see http://www.livingliesstore.com.

Josh Arnold has written an interesting article that reveals both realities and misconceptions arising from gross misconceptions. His misperceptions arise primarily from two factors. First he either ignores the fact that JPM was integrally involved in the underwriting, sale and hedging of the alleged mortgage bonds, never actually acquired the loans or the bonds on which they claimed a loss, and made huge “profits” from fictitious trades disguised as “proprietary” trading which was a cover for tier 2 yield spread premiums that were never disclosed to investors or borrowers. The deregulation of those mortgage securities may have provided cover for the fraud that occurred to investors, but the failure to disclose this “compensation” to borrowers violates the truth in lending act and state deceptive lending laws.

Second, the article is based upon a point of view that is not surprising coming from a Wall Street analyst but which is bad for the country. The ideology behind this is clear — Wall Street is there to make money for itself. That has never been true. Wall Street exists solely because in a growing and complex economy, liquidity must be created by breaking up risks into portions small enough to attract investors to the table. Whether they make money or not depends upon their skill in running a company.

Unfortunately in the early 1970′s the door was flung wide open when broker-dealers were allowed to incorporate and go public. Just ask Alan Greenspan who believed the markets would self correct because the players would act rationally in their own self interest. As he he says in his latest book, the banks did not act rationally nor in their own best interest because they were being run by management that was acting for the self interest of management and not the company. Back in the 1960′s none of this would have occurred when the broker-dealers were partnerships —leading partners to question any transaction by any partner that put the partners at risk. Now the partners are remote and distant shareholders who are among the victims of management fraud or excess risk taking.

The effect on foreclosure defense is that, at the suggestion of the former Fed Chairman, we should stop assuming that the broker dealers that are now called banks were acting with enlightened or rational self-interest. The opening and closing statement should refer to the information like this article Quoted below as demonstrating that the banks were openly violating common law, statutory, and administrative rules because the losses from litigation would not be a liability of the actual people who caused the violations.

Any presumption in favor of the foreclosing bank should be looked at with intense skepticism. And in discovery remember to ask questions about just how bad the underwriting process was and revealing the absolute fact, now proven beyond any reasonable doubt, the goal was for the first time NOT to minimize risk, but rather to force applications to closing because of giant profits that could be booked as soon as the loan was sold, since at the time of closing the loans were already part of a reported chain of securitization. Investigation at real banks as opposed to “originators” will reveal two sets of underwriting rules and practices — one for their own portfolio loans in compliance with industry standards and the other for the vast majority of loans that were claimed to be part of a fictitious cloud of securitization that did not comply with industry standards.

In the end my initial assessment in 2007-2008 on these pages is proving to be true. The unraveling of this mess will depend upon quiet title lawsuits and lawsuits for damages resulting from violations of the Truth in Lending Act — where those gross profit distortions at the broker-dealer level are required to be paid to the homeowner because they were not disclosed at closing.
———————————————————————————————
From Seeking Alpha website, by Josh Arnold —

JPMorgan’s (JPM) legal woes got a lot worse over the weekend with its well-publicized $13 billion settlement. JPM already has much more than that set aside to pay legal claims so it’s really a non-event for the bank; they saw it coming to a degree. I’m not here to debate whether or not JPM’s employees misled investors, including Fannie and Freddie, but what I think the most important, and disconcerting, piece of this settlement is the way it was undertaken by the Administration.

Think back to 2008 when the world as we knew it was ending. Smaller financial institutions were failing left and right and even the larger players, including Lehman, Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual, Wachovia and others eventually found themselves in enormous trouble to the point where distressed sales were the only way to stave off bankruptcy (save Lehman, of course). The federal government, eager to avoid a massive crisis, asked JPM, Wells Fargo (WFC) and others to aid the effort to avoid such a calamity. Both obliged and we know history shows JPM ended up with Washington Mutual and Bear Stearns while Wells purchased Wachovia as it was on the cusp of going out of business. At the time, JPM CEO Jamie Dimon famously asked the government, as a favor for bailing out WaMu and Bear Stearns, not to prosecute JPM down the road for the sins of the acquired institutions. This is only fair and it should have gone without saying as the idea of prosecuting an acquirer for something the acquired company did as an independent institution is preposterous.

However, that is exactly where we find ourselves today with the settlement that has been struck. JPM has said publicly that 80% of the losses accrued from the loans that are the subject of this settlement were from Bear and WaMu. This means that, despite Dimon’s asking and the fact that the federal government “urged” JPM to acquire these two institutions, JPM is indeed being punished for something it had nothing to do with. This is a watershed moment in our nation’s history as the next time a financial crisis rolls around, who is going to want to help the federal government acquire failing institutions? Now that we know that the reward for such behavior is perp walks, public shaming via our lawmakers (who can’t even fund their own spending) and enormous legal fines and settlements, I’m thinking it will be harder for the government to find a buyer next time.

Not only is the subject of this legal settlement and the very nature of the way it has been conducted suspect, but even the fines themselves as part of the settlement amount to nothing more than tax revenue. The $13 billion is split up as follows: $9 billion in penalties and fees and $4 billion in consumer relief. The penalties and fees are ostensibly for the “wrongdoing” that JPM must have performed in order to be subject such a historic settlement. These penalties and fees are for allegedly misleading investors in these securities and misrepresenting the strength of the underlying loans. The buyers of these securities, however, were all very sophisticated themselves, including the government sponsored entities. These companies had analysts working on these securities purchases and could very well have realized that the underlying loans were bad. However, Fannie and Freddie blindly purchased the mortgages and were eventually saddled with large losses as a result. But instead of the GSE’s taking responsibility for bad investment decisions, the government has decided to simply confiscate $13 billion from a private sector company while Fannie and Freddie have claimed zero responsibility whatsoever for their role in the losses.

The other $4 billion is earmarked for “consumer relief” but the worst part of this is that these loans were sold to institutions. This means that this consumer relief is simply a bogus way to confiscate more money from JPM and the alleged reason has no basis in reality. The consumer relief portion would suggest that JPM misled the individual consumers taking the loans that were eventually securitized but that is not what the settlement is about. In fact, this is simply a way to redistribute wealth and the Administration is taking full advantage. In order for the redistribution of wealth to make the alleged victims whole it would need to be distributed among the institutions that purchased the securities. So is this part of the settlement, under the guise of “consumer relief”, really just another tax levy? Or is it going to consumers that had absolutely nothing to do with this case? Either way, it’s confiscatory and doesn’t make any sense. Based on reports about this consumer relief portion of the settlement, this money is going wherever the Administration sees fit. In other words, this is simply tax revenue that is being redistributed and given to consumers that have absolutely zero to do with this case.

Even the $9 billion in penalties and fees is going to be distributed among various government agencies and as such, this money is also tax revenue. Otherwise, the money for these agencies would eventually come from the Treasury but instead, JPM is going to foot the bill.

I’m not against companies that have done something wrong being punished. In fact, that is a necessary part of a fair and open capitalist system that allows the free world the economic prosperity it has enjoyed over history. However, this settlement is a clear case of the federal government confiscating private assets in order to redistribute them among government operations and consumers that had absolutely nothing to do with the lawsuit. I am extremely disappointed in the way the Administration has handled this case and other banks should be on notice; it doesn’t matter what you did or didn’t do, if you’ve got the money, the government will come after you.

In terms of what this means for the stock, JPM has already set aside $23 billion for litigation reserves so when the bill comes due for this settlement, JPM has more than enough firepower available to pay it. In fact, this settlement is likely a positive for the stock. Since this is likely to be the largest of the fines/settlements handed down on the Bank of Dimon, the fact that the uncertainty has been lifted should alleviate some concern on the part of investors. In addition to this, since JPM still has a sizable reserve, $10 billion or so, left for additional litigation, investors may be surprised down the road if JPM can actually recoup some of that litigation expense and boost earnings. Not only would that remove a multi-billion drain on book value but it could also increase the bank’s GAAP earnings if all litigation reserves weren’t used up. In any event, even if that is not the chosen path, JPM could still recognize higher earnings in the coming quarters if it sees it needs less money set aside each quarter for litigation reserves. Again, this is very positive for the stock but for more tangible reasons.

The bottom line is that JPM got the short end of the stick with this settlement. Not only is the bank paying for the sins of others but it is paying very dearly and sustaining reputational damage in the process. I couldn’t be more disappointed with the way the Administration’s witch hunt was conducted and the end result. But that is the world we apparently live in now and if you want to invest in banks you need to be prepared to deal with confiscatory fines and levies against banks simply because they can’t stop the government from taking it.

However, JPM is better positioned than perhaps any of its too-big-too-fail brethren to weather the storm and I think that is why there was virtually no movement in the stock when the settlement became public. JPM has been stockpiling litigation reserves when no one was looking and has done well in doing so. With the looming threat of this settlement now come and gone, investors can concentrate on what a terrific money making machine JPM is again. Trading at a small premium to book value and only nine times next year’s earnings estimates, JPM is the safe choice among the TBTF banks. Couple its very cheap valuation with its robust, nearly 3% yield and the largest settlement against a single company in our country’s history behind it and you’ve got a great potential long term buy.

Disclosure: I have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Share this ArticleComments(8)

Don Dion
Oct 23 07:49 AM
Josh,

Great article. See also http://seekingalpha.co…

Don

Rescission Returns in 3rd Circuit Opinion

Forbes has taken notice. There is a shift toward borrowers in mortgage litigation. The decision points back to the origination of the loan. This decision follows a similar decision in the 4th circuit. It all comes down to what actually happened at closing? And we don’t actually know if the decision to allow rescission indefinitely on second mortgages will extend to the first mortgage if it is all part of the same transaction. The result of rescission is that all payments of every kind must be returned to the borrower plus interest and attorney fees and potentially treble damages. All payments mean closing costs, fees, costs, expenses, principal interest, escrow and anything else. If the “lender” doesn’t do that the mortgage lien is expressly invalidated by operation of law, which is the same as being subject to a recorded satisfaction of mortgage. TILA is back!! — at least until the Supreme Court gets to weigh in on this ongoing dispute.

TILA requires only a clear statement and communication that the borrower wishes to rescind the transaction. The statute is clear that the burden shifts to the “lender” to either agree to rescission or sue to disqualify the rescission that must be supported by allegations and proof that the lender violated disclosure requirements at the time of origination of the loan. To be sure, there is a loophole created by the courts — that the rescinding borrower have the money to give back to the lender. But that is exactly what is going to cause the problem for Foreclosers. If the borrower can show some credible source of funds, the “lender” is screwed — because the lender is not the party who was named on the note and mortgage.

So the offer of the money will immediately cause an inquiry and discovery into the question who actually was the lender? We certainly don’t want to give the rescission money to the named party on the note and mortgage when the source of funds was a party with no legal relationship to the named “lender.” The facts will show that the mortgage lien was never perfected —and that therefore rescission under TILA is potentially unnecessary.

Either way, the debt turns up unsecured and can be discharged in bankruptcy. The problem for Wall Street is how they will explain to investors why the investors were not identified as the lenders in each closing. The answer is that Wall Street Banks wanted to use those loans as “assets” they could trade, insure, hedge and even sell contrary to the prospectus and PSA shown to pension Funds and other investors who advanced funds to investment banks as “payment” for mortgage bonds underwritten by those banks.

When the limelight is focused on the original closing, Pandora’s box will open for the bankers. It will show that they never used the money from investors to buy bonds issued by a REMIC trust. It will show the trusts to be unfunded. It will show the unfunded trusts never bought or funded the loans. It will show that the disclosure requirements and the reason for TILA (borrowers’ choices in the marketplace) were regularly violated.

That in turn will lead to the inquiry as to the balance of the loan that is now due. Rescission means giving back what you received. But what if, by operation of law, you have already given back some or all of the money? The investment banker will be hard pressed to describe itself as anything but the agent of the lender investors. As agent, it received payments from insurance, hedges and sales to the Federal Reserve. How will the Wall Street Banks explain why those payments should not be applied to reduce the account receivable of the investor lenders? How many times should the lender be paid on the same debt?

Remember that there is no issue of subrogation, contribution or other claims against the borrower here. They were expressly waived in the contracts for insurance and credit default swaps. Hence the payments should equitably be applied to the benefit of the investors whose money was used to start the false securitization scheme under false pretenses. Once the investors are paid or considered paid because their agents received the money from third party co-obligors, what is left for the borrowers to pay? Will the court order the borrower to pay “back” a lender who never made the loan?

Dreamli Zs 6:22pm Sep 28

http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/02/07/court-decision-gives-borrowers-an-ace-in-the-hole-lenders-a-headache/

Court Decision Gives Lenders A Headache, Borrowers An Ace In The Hole
http://www.forbes.com
A court ruling gives borrowers an unlimited deadline for rescinding second mortgages

How Do I Use an Expert Declaration?

With judges under pressure to clear their calendar, the strategy of the banks in delaying prosecution of foreclosure cases is coming to an end. And the opportunity for the borrower, as well as a good reason for action, has just begun. An aggressive approach is more likely to yield good results than any strategy predicated upon delay. And judges are prone to blame the delay on the homeowner who wants to stay in his home rent-free for as long as possible.

So having an aggressive plan to prosecute the case with solid answers and affirmative defenses is key to getting the judges curiosity — why is the homeowner trying so hard to move the case along and the bank stonewalling and delaying the action alleging they need relief? Some lawyers, like Jeff Barnes, don’t know how to litigate with kid gloves on. When they take a case it is to draw blood and Barnes has established himself as not only an aggressive attorney but one who often wins a satisfactory result for his clients.

My expert declaration covers the gamut from property issues through UCC and contract issues. Securitization is something I understand very well — how it is intended to be used, how the law got passed exempting it from being characterized as securities or insurance products and how it was sold to Congress and Clinton as an innovative way to spread and reduce risk of loss, thus raising an investment with a medium degree of risk of loss to very low and therefore suitable for stable managed funds who are required to put their money into extremely low risk triple A rated investments.

All that said, for all I know and can say, neither my declaration nor testimony is ever dispositive in the final ruling of the case, with a few exceptions. On the other hand out of hundreds of times my declarations or testimony has been used in court, the number of times the banks have proffered an alternate “expert” to say I was wrong, mistaken or had used defective analysis to reach my conclusions is ZERO. And the banks took my deposition in a class action suit in which I was admitted as an expert witness in Federal Court — the deposition lasted six full working days 9:00am to 5:00pm. About the only negative thing they had to say after hours and hours of testimony was that my opinion was “grandiose” to which I answered that it was not nearly as grandiose as the fraud their clients were perpetrating upon our society.

So the most common question is how can I use your expert declaration? And the first answer I  always give is (a) my declaration, whether notarized or not, is never and should never be a substitute for actual facts applicable to the actual case which requires actual witnesses who have actual knowledge (usually from the opposition in discovery) and (b) you should have a plan for your case that does not call for a knock-out punch in the first hearing. If you think that is going to happen you are deluding yourself.

The most common attack on my affidavit is a motion to strike or a memorandum that alleges that I am not a credible expert. But the rules on admission of expert testimony are so lax that almost anyone can be admitted as an expert but he Judge is not required to presume the expert knows what he is talking about or has anything of value to offer. Thus a proper foundation of facts, timelines, paper trails and money trails needs to be laid out in front of the judge in a manner and form that makes it easy to understand. The declaration is only one step of a multistage process. When the opposition attacks the declaration, they are trying to distract the court from the real issues.

The best and most fruitful uses of an expert declaration are to use them when battling for information through the discovery. That is where cases are often won and lost, where cases end up being settled to the satisfaction of the borrower or lost, pending appeal. The expert declaration tells the court what the expert looked at and raises issues and opinions including the information that is absent which will resolve the issue of whether the forecloser actually has a cause of action upon which relief could be granted (an inquiry applicable to both judicial and non-judicial states).
Expert declarations have been used with success in hearings on discovery because it explains why you need to take the deposition of a specific witness or compel production of certain documents or compel answers to interrogatories. Once that order is entered agreeing that you are entitled to  the information it is often the case that the mater is settled within hours or days.
To a lesser degree expert declarations have been successful in non-judicial states where the homeowner seeks a temporary restraining order. And a fair amount of traction has been seen where it is used to show the court hat there are material issues of fact in dispute to defeat a motion for summary judgment, sometimes effective if there is a cross-motion for summary judgment for the homeowner where there is an effective attack on the affidavit filed in support of the forecloser’s motion for summary judgment.
The least traction for the expert declaration is where homeowners attempt to use it as a substitute for evidence — which means no live witnesses testifying to facts that lay the foundation for introduction of documents into evidence. And there are mixed results on motions to lift stay — but even where effective temporarily the debtor is usually required to file an adversary action.
After you file the declaration along with some pleading that states the purpose of the filing, you will most likely be met with a barrage of attacks on the use of the affidavit. They are trying to bait you into an argument about me and whether anything I said was true. Of course they do not submit an affidavit from an expert who comes to contrary conclusions; but even if the declaration is perfect, it is no substitute for real evidence. It is the reason why you need to get a court order requiring the forecloser to answer discovery and how they should answer it. It is support for why you believe your discovery will lead to admissible evidence or cut short the litigation. The declaration explains why you want to pursue the money trail to see of negotiation of the note and mortgage ever took place. The assignment says yes but if the payment isn’t there, no transaction exists. The UCC and contract law are in complete agreement — offer, acceptance and payment are required to enforce a contract. And on the offer side, you can either start with the investor or the borrower.
In live testimony it is my job to show the court what really happened not by piling presumption on opinions but by pointing to the facts you revealed in discovery and then explaining what transactions actually occurred. The only actual transaction — the only time money exchanged hands was when investors advanced money to be used for the acquisition or origination of loans.
But the intermediaries usurped the money and kept part of it instead of funding mortgages. And the intermediaries diverted title to the loan documents from the investors and claimed ownership so they could create the illusion of an insurable interest and the illusion of a risk of loss justifying the credit default swap contracts.
It was also used by the banks to sell worthless mortgage bonds to the Federal Reserve. We know now that the “trustee” of the REMIC trust never received any of the investment dollars advanced by the investors. The reason we know that the mortgage bonds are worthless is that there is no record of the existence of a trust account for the REMIC pool. Hence, the trust had no money to buy or originate the loan.

But it is nonetheless true that the investors advanced money and the borrowers got some of it. The amount received by or on behalf of the borrower is a legitimate debt owed by the borrowers to the investors as lenders. If you say otherwise, your entire argument will be viewed with justifiable skepticism. But the investors cannot be grouped by REMIC common law trusts under New York law because they too, like the assignments and allonges and endorsements, lack any money or other transfer of consideration in exchange  for the loan.

So we have consideration without a REMIC trust, without an enforceable contract which means that the debt existed but there were no agreed terms — the note and bond terms are very different, contrary to the requirements of TILA and Reg Z. Thus the investors may have received bonds issued by the REMIC trust, but their money never went into the trust contrary to the terms of the prospectus. So the investors are owed the money as a group by the borrowers as a group. That means the only way to refer to the investors as a group (contrary to their belief because they think their money went into the REMIC trust) is a partnership arising by operation of law. That is a common law general partnership. But because equitable liens a NOT allowed by law, they have n way to use the mortgage lien or the note. But they do have a claim, even if it is unsecured.

And the amount owed to the investors is different than the amount of principal on the defective notes and mortgages. That is because the investment bank took more money than it used for funding mortgages and pocketed the difference. So the transaction with the borrower gives rise to a liability to the investor lenders but the borrowers are only one of several co-obligors by contract and through tort theory. And the money received by the intermediary bank that claimed the bond and loans as their own using investor money should be credited to the receivable account of the investor. The argument here is that the investment banks cannot pretend to be agents of the investors for purpose for taking money from the investors and then claim not to be the agent for the purpose of receiving money from co-obligors including the homeowner.

It is only by untangling this mess that the request for modification from the investors can be directed to the right parties but that requires the investors’ identities to be revealed. There can be no meaningful modification, mediation or litigation without getting this straight.
Let’s start with the borrower. The borrower executes a note and mortgage. If the borrower denies ever getting a loan from the payee or mortgagee or beneficiary, then the issue is in dispute as to whether the borrower’s initial transaction was anything more than offer for someone to accept.
TILA says the lender must be disclosed, as well as common sense. If the payee was merely a nominee performing fee for service, then there is no payee and no mortgagee or beneficiary — and under property law there is nobody known to borrower who can execute a satisfaction of mortgage on the day of closing.
So we have the issuance of a note that might qualify as a security that is NOT exempted from registration and security regulations and/or the note and mortgage constitute an offer. The fact that there was no lender disclosed and no disclosed source of funds (a table funded loan labeled predatory per se by Reg Z and TILA) means that the terms of the note and the terms of the security instrument have not been accepted — and at this pointing our example there is only one party who can accept it — the party who loaned actual money to the borrower — I.e., the sourceof the  funds.
Now as it turns out that the source if funds was a group of investors who were not offered the note nor offered the terms expressed on the note and instead they agreed to the terms of the prospectus/indenture. But those terms were immediately breached just as the law was immediately broken when the borrower was tricked into executing a security issuance or an offer.
The investors thought their money was going into a REMIC trust just like the borrower trout that the originator was indeed his lender. Neither the investors nor the borrowers were told that there were dozens of intermediaries who were making money off of the issuance of the bond and the issuance of the note, neither of which bound the investor lender nor the borrower to anything. But nobody except the investment banks acting supposedly as intermediaries knew that the banks were claiming town both the bonds and the loans — at least long enough to trade on them.
Since the borrower did not agree to the terms of the bond and the investor didn’t agree to the terms of the note, they have no offer, they have no acceptance but they do have consideration. I have appeared in several class actions in Phoenix and Reno and dozens of cases in bankruptcy court, civil state and Federal cases.
Where the lawyer used my declaration as a means to an end — discovery, they got good results. Where they tried to suit in lieu of admissible evidence it is not so valuable. A few hundred motions for summary judgment have been turned down based upon my affidavit, but in other cases, the Judge accepted me as an expert but said that my opinion evidence was not supported by supporting affidavits from people with personal knowledge — I.e., competent witnesses to lay a competent foundation. Thus expert declarations are a valuable tool if they are backed up by real facts and issues — a task for the lawyer or pro se litigant, not the expert unless you are going to pay tens of thousands of dollars using the expert’s valuable time to perform clerical work.

Wells Fargo Wrongful Foreclosure Kills Elderly Homeowner?

see http://livinglies.wordpress.com/2013/04/29/hawaii-federal-district-court-applies-rules-of-evidence-bonymellon-us-bank-jp-morgan-chase-failed-to-prove-sale-of-note/

“The administrator of the estate of Larry Delassus sued Wells Fargo, Wachovia Bank, First American Corp. and others in Superior Court, for wrongful death, elder abuse, breach of contract and other charges.

Delassus died at 62 of heart disease after Wells Fargo mistakenly held him liable for his neighbor’s property taxes, doubled his mortgage payments, declared his loan in default and sold his Hermosa Beach condominium, according to the complaint.”

If you are seeking legal representation or other services call our South Florida customer service number at 954-495-9867 and for the West coast the number remains 520-405-1688. In Northern Florida and the Panhandle call 850-296-1960. Customer service for the livinglies store with workbooks, services and analysis remains the same at 520-405-1688. The people who answer the phone are NOT attorneys and NOT permitted to provide any legal advice, but they can guide you toward some of our products and services.

SEE ALSO: http://WWW.LIVINGLIES-STORE.COM

The selection of an attorney is an important decision  and should only be made after you have interviewed licensed attorneys familiar with investment banking, securities, property law, consumer law, mortgages, foreclosures, and collection procedures. This site is dedicated to providing those services directly or indirectly through attorneys seeking guidance or assistance in representing consumers and homeowners. We are available to any lawyer seeking assistance anywhere in the country, U.S. possessions and territories. Neil Garfield is a licensed member of the Florida Bar and is qualified to appear as an expert witness or litigator in in several states including the district of Columbia. The information on this blog is general information and should NEVER be considered to be advice on one specific case. Consultation with a licensed attorney is required in this highly complex field.

Editor’s Comment and Analysis: There are two reasons why I continue this blog and my return to the practice of law despite my commitment to retirement. The general reason is that I wish to contribute as much as I can to the development of the body of law that can be applied to large-scale economic fraud that threatens the fabric of our society. The specific reason for my involvement is exemplified in this story which results in the unfortunate death of a 62-year-old man. I have not reported it before, but I have been the recipient of several messages from people whose life has been ruined by economic distress and who then proceeded to take their own lives.  In some cases I was successful in intervening. But in most cases I was unable to do anything before they had already committed suicide.

It is my opinion that the current economic problems, and mortgage and foreclosure problems in particular, stem from an attitude that pervades corporate and government circles, to wit: that the individual citizen is irrelevant and that damage to any individual is also irrelevant and unimportant. If you view the 5 million foreclosures that have already been supposedly completed as merely a collection of irrelevant and unimportant citizens and their families then the policies of the banks on Wall Street and the politicians who are unduly influenced by those banks, becomes perfectly logical and acceptable.

I start with the premise that each individual is both relevant and important regardless of their economic status or their political status. In my opinion that is the premise of the Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution. The wrongful foreclosure by strangers to the transaction is not only illegal and probably unconstitutional, it is fundamentally wrong in that it is founded on the arrogance of the ruling class. Our country is supposed to be a nation of laws not a nation of a ruling class.

If you start with the premise that the Wall Street banks want and need as many foreclosures as possible to complete transactions in which they received the benefit of insurance proceeds and proceeds of head products like credit default swaps, then you can see that these “mistakes”  are in actuality intentional acts intended to drive out legitimate homeowners from their homes. These actions are performed without any concern for the legality of their actions, the total lack of merit of their claims, or the morality and ethics that we should be able to see in economic institutions that have been deemed too big to fail.

The motive behind these foreclosures and the so-called mistakes is really very simple, to wit: the banks have nothing to lose by receiving with the foreclosure but they had everything to lose by not proceeding with the foreclosure. The problem is not a lack of due diligence. The problem is an intentional avoidance of due diligence and the ability to employ the tactic of plausible deniability. Mistakes do happen. But in the past when the bank was notified that the error had occurred they would promptly rectify the situation. Now the banks ignore such notifications because any large-scale trend in settling, modifying or resolving mortgage issues such that the loan becomes classified as “performing” will result in claims by insurers and claims from counterparties in credit default swaps that the payments based upon the failure of the mortgage bonds due to mortgage defaults was fraudulently reported and therefore should be paid back to the insurer or counterparty.

In most cases the amount of money paid through various channels to the Wall Street banks was a vast multiple of the actual underlying loans they claimed were in asset pools. The truth is the asset pools probably never existed, in most cases were never funded, and thus were incapable of making a purchase of a bundle of loans without any resources to do so. These banks claim that they were and are authorized agents of the investors (pension funds) who thought they were buying mortgage bonds issued by the asset pools but in reality were merely making a deposit at the investment bank. The same banks claim that they were not and are not the authorized agents of the investors with respect to the receipt of insurance proceeds and proceeds from hedge product’s life credit default swaps. And they are getting away with it.

They are getting away with it because of the complexity of the money trail and the paper trail. This can be greatly simplified by attorneys representing homeowners immediately demanding proof of payment and proof of loss (the essential elements of proof of ownership) at the origination, assignment, endorsement or other method of acquisition of loans. In both judicial and nonjudicial states it is quite obvious that the party seeking to invoke  foreclosure proceedings avoids the third rail of basic rules and laws of contract, to wit: that the transactions which they allege occurred did not in fact occur and that there was no payment, no loss and no risk of loss to any of the parties that are said to be in the securitization chain. The securitization chain exists only as an illusion created by paperwork.

The parties who handled the money as intermediaries between the lenders and the borrowers do not appear anywhere in the paperwork allegedly supporting the existence of the securitization chain. Instead of naming the investors as the owner and payee on the note and mortgage, these intermediaries diverted the ownership of the note to controlled entities that use their apparent ownership to trade in bonds, derivatives, and hedge products as though the capital of the investment bank was at risk in the origination or acquisition of the loans and as though the capital of the investment bank was at risk in the issuance of what can only be called bogus mortgage bonds.

Toward that end, the Wall Street banks have successfully barred contact and cooperation between the actual lenders and the actual borrowers. These banks have successfully directed the attention of the courts to the fabricated paperwork of the assignments, endorsements and securitization chain. The fact that these documents contain unreliable hearsay statements about transactions that never occurred has escaped the attention and consideration of the judiciary, most lawyers, and in fact most borrowers.

It is this sleight-of-hand that has thrown off policymakers as well as the judiciary and litigants. The fact that money appeared at the time of the alleged loan closing is deemed sufficient to prove that the designated lender on the closing papers was in fact the source of the loan; but they were not the source of the funds for the loan and as the layers of paperwork were added there were no funds at all in the apparent transfer of ownership of the loan that was originated by a strawman with an undisclosed principal, thus qualifying the loan as predatory per se according to the federal truth in lending act.

The fact that the borrower in many cases ceased making payments is deemed sufficient to justify the issuance of a notice of default, a notice of sale and the actual foreclosure of the home and eviction of the homeowner. The question of whether or not any payment was due as escaped the system almost entirely.

Even if the  borrower makes all the payments demanded, the banks will nonetheless seek foreclosure to justify the receipt of insurance and credit default swap proceeds. So they manufacture excuses like failure to pay taxes, failure to pay  insurance premiums, abandonment, failure to maintain or anything else they can think of that will justify the foreclosure and a demand for money that far exceeds  any loss and without giving the borrower an opportunity to avoid foreclosure by either curing the problem for pointing out that there was no problem at all.

As I have pointed out before, the entire mortgage system was turned on its head. If you turn it back to right side up then you will see that the receipt of money by the intermediary banks is an overpayment on both the bond issued to the investor (or the debt owed to the investor) and the promissory note that was executed by the borrower on the false premise that there had been full disclosure of all parties, intermediaries and their compensation as required by the federal truth in lending act, federal reserve regulations and many state laws involving deceptive lending.

Wells Fargo will no doubt defend the action of the estate of the dead man with allegations of a pre-existing condition which would have resulted in his death in all events. The problem they have in this particular case is that the causation of the death is a little easier to prove when the death occurs in the courtroom based upon false claims, false collections, and probably a duty to refund excess payments received from insurers and counterparties to credit default swaps.

The cost of the largest economic crime in human history is very human indeed.

 

Elderly Man Allegedly Dies in Court Fighting Wells Fargo ‘Wrongful’ Foreclosure
http://www.alternet.org/economy/elderly-man-allegedly-dies-court-fighting-wells-fargo-wrongful-foreclosure

Follow the Money Trail: It’s the blueprint for your case

If you are seeking legal representation or other services call our Florida customer service number at 954-495-9867 and for the West coast the number remains 520-405-1688. Customer service for the livinglies store with workbooks, services and analysis remains the same at 520-405-1688. The people who answer the phone are NOT attorneys and NOT permitted to provide any legal advice, but they can guide you toward some of our products and services.
The selection of an attorney is an important decision  and should only be made after you have interviewed licensed attorneys familiar with investment banking, securities, property law, consumer law, mortgages, foreclosures, and collection procedures. This site is dedicated to providing those services directly or indirectly through attorneys seeking guidance or assistance in representing consumers and homeowners. We are available to any lawyer seeking assistance anywhere in the country, U.S. possessions and territories. Neil Garfield is a licensed member of the Florida Bar and is qualified to appear as an expert witness or litigator in in several states including the district of Columbia. The information on this blog is general information and should NEVER be considered to be advice on one specific case. Consultation with a licensed attorney is required in this highly complex field.
Editor’s Analysis and Comment: If you want to know where all the money went during the mortgage madness of the last decade and the probable duplication of that behavior with all forms of consumer debt, the first clues have been emerging. First and foremost I would suggest the so-called bull market reflecting an economic resurgence that appears to have no basis in reality. Putting hundred of billions of dollars into the stock market is an obvious place to store ill-gotten gains.
But there is also the question of liquidity which means the Wall Street bankers had to “park” their money somewhere into depository accounts. Some analysts have suggested that the bankers deposited money in places where the sheer volume of money deposited would give bankers strategic control over finance in those countries.
The consequences to American finance is fairly well known here. But most Americans have been somewhat aloof to the extreme problems suffered by Spain, Greece, Italy and Cyprus. Italy and Cyprus have turned to confiscating savings on a progressive basis.  This could be a “fee” imposed by those countries for giving aid and comfort to the pirates of Wall Street.
So far the only country to stick with the rule of law is Iceland where some of the worst problems emerged early — before bankers could solidify political support in that country, like they have done around the world. Iceland didn’t bailout bankers, they jailed them. Iceland didn’t adopt austerity to make the problems worse, it used all its resources to stimulate the economy.
And Iceland looked at the reality of a the need for a thriving middle class. So they reduced household debt and forced banks to take the hit — some 25% or more being sliced off of mortgages and other consumer debt. Iceland was not acting out of ideology, but rather practicality.
The result is that Iceland is the shining light on the hill that we thought was ours. Iceland has real growth in gross domestic product, decreasing unemployment to acceptable levels, and banks that despite the hit they took, are also prospering.
From my perspective, I look at the situation from the perspective of a former investment banker who was in on conversations decades ago where Wall Street titans played the idea of cornering the market on money. They succeeded. But Iceland has shown that the controls emanating from Wall Street in directing legislation, executive action and judicial decisions can be broken.
It is my opinion that part or all of trillions dollars in off balance sheet transactions that were allowed over the last 15 years represents money that was literally stolen from investors who bought what they thought were bonds issued by a legitimate entity that owned loans to consumers some of which secured in the form of residential mortgage loans.
Actual evidence from the ground shows that the money from investors was skimmed by Wall Street to the tune of around $2.6 trillion, which served as the baseline for a PONZI scheme in which Wall Street bankers claimed ownership of debt in which they were neither creditor nor lender in any sense of the word. While it is difficult to actually pin down the amount stolen from the fake securitization chain (in addition to the tier 2 yield spread premium) that brought down investors and borrowers alike, it is obvious that many of these banks also used invested money from managed funds as gambling money that paid off handsomely as they received 100 cents on the dollar on losses suffered by others.
The difference between the scheme used by Wall Street this time is that bankers not only used “other people’s money” —this time they had the hubris to steal or “borrow” the losses they caused — long enough to get the benefit of federal bailout, insurance and hedge products like credit default swaps. Only after the bankers received bailouts and insurance did they push the losses onto investors who were forced to accept non-performing loans long after the 90 day window allowed under the REMIC statutes.
And that is why attorneys defending Foreclosures and other claims for consumer debt, including student loan debt, must first focus on the actual footprints in the sand. The footprints are the actual monetary transactions where real money flowed from one party to another. Leading with the money trail in your allegations, discovery and proof keeps the focus on simple reality. By identifying the real transactions, parties, timing and subject moment lawyers can use the emerging story as the blueprint to measure against the fabricated origination and transfer documents that refer to non-existent transactions.
The problem I hear all too often from clients of practitioners is that the lawyer accepts the production of the note as absolute proof of the debt. Not so. (see below). If you will remember your first year in law school an enforceable contract must have offer, acceptance and consideration and it must not violate public policy. So a contract to kill someone is not enforceable.
Debt arises only if some transaction in which real money or value is exchanged. Without that, no amount of paperwork can make it real. The note is not the debt ( it is evidence of the debt which can be rebutted). The mortgage is not the note (it is a contract to enforce the note, if the note is valid). And the TILA disclosures required make sure that consumers know who they are dealing with. In fact TILA says that any pattern of conduct in which the real lender is hidden is “predatory per se”) and it has a name — table funded loan. This leads to treble damages, attorneys fees and costs recoverable by the borrower and counsel for the borrower.
And a contract to “repay” money is not enforceable if the money was never loaned. That is where “consideration” comes in. And a an alleged contract in the lender agreed to one set of terms (the mortgage bond) and the borrower agreed to another set of terms (the promissory note) is no contract at all because there was no offer an acceptance of the same terms.
And a contract or policy that is sure to fail and result in the borrower losing his life savings and all the money put in as payments, furniture is legally unconscionable and therefore against public policy. Thus most of the consumer debt over the last 20 years has fallen into these categories of unenforceable debt.
The problem has been the inability of consumers and their lawyers to present a clear picture of what happened. That picture starts with footprints in the sand — the actual events in which money actually exchanged hands, the answer to the identity of the parties to each of those transactions and the reason they did it, which would be the terms agreed on by both parties.
If you ask me for a $100 loan and I say sure just sign this note, what happens if I don’t give you the loan? And suppose you went somewhere else to get your loan since I reneged on the deal. Could I sue you on the note? Yes. Could I win the suit? Not if you denied you ever got the money from me. Can I use the real loan as evidence that you did get the money? Yes. Can I win the case relying on the loan from another party? No because the fact that you received a loan from someone else does not support the claim on the note, for which there was no consideration.
It is the latter point that the Courts are starting to grapple with. The assumption that the underlying transaction described in the note and mortgage was real, is rightfully coming under attack. The real transactions, unsupported by note or mortgage or disclosures required under the Truth in Lending Act, cannot be the square peg jammed into the round hole. The transaction described in the note, mortgage, transfers, and disclosures was never supported by any transaction in which money exchanged hands. And it was not properly disclosed or documented so that there could be a meeting of the minds for a binding contract.
KEEP THIS IN MIND: (DISCOVERY HINTS) The simple blueprint against which you cast your fact pattern, is that if the securitization scheme was real and not a PONZI scheme, the investors’ money would have gone into a trust account for the REMIC trust. The REMIC trust would have a record of the transaction wherein a deduction of money from that account funded your loan. And the payee on the note (and the secured party on the mortgage) would be the REMIC trust. There is no reason to have it any other way unless you are a thief trying to skim or steal money. If Wall Street had played it straight underwriting standards would have been maintained and when the day came that investors didn’t want to buy any more mortgage bonds, the financial world would not have been on the verge of extinction. Much of the losses to investors would have covered by the insurance and credit default swaps that the banks took even though they never had any loss or risk of loss. There never would have been any reason to use nominees like MERS or originators.
The entire scheme boils down to this: can you borrow the realities of a transaction in which you were not a party and treat it, legally in court, as your own? So far the courts have missed this question and the result has been an unequivocal and misguided “yes.” Relentless of pursuit of the truth and insistence on following the rule of law, will produce a very different result. And maybe America will use the shining example of Iceland as a model rather than letting bankers control our governmental processes.

Banking Chief Calls For 15% Looting of Italians’ Savings
http://www.infowars.com/banking-chief-calls-for-15-looting-of-italians-savings/

Banking Shaping American Minds

“I wish someone would give me one shred of neutral evidence that financial innovation has led to economic growth — one shred of evidence.” — Paul Volcker, former Fed Chairman, 2009

“We have allowed the borrower to get raped and then we have gone to the rapist for a course on sex education. Thus the investors (pension funds who will announce reductions in vested pensions) and the homeowners have been screwed on such a grand scale that the entire economy of our country and indeed the world have been turned upside down.” — Neil F Garfield, livinglies.me 2012

CHECK OUT OUR DECEMBER SPECIAL!

What’s the Next Step? Consult with Neil Garfield

For assistance with presenting a case for wrongful foreclosure, please call 520-405-1688, customer service, who will put you in touch with an attorney in the states of Florida, California, Ohio, and Nevada. (NOTE: Chapter 11 may be easier than you think).

Editor’s Comment: The article below is very much like my own recent article on privatized prisons and the inversion of critical thinking in favor of allowing economic crimes to have a special revered status in our society. Kim highlights the rampage allowed to continue to this day in which Banks are ravaging our society and supporting anything that will confuse us or indoctrinate us to accept outright theft from our society, our purses, and our lives.

It is this lack of critical thinking that has made it so difficult for homeowners to get credit on loan balances that are already paid down by parties who expressly waived any right to collect from the borrower. It is the reason Judges are so reluctant to allow homeowner relief because they perceive the fight as one in which the homeowners are only expressing buyer’s remorse on an otherwise valid transaction.

It is the reason why lawyers are reluctant to deny the debt, deny the balance, deny that a payment was due, deny the default, deny the note as evidence of any debt, deny the validity of the mortgage and counter with actions to nullify the instruments signed by confused and befuddled borrowers assured by the banks that they were making a safe and viable investment.

In most civil cases Plaintiff sues Defendant and Defendant denies most of the allegations — forcing the Plaintiff to prove its case. Not so in foreclosure defense. Lawyers, afraid of looking foolish because they have not researched the matter, refuse to deny the falsity of the allegations in mortgage foreclosure complaint, notice of default and notice of sale. Lawyers are afraid to attack sales despite decisions by Supreme Courts of many states, on the grounds that the sale was rigged, the bidder was a non-creditor submitting a credit bid, and the fact that the forecloser never had any privity with the homeowner, never spent a dime funding any mortgage and never spent a dime funding the purchase of a mortgage.

The quote from the independent analysis of the records in San Francisco County concluded that a high percentage of foreclosures were initiated and completed by entities that were complete “strangers to the transaction.” Why this is ignored by members of the judiciary, the media and government agencies is a question of power and politics. Why it MUST be utilized to save millions more from the sting of foreclosure is the reason I keep writing, the reason I consult with dozens of lawyers across the country and why I have moved back to Florida where I am taking on cases.

As a result of the perception of the inevitability of the foreclosure most court actions are decided in favor of the forecloser because of the presumption that the transaction was valid, the default is real, and that no forgery or fabrication of documents changes those facts. The forgeries and fabrications and robo-signed documents are bad things but the “fact” remains in everyone’s mind that the ultimate foreclosure will proceed. That “fact” has been reinforced by inappropriate admissions from the alleged borrower, who never received a nickle from the loan originator or any assignee.

The lawyers are admitting all the elements necessary for a foreclosure and then moving on to attack the paperwork. Theoretically they are right in attacking assignments and endorsements that are falsified, but if they have already admitted all the basic elements for a foreclosure to proceed, then the foreclosure WILL proceed and if they have any real damages they can sue for monetary relief.

But under the current perception carefully orchestrated by the banks, there are no damages because the debt was real, the borrower admitted it, the payments were due, the borrower failed to make the payments, and the mortgage is a valid lien on the property securing a note which is false on its face but which is accepted as true.

Even the borrowers are not seeing the truth because the people with the real information on the ones that are foreclosing on them. So borrowers, knowing they received a loan, do not question where the loan came from and whether the protections required by the truth in lending statute, RESPA and other federal and state lending laws were violated. We have allowed the borrower to get raped and then we have gone to the rapist for a course on sex education. Thus the investors (pension funds who will announce reductions in vested pensions) and the homeowners have been screwed on such a grand scale that the entire economy of our country and indeed the world have been turned upside down.

Deny and Discover is getting traction across the country, with a focus on the actual money trail — which is the trail of real transactions in which there was an offer, acceptance and consideration between the relevant parties. More and more lawyers are trying it out and surprising themselves with the results. Slowly they are starting to realize that neither the origination of the, loan as set forth in the settlement documents at closing nor the assignments and endorsements were real.

The debt described in the note does not exist and never did. Neither was it the same deal that the lender/investors meant to offer through their investment bankers.

The note and the bond have decidedly different terms of repayment. The payment of insurance and credit de fault swaps to the banks was a crime unto itself — a diversion of money that was intended to protect the investors. The balances owed to those investors would have been correspondingly reduced. The balances owed from the borrowers should be correspondingly reduced by payment received by the only real creditor.

Thus millions of homeowners have walked away from homes they owned on the false representation that the balance owed on their homes was more than they could pay. And the messengers of doom were the banks, depriving investors of money due to them and depriving the borrower of the real facts about their loan balances. Lawyers with only a passing familiarity have either told borrowers that they have no real case against the banks or they take a retainer on a case they know they are going to lose because they will admit things that they don’t realize are false. And Judges hearing the admissions, have no choice but to let the foreclosure proceed.

But that doesn’t mean you can’t come back and overturn it, get damages for wrongful foreclosure, and this is where lawyers have turned bad lawyering into bad business. There is a fortune to be made out there pursuing justice for homeowners. And the case far from the complexity brought to the table by the banks is actually quite simple. Like any other civil case or even criminal case, stop admitting facts that you don’t know are are true and which are in actuality false.

In every case I know of, where the lawyer has followed Deny and Discover and presented it in a reasonable way to the Judge, the orders requiring discovery and proof have resulted in nearly instant “confidential” settlements. Some lawyers and waking up and making millions of dollars helping thousands of homeowners —- why not join the crowd?

Banks Stealing Wealth and the Minds of Our Children

by JS Kim

In the past several years, people worldwide are slowly beginning to shed the web of deceit woven by the banking elite and learning that many topics that were mocked by the mainstream media as conspiracy theories of the tin-foil hat community have now been proven to be true beyond a shadow of a doubt. First there was the myth that bankers were upstanding members of the community that contributed positively to society. Then in 2009, one of their own, Paul Volcker, in a rare momentary lapse of sanity, stated “I wish someone would give me one shred of neutral evidence that financial innovation has led to economic growth — one shred of evidence.” He then followed up this declaration by stating that the most positive contribution bankers had produced for society in the past 20 years was the ATM machine. Of course since that time, we have learned that Wachovia Bank laundered $378,400,000,000 of drug cartel money, HSBC Bank failed to monitor £38,000,000,000,000 of money with potentially dirty criminal ties, United Bank of Switzerland illegally manipulated LIBOR interest rates on a regular basis for purposes of profiteering, and though they have yet to be prosecuted, JP Morgan bank, Goldman Sachs bank, & ScotiaMocatta bank are all regularly accused of manipulating gold and silver prices on nearly a daily basis by many veteran gold and silver traders.

http://www.zerohedge.com/contributed/2013-01-03/banking-elite-are-not-only-stealing-our-wealth-they-are-also-stealing-our-min

9th Circuit Circular Logic: Medrano v Flagstar

CHECK OUT OUR DECEMBER SPECIAL!

What’s the Next Step? Consult with Neil Garfield

For assistance with presenting a case for wrongful foreclosure, please call 520-405-1688, customer service, who will put you in touch with an attorney in the states of Florida, California, Ohio, and Nevada. (NOTE: Chapter 11 may be easier than you think).

Editor’s Note: If a Court wants to come to a certain conclusion, it will, regardless of how it must twist the law or facts. In this case, the Court found that a letter that challenges the terms of the loan or the current loan receivable is not a qualified written request under RESPA.

The reasoning of the court is that a challenge or question about the real balance and real creditor and real terms of the deal is not related to servicing of the loan and therefore the requirement of an answer to a QWR is not required.

The Court should reconsider its ruling. Servicing of a loan account assumes that there is a loan account that the presumed subservicer has received authorization to service. The borrower gets notice often from companies they never heard of but they assume that the servicing function is properly authorized.

The “servicer” is used too generally as a term, which is part of the problem. The fact that there is a Master Servicer with information on ALL the transactions affecting the alleged loan receivable from inception to the present is completely overlooked by most litigants, trial judges an appellate courts.

The “servicer” they refer to is actually the subservicer whose authority could only come from appointment by the Master Servicer. But the Master Servicer could only have such power to appoint the subservicer if the loan was properly “securitized” meaning the original loan was properly documented with the right payee and the lien rights alleged in the recorded mortgage existed.

If the party asserts itself as the “Servicer” it is asserting its appointment by the Master Servicer who also has other information on the money trial. It should be required to answer a QWR and based upon current law, should be required to answer on behalf of all parties including the Master Servicer and the “trustee” of the loan pool claiming rights to the loan. If there are problems with the transfer of the loan compounding problems with origination of the loan, the borrower has a right to know that and the QWR is the appropriate vehicle for that.

The servicer cannot perform its duties unless it has the or can produce the necessary information about the identity of the real creditor, the transactions by which that party became a creditor and proof of payment or funding of the original loan and proof of payment for the assignments of the loan, along with an explanation of why the “Trustee” for the pool was not named in the original transaction or in a recorded assignment immediately after the “closing” of the loan transaction.

The 9th Circuit, ignoring the realities of the industry has chosen to accept the conclusion that the “servicer” is only the subservicer and that information requested in a QWR can only be required from the subservicer without any duty to provide the data that corroborates the monthly statement of principal and interest due. The new rule from the Federal Consumer Financial Board stating that all parties are subject to the Federal lending laws underscores and codifies industry practice and common sense.

The Court is ignoring the reality that the lender is the investor (pension funds etc.) and the borrower is the homeowner, and that all others are intermediaries subject to TILA, RESPA, Reg Z etc. The servicer appointed by the Master Servicer is a subservicer who can only provide a snapshot of a small slice of the financial transactions related to the subject loan and the pool claiming to own the loan.

They are avoiding the clear premise of the single transaction doctrine. If the investors did not advance money there would have been no loan. If the borrower had not accepted a loan, there would have been no loan. That is the essence of the single transaction doctrine.

Now they are opening the door to breaking down single transactions into component parts that can change the contractual terms by which the lenders loaned money and the borrower borrowed money.

It is the same as if you wrote a check to a store for payment of a TV or groceries and the intermediary banks and the financial data processors suddenly claimed that they each were part of the transaction and there had ownership rights to the TV or groceries. It is absurd. But if the question is one of payment they are ALL required to show their records of the transaction. This includes in our case the investment banker who is the one directing all movements of money and documents.

If the Court leaves this decision in its current form it is challenging the law of unintended consequences where no transaction is safe from claims by third party intermediaries. Even if Flagstar had no authority to service the account, which is likely, they were acting with apparent authority and must be considered an intermediary servicer for purposes of RESPA and a QWR.

PRACTICE TIP: When writing a QWR be more explicit about the connections between your questions, your suspicion of error as to amount due, payments due etc. Show that the amount being used as a balance due is incorrect or might be incorrect based upon your findings of fact. Challenge the right of the “servicer” to be the servicer and ask them who appointed them to that position.

9th Circuit Medrano v Flagstar on Qualified Written Request

The Truth About TILA

What’s the Next Step? Consult with Neil Garfield

For assistance with presenting a case for wrongful foreclosure, please call 520-405-1688, customer service, who will put you in touch with an attorney in the states of Florida, California, Ohio, and Nevada. (NOTE: Chapter 11 may be easier than you think).

Victims can receive up to $125,000 in cash or, in some cases, get their homes back. But the review has already been marred by evidence that the banks themselves play a major role in identifying the victims of their own abuses, raising the question of whether the review is compromised by a central conflict of interest.”

Editor’s Comment and Analysis: There have been so many questions and misconceptions about TILA that I thought it would be a good thing to summarize some aspects of it, how it is used in forensic examination and the limitations of TILA. Note that the absence of a prohibition in TILA or the apparent expiration of TILA does not block common law actions based upon the same facts and some states have more liberal statutes of limitations. TILA is a federal law called the Truth in Lending Act. It’s principal purpose according to all accounts and seminars given on the subject is to provide the borrower with a clear choice of lenders with whom he/she wants to do business and clear terms for comparison of terms offered by each lender. It is also designed to smoke out undisclosed parties who are receiving compensation and it has real teeth in clawing back such undisclosed compensation.

Undisclosed compensation is very broadly defined in TILA so it is fairly easy to apply to anyone who made money resulting from the purported loan transaction, and the clawback might include treble damages, attorneys fees and other relief. Note that rescission does NOT mean you must offer up the house (“give it back”) to the lender. The lender, if there was one, gave you money not a house. rescission is a reversal of that transaction which means you must tender (according to the 9th Circuit) money in exchange for cancellation of the transaction. If you follow the rules, a TILA rescission eliminates the note and mortgage by operation of law, so while you have the right to demand and sue for return of the note as paid and satisfaction of the mortgage (release and reconveyance in some states). Unless the “lender” files a Declaratory action (lawsuit) within 20 days of your demand for rescission, the security is gone and can be eliminated in bankruptcy.

Use of the rescission remedy can be employed in bankruptcy actions as well where the Judge has wide discretion as to what constitutes “tender” (including a payment plan). Some Judges have interpreted the statute as it si written which does not require tender. The 9th Circuit disagrees.

As to the statute of limitations, it simply does not apply if the “lender” has intentionally mislead the borrower, committed fraud or otherwise withheld information that is deemed fundamental to the disclosures required by TILA. This is the most common error committed by borrowers and their attorneys. In most cases the table funded loan is “predatory per se” and gives you a leg up on the allegation of fraud or misrepresentation at closing.

Fraud may be fraud in the inducement (they told you that even though your payments would reset to an amount higher than your household income has ever been, you would be refinanced, get even more money and be able to fund the payments through additional equity in the house).

Fraud may be in the execution where you signed papers that you didn’t realize was not the deal you were offered or which contained provisions that were just plain wrong. If you thought that you were getting a loan from BNC and the loan was in fact funded by another entity unrelated and undisclosed, then your legal obligation to repay the money naturally goes back to the the third party. But the presence of the third party indicates a table funded loan, which is predatory per se; and the terms of repayment are different from what was offered or what was agreed to by the lender acting through the investment banker that was creating (but not necessarily using) REMICs or trusts. In plain words the mortgage bond and the prospectus, PSA and other securitization are at substantial variance from what was put on the note, including the name of the payee on the note and the name put on the security instrument (Mortgage or deed of trust).

The office of the controller has published a series of papers describing the meaning and intent of TILA and to whom it applies, even pre Dodd-Frank.

For example, it describes “Conditions Under Which Loan Originators Are Regulated as Loan Underwriters.” Thus the use of a strawman is expressly referred to in the OCC papers (see below) and there are specific indicia of whether an entity is in fact a loan underwriter, which is the basis for my continual statement that a loan originator is not a lender (pretender lender) and the very presence of a loan originator on the paperwork is a violation of TILA tolling any state of limitations.

If the loan originator is not a bank or savings and loan or credit union, then the highest probability is that the name on the note and the name on the mortgage is wrong. They didn’t loan the money. Your signature was procured by both fraud in the inducement and fraud in the execution, because it was predicated upon that payee giving a loan of money. “Arranging” the loan from a third party doesn’t count as being a lender. It counts as being a licensed broker or the more vague term of loan “originator.” The arguments of the banks and servicers to the contrary are completely wrong and bogus.If they were right, for purposes of collection and foreclosure that the origination documents were enforceable then that would mean that there would be a window immediately following closing where you could not actually rescind or even pay off the obligation because the originator has no right, justification,, power or excuse to execute a release and reconveyance. The loan already belonged to someone else and the paperwork was defective, which is why investors are suing the investment bankers alleging principally that they were victims of fraud: they were lied to about what was in the REMIC, lied to about what was going into the REMIC, and then even the claimed paperwork on defaulted and other loans were not properly assigned because they never started with the actual owner of the obligation.

Thus the theory put forward by banks and servicers and other parties in the foreclosure scheme that the origination documents are enforceable falls flat on its face. Those documents, taken on their face were never supported by actual consideration from the named parties. If the investment banks weren’t playing around with investment money deposited with them by managed investment funds, the name of the REMIC or group of investors would be on the origination documents.

In the case where the originator is a bank, one must look more closely at the transaction to see if they ever booked the loan as a loan receivable or if they booked the transaction as a fee for services to the investment bank. This is true even where mega banks appear to be the originators but were not the underwriters of the loan.

If you are looking for the characteristics of a loan underwriter, versus a loan originator the OCC paper provides a list. In the case of banks the presence of some of these characteristics may be irrelevant in the subject transaction if they treated the “securitized” loan differently through different departments than their normal underwriting process. There such a bank would appear to be a loan underwriter, but when you scratch the surface, you can easily see how the bank was merely posing as the lender and was no better than the small-cap originators that sprung up across the country who were used to provide the mega banks with cover and claims to plausible deniability as to the existence of malfeasance at the so-called closing:

  1. Risk Management Officers in Senior Management: In the case of small cap originators it would be rare to find anyone that even had the title much less acted like a risk management officer. In the case of banks, the presence in the bank of such an officer does not mean that he or she was involved in the transaction. They probably were not.
  2. Verification of employment: There are resources on the internet that enable the bank to check the likelihood of employment, as well as the usual checking for pay stubs and calling the employer. In a matter of moments they can tell you if a person who cleans homes for a living is likely to have an income of $15,000 per month. Common sense plays a part in this as well. This was entirely omitted in most loans as shown by operation “hustle” and other similar named projects emphasized that to retain employment and get out-sized bonuses far above previous salaries the originator employee must close the loan, no matter what — which led to changing the applications to say whatever they needed to say, often without the borrower even knowing about the changes or told “not to worry about it” even though the information was wrong.
  3. Employment conforms to income stated. See above. I have seen cases where a massage therapist making $500 per month was given a seven figure loan based upon projected income from speculative investment that turned out to be a scam. She lost two fully paid for homes in that scam. If normal underwriting standards had been employed she would not have been approved for the loan, the scam would never have damaged her and she would still be a wealthy woman.
  4. Verification of value of collateral. Note that this is a responsibility of the lender, not the borrower. Quite the reverse, the borrower is relying reasonably that the appraisal was right because the bank verified it. In fact, the appraiser was paid extra and given explicit instructions to arrive at an appraised value above the amount required, usually by $20,000. By enlarging the apparent value of the collateral, the originators were able to satisfy the insatiable demand from Wall Street for either more loans or more money loaned on property. In 1996 when they ran out of borrowers, they simply took the existing population of borrowers and over-appraised their homes in refinancing that took place sometimes within 3 months of the last loan at 20% or more increase in the appraisal. That was plainly against industry standards for appraisals and obvious to anyone with common sense that the value could never have been verified. If you look at companies like Quicken Loans you will see on some settlements that they were not content to get overpaid for originating bad loans, they even took a piece of the appraisal fee.
  5. Verification of LTV ratios. Once the appraisals were falsified it was easy to make the loan look good. LTV often showed as 20% equity when in fact the value, as could be seen in some cases weeks after the closing was 20% or more lower than the the amount loaned. Many buyers immediately lost their down payment as soon as they thought the deal was complete (it wasn’t really complete as explained above). Because of the false appraisal, at the moment of closing their down payment was devalued to zero and they owed more money than the home was actually worth in real fair market value terms. Normal industry practice is to have a committee that goes through each loan verifying LTV because it is the only real protection in the event of default. In most cases involving loans later subject to claims of securitization, the committee did not exist or did not review the loan, the verification never happened and the only thing the originator was interested in was closing the loan because the compensation of the originator and their own salary and bonuses were based purely on the number or amount of “closed” loans.
  6. Verification of credit-worthiness of buyers. This is an area where many games were played. Besides the verification process described above, the originator was able to receive a yield spread premium that was not disclosed to the borrower and the investment bank that “sold” the loan was able to obtain an even larger yield spread premium that was not disclosed to the borrower. It is these fees that I believe are subject to clawback under TILA and RESPA. In the Deny and Discover strategy that I have been pushing, once the order is entered requiring the forecloser to produce the entire accounting from all parties associated with the loan, the foreclosure collapses and a settlement is reached. This can often be accomplished in a less adversarial action in Chapter 11.
  7. Verification of income and/or viability of loan for the life of the loan. This has a huge impact on the GFE (Good faith estimate) especially in adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) and negative amortization mortgage loans (teaser rates). Plainly stated the question is whether the borrower would qualify for the loan based upon current income for when the loan resets. If the answer is no, which it usually is, then the life of the loan is a fabricated figure. Instead of it being a 30 year loan, the loan becomes much shorter reduced to the moment of reset of the payments, and all the costs and points charged for the loan must be amortized over the REAL LIFE of the loan. In such cases the “lender” is required to return all the interest, principal and other payments and other compensation received from all parties, possibly with treble damages and attorney fees. It’s pretty easy to prove as well. Most people think they can’t use this provision because of misstatements on the application. The obligation to verify the statements on the application is on the underwriter not the customer. And the law was written that way to cover just such a situation as this. If you paid 3 points to close and it was added to your loan or you paid in cash those points would substantially raise your effective APR or even stated interest rate if the loan life was reduced to two years. In many cases it would rise the level of usury, where state law provides for that.
  8. Vendor management: This is where even before Dodd-Frank you could catch them in the basket of allegations. The true management of the vendors lay not with the originator but with the investment banker who was selling mortgage bonds. This alone verified that the party on the note and named on the mortgage was an originator (strawman) and not an underwriter. And the accounting that everyone asks for should include a demand for an accounting from the investment banker and its affiliates who acted as Master Servicer, Trustee of a “pool,” etc.
  9. Compliance programs and audits: Nonexistent in originators and the presence of such procedures and employees is not proof that they were part of the process. Discovery will reveal that they were taken out of the loop on loans that were later claimed to be subject to claims of securitization.
  10. Effective Communication Systems and Controls: The only communication used was email or uploading of flat files to a server operated or controlled by the investment banker, containing bare bones facts about he loan, absent copies of any of the loan closing documents. This is how the investment bankers were able to claim ownership of the loans for purposes of foreclosure, bailouts, insurance, and credit default swaps when the real loss was incurred by the investors and the homeowners.
  11. Document Management: I need not elaborate, after the robo-signing, surrogate-signing, fabrication and forgeries that are well documented and even institutionalized as custom and practice in the industry. The documents were lost, destroyed, altered, fabricated and re-fabricated, forged in vain attempts to make them conform to the transaction that is alleged in foreclosures, but which never occurred. The borrowers and their lawyers are often fooled by this trick. They know the money was received, so their assumption was that the originator gave them the loan. This was not the case, In nearly all cases the loan was table funded — i.e., funded by an undisclosed principal access to whom was prohibited and withheld by the servicer, the originator and everyone else. AND remember that under Dodd-Frank the time limits for response to a RESPA 6 (QWR) inquiry have been reduced to 5 days and 30 days from 20 days and 60 days respectively.
  12. Submission of periodic information to appropriate regulatory agencies that regulate Banks or lenders: If the originator did not report to a regulatory agency, then it wasn’t a lender. If it did report to regulatory agencies the question is whether they ever included in any of their reports information about your loan. In most cases, the information about your loan was either omitted or falsified.
  13. Compliance with anti-fraud provisions on Federal and State levels: This characteristic would be laughable if wasn’t for the horrible toll taken upon millions of homeowners and tens of millions of people who suffered  unemployment, reduced employment and loss of their retirement funds.
  14. In house audits to assess exposure for financial loss through litigation, fraud, theft, loss business and wasted capital from failed strategic initiatives: The simple answer is that such audits were and remain virtually non-existent. Even the so-called foreclosure review process is breaking all the rules. But it wouldn’t hurt to ask, in discovery, for a copy of the plan of the audit and the results. The fact is that most banks involved in the PONZI scheme that was called “Securitization” are still not reporting accurately, still reporting non-existing or overvalued assets and still not reporting liabilities in litigation that are even close to reality.

See the rest of the OCC Paper:

TILA Summary Part 1 11-13-12

TILA Appendix Worksheets 11-13-12

TILA worksheets -2 — 11-13-12

Tenant Protection OCC 11-13-12

RESPA and Worksheets 11-13-12

Appraisal Fraud and Facts: Essential to Securitization Scam

The REMICS are mirror images of the NINJA loans — no income, no assets, no job

the borrower did not realize that the false appraisal and other deficiencies in underwriting had shifted the risk of loss to the homeowner and the investors

Editor’s Notes: Our economy and the economic structure in other countries is stuck because of the false appraisal reports that supported funding of at least $13 trillion (U.S. only) of loans that were so complex that the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan didn’t understand them nor his staff of more than 100 PhDs. They were intentionally opaque because complexity is the way you get the other side of the “deal” (the buyer) to accept your explanation of the transaction. It also is designed to avoid criminal penalties even when the scheme unravels. Getting a Judge or Jury to understand what really happened is a challenge that has been insurmountable in both civil and criminal cases and investigations.

As stated in the 2005 petition to Congress from 8,000 appraisers who did not want to “play ball” with the banks, the appraisers were faced with a choice: either they submit appraisal reports $20,000 higher than contract and earn more money for each appraisal and earn  more money through volume, OR they won’t work at all.

Developers, mortgage brokers, and the “originators” (sales organization that pretended to be the lender), sellers and homeowners needing cash in an economy where there wages and earnings were not keeping up with the cost of living —- all reacted with glee when this system went into action. As “prices” rose by leaps and bounds — fed by a flood of money and demands for more mortgages — everyone except the banks ended up crashing when the money stopped flowing. That is how we know that it was the money that made prices rise, rather than demand.

So most appraisers were both stuck and pleasantly enjoying incomes 4-10 times what they had previously received, and obediently submitted appraisal reports that were in fact unsupportable by industry standards or any other standards that a reasonable and rational lender would use — if they were lending their own money. By lending money from investors the risk of loss was entirely removed. The originators got paid regardless of whether the mortgage was paid, or went underwater or caused the homeowner to execute a strategic default.

By using the originators as surrogates at the closing, the appraisal report was accepted without the required due diligence and confirmation that would be present if you went to the old style community bank loan department. The fact is that there was NO UNDERWRITING involved as we knew it before the securitization scam. The “extra” interest charged to No DOC loans (usually 3/4%-1.5%) and the premium interest charged on NINJA (No income, no assets, no job) loans was sold to borrowers on the premise that the “lender” was taking a higher risk. But the truth is they didn’t do any due diligence or underwriting of the loans regardless of whether or not the borrower was submitting information that confirmed their income, assets and ability to pay.  Thus the premium for the “extra risk” was based upon a false premise (like all the other premises of the securitization PONZI scheme).

The normal way of judging the price of a loan (the interest rate) was the perceived risk composed of two elements: ability to repay the loan, and the value of the property if the loan is not repaid. The banks that foisted the securitization scam upon the world got rid of both: they did nothing to confirm the ability to repay because they didn’t care if the borrower could repay. And they intentionally hyped the “value” of the property far above any supportable level as is easily shown in the Case Schiller index.

This is where PRICE and VALUE became entirely different concepts. By confusing the homeowner and hoodwinking the investors with false appraisals, they were able to move more money into the PONZI Scheme, as long as investors were buying the bogus mortgage bonds issued by fictitious entities that had no assets, no income and no prospects of either one. The REMICS are a mirror image of NINJA loans.

The value of the property was not the same as the prices supported by the false appraisal reports. The prices were going up because of the sales efforts of the banks to get homeowners giddy over the the numbers, making them feel, for a few moments as though they were more wealthy than they were in reality. But median income was flat or declining, which means that the value was flat or declining.

Thus prices went up while values of the homes were going down not only because of the median income factor but because of the oversold crash that was coming. Thus the PONZI scheme left the homeowner with property that would most likely be valued at less than any value that was known during the time the homeowner owned the property, while the contract price and appraisal report “valued” the property at 2-4 times the actual value.

The outcome was obvious: when all was said and done, the banks would be holding all the money and property while the investors, taxpayers, and homeowners were all dispensable pawns whose losses came under the category of “tough luck.”

While this might seem complex, the proof of appraisal fraud is not nearly as difficult as the explanation of why the banks wanted false appraisals. In the civil actions for wrongful lending or wrongful foreclosure, the homeowner need only show that the lender intentionally deceived the borrower as to the value of the property.

And the lack of actual underwriting committees and confirmations is essentially the proof, but you would be wise to have an appraiser who can testify as an expert as to what standards apply in issuing an appraisal report, to whom the appraisal report is addressed (i.e., the “originator”). Then using the foundation for the standards apply it to the property at hand at the time the original appraisal report was issued. It might also help if you catch the “originator” getting a part of the appraisal fee (like Cornerstone Appraisals, owned by Quicken Loans).

The borrower testifies that they were relying upon the “lender” representation that the loan had been carefully reviewed, underwritten, confirmed and approved based upon market conditions, ability of the borrower to repay and the value of the property. After all it was the “lender” who was taking the risk.

Thus the borrower did not realize that the false appraisal and other deficiencies in underwriting had shifted the risk of loss to the homeowner and the investors whose money was used to fund the loan — albeit not in the way it was presented in the prospectus where the REMIC was the supposed vehicle for the funding of the loans or the purchase of the loans.

Everyone in the securitization PONZI Scheme got paid. When you look at it from the perspective described above then you probably arrive at the same conclusion I did — all that money that was made and paid and not disclosed to the borrower changes the dynamics of the deal and the undisclosed compensation and profits should be paid to the borrower who was the party with the real risk of loss.

And in fact, if you look at the Truth in Lending Act, THAT is exactly what it says — all undisclosed compensation (which is broadly defined by the Act) is refundable with treble damages. Why lawyers have not taken action on this highly lucrative and relatively easy case to prosecute is a mystery to me.

Because of the statute of limitations applied in TILA cases, the TILA cause of action might not survive, especially in today’s climate, although more and more  judges are starting to see just how badly the banks acted. I therefore recommend to attorneys to use alternative pleading and add counts under other federal statutes (RICO, etc) and state statutes of deceptive lending, and common law fraud. The action for common law fraud, is the easiest to prosecute as I see it.

The interesting aspect of this that will lead to early settlement is that the pleading is simple as to the elements of the cause of action and can easily survive a motion to dismiss, the facts are clearly going to be in dispute which makes survival on a motion for summary judgment a much higher probability, and in discovery you have a nuclear option: since your cause of action is for return or sharing of the unlawful booty that was paid, plus treble, punitive or exemplary damages, discovery into all the different parties who made money in the chain is far easier to argue than the usual defensive foreclosure case.

The other thing you have is the possibility of stating a cause of action to force the retention of the property, to protect the homeowner in the collection of damages rendered by the final verdict. A lis pendens might be appropriate, and the bond need not be much more than nominal because unless the bank or servicer has a BFP to buy the property, you can easily show that your client is already posting bond every month they pay the utilities and maintain the property.

The compensatory damages would be a measure of the difference between the actual value of the deal and the deal that was offered to the homeowner. In simple terms, it could be that the appraisal report was $250,000 higher than the actual value of the property. As a result, the damages include the $250,000 plus the interest paid on that $250,000 and where appropriate, the loss of the house in foreclosure, plus interest from the date of the fraud (i.e. the closing), attorney fees, and costs of the action.

This action might also have special applications in commercial property cases where the appraisals are known to have come in much higher than the owner or buyer had ever expected. In some cases the “appraisal” actually changed the terms of the contract on the assumption that the property was worth much more than the original offer.

Deny and Discover Strategy Working

For representation in South Florida, where I am both licensed and familiar with the courts and Judges, call 520-405-1688. If you live in another state we provide direct support to attorneys. call the same number.

Having watched botched cases work their way to losing conclusions and knowing there is a better way, I have been getting more involved in individual cases — pleading, memos, motions, strategies and tactics — and we are already seeing some good results. Getting into discovery levels the playing field and forces the other side to put up or shut up. Since they can’t put up, they must shut up.

If you start with the premise that the original mortgage was defective for the primary reason that it was unfunded by the payee on the note, the party identified as “Lender” or the mortgagee or beneficiary, we are denying the transaction, denying the signature where possible (or pleading that the signature was procured by fraud), and thus denying that any “transfer” afterwards could not have conveyed any more than what the “originator” had, which is nothing.

This is not a new concept. Investors are suing the investment banks saying exactly what we have been saying on these pages — that the origination process was fatally defective, the notes and mortgages unenforceable and the predatory lending practices lowering the value of even being a “lender.”

We’ve see hostile judges turn on the banks and rule for the homeowner thus getting past motions to lift stay, motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment in the last week.

The best line we have been using is “Judge, if you were lending the money wouldn’t you want YOUR name on the note and mortgage?” Getting the wire transfer instructions often is the kiss of death for the banks because the originator of the wire transfer is not the payee and the instructions do not say that this is for benefit of the “originator.”

As far as I can tell there is no legal definition of “originator.” It is one step DOWN from mortgage broker whose name should also not be on the note or mortgage. An originator is a salesman, and if you look behind the scenes at SEC filings or other regulatory filings you will see your “lender” identified not as a lender, which is what they told you, but as an originator. That means they were a placeholder or nominee just like the MERS situation.

TILA and Regulation Z make it clear that even if there was nexus of connection between the source of funds and the originator, it would till be an improper predatory table-funded loan where the borrower was denied the disclosure and information to know and choose the source of a loan, thus enabling consumers to shop around.

In order of importance, we are demanding through subpoena duces tecum, that parties involved in the fake securitization chain come for examination of the wire transfer, check, ACH or other money transfer showing the original funding of the loan and any other money transactions in which the loan was involved INCLUDING but not limited to transactions with or for the fake pool of mortgages that seems to always be empty with no bank account, no trustee account, and no actual trustee with any powers. These transactions don’t exist. The red herring is that the money showed up at closing which led everyone to the mistaken conclusion that the originator made the loan.

Second we ask for the accounting records showing the establishment on the books and records of the originator, and any assignees, of a loan receivable together with the name and address of the bookkeeper and the auditing firm for that entity. No such entries exist because the loan receivable was converted into a bond receivable, but he bond was worthless because it was based on an empty pool.

And third we ask for the documentation, correspondence and all other communications between the originator and the closing agent and between each “assignor” and “assignee” which, as we have seen they are only too happy to fabricate and produce. But the documentation is NOT supported by underlying transactions where money exchanged hands.

The net goals are to attack the mortgage as not having been perfected because the transaction was and remains incomplete as recited in the note, mortgage and other “closing” documents. The “lender” never fulfilled their part of the bargain — loaning the money. Hence the mortgage secures an obligation that does not exist. The note is then attacked as being fatally defective partly because the names were used as nominees leaving the borrower with nobody to talk to about the loan status — there being a nominee payee, nominee lender, and nominee mortgagee or beneficiary.

The other part, just as serious is that the terms of repayment on the note do NOT match up to the terms agreed upon with the institutional investors that purchased mortgage bonds to which the borrower was NOT a party and did not issue. Hence the basic tenets of contract law — offer, acceptance and consideration are all missing.

The Deny and Discover strategy is better because it attacks the root of the transaction and enables the borrower to deny everything the forecloser is trying to put over on the Court with the appearance of reality but nothing to back it up.

The attacks on the foreclosers based upon faulty or fraudulent or even forged documentation make for interesting reading but if in the final analysis the borrower is admitting the loan, admitting the note and mortgage, admitting the default then all the other stuff leads a Judge to conclude that there is error in the ways of the banks but no harm because they were entitled to foreclose anyway.

People are getting on board with this strategy and they have the support from an unlikely source — the investors who thought they were purchasing mortgage bonds with value instead of a sham bond based upon an empty pool with no money and no assets and no loans. Their allegation of damages is based upon the fact that despite the provisions of the pooling and servicing agreement, the prospectus and their reasonable expectations, that the closings were defective, the underwriting was defective and that there is no way to legally enforce the notes and mortgages, notwithstanding the fact that so many foreclosures have been allowed to proceed.

Call 520-405-1688 for customer service and you will get guidance on how to get help.

  1. Do we agree that creditors should be paid only once?
  2. Do we agree that pretending to borrow money for mortgages sand then using it at the race track is wrong?
  3. Do we agree that if the lender and the borrower sign two different documents each containing different terms, they don’t have a deal?
  4. Can we agree that if you were lending money you would want your name on the note and mortgage and not someone else’s?
  5. Can we agree that banks who loaned nothing and bought nothing should be worth nothing when the chips are counted in mortgage assets?

 

Underwater homes under 40 and over 55 still in dire straights

Obama response unclear. He keeps saying that the  object here is not to include “undeserving” borrowers who are just trying to get out of a bad deal a deal that went bad or whose eyes were bigger than their pocket book. As long as he keeps saying that he is missing the whole point. This was a Ponzi Scheme and even if the borrowers were convicted felons behind bars they would still be victims of THIS Scheme. ALl the elements are present — identity theft, diversion of funds, false documentation to both sides, fabrication of documents as the lies came under scrutiny, forgeries, surrogate signing, robo-signing, and profits 1000 times the usual profits for processing or originating loans.

None of these profits were disclosed to either the lender-investor nor the homeowner borrower, violating a myriad of mending and contract laws. It doesn’t matter whether the borrower is perceived as deserving relief — they all are if they were fraud victims.

If the average guy on the street knows we have been screwed without all the economic statistics, why won’t Obama at least acknowledge it?

See Vast geography contains underwater homes inviting homeowners to walk away from homes they are willing to pay for

White Paper: Many Causes of Foreclosure Crisis

Featured Products and Services by The Garfield Firm

NEW! 2nd Edition Attorney Workbook,Treatise & Practice Manual – Pre-Order NOW for an up to $150 discount
LivingLies Membership – Get Discounts and Free Access to Experts
For Customer Service call 1-520-405-1688

Want to read more? Download entire introduction for the Attorney Workbook, Treatise & Practice Manual 2012 Ed – Sample

Pre-Order the new workbook today for up to a $150 savings, visit our store for more details. Act now, offer ends soon!

Editor’s Comment:

I attended Darrell Blomberg’s Foreclosure Strategists’ meeting last night where Arizona Attorney General Tom Horne defended the relatively small size of the foreclosure settlement compared with the tobacco settlement. To be fair, it should be noted that the multi-state settlement relates only to issues brought by the attorneys general. True they did very little investigation but the settlement sets the guidelines for settling with individual homeowners without waiving anything except that the AG won’t bring the lawsuits to court. Anyone else can and will. It wasn’t a real settlement. But the effect was what the Banks wanted. They want you to think the game is over and move on. The game is far from over, it isn’t a game and I won’t stop until I get those homes back that were ripped from the arms of homeowners who never knew what hit them.

So this is the first full business day after AG Horne promised me he would get back to me on the question of whether the AG would bring criminal actions for racketeering and corruption against the banks and servicers for conducting sham auctions in which “credit bids” were used instead of cash to allow the banks to acquire title. These credit bids came from non-creditors and were used as the basis for issuing deeds on foreclosure, each of which carry a presumption of authenticity.  But the deeds based on credit bids from non-creditors represent outright theft and a ratification of a corrupt title system that was doing just fine before the banks started claiming the loans were securitized.

Those credit bids and the deeds issued upon foreclosure were sham transactions — just as the transactions originated with borrowers were based upon the lies and false pretenses of the acting lenders who were paid for their acting services. By pretending that the loan came from these thinly capitalised sham companies (all closed with no forwarding address), the banks and servicers started the lie that the loan was sold up the tree of securitization. Each transaction we are told was a sale of the loan, but none of them actually involved any money exchanging hands. So much for, “value received.”

The purpose of these loans was to create a process that would cover up the theft of the investor money that the investment bank received in exchange for “mortgage bonds” based upon non-existent transactions and the title equivalent of wild deeds.

So the answer to the question is that borrowers did not make bad decisions. They were tricked into these loans. Had there been full disclosure as required by TILA, the borrowers would never have closed on the papers presented to them. Had there been full disclosure to the investors, they never would have parted with a nickel. No money, no lender, no borrower no transactions. And practically barring lawyers from being hired by borrowers was the first clue that these deals were upside down and bogus. No, they didn’t make bad decisions. There was an asymmetry of information that the banks used to leverage against the borrowers who knew nothing and who understood nothing.  

“Just sign everywhere we marked for your signature” was the closing agent’s way of saying, “You are now totally screwed.” If you ask the wrong question you get the wrong answer. “Moral hazard” in this context is not a term anyone knowledgeable uses in connection with the borrowers. It is a term used to express the context in which unscrupulous Bankers acted without conscience and with reckless disregard to the public, violating every applicable law, rule and regulation in the process.

Why Did So Many People Make So Many Ex Post Bad Decisions? The Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis

Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 12-2


by Christopher L. Foote, Kristopher S. Gerardi, and Paul S. Willen

This paper presents 12 facts about the mortgage market. The authors argue that the facts refute the popular story that the crisis resulted from financial industry insiders deceiving uninformed mortgage borrowers and investors. Instead, they argue that borrowers and investors made decisions that were rational and logical given their ex post overly optimistic beliefs about house prices. The authors then show that neither institutional features of the mortgage market nor financial innovations are any more likely to explain those distorted beliefs than they are to explain the Dutch tulip bubble 400 years ago. Economists should acknowledge the limits of our understanding of asset price bubbles and design policies accordingly.

To ready the entire paper please go to this link: www.bostonfed.org/economic/ppdp/2012/ppdp1202.htm

How Did H & R Block Get into the Subprime Mortgage Business?

MOST POPULAR ARTICLES

COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary CLICK HERE TO GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION REPORT

CUSTOMER SERVICE 520-405-1688

Tax Preparer Slammed with $24 Million in Fines on Toxic Mortgages

Editor’s Comment:  You really have to think about some of these stories and what they mean. 

1. Where is the synergy in a merger between Option One and H&R Block? The answers that they were both performing services for fees and neither one was ever a banker, lender or even investor sourcing the funds that were used to lure borrowers into deals that were so convoluted that even Alan Greenspan admits he didn’t understand them.

2. The charge is that they didn’t reveal that they could not buy back all the bad mortgages — meaning they did buy back some of them. which ones? And were some of those mortgages foreclosed in the name of a stranger to the transaction? WORSE YET — how many satisfactions of mortgages were executed by Ocwen, which was not the creditor, never the lender, and never the successor to any creditor. Follow the money trail. The only trail that exists is the trail leading from the investor’s banks accounts into the escrow agent’s trust account with instructions to refund any excess to parties who were complete strangers to the transaction disclosed to the borrower. The intermediary account in which the investor money was deposited was used to pay pornographic fees and profits to the investment banker and close affiliates as “participants” in a scheme of ” securitization” that never took place.

3. Under what terms were the loans purchased? Was it the note, the mortgage or the obligation? There are differences between all three.

4. Since they didn’t have the money to buy back the loans it might be inferred that they never had that money. In other words, they appeared on the “closing papers” as lender when in fact they never had the money to loan and they merely had performed a fee for service — I.e., acting as though they were the lender when they were not.

5. Who was the lender? If the money came from investors, then we know how to identify the creditor. but if we assume that the loan might have been paid or purchased by Option One, then isn’t the lender’s obligation paid? let’s see those actual repurchase transactions.

6. If that isn’t right then Option One must be correctly identified as the lender on the note and mortgage even though they never loaned any money and may or may not have purchased the entire loan, just the receivable, the right to sell the property — but how does anyone purchase the right to submit a credit bid at the foreclosure auction when everyone knows they were not the creditor?

7. How could any of these entities have any loans on their books when they were never the source of funds and why are they being allowed to claim losses obviously fell on the investors who put up the money on toxic mortgages believing them to be triple A rated. 

8. Why would anyone underwrite a bad deal unless they knew they would not lose any money? These mortgages were bad mortgages that under normal circumstances would never have been  offered by any bank loaning its own money or the it’s depositors. 

9. The terms of the deal MUST have been that nobody except the investors loses money on this deal and the kickers is that the investors appear to have waived their right to foreclose. 

10. So the thieves who cooked up this deal get paid for creating it and then end up with the house because the befuddled borrower doesn’t realise that either the debts are paid (at least the one secured by the mortgage) or that the debt has been paid down under terms of the loan (see PSA et al) that were never disclosed to the borrower — contrary to TILA.

11. The Courts must understand that there is a difference between paying a debt and buying the debt. The Courts must require any “assignment” to be tested b discovery where the money trail can be examined. What they will discover is that there is no money trail and that the assignment was a sham.  

12. And if the origination documents show the wrong creditor and fail disclose the true fees and profits of all parties identified with the transaction, the documents — note, mortgage and settlement statements are fatally defective and cannot create a perfected lien without overturning centuries of common law, statutory law and regulations governing the banking and lending industries.

H&R Block Unit Pays $28.2M to Settle SEC Claims Regarding Sale of Subprime Mortgages

By Kansas City Business Journal

H&R Block Inc. subsidiary Option One Mortgage Corp. agreed to pay $28.2 million to settle Securities and Exchange Commission    charges that it had misled investors, federal officials announced Tuesday.

The SEC alleged that Option One promised to repurchase or replace residential mortgage-backed securities it sold in 2007 that breached representations and warranties. The subsidiary did not disclose that its financial situation had degraded such that it could not fulfill its repurchase promises.

Robert Khuzami, director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, said in a release that Option One’s subprime mortgage business was hit hard by the collapse of the housing market.

“The company nonetheless concealed from investors that its perilous finances created risk that it would not be able to fulfill its duties to repurchase or replace faulty mortgages in its (residential mortgage-backed securities) portfolios,” Khuzami said in the release.

The SEC said Option One was one of the nation’s largest subprime mortgage lenders, with originations of $40 billion in its 2006 fiscal year. When the housing market began to decline in 2006, the unit was faced with falling revenue and hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of margin calls from creditors.

Parent company H&R Block (NYSE: HRB) provided financing for Option One to meet margin calls and repurchase obligations, but Block was not obligated to do so. Option One did not disclose this reliance to investors.

Option One, now Sand Canyon Corp., did not admit or deny the allegations. It agreed to pay disgorgement of $14.25 million, prejudgment interest of nearly $4 million and a penalty of $10 million.

Kansas City-based H&R Block reported that it still had $430.19 million of mortgage loans on its books from Option One as of Jan. 31. That’s down 16.2 percent from the same period the previous year.

Using UDCPA Fair Debt Collection Acts to get Money, Information and Fees

MOST POPULAR ARTICLES

COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary CLICK HERE TO GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION REPORT

RIPE AREA FOR STEADY INCOME FOR LAWYERS REPRESENTING HOMEOWNERS

Editor’s Comment: One small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind. You have both a private right of action against the debt collector and the right to apply to the FTC to set up administrative hearings, where these cases should probably be heard by experienced hearing officers who know what they are looking at.

The practice of playing the numbers on debt collection has been around for a long time. Whether the debt is real or not, there is a statute of limitations, bankruptcies and other obstacles to collection. A lot of times the debt is now owed at all, but byb pestering customers, the collection agency gets some money out of them, which they keep because they have already bought the portfolio at pennies or less on the dollar.

This is where servicers and other intermediaries in the fake securitization chain are going to get into hot water. The debt was created when the investor loaned the borrower the money. The intermediaries are by definition debt collectors under the UDCPA and they are, and have been banged for fines many times on individual cases.

This is an instance where the Obama administration is attacking the practice head-on and taking away their toys. So when the pretender lender comes knocking, it isn’t just a RESPA 6 (Qualified Written Request) that you send out, it is a UDCPA letter you send demanding to know both the identity and contact information for the creditor. As you can see from this article, failure to provide you with that information  plus the balance due and how it was computed, is a violation of that Federal Statute.

It might also be a shortcut way of identifying the pretender not as holder of the note but as agent for an undisclosed principal seeking to collect on a note that was defective in the first place because they did not identify the correct creditor (in violation of TILA) and it did not provide you with a proper accounting showing exactly what this “creditor” received that would reduce your loan balance.

The MAIN point here is that the servicer might well be the one sending you the notice of delinquency swhen they have performed zero due diligence as to the creditor’s accounting. Where the servicer itself or some other party is keeping the account current, as is often the case, the loan is neither delinquent nor susceptible to being declared in default — but they do it anyway.

Now that the FTC has declared war on debt collectors who perform illegally, and banged them with this fine, we can invoke the same administrative procedures and grievances with the FTC as to the collection efforts on mortgages where the “collector” is not the creditor and where the money demanded is not actually shown as due.

There is a presumption that if you didn’t make the payment as set forth in the note, then you must be delinquent and you must be declared (at some point) in default. But that is not true in most cases. There can only be a delinquency or default under the mortgage loan if the borrower has failed to make a payment or cure a payment that is actually due. If the payment has been made already, then no such payment is due, regardless of whether it came from the borrower or not.

This is why you need to know the four legs of the stool in order to object, sue, defend, and present genuine issues of fact before a trial court that will have no choice but to allow you to proceed to discovery. Discovery is where these cases settle because the pretenders know they didn’t fund the loan, they didn’t pay for the loan and the creditor has been paid in whole or in part, with a lower or zero balance remaining.

Just for reminders, the four legs of the stool are:

  1. The loan closing papers with the investors under which he agrees to advance funds into a pool in exchange for a note or bond from a REMIC (which is never properly constituted). Here the investors expects that the money advanced will be used for funding mortgages conforming with the standards set forth in the prospectus and pooling and servicing agreement. Note that there is no nexus or connection between the investor and the borrower because the borrower usually does not even exist at that point in time. If a nexus ever arises, it is when the loan is transferred into the pool, something which we all now know was never done until the loan went into litigation or foreclosure — obviously in violation of the cut-off date required by the IRS REMIC statute, and the concurrent cut-off date in the PSA. But more importantly is the money angle — the investors didn’t advance money for loans that were delinquent or in default. They invested their money for good quality performing loans. Thus there is no way that the loans could be transferred into the pools if they were already declared problematic, delinquent, or non-performing. The failure to provide a nexus between borrower and lender (investor) is fatal to the enforcement of the mortgage lien. The creditor has no interest in the loan and doesn’t want one. Any claim from third parties who also have no nexus with the borrower would be on causes of action that are separate or apart from the mortgage lien. (SEE COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION REPORT ABOVE)
  2. The loan closing papers with the borrower(s), which are subject to roughly the same analysis with identical result. There is no nexus between the borrower and the investor because neither one knows the other, despite requirements in the TILA and RESPA laws that require disclosure of parties and their compensation. (SEE FORENSIC ANALYSIS TILA+ REPORT on Livinglies-store.com) The note does not describe the actual monetary transaction between the investor lender and the borrower. Instead it inserts a straw-man as “lender” and a straw-man as “beneficiary”. This usually takes the form of a new animal in mortgage lending called an “originator” who is a paid fee service provider whose sole duty is to pretend to be the lender, even though they never funded the loan, never bought the loan and never had any interest in the debt, the note or the mortgage. This is deemed by many in the title industry as a corrupted document that breaks the chain of title if any action was taken on such a loan in foreclosure. 
  3. The actual money trail which varies from both the requirements set forth in the paperwork with the investor lender and the paperwork with the homeowner borrower. A full accounting would show that the parties in the middle without any interest in the loan, bought, sold, transferred and used those fabricated, forged documents to initiate foreclosure and eviction proceedings. Under the investor documentation, the pretenders are allowed to use a legal PONZI scheme in which the investors money is used to pay him his interest income, although it is not reported as such. The servicer also has the option of taking money from other revenue and pools and paying certain investors in complete  violation of the explicit requirements of any standard promissory note from a borrower requiring that payments be credited to the account of the borrower. Instead, they make the payment and do not credit the borrower or they receive the money and they pay neither the investors nor the give credit to the borrowers. (see Loan Level Accounting REPORT on Livinglies-store.com). The servicers and intermediaries and attempting, with some success to take over the position of the investor without an assignment from the investor, and enforce a mortgage to which they are not a party.
  4. The Fourth legal of the stool arises from the false representations made in court or foreclosure proceedings. These representations made by people who purport to be authorized to substitute trustees, or file notice of defaults, notice of sales, notice of evictions, or lawsuits for all of those in judicial states, turn out to be at variance with all three of the other legs of the stool — the investor paperwork, the borrower’s paperwork and the actual money trail. 

Using a service like Elite Litigation Management services or others to present the matrix, which we also offer at livinglies-store.com, dial 480-405-1688, and you can present a poster-size board that shows a number of the discrepancy between all four legs of the stool, thus giving rise to the question of fact necessary to get to the next step in litigation. remember, if you go in thinking you have a magic bullet that will end your case, you are dreaming of a better worked than the one we have.

F.T.C. Fines a Collector of Debt $2.5 Million

See Full Article on New York Times and Firedoglake.com
By

The Federal Trade Commission signaled on Monday that it would continue to crack down on debt collectors who harass consumers for money they may not even be legally obligated to pay.

In the second-largest penalty ever levied on a debt collector, the F.T.C. said that Asset Acceptance, one of the nation’s largest debt collection companies, had agreed to pay a $2.5 million civil penalty to settle charges that the company deceived consumers when trying to collect old debts.

The settlement is part of a broader effort to patrol the industry, agency officials said.

“Our attention to debt collection has increased over the past couple of years because the complaints have been on the rise,” said J. Reilly Dolan, assistant director for the F.T.C.’s division of financial practices.

Consumer complaints about debt collection companies consistently rank as the second-highest category among all complaints at the agency, behind identity theft. But in 2010, complaints jumped 17 percent to 140,036, which represented 11 percent of all complaints in the commission’s database, up from 119,540, or about 9 percent of complaints, in 2009.

Asset Acceptance, based in Warren, Mich., was charged with a variety of complaints, including failing to tell consumers that they could no longer be sued for failing to pay some debts because the debts were too old. The company’s collectors also failed to inform consumers that paying even a small portion of the amount owed would revive the debt — in other words, making a payment would extend the amount of time the collector could legally sue.

Debt collectors have only a certain number of years to sue consumers. The statute of limitations varies by state, but typically ranges from two to 15 years, Mr. Dolan said, beginning when a consumer fails to make a payment. But borrowers often do not realize that making a payment on the old debt may restart the clock.

Among other things, the complaint also contended that the company — which buys unpaid debts for pennies on the dollar from credit card companies, health clubs and telecommunications and utility providers and tries to collect them — reported inaccurate information about the consumers to the credit reporting agencies. It also said that Asset Acceptance failed to conduct a reasonable investigation when it was notified by one of the credit agencies that a debt was being disputed. Moreover, the complaint says that the company used illegal collection practices and that it continued to try to collect debts that consumers disputed even though the company failed to verify that the debt was valid.

The proposed settlement with Asset Acceptance requires the company to tell consumers whose debt may be too old to be collected that it will not sue. It also requires the company to investigate disputed debts and to ensure it has a reasonable basis for its claims before going after the consumer. It is also barred from placing debt on credit reports without notifying the consumer.

The penalty “is certainly a slap on the wrist and probably a little bit more, but it really depends on what the F.T.C. does to enforce this in the coming months and years,” said Robert Hobbs, deputy director at the National Consumer Law Center and author of “Fair Debt Collection” (National Consumer Law Center, 1987). But “it is a great step forward. It is not self-enforcing, and it has a mechanism for the F.T.C. to follow up.”

Still, while the settlement requires the company to take more responsibility for checking the statute of limitations before it contacts consumers, he said most states did not require debt collectors to do that. That means it is up to consumers to know the rules on the statute of limitations, which, he said, can be “an enormously complex legal question.”

In a statement, Asset Acceptance said that the settlement ended an F.T.C. investigation that began nearly six years ago, and that the company did not admit to any of the allegations. “We are pleased to have this matter behind us, and to have clarity on the F.T.C.’s policies and expectations of the debt collection industry,” said Rion Needs, president and chief executive of Asset Acceptance.

In March, another leading debt collection company, West Asset Management, agreed to pay $2.8 million, the largest civil penalty ever levied by the F.T.C., to settle charges that its collection techniques violated the law. The commission charged that West Asset’s collectors often called consumers multiple times a day, sometimes using rude and abusive language, about accounts that were not theirs. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the F.T.C. now share enforcement authority for debt collection companies, though the new bureau has a power that the F.T.C. did not: it can write new rules for debt collectors. But F.T.C. officials said that debt collection enforcement would remain a top priority.

 

MBS Investors in Revolt: Ultimatums to US Bank and Wells Fargo

MOST POPULAR ARTICLES

COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary CLICK HERE TO GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION REPORT

INVESTORS COMING OUT OF THE SHADOWS: BANKS’ WORST NIGHTMARE

EDITOR’S ANALYSIS: For those who have followed this Blog for any length of time, this news will come as no surprise. Ultimately, the proof and the relief sought by homeowners will come from investors who demand answers to what happened to their money when they purchased mortgage backed securities and pooled their money to fund mortgages.

The result is a pincer action, to put it military terms, where the creditors and the debtors are making the same allegations against the intermediaries who stole from both sides, “borrowed” the loss to claim Federal bailout money, and left both sides holding the bag.

Lawyers for the investors are clearly smelling blood and are on the hunt. Unlike the foreclosure defense side where the arguments and theories are the same, these lawyers will represent institutional investors whose credibility in court will rival, if not exceed, the credibility normally allowed to anyone with the word “Bank” in their name. These lawyers are going to make a fortune, as will any foreclosure defense lawyer who realizes the true nature of what is going on.

What they already know and they are demanding answers: that the mortgage origination process was defective in multiple ways that created fatal defects in the the quality and quantity of loans as well as the security of the collateral (the homes). The proof that will emerge is that the homes were not subject to a perfected lien because the intermediaries wanted to claim the loans themselves to create “trading profits” before they provided for any accounting to the investors and with no intention of ever providing an accounting to the borrower.

The document trail from the closing with investors, the document trail from the closing with borrowers, the actual money trail and the representations made in court are all at variance with each other. “Transfers” to the pool occurred only after the alleged default by the borrower, which was misrepresented because the default claimed did not match the actual receipt of funds that should have been reported to investors. All of this is in direct violation of the PSA and other securitization documents.

The final result will be the investors disavowing any interest in the loans, absent a broad settlement that allows for modifications of the mortgages based upon realistic values and terms. The investors will see, that the deep pockets here for recovery of their losses are where the money went in the first place — the investment banks.

The money advanced by investors was not used to fund mortgages as advertised but rather was sponged into a complex matrix of fees, trading profits for the investment banks, credit enhancements that inured to the benefit of the banks, and bets that the bonds would fail — a sure thing because the banks reserved the right exclusively to declare the failure.

All of this projects broad similar actions from investors around the world demanding answers on each and every pool. All loans will be thrown into a grey area of ownership and the end result may well be that the “free house” spin by the Banks will come back and bite them. With the creditors disavowing the transaction and making no claim against the homeowners there might be nobody to pay. Short of that, the proof will most likely provide a relatively easy way for homeowners to strip their homes of the liens of record as they relate to loans in which a securitization claim is present — because in most cases, the loan was not made or paid for by the originator who appears on the note and mortgage.

TILA rescission is most probably going to get much easier as a result of these actions. Meanwhile US Bank and Wells Fargo are going to experience the frustration that they have caused homeowners. Their attempts at foreclosure are going to met with stiff resistance as the investors emerge and have their say in foreclosure actions.

HSBC and US Bank to Investigate Ineligible Mortgages in Over $19 Billion of Wells Fargo-Issued RMBS

(Source: Gibbs & Bruns, LLP) – HOUSTON, Jan. 5, 2012 - Gibbs & Bruns LLP announced today that its clients have issued instructions to US Bank and HSBC, as Trustees, to open investigations of ineligible mortgages in pools securing over $19 billion of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) issued by various affiliates of Wells Fargo.  Collectively, Gibbs & Bruns’ clients hold over 25% of the Voting Rights in 48 Trusts that issued these RMBS.

“Our clients continue to seek a comprehensive solution to the problems of ineligible mortgages in RMBS pools and deficient servicing of those loans.  Today’s action is another step toward achieving that goal,” said Kathy D. Patrick of Gibbs & Bruns LLP, lead counsel for the Holders.

The Holders anticipate that they may provide additional instructions to Trustees, as needed, to further the investigations.  The securities that are the subject of these instruction letters include:

WFALT 2005-1 WFMBS 2005-9 WFMBS 2006-19 WFMBS 2007-13
WFALT 2007-PA2 WFMBS 2005-AR11 WFMBS 2006-20 WFMBS 2007-8
WFALT 2007-PA3 WFMBS 2005-AR12 WFMBS 2006-6 WFMBS 2007-9
WFALT 2007-PA4 WFMBS 2005-AR14 WFMBS 2006-7 WFMBS 2007-AR3
WFALT 2007-PA6 WFMBS 2005-AR16 WFMBS 2006-8 WFMBS 2007-AR8
WFHET 2005-3 WFMBS 2005-AR3 WFMBS 2006-AR10 WMLT 2005-A
WFHET 2006-3 WFMBS 2005-AR5 WFMBS 2006-AR13 WMLT 2005-B
WFHET 2007-1 WFMBS 2005-AR8 WFMBS 2006-AR14 WMLT 2006-A
WFMBS 2005-12 WFMBS 2005-AR9 WFMBS 2006-AR18 WMLT 2006-ALT1
WFMBS 2005-17 WFMBS 2006-11 WFMBS 2006-AR2
WFMBS 2005-18 WFMBS 2006-13 WFMBS 2006-AR4
WFMBS 2005-3 WFMBS 2006-14 WFMBS 2006-AR8
WFMBS 2005-4 WFMBS 2006-17 WFMBS 2007-10

ABOUT GIBBS & BRUNS LLP
Gibbs & Bruns is a leading boutique law firm engaging in high-stakes business and commercial litigation.  The firm is renowned for its representation of both plaintiffs and defendants in complex matters, including significant securities and institutional investor litigation, director and officer liability, contract disputes, fraud and fiduciary claims, energy, oil and gas litigation, construction litigation, insurance litigation, trust & estate litigation, antitrust litigation, legal and professional malpractice, and partnership disputes. Gibbs & Bruns is routinely recognized as a top commercial litigation firm in the US.  For more information, visit www.gibbsbruns.com.

Source: Gibbs & Bruns, LLP

 

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 3,247 other followers

%d bloggers like this: