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CHAIN OF TITLE by David Dayen. Available on Amazon

LISTEN LIBERALS! by Thomas Frank. Available on Amazon and Kindle.

Pretender Lenders: How Tablefunding and Securitization Go Hand in Hand” By William Paatalo and Kimberly Cromwell. CLICK:

Payments Current? Here comes foreclosure!

French bookkeeping: an old anecdote that reflects reality. Three sets of books. One for himself, one for his partner and one for the government. If permitted in discovery virtually every homeowner could easily show that there are multiple sets of accounting for “loan” payments, multiple sets of accounting for insurance and multiple sets of accounting for modifications. Some are for investors based upon complete fiction.

Some are for homeowners which are mostly fictitious. And then there is a new set of books for each “servicer” that ever claimed the right to administer the alleged loan account.

Trustees have no books and records because the trust doesn’t really exist and no real world transactions were ever conducted using the name of the trust. THAT record is just paper that is changed as quickly as you edit a document in a word processing program.

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I am seeing, with increasing frequency, a phenomenon that can only be explained by reference to the false assertions to “Securitization” or as Adam Levitin has coined it — “Securitization Fail.”
We have too many stories to recount here. But a representative sampling shows that it all starts with bad posting of transactions between the alleged servicer and the homeowner who is described as a “borrower.” It is difficult to imagine how this could get through the courts, but many times, as I have personally witnessed, judges demonstrate an unwillingness to even consider the possibility that the homeowner did nothing wrong. Such judges compound their erroneous rulings by reference to the fact that a long period of time has elapsed since the homeowner made their last payment.
In each case, the “servicer” or “holder” claims a default. In each case, the homeowner had been making timely payments — right up until the moment when the servicer or bank said they wouldn’t accept payments unless the homeowner paid up an imaginary sum of money to “reinstate” the loan or to start a new modification. And even where the money was paid, the foreclosure continued. Money paid by the homeowner is not subject to accounting and neither are the original records of receipts and disbursements. The courts allow “new originals” based upon an IT platform that will produce anything desired by the user — something like the way WordPress allows me to say anything I want here in this article.
Sometimes it is about the “servicer” getting it wrong about the insurance, and then forcing the homeowner into forced placed insurance caused by the “negligence” of the servicer. Then the servicer accepts the regular monthly payments without payment for the surcharged forced placed insurance; BUT on an entirely independent set of books it shows the account as increasingly delinquent for non payment of the forced placed insurance that never should have been charged in the first place. Suddenly, without any provocation arising out of the homeowner’s conduct, a letter is received and then another reciting the delinquency on the other set of “books” and declaring a default and acceleration of the entire principal amount.
Efforts to get the “trustee” to back off because they are not proceeding on valid information are useless because they are using a third set of books that is not based upon payments from a borrower.
The point was well stated by a manager for Bank of America in Massachusetts: “we are not in the modification business. We are in the foreclosure business.” And the reason is the same as I have been saying for years: foreclosure produces the first and only authentic legal document in a chain of fraud. It is self perpetuating because of the presumptions that arise from a foreclosure judgment and a foreclosure sale.
The fact that it is nearly impossible to get the current “servicer” to correct its books for an error made by them or a predecessor absolutely corroborates the complaints that the banks simply ignored the requirement of performing real reviews. And the reason they didn’t do the review has nothing to do with negligence. The banks NEED foreclosures. They need as many loans as possible to go into foreclosure because that is the only path available to create a presumption of facial validity to the false chain of paper — a path littered with the lives of decent people many of whom had paid every cent required by a legally void note and mortgage.

14% Of Polled Wells Fargo Customers Have Decided To Leave The Bank- Will You?

Wells Fargo’s illegal cross-selling and fraudulent account creation practices appear to have caught up with the bank, just days after CEO John Stumpf announced his surprise resignation. As Bloomberg reports, management consultancy cg42 released a poll showing 14% of Wells Fargo customers have decided to leave the bank, “potentially withdrawing billions of dollars and crimping revenue.”

The data confirms what a separate poll by SurveyMonkey Intelligence released last week revealed. According to the survey, since the scandal broke, Wells Fargo has been losing asmuch as 140,000 of its mobile customers every week. The report finds that while the bank reported a downturn in new customer applications and accounts opened since the scandal broke, Wells Fargo curiously hasn’t reported on its customer churn rates. That is, the rate at which Wells Fargo is losing customers as they close their accounts after the scandal. (Conversely, customer retention rates would reveal the rate of customers keeping their accounts. Either metric works.)

Wells Fargo account scandal impact

In September, when the scandal hit, Wells Fargo Mobile download numbers dropped lower than in any other month in 2016.

Wells Fargo app downloads in 2016


Looking specifically at the 30 days after the Wells Fargo scandal broke and comparing them to the previous 30 days, downloads of the Wells Fargo Mobile app dropped by 7.7%.

Wells Fargo Mobile downloads after scandal


The trend is bank specific: Chase, BoA, and Citi all saw a modest increase in downloads in this same time period. In fact, while Chase, BoA, and Citi saw growth within the expected range for their app downloads after the scandal, only Wells showed a significant–and negative–departure from its previous growth rat

Bank app download rates after scandal


The survey also found that weekly user retention rates averaged 79.9% in August, and had even been slightly improving in the weeks leading up to the scandal breaking, with a weekly retention rate of 80.9% for the week ending September 7. But then the Wells Fargo account scandal hit, and weekly retention rates hit a six-month low of 78.0% for the week ending October 9.

Wells Fargo mobile retention

A 2.7% drop in the weekly user retention rate might not seem like much, but think about it in the context of the Wells Fargo Mobile app:

For a mobile app that has 7 million weekly active users, when the weekly user retention rate drops 2.5% from 80% to 78%, that’s an additional 140 thousand users who aren’t returning to the app from one week to the next. While some of those users might return in later weeks or months, some percentage of these hundreds of thousands of users that Wells Fargo has lost from week-to-week since the scandal began will never return.

* * *

The good news for Wells is that this exodus has yet to be reflected in the public figures released by the bank. Last week, the bank’s new CEO Tim Sloan said that customer traffic at branches and call centers remained at typical levels in September while deposit balances rose by $6.5 billion from the previous month; Folk however declined to provide updated figures.

Still, Wells is not taking any chances and in an attempt to quell the scandal that has engulfed its consumer bank, the bank will start broadcasting nationwide television commercials Monday night, outlining steps it has taken to halt abuses.

As Bloomberg adds, “the move escalates a public-relations campaign that has featured advertisements online and in newspapers, as the firm tries to convince customers it’s putting their interests first. Authorities fined the bank $185 million last month, saying branch workers may have opened more than 2 million unauthorized deposit accounts and credit cards over half a decade.”

“The advertising reiterates Wells Fargo’s commitment to customers and the steps we are taking to move forward and make things right,” Mark Folk, a company spokesman, said in an interview. Some ads will air during Sunday morning talk shows, and the push will include networks Univision and Telemundo, he said.

WAMU “Merger”: Paper Chase Part 2

It all comes down to the final unavoidable conclusion: Chase has been lying about its ownership of WAMU originations of residential mortgage loans and the FDIC and other government institutions and agencies are either complicit or negligent.

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Hat tip to Donna Steenkamp at


The issue is the Purchase and Assumption Agreement when Chase supposedly acquired assets from the FDIC receiver for Washington Mutual (WAMU) and from the US Trustee in bankruptcy for the WAMU estate.

It seems to be saying that a condition precedent to the actual ownership of loans is that the FDIC must execute a “Receiver’s Deed” or “Receiver’s Bill of Sale.” The problem is not being right — the problem is being able to simplify this for the judge to rule on it.
From what I know and according to the FDIC receiver, no such document was ever executed. It would therefore logically follows that Chase neither purchased nor received any ownership of any debts/loans from the WAMU estate. Of course it has always been my position that at the time of the FDIC-US BKR Trustee-Chase-WAMU deal, WAMU did not own any residential mortgage loans — but that is a different story.
But like rescission and other things that seem clear on their face and even have the force of both statutory and common law behind them, lawyers continue to fabricate arguments against the plain words of the instrument. In this case they say that what was said on that instrument is irrelevant. Chase assumed ownership and liability for the loans. But of course Chase disclaimed the liability in a fiery confrontation with the FDIC.
Most of this is too abstract for the average trial judge to handle. So if they are presented with an option that removes the issue from the trier of fact, the judge makes that ruling. That way the Judge is not rocking the boat with a pronouncement that the subject loan was not backed by a receiver’s Deed or Bill of Sale. Either one could be construed as an assignment or allonge for endorsement. The lack thereof would be a judicial pronouncement that Chase has been lying about that deal starting before it was ever executed.
The issue is further obscured by two facts: (1) the original Purchase and Assumption Agreement as posted on the FDIC site for years was taken down and a replacement was inserted and (2) the FDIC is tacitly supporting Chase giving rise to the issue of void vs voidable and whether the “transaction” was ratified by the FDIC and/or by Chase who received a Power of Attorney from the FDIC as receiver for the WAMU estate.
BUT all that said, the argument is clearly present that the condition precedent with a US government agency was not met and Chase got nothing. ALSO it gives rise to the ability to ask questions in discovery that might lead to early settlements. The questions (not in proper discovery form) are:
  1. Has Chase ever received a Receiver’s Deed or receiver’s Bill of Sale from the FDIC, as receiver for the estate of Washington Mutual
  2. If the answer to the preceding question is yes, who has it, where are they and give us a copy.
  3. If the answer to question #1 is no, then describe any document in which Chase received ownership of one or more loans from the Washington Mutual estate. For purposes of this question ownership means that (a) the estate of Washington Mutual contained a loan receivable account for the subject loan and then (b) Chase posted the transaction as a loan receivable on its financial statement. For purposes of this question, “Chase” includes all Chase entities, subsidiaries or affiliates.
  4. If the answer to question #1 is that the party answering that question lacks sufficient information to give an answer, then please describe and name the person who would have such knowledge, along with their contact information.
I would also include the quote from paragraph 3.3 (Manner of Conveyance; limited warranty; Nonrecourse; etc). as follows, since they signed the document in which this paragraph is included:


The next point is the sale back to the FDIC —
The Purchase and Assumption Agreement (in its current form) basically says that any loans evidenced by forged or stolen instruments entitles Chase to sell the loans to the FDIC (presumably at par value, creating a windfall to Chase). Interesting. So there was an awareness that forged and stolen instruments were an issue when this deal was done back in 2008.
So, assuming that loans=debts, which is debatable, that leads to the following questions that are again NOT in presentable form for discovery:
  1. Did anyone perform a review to determine whether any debts were in fact transferred to Chase?
  2. If the answer to the preceding question is yes, then identify the party who performed such review including his/her contact information.
  3. If the answer to question #1 is yes, please state (a) whether the subject debt was part of the review and (b) whether any determination was made as to the ownership of the subject debt.
  4. If the answer to question #1 is yes, then please answer this question: Did anyone perform a review of the debts deemed transferred to Chase for determining whether any of the debts were based upon forged or stolen documents?
  5. If the answer to the preceding question is yes, then identify the party who performed such review including his/her contact information.
  6. If the answer to question #3 is yes, please state whether the subject loan was part of such review.
  7. If the answer to the preceding question is yes, then identify the party who performed such review including his/her contact information.
  8. If the answer to question #6 is no, please state the person or persons who decided not to perform such a review.
  9. If the answer to question #6 is no, please state the reasons for why such a review was not executed.
  10. Please identify the name, position, and location of the person who is custodian or otherwise in possession of “put notices” (see below) under the Purchase and Assumption Agreement.
“Puts Prior to the Settlement Date. During the period from Bank Closing to and including the Business Day immediately preceding the Settlement Date, the Assuming Bank shall be entitled to require the Receiver to purchase any Asset which the Assuming Bank can establish is evidenced by forged or stolen instruments as of Bank Closing. The Assuming Bank shall transfer all such Assets to the Receiver without recourse, and shall indemnify the Receiver against any and all claims of any Person claiming by, through or under the Assuming Bank with respect to any such Asset, as provided in Section 12.4.

Notices to the Receiver. In the event that the Assuming Bank elects to require the Receiver to purchase one or more Assets, the Assuming Bank shall deliver to the Receiver a notice (a “Put Notice”) which shall include:(i) a list of all Assets that the Assuming Ban requires the Receiver to purchase;

(ii) a list of all Related Liabilities with respect to the Assets identified pursuant to (i) above; and

(iii) a statement of the estimated Repurchase Price of each Asset identified pursuant to (i) above as of the applicable Put Date.

Such notice shall be in the form prescribed by the Receiver or such other form to which the Receiver shall consent.   As provided in Section 9.6, the Assuming Bank shall deliver to the Receiver such documents, Credit Files and such additional information relating to the subject the Put Notice as the Receiver may request and shall provide to the Receiver full access to all other relevant books and records.”
Purchase by Receiver. The Receiver shall purchase Loans that are specified in the Put Notice (discovery?) and shall assume Related Liabilities with respect to such Loans, and the transfer of such Loans and Related Liabilities shall be effective as of a date determined by the Receiver the Credit Files which date shall not be later than thirty (30) days after receipt by the Receiver of with respect to such Loans (the “Put Date”)

Ankle Biting Between Foreclosure Mills and TBTF Banks

Law firms are now suing the banks because they say the banks didn’t get the forged fabricated documents in time to complete cases, resulting in heavy losses to the law firms. While the banks dallied in producing forged fabricated documents, the law firms were forced to continue paying salaries to lawyer and support staff and all the accoutrements to hiring a lawyer.

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As I have long predicted, the foreclosure mills and the big banks that were running the show are at each other’s throats now or the ankles whichever you prefer. These firms looked the other way knowing that documents and representations were most likely lacking in any element of truth.
Incredibly the banks threw the foreclosure mills under the bus — when they encountered difficulties with getting robo-signers to forge fabricated documents. And even more incredible is that the law firms are now suing because they say the banks didn’t get the forged fabricated documents in time to complete cases, resulting in heavy losses. While the banks dallied in producing forged fabricated documents, the law firms were forced to continue paying salaries to lawyer and support staff and all the accoutrements to hiring a lawyer.
The real question that comes out of all these revelations and lawsuits by law firms, investors, GSE’s and hedge funds is this: When will the courts start recognizing that the “loans” were just part of a multiparty scam to defraud investors, the government and borrowers?

Oct. 19, 2016 5:08 p.m. ET

A New Jersey law firm that helped Wells Fargo Bank N.A. foreclose on thousands of homeowners has sued the lender, saying the bank’s delayed efforts to fix its robo-signing problems led the law firm to collapse.

Lawyers for the Zucker, Goldberg & Ackerman law firm, which laid off most of its 335 workers last year, are accusing Wells Fargo of taking several years to comply with a 2010 New Jersey Supreme Court order that called for lenders to show that they were properly submitting mortgage details before foreclosing on a property.

The order, which required banks to submit their internal foreclosure policies, paralyzed foreclosures throughout the state. The average time for the foreclosure process—from filing the lawsuit to a sheriff’s sale—grew from about 200 days to about 1,000 days, according to documents filed in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Newark.

Wells Fargo’s delay in responding to the court order caused financial problems for Zucker, Goldberg & Ackerman, according to the lawsuit. Under its agreements with mortgage lenders, the law firm would advance most of the foreclosure-related expenses and be reimbursed later, usually after a judgment or sale, court papers said.

“[Wells Fargo officials] were incapable for a very long period of time of complying with what the New Jersey Supreme Court said they should have been doing all along,” said Daniel M. Stolz, a New Jersey lawyer who put Zucker, Goldberg & Ackerman into bankruptcy on Aug. 3, 2015.

The lawsuit also states that Wells Fargo has refused to pay more than $2.5 million for work that Zucker, Goldberg & Ackerman did. Wells Fargo hired the law firm to file court pleadings, ensure compliance with state and federal regulations and research information such as ownership, payment history and title history for each case, according to court papers.

Wells Fargo spokesman Tom Goyda said the bank disagrees “with the claims regarding fees owed to the firm” and said that the lawsuit’s other allegations “should not be viewed as credible.”

U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge Christine Gravelle set a Dec. 21 hearing on the lawsuit.

The lawsuit, filed Friday, is part of Mr. Stolz’s efforts to collect money to repay roughly $30 million of the Zucker, Goldberg & Ackerman law firm’s debts.

Law firm officials said in earlier court papers that the mortgage crisis, aside from causing foreclosure delays, also “gave rise to onerous new regulations on the lenders, which the lenders passed along [to the law firm].”

“Because foreclosure law is significantly impacted by economic conditions, government regulations and the condition of the lending industry, it has always been difficult for [the law firm] to control its own destiny,” Zucker, Goldberg & Ackerman officials said.

Zucker, Goldberg & Ackerman is one of several high-volume law firms that worked for the banks and stumbled after consumer advocates and government regulators questioned the mortgage industry’s foreclosure practices amid the crisis. In 2012, five of the nation’s biggest banks agreed to a $25 billion national foreclosure pact to settle accusations of improper practices, such as “robo-signed” documents and otherwise flawed court papers.

In March 2013, a Georgia-based foreclosure processor called Prommis Solutions LLC filed for chapter 11 protection and later sold some of its operations to a competitor.

The 710-worker firm, was hired by law firms and mortgage servicers to keep track of mortgages as they go through the default cycle, grew rapidly after opening in 2006, its lawyers said in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Wilmington, Del., at the time of the filing. But business slowed once federal regulators and state attorneys general began investigating the mortgage industry’s “robo-signing” scandal.

“Residential mortgage default resolution processors, including [Prommis Holdings and its affiliates], experienced a significant deceleration of revenue recognition and, thus, decline in business,” Chief Executive Charlie Piper said in court papers.

The Butler & Hosch law firm shut down in May 14, 2015, and laid off nearly 700 lawyers, paralegals and back office staff, according to federal lawsuit that some workers filed over unpaid wages and violations to federal layoff noticing rules.

The Orlando, Fla., firm typically handled between 50,000 and 60,000 foreclosures filed in 27 states, according to the lawsuit. In an email made public in court papers, Chief Executive Officer Robert Hosch said the company “grew too fast.”


Bank Fraud From the Top Down

MERS is not, as its proponents claim, a device for eliminating the recording charges on legitimate purchases and sales of mortgage loans; instead it is a “layering” device (another Wall Street term) for creating the illusion of such transfers even though no transaction actually took place.

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I recently had the occasion to ghost write something for a customer in relation to claims based upon fraud, MERS, and “Successors.” Here is what I drafted, with references to actual people and entities deleted:

  •  MERS was created in 1996 as a means for private traders to create the illusion of loan transfers. On its website MERS states emphatically that it specifically disclaims any interest in any debt and disclaims any interest in any documentation of debt (i.e., a promissory note) and specifically disclaims any interest in any agreement for collateralizing the obligations stated on the note.
  • There is no agreement in which MERS is authorized as an agent of any creditor. The statement on the note and/or mortgage that it is named as nominee for a “lender” is false. No agreement exists that sets forth the terms or standards of agency relationship between the Payee on the subject “note” or the mortgagee on the subject mortgage. MERS is merely named on instruments without any powers to exercise on behalf of any party who would qualify as a bona fide mortgagee or beneficiary.
  • No person in MERS actually performs ANY action in connection with loans and no officer or employee of MERS did perform any banking activity in relation tot he subject loan. MERS is a passive database for which access is freely given to anyone who wants to make an entry, regardless of the truth or falsity of that entry. It is a platform where the person accessing the MERS IT system appoints themselves as “assistant secretary” or some other false status in relation to MERS. MERS is not, as its proponents claim, a device for eliminating the recording charges on legitimate purchases and sales of mortgage loans; instead it is a “layering” device (another wall Street term) for creating the illusion of such transfers even though no transaction actually took place.
  • Hence there is no basis under existing law under which MERS, in this case, was either a nominee for a real creditor and no basis under existing law under which MERS, in this case, could possibly claim that it was either a mortgagee or beneficiary under a deed of trust.
  • MERS has not claimed and never will claim that it is a mortgagee or beneficiary.
  • The lender, under the alleged “closing documents” was also a sham nominee. None of the parties in the alleged “chain” were at any times a creditor, lender, purchaser, mortgagee, beneficiary, or holder of any note. None of them have any financial interest or risk of loss in the performance of the alleged “loan” obligations.
  • Plaintiff reasonably relied upon the representations at the “Closing” that the originator who was named as Payee on the note was lending her money. But in fact the originator was merely acting as a broker, conduit or sales agent whose job was to get the Plaintiff to sign papers — an event that triggered windfall compensation to all the participants (except the Plaintiff), equal to or even greater than the amount of principal supposedly due from the “loan.”
  • In fact, the originator and multiple other parties had entered into a scheme that was memorialized in an illegal contract violating public policy regarding the disclosure of the identity of the “lender” and the compensation by all parties who received any remuneration of any type arising out the “Closing of the transaction.” The name of the contract is probably a “Purchase and Assumption Agreement” — a standard agreement that is used in the banking industry after the loan has been underwritten, approved and funded. In the case at bar those parties entered into the Purchase and Assumption Agreement before the subject “loan” was closed”, before the Plaintiff even applied for a loan.
  • The source of the money for the alleged “loan” was a “dark pool” (a term used by investment bankers) consisting of the money advanced by investors who thought they were buying mortgage bonds issued by a Trust, in which their money would be managed by the Trustee. In fact, the Trust is either nonexistent or inchoate having never been funded with the investors’ money. The dark pool contains money commingled from hundreds of investors in thousands of trusts.
  • The investors were generally stable managed funds including pension, retirement, 401K money for people relying upon said money for their living expenses after retirement. They are the unwitting, unknowing source of funds for the transaction described as a “closing.” Hence the loan contract upon which the Defendants rely is based upon fraudulent representations designed to mislead the court and mislead the Plaintiff and the byproduct of a broader scheme to defraud investors in “Mortgage backed securities” that were issued by a nonexistent trust that never owned the assets supposedly “backing” the “security” often described as a mortgage bond.
  • Thus the fraud starts with the misrepresentation to investors that the managed funds would be managed by a trustee and would be used to acquire existing loans rather than originate new loans. Instead their funds were used directly on the “closing” table by presumably unwitting “Closing agents.” The fact that the funds arrived created the illusion that the party named on the note and mortgage was actually funding the loan to the “borrower.” This was a lie. But it explains why the Defendants have continually refused to provide any evidence of the “purchase” of the loan by the parties they claim to form a “Chain.”
  • In the alleged “transfer” of the loan, there was no purchase and no payment of money because at the base of their chain, the originator, there was no right to receive the money that would ordinarily be a requirement for purchase of the loan. There also was no Purchase and Assumption Agreement, which is basic standard banking practice in the acquisition of loans, particularly in pools.
  • As Plaintiff as recently learned, the originator was not entitled to receive any payment from “successors” and not entitled to receive any money from the Plaintiff who was described as a “borrower.” In simple accounting terms there was no debit and so there could be no “corresponding” credit. And in fact, the originator never did receive any money for purchasing the loan nor any payments that were credited to a loan receivable account in its accounting records. Yet the originator executed or allowed instruments to be executed in which the completely fraudulent assertion that the originator had sold the loan was memorialized.
  • The “closing” was completely improper in which Plaintiff was fraudulently induced to execute a promissory note as maker and fraudulently induced to execute a mortgage as collateral for the performance under the note. Plaintiff was unaware that she had just created a second liability because the debt could not be legally merged into an instrument that named a party who was not the lender, not a creditor, and not a proper payee for a note memorializing a loan of money from the “lender” to the Plaintiff.
  • The purpose of the merger rule is to prevent a borrower from creating two liabilities for one transaction. The debt is merged into the note upon execution such that no claim can be made on the debt. None of these fine points of law were known to Plaintiff until recently. The reason she did not know is that the originator and the rest of the parties making claims based upon the fraudulent “loan” memorialized in the note all conspired to withhold information that was required to be disclosed to “borrowers” under Federal and State Law.
  • In the case at bar, the debt arises from the fact that Plaintiff did in fact receive money or the benefit of payments on her behalf — from third parties who have no contractual, constructive or other relationship with the source of funds for the transaction. The note is based upon a transaction that never existed — a loan from the originator to the Plaintiff. The debt is based upon the receipt of money from a party who was clearly not intending to make a gift to Plaintiff. The debt and the note are two different liabilities.
  • Assuming the original note exists, Plaintiff is entitled to its its cancellation and return, along with release and satisfaction of the mortgage that collateralizes the obligation set forth on the sham promissory note.
  • In the interim, as this case clearly shows, the Plaintiff is at risk of a second liability even if she prevails in her claim that the note was a sham, to wit: Under UCC Article 3, if an innocent third party actually purchases the mortgage or deed of trust, the statute shifts the risk of loss onto the maker of the instrument regardless of how serious and egregious the practices of the originator and the background “players” who engineered this scheme.
  • Further the financial identity and reputation of the Plaintiff was fraudulently used without her knowledge and consent to conduct “trades” based upon her execution of the above referenced false instruments in which many undisclosed players were reaping what they called “trading profits” arising from the “closing” and the illegal and unwanted misuse of her signatures on instruments in which she was induced to sign by fraudulent misrepresentations as to the nature and content of the documents.
  • Plaintiff suffered damages in that her title was slandered and emotional distress damages and damage to her financial identity and reputation. Further damages arising from violation of her right to quiet enjoyment of the property was violated by this insidious scheme.

The Neil Garfield Show LIVE at 6 PM Eastern with CA Attorney Charles Marshall: Window into the Life-Cycle of a Lawsuit

The JPMorgan Paper Chase Live at 6 pm

Thursdays LIVE! Click in to the The Neil Garfield Show

Or call in at (347) 850-1260, 6pm Eastern Thursdays

This episode discusses strategic planning of a lawsuit campaign, which is somewhat similar whether on the Plaintiff or Defendant side with strategic litigation planning, to encompass following elements:

– pre-foreclosure negotiation and settlement demands;

– filing of lawsuit;

– demurrers/mtd;

– discovery;

– motions for summary judgment;

– pre-trial prep and motions;

– trial;

– appeals;

– post appeal judgment options


California-licensed attorney Charles T. Marshall (CA Bar # 176091) earned his Juris Doctorate in 1992 from the University of San Diego School of Law. His practice includes Foreclosure Relief, Civil Litigation, Bankruptcy, Immigration, Estate Planning and all facets of Personal Financial Management.

Charles Marshall can be contacted at:

Charles Marshall, Esq.
Law Offices of Charles T. Marshall
415 Laurel St., #405
San Diego, CA 92101

Livinglies Review and Report

People keep asking about what is in the Review and Report I do. I don’t promote it very much because of the amount of work it entails. The goal is to provide the attorney or client with a good starting point for developing the internal and external narrative of the case. Without having such a narrative it is impossible to have a coherent plan for discovery, motions and trial. It is hard to say what will be in any individual report because they are not templates and they all start from scratch. I review every single document that is submitted and I frequently ask for more. I don’t farm out the work because when I notice something that could be useful I go down that path in my research.

But for the sake of example, you will find below the table of contents from my latest R&R. I think it is a good start on the trial notebook. The length of the report, as you can see is around 20 pages, more or less. The price varies from $2500-$7500 depending upon complexity. Most pro se litigants will only have a vague idea of how to use this “book” on their case. Most trial attorneys will instantly see its value for them.

If you want such a review and report, you can call our main number at 202-838-6345. It is a good idea to book a consult before you order the R&R. 30 minutes should suffice. This R&R frequently serves as the basis for my expert testimony on securitization of debt, banking practices and real property transactions. In order to quote you a price for your case, it is like a moving company — I must do an inventory of all your document submissions and calculate the amount of time it will take to review, analyze, make notes and render a report.  To do that you must upload all your documents to our FTP site. The better you are at labeling each document before uploading it the easier it will be to assess the work required.

Forgive the formatting errors when I pasted the TOC from an actual report:


PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW……………………………..4 – 5

Discovery and Litigation Guidance……………………4



SUMMARIES – CASE SPECIFIC……………………………………………………5 – 8


Credit Bid…………………………………………………..5

Discussion And Conclusions…………………………….5 – 9


Default………………………………………………………9 – 10

III. DOCUMENTS – ANALYTICAL SUMMARIES……………………………………………….10 – 21

Substitution Of Trustee………………………………………………………10

Neutrality Of Trustee……………………………………..10

Servicer Advances………………………………………….10 – 11

Default, Collection And Enforcement…………………………………………………11

Substitute Trustee…………………………………………..11

Fannie Mae…………………………………………………..12

The Second Notice Of Hearing……………………………………………………….12

True Beneficiary Under Deed of Trust…………………………………………………………..12

Invalid Power Of Attorney…………………………………12 – 13

False Affidavit Of Default                                                                              dated xxxxxxxxx…………………………………………..13 – 14

Promissory Note                                                                                               Dated xxxxxxxxx ……………………………………..15 – 16

The Allonge…………………………………………………..16 – 17

Deed Of Trust                                                                                                       Filed xxxxxxxxxxxxx………………………………………17

Notice Of Sale                                                                                                     dated xxxxxxxxxxxxx………………………………………17 – 18

Seterus Letter And Attachment                                                              dated xxxxxxxxxxx Unsigned…………………………………………………….18

Corporate Assignment From Indymac To Fannie Mae…………………………………………………………..18 – 19

Corporate Assignment From Onewest(?) To Fannie Mae……………………………………………………………19

Assignment From Onewest To Ocwen Servicing…………………………………………………….19 – 20

Assignment From Ocwen To Fannie Mae……………………………………………………………20

Motion To Dismiss Filed By Ocwen………………………………………………………..20

Deposition Transcript……………………………………………………21

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