For assistance with presenting a case for wrongful foreclosure, please call 520-405-1688, customer service, who will put you in touch with an attorney in the states of Florida, Tennessee, Georgia, California, Ohio, and Nevada. (NOTE: Chapter 11 may be easier than you think).
Editor’s Note: We are still following a national policy of allowing the mega banks to self-police, regardless of appearances. The intentional effort to suppress findings of harm, and the amount of harm to borrowers was systemic during the review process.
A real review would be team of people who would audit the transactions and assignments from one end to the other. The argument that the borrower might get a windfall if the foreclosures were not seen as inevitable regardless of the fatal defects in origination, assignment and foreclosure would be disregarded for what it is — trash. If we allow BofA to get away with this, then we should let Madoff, Dreier and Stanford out of jail.
It is only the scale of the fraud that separates the fake securitization of loans covering up a PONZI scheme that separates Wall Street titans from people who are languishing in jail. The increase in the number of such fraudulent schemes, mostly PONZI by their very nature, testifies to the effect on our society where bullying your way out of anything goes society becomes the norm.
As we described in earlier posts in this series (Executive Summary, Part II, Part IIIA and Part IIIB), OCC/Federal Reserve foreclosure reviews meant to provide compensation to abused homeowners were abruptly shut down at the beginning of January as the result of a settlement with ten major servicers. Whistleblowers from the biggest, Bank of America, provide compelling evidence that the bank and its independent consultant, Promontory Financial Group, went to considerable lengths to suppress any findings of borrower harm.
These whistleblowers, who reviewed over 1600 files and tested hundreds more in the attenuated start up period, saw abundant evidence of serious damage to borrowers. Their estimates vary because they performed different tests and thus focused on different records and issues. When asked to estimate the percentage of harm and serious harm they found, the lowest estimate of harm was 30% and the majority estimated harm at or over 90%. Their estimates of serious harm ranged from 10% to 80%.
We found four basic problems:
The reviews showed that Bank of America engaged in certain types of abuses systematically
The review process itself lacked integrity due to Promontory delegating most of its work to Bank of America, and that work in turn depended on records that were often incomplete and unreliable. Chaotic implementation of the project itself only made a bad situation worse
Bank of America strove to suppress and minimize evidence of damage to borrowers
Promontory had multiple conflicts of interest and little to no relevant expertise
We discuss the third major finding below.
Concerted Efforts to Suppress Findings of Harm
Both Bank of America and Promontory suppressed and ignored both broad categories and specific examples of borrower harm. We’ll discuss how this occurred from two vantages. The first was organizational: that the reviews were structured and managed so as to make it hard for particular cases of borrower harm to get through the gauntlet. The second was substantive: that the bank and Promontory excluded some types of harm entirely and insisted other aspects of the review be focused as narrowly as possible, which served to minimize and exclude evidence of borrower abuses.