Statute of LImitations Running on Bank Officers Who Perpetrated Mortage Crisis

For more information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

==============================

see http://www.courant.com/opinion/letters/hc-go-after-mortgage-fraud-perps-20150427-story.html

It appears that the statute of limitations might be running out this year on any claim against the officers of the banks that created the fraudulent securitization process. Eric Holder, outgoing Attorney general, made an unusual comment a few months back where he said that private suits should be brought against such officers. The obvious question is why didn’t he bring further action against these individuals and the only possible answer I can think of is that it was because of an agreement not to prosecute while these officers and their banks “cooperated” in resolving the mortgage crisis and the downturn of the US economy.

People keep asking me what the essential elements of the fraud were and how homeowners can use it. That question involves a degree of complexity that is not easily addressed here but I will try to do so in a few articles.

The first point of reference is that the investment banks sold mortgage backed securities to investors under numerous false premises. The broker dealers sold shares or interests in REMIC Trusts that existed only on paper and were registered nowhere. This opened up the possibility for the unthinkable: an IPO (initial public offering) of securities of an “entity” that would not complain if they never received the proceeds of the sale. And in fact, as I have been advised by accountants and other people who were privy to the inner workings of the Securitization fail (See Adam Levitin) the money from the offering was never turned over to the Trustee of the “Trust” which only existed on paper by virtue of words written by the broker dealers themselves. They created a non existent entity that had no business and sold securities issued by that entity without turning over the proceeds of sale to the entity whose securities had been sold. It was the perfect plan.

Normally if a broker dealer sold securities in an IPO the management and shareholders would have been screaming “fraud” as soon as they learned their “company” was not receiving the proceeds of sale. Here in the case of REMIC Trusts, there was no management because the Trustee had no duties and was prohibited from pretending that it did have any duties. And here in the case of REMIC Trusts, there were no shareholders to complain because they were contractually bound (they thought) to not interfere with or even ask questions about the workings of the Trust. And of course when Clinton signed the law back in 1998 these securities were deregulated and redefined as private contracts and NOT securities, so the SEC couldn’t get involved either.

It was the perfect hoax. brokers and dealers got to sell these “non-securities” and keep the proceeds themselves and even register ownership of interests in the Trust in the name of the same broker dealer who sold it to pension funds and other investors. Back in 2007-2008 the banks were claiming that there were no trusts involved because they knew that was true. But then they got more brazen, especially when they realized that this was an admission of fraud and theft from investors.

Now we have hundreds of thousands of foreclosures in which a REMIC Trust is named as the foreclosing party when it never operated even for a second. It never had any money, it never received any income and it never had any expenses. So it stands to reason that none of the loans claimed to be owned by the Trusts could ever have been purchased by entities that had no assets, no money, no management, and no operations. We have made a big deal about the cutoff date for entry of a particular loan into the loan pool owned by the trust. But the real facts are that there was no loan pool except on paper in self-serving fabricated documents created by the broker dealers.

Investors thought they were giving money to fund a Trust. The Trust was never funded. So the money from investors was used in any way the broker dealer wanted. The investors thought they were getting an ownership interest in a valid note and mortgage. They never got that because their “Trust” did not acquire the loans. But their money was used, in part, to fund loans that were put on a fast track automated underwriting platform so nobody in the position of underwriter could be disciplined or jailed for writing loans that were too rigged to succeed. Then the broker dealers, knowing that the mortgage bonds were worthless bet that the value of the bonds would decrease, which of course was a foregone conclusion. And the bonds and the underlying loans were insured in the name of the broker dealer so the investors are left standing out in the wind with nothing to show for their investment — an interest in a worthless unfunded trust, and no direct claim for the repayment of loans that were funded with their money.

The reason why the foreclosing parties need a foreclosure sale is to create the appearance that the original loan was a valid loan contract (it wasn’t because no consideration actually flowed from the “lender” to the “borrower” and because the loan was table funded, which as a pattern is described in Reg Z as “predatory per se”). By getting foreclosures in the name of the Trust they have a Judge’s stamp of approval that the Trust was either the lender or the successor to the lender and that makes it difficult for anyone to say otherwise. And THAT is why TILA was passed with the rescission option.

So through a series of conduits and sham entities, the Wall Street investment banks lied to the investors and lied to the borrowers about who was in the deal and who was making money off the deal and how much. They lied to the investors, lied to the public, lied to regulatory agencies and lied to borrowers about the quality of the loan products they were selling which could not succeed and in which the broker dealers had a direct interest in making sure that the loans did not succeed. That was the whole reason why the Truth In Lending Act and Reg Z came into existence back in the 1960’s. Holder’s comments are a clue to what private lawyers should do and how much money there is in these cases against the leaders of the those investment banks. Both borrowers and lawyers should be taking a close look at how they get even for the fraud perpetrated upon the American consumer and the American taxpayer.

It is obvious that someone had to be making a lot of money in order to spend hundreds of millions of dollars advertising and promoting 2% loans. There is no profit there unless someone is stealing the money and tricking borrowers into signing loan papers that instantly clouded their title and created two potential liabilities — one to the payee on the note who never had any economic interest in the deal and one to the investors whose money was used to fund the loan. Most investors still don’t realize what happened to their money and many are still getting payments as though the Trust was real — but they are not getting payments or reports from the REMIC Trust.

And most borrowers don’t realize that their identity was stolen, that their loan was cloned, and that each version of their loan that was sold netted another 100% profit to the investment banks, who also sold the bonds to the Federal Reserve after they had already sold the same bonds to investors. Thus the investment banks screwed the investors, screwed the borrowers and screwed the taxpayers while their plan resulted in a cataclysmic failure of the economies around the world. Investors mostly don’t realize that they are never going to see the money they were promised and that the banks are keeping the investors’ money as if it belonged to the bank. Most investors also don’t realize that the investment banks were their servant and that all that money the bank made really belongs to the investor, thus zeroing out the liability of the borrower but creating an enormous profit to the investors. Most borrowers don’t realize that they certainly don’t owe money to any of the foreclosing parties, but that they might have some remote liability to the clueless investors whose money was used to fund this circus.

47 Responses

  1. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR THE CRIMINAL BANKSTERS> BUT NO STATUTE OF LIMITATION FOR YOUR THE SHEEPLES MORTGAGE. LOL

  2. Does anyone have Wells Fargo In House Attorney’s or Legal Department contact information?

  3. This is so upsetting when I read stuff here that took me years to learn the law properly because I was an honest person with Preponderance of Evidence but the truth & proof did not set us free. We were guilty until proven innocent but by that time the Judge was so corrupt and made an UNETHICAL JUDGMENT. Our case will blow your mind! Never in arrears paid off our home in under 15 years after it also being paid by Freddie Mac, INs, BK etc???????????? Our home of almost 25 years was paid off in full atleast 5x

  4. Reblogged this on Deadly Clear.

  5. Converting to Shares’… as in IPOs?

  6. neidermeyer, you said: “I have nothing against securitization as practiced in the past… you convert it ONE TIME to shares and sell the shares to regenerate your working capital , make a profit and pay the other players fees… That is honest and easily understood, that is why the GSE’s were created… and selling a MBS/trust to a GSE on it’s face should be a tipoff that something’s is really wrong… in an honest transaction it’s an unnecessary cost.”

    I’d sure appreciate some help with this. FNMA and FHLMC were created to recapitalize lenders. Lenders could originate/make loans and as long as the loans were approved pursuant to their guidelines, one or the other would purchase them. The lenders made some fees, served their communities, got back their working capital, and everyone was happy.
    Even if they wanted a risk-share platform, why derivatives? You said “you convert it one time to shares”. I take it you mean the loans were converted one time to shares. Why? Why was the conversion necessary at all? One doesn’t convert widgets to anything to sell shares in the business. And if the loans were ‘converted’, what does that actually mean as to the loans?
    Then you say that’s why the gse’s were created, which has got me really stumped, since they were created to buy paper for lender’s recapitalization having naught to do with securitization (that i know of).
    Given my understanding that fnma and fhlmc basically had unlimited access to funds to do so, I can’t imagine why they would have needed to sell loans they purchased unless they sought to do something outside the reason for their creation, i.e., the recapitalization of real property lenders. F & F set the prices they would pay and the lenders priced their loans accordingly (including the cost of the lenders short-term money to make the loans).

    “…and selling a MBS/trust to a GSE on it’s face should be a tipoff that something’s is really wrong… in an honest transaction it’s an unnecessary cost.”

    Now that’s got me confused again. What do you mean by selling a trust to a gse? F & F created their own, did they not? FNMA was assuredly the one who put out the prospectus, the one which guaranteed payment. They didn’t create it, underwrite it, issue the shares ????

    What’s troubling me is f & f’s involvement with securitization in the first place. They can only have been trying to make more money by way of something not in the act when they were created. If they say they were taking it in the shorts on defaults, first of all, it’s much more likely than not it’s because they weren’t doing their job, succinctly, i.e., they were buying paper which didn’t meet their guidelines. (They were “A paper” lenders who moved into (“A minus paper” sometimes aka “Alt A paper”) Secondly, if that’s the reason, how swell of them to try to foist that paper on others. And how absurd for yet others to insure that paper, esp if it’s not for the benefit of the guy at risk. (The one who got left out of this scheme was the one who would really suffer for getting a loan no one should’ve made him, but obviously he was the sap needed to create it all). Loans over 80% ltv required private mtg insurance which the borrower paid for, as it should be. Those loans required add’l underwriting by the pmi provider (not less underwriting). That’s all the risk-share they needed. It wasn’t broken. It’s simply greed which trashed it and all the rest (including the greed of fnma’s officers who wanted bigger production bonuses. People lost homes for that eyes wide shut as to underwriting to get those bonuses.) We can’t always get what we want and obviously a temporary boom in construction, etc. falsely instigated has a price, and as we now know, this one is unprecedented. (Carter, as you’ll recall, was maligned something awful when he tried to put the breaks on.)

  7. “So they can’t possibly be the owner/holder of the notes when default occurred in 2012. Note that if the trust takes assignment of the note and mortgage in 2013, they can’t really say that they paid for all this back in 2007. If the trust paid for all the note back in 2007, why is the original lender assigning them the note and mortgage in 2012?”

    “mers” is the answer re the collateral instrument acc to courts nd lately me because i now believe mers is thee ben assigning the coll instrument in its own right. But not the note. The trust could be taking the note currently to replace a security interest (an admission that’s all they had imo – goodbye remic status) created by payment but non-delivery, but at any rate, not from ‘mers’. Oh, cripes. UNless ‘mers’ has been given so and so’s power of attorney. But who the hey would that be? And if under a poa, this must be disclosed. all it says, as you know, is “as nominee for orig lender”. What a cluster-you-know.

  8. Bob g: “Do you really think that Deutsche Bank took a couple thousand PSAs down to its local Wells Fargo branch office and opened up 2,000 separate trust accounts? And who were the signatories, and where are the applications that they would have had to fill out to open the accounts? There aren’t any .”

    holy cow. yes, of course most of us would think they opened 2000 accts – if we ever thought about it at all, that is. I’ve been cowing because the assignments are made to the alleged trustee, not to the trusts. Whaddup with that?
    Are you saying, then, that different ‘trust” monies (p & i and any funds from f/c sales etc). are being commingled?! I can’t say any more than that this doesn’t sound right.
    How and what do these trustees get paid? They don’t because they’re all banks and get some float, just like the servicers I suspect?

  9. Why, Bob? why not play it straight? Please tell those of us who don’t get it why they did what they did. Was it that this allowed them to earn interest without paying any themselves? I can see that would be a whole lot of money, gazillions. Do you think they planned to play it straight with sec’n but the allure was too great? IS legit secn actually possible or is it all just smoke and mirrors when what secn may actually lead to is loans which have become dead-ended and unenforceable? My take on mers is pretty clear – they’re a mob syndicate. But I think they’re in this other stuff up to their eyeballs, also. They’re still allowing their name to be used to execute assignments, for instance. I don’t see how they could’ve done it without mers.
    But what i really don’t get is if secn is such a bum deal for investors (as it appears), why is it still going on? I mean, a lot of people imo don’t know any better than to sign a mers mortgage, but how is it that pension fund managers, say, would still invest in remics if they’re nothing but turkeys?

  10. Neil is missing a couple pieces to the puzzle. If he would return calls, he would learn what they are. Simply put, no institutional investor money was ever wired to any MBS trust. The money was wired to the deal’s underwriters, who took their cut and then remitted the net proceeds not to the trusts, but to the warehouse lenders hiding behind the curtain. The certificates were issued in book entry form. The trusts never even had bank accounts from which they could purchase loans even if they wanted to. The trusts are financial holograms and legal fictions. I know this for a fact, because I worked for one of the largest public pension funds in the U.S. The only time we didn’t wire money to an underwriter or broker was: (1) when we funded a real estate deal (wired $ to the title company); (2) purchased a private equity or venture capital limited partnership interest; or (3) wired $ to a fixed income or equity fund manager. Everyone else the money was wired to the broker or underwriter, who took its cut and then remitted to an issuer, such as GE or IBM. But not the REMIC trusts.

    Whereas GE or IBM has one principal treasurers checking account, the REMIC trustees would have had to have thousands. Do you really think that Deutsche Bank took a couple thousand PSAs down to its local Wells Fargo branch office and opened up 2,000 separate trust accounts? And who were the signatories, and where are the applications that they would have had to fill out to open the accounts? There aren’t any. The monthly investor reports never show any money coming into the trust from inception to present, other than P&I and foreclosure sale money. You can’t find any available funds in those reports which would would have enabled the trusts to purchase anything.

    And the master purchase and loan docs never show the purported original lender as the ultimate depositor to whom the trust was supposed to have purchased the loans from at start up. So the original lenders were already taken out on paper at the inception of the deal. So they can’t possibly be the owner/holder of the notes when default occurred in 2012. Note that if the trust takes assignment of the note and mortgage in 2013, they can’t really say that they paid for all this back in 2007. If the trust paid for all the note back in 2007, why is the original lender assigning them the note and mortgage in 2012?

    One final thing…virtually all the certificates were registered. But because it turned out that each deal had less than 300 investors, the registrations were soon terminated so as to avoid continuing SEC reporting requirements. If you go on Fidelity’s brokerage website, you can type in a REMIC CUSIP number and see if the tranche is still trading. Buy a couple certificates, and you should have standing to challenge the assignments because investors were intended PSA beneficiaries.

  11. Who was the Original Creditor?

  12. PPM..Private Placement Memorandums not filed with SEC

  13. Jonh gault-
    I remember watching the dog and pony show on the FCIC (financial crisis inquiry commission) on CSPAN2 in front of our duly elected representatives. Someone from either Moody’s or Standard & Poors was being questioned about their ratings of toxic mortgage pools. This guy says “we didn’t rate them all, we only rated 43,500 of them”. Now I don’t know if they were registered or not, but on the IRS website if you look up REMICS there aren’t even 2000 currently listed. And you can enter a differed year and the results are about the same.

  14. Shadowcat ,

    “Infinite rehypothication because of irrevocability ?”
    ********************************
    To my thinking that’s part of it, it keeps the actual investors (in GS parlance “muppets”) in the dark so they can be ripped off,,, but you start with the underwriters getting their tranches gratis after they sell off the rest ,, that’s already multiplying their initial investment, then that is the basis for other loans and creation or extension of credit for another deal (not investor money since that is collected AFTER the sale of shares) .. and so on.. then you add in the layered insurance products which NEVER benefit the owners (investors) and the interlocking agreements with counterparties which are playing the same games… I have nothing against securitization as practiced in the past… you convert it ONE TIME to shares and sell the shares to regenerate your working capital , make a profit and pay the other players fees… That is honest and easily understood, that is why the GSE’s were created… and selling a MBS/trust to a GSE on it’s face should be a tipoff that something’s is really wrong… in an honest transaction it’s an unnecessary cost.

    Honestly with the entire “financial product” being scam based (trust not actually created , tax status invalid , false ratings , bogus underwriting to get taxpayer support from FNM FRE , failure to distribute insurance proceeds to investors etc. etc.) it’s hard to say where it ends… and that complexity is the hallmark of a criminal enterprises attempt to avoid prosecution by faking legitimacy and adding complexity to make it all but impossible for a jury to understand.

  15. Shadowcat you miss the point, my case is not yours
    The SERVICER issued a 1099a as LENDER for the love they are not the lender they collect mortgage payments and they are supposed to forward to go into a trust/slush fund and so forth, they SERVICE a loan for the true CREDITOR the point is are we not to ever know the party who actually lost money and was actually harmed to the tune of the face of the note ( minus the real market VALUE and what they got for selling my home by seizing it under power of sale – these are mY beefs lovey) – because that is what they are telling the IRS
    I may live in a ” non deficiency State” but it does not change the aforesaid, my name is on tbe 1099a and im dusputing who issued it because- it matters.

  16. Well, Neil, thanks for responding. I will say it never occurred to me that if and because these deals could be unregistered, they could just make them up. I couldn’t possibly know if they did, but if they did, I also couldn’t be surprised. Surprise at degeneracy has left the building for many of us. You always say the emperor has no clothes, i.e., the investors funds were spent by using the funds to fund loans (I think that’s one of your positions). If that’s true, the trust couldn’t purchase anything, having no moolah to do so. But I’m troubled and have been by some aspects of the consequence. I’m a former lender – years worth. Got out before “mers”. Wouldn’t get back in even if I otherwise wanted to because I could never in good conscience have anyone sign a “mers” anything.
    But what I have trouble with is a statement that all table-funding (which stmt I’m not prescribing to you) is dog doobage or tainted. We made hundreds of loans whereby it might be determined (after some serious debate) we utilized the funds of others but we were shown as the lender. We sold money. We ‘bought it’ and we sold it. At the moment of the borrower’s signature and the funding of the loan, the people from whom we bought the money had a security interest in the note, but we were yet the lender. They had a security interest because in exchange for selling us the money at price X, we had committed the loan to them. We could have returned the money in lieu of the loan, but it would have been at a diff (higher) price than we paid for it. We had contracts with what I’ve called “bigger guys” and I’ve opined it’s a mistake to ignore those contracts because imo they legitimize the transaction.
    What concerns me is a theory that the loan is piffle in the scenario where the investors funds were used because with little guys (not so much whales who would’ve known whose money it was), those guys
    had contracts and made the loans in good faith (those who did and also didn’t engage in the unprecedented predatory lending from 2000- 2007). To the extent that was true, there was an enforceable contract made. Consequently, to the extent these notes are regulated by article III (and disregarding the express language in them re: enforcement) and hdc could thus apply, one may become a hdc (though still got me how when these contracts as a whole (note + dot / mtg) are subject to defenses created by common law and tila, defenses not prescribed by the UCC III in its recitation of the limited defenses available against a hdc).
    To become a hdc, one must take the note without notice, succinctly, and even if abc’s note were funded with investors’ funds, subsequent note buyers wouldn’t necessarily ‘have notice’. How do you reconcile that? If we’re to defeat this bs, we have to be looking for the right answers with the right questions.
    One obvious argument is that if the investors funds (not trust funds – the actual investor dollars to the closing table) were used to fund loans, no matter who subsequently purchased (for me assuming arguendo) before the trusts, the trusts wouldn’t have any money to purchase the loans. This is obviously a very messed situation if investor funds were used to fund loans. What would the law say: the investors’ funds were used to fund loans at closing, someone may have purchased the notes in good faith, for value, and without notice. Stop. So in the best possible scenario*, we’re at, say, “C” ( the “C” in A to D) owns the note as a hdc (but only to the extent of actual payment or an irrevocable promise to pay). The ‘trust’ can’t buy it because the trust has no money to do so: 1) Where would the law find everyone? 2) Where would the law find everyone after a ‘mers’ assignment to the trust?

    *If your theories are factual, “C” probably knows full well whose money funded the loans, whether or not the originator knew. In your theory, has anyone paid for the loans on their way to a mers’ assgt to the trusts? No one talks about this. Got me why. I figure they might’ve made some book entries, and possible on mers’ computer system, if not that the entry into mers’ was itself the totality of a note ‘transfer’. Or they traded them electronically. But if they did trade electronically or in any scenario, did any money ever change hands? And how does the answer to this impact questions 1 and 2 above?

  17. Infinite rehypothication because of irrevocability ?

  18. Because the Trustee is claiming secured interest via advances for taxes ?

  19. Neil Garfield – t
    You may remember a N
    Mr Philip Liu, NYC controller or similar, announced a lawsuit in 2008 regarding the 448 billion in MBS held by NYC pension funds which had lost most if not all of their value.
    Fast forward to 2010 or 2011, the MBS have been 100% replaced with…….T-Bills, without a word on mainstream media. And a number of other cities were given the same treatment.

  20. I know we are back to rescission today but what about the irs and their public duty, the credit reporting and the missing 1099c and the fact that a ” trustee” is claiming a ” secured” interest in court

  21. Greetings Neil.
    I do agree with what you said here in this article. You and I both know they didn’t prosecute because the Truth would be exposed causing an immediate economic collapse.

    p.s. …. I prefer red wine myself.

    Many Blessings to All

  22. Why do you guys and gals think the tide is turning. The investors finally realized that the only ones making money are the banksters on fees.

    The banksters pissed off the wrong investors.

    NEVER AGAIN

    The above is my opinion in layman’s terms

  23. Rock cyberbullying is a serious crime.
    Caveat
    NEVER AGAIN

  24. I agree with most of what you said — except the part about me of course.🙂

  25. John Gault: The reason is the same way they they were sold the securities — lies. When they bought they thought that they were buying shares of a REMIC Trust that was funded with their money and the money of other investors. It never happened and so their “shares” are worthless. Hence their “protection” never existed. They never had any legal interest in the note or mortgage, directly or indirectly. Several investors have been paid off totaling in the hundreds of billions of dollars but most are content to “comply” with the contractual provisions and fear that they will upset their tax status of they make inquiry. They are content because they are getting payments. And they are fearful because the management company or fund manager is at risk for not peaking under the hood and relying on the ratings agencies to do the work that the fund manager is supposed to do.

  26. Rock,
    ” The nitwit doesn’t even know how to draw up a proper affidavit, but brainless homeowners who drink his Kool-Aid believe his lies and lose their homes.

    Educated people who understand our money system, know they have been securitizing notes in this country since the 1700’s. ”

    *******************

    So now you’re here to intimidate by stating that you’re here to collect info for a suit… Wouldn’t that be better kept under your hat?

    And you again chime in with the partially true analogy (above) ,, securitization has been around for a long time YES , but it’s the infinite rehypothication of colatteral and the fraud involved in that process (inability to tender/unwind and loss of control over supposedly secured assetts) that is the problem..

    But as a securitization shill you’d never see that..

  27. Okay, Neil. The real crapinzki was from 2000 to 2007. Perhaps you can explain, then, how investors mostly don’t realize at this date that they’re not going to see the money:

    “Investors mostly don’t realize that they are never going to see the money they were promised and that the banks are keeping the investors’ money as if it belonged to the bank.”

    Despite the form of my querry, I’d like an explanation if you have one please.

  28. Didn’t i read that fnma put something like 6 million in merscorp/ mers?
    If so, under what authority did fnma invest or just plain fund private enterprise? i guess it doesn’t really matter since the dye is cast, but it’s sure puzzling. But I guess it still does matter in that it’s one more reason this whole thing is a crock.
    MERS HAS TO GO

  29. NG: “They lied to the investors, lied to the public, lied to regulatory agencies and lied to borrowers about the quality of the loan products they were selling which could not succeed and in which the broker dealers had a direct interest in making sure that the loans did not succeed.

    ** That was the whole reason why the Truth In Lending Act and Reg Z came into existence back in the 1960’s”. **

    Neil, what are you smoking? I thought you were writing a factual piece until I got to this. I agree and then some they did all that, but it is NOT
    the ‘whole reason” for tila and reg z in the 60’s. Predatory lending to some degree has been around for awhile, but what’s going on now and being sanctioned is something else altogether. Because I prefer to believe that not all politicians and their cronies are criminals, I have to believe the law has been usurped and taken hostage for a ransom we can’t pay. We can’t pay it, or won’t, so we’ve become someone else, lost our identity, as a country – a lawless country or at least one where law is selectively enforced like never before. I’ll tell you what’s piffle: short of becoming an expert on the UCC, substantive law, securitization, procedure, rules of evidence (not just an attorney, but an “A” list attorney), until there is a rebuttal for poss of a bearer note and a ‘mers’ assignment, sorry to be so crude, but here you have it: bend over. Otherwise you can be like christine and garner some pittance for misapplication of payments which has exactly zero to do with the battles most homeowners must wage: no rpii, no bearer note, no mers assgt, no rigged index, no tila issue (well, except trying to sue the servicer, wasn’t it?!) But one has little if any defense (cept what are mostly flukes by way of tila or some state law against bs lending) against pretenders otherwise. The norm is we’re losing our homes to people who demonstrate no interest but are allowed to rely on (alleged) poss of notes and the ‘mers’ assignments. There is NO one in this act who may not purport to have a note or a mers assgt. They’re all members of the same club.
    We’re losing homes to people who are more likely than not the ones getting a free home or at least getting 10 unearned pounds of flesh out of the deal at someone else’s expense. And people are losing their homes because the guy who was to see to it that they didn’t bite off more than they can chew didn’t. With loans tied to a rigged index yet.
    No wonder it’s stinking said that truth is stranger than fiction.

  30. sworn and unsworn reminds me of neither affirm nor deny.

  31. Can’t really punish people if there aren’t enough criminal complaints to support it..

    Initially people fighting these ‘astards, filed so many AG complaints in each state, that we at a minimum received a 50 state investigation, but after a while, the complaints stopped making it appear that the banks have cleaned up their “act”.

    These rulings that are not according to law.
    And it’s RICO and extortion but if no one claims any harm, they say we agree to their solution/their decision, as if there is no harm no foul.

    In their world, silence is acquiescence (acceptance where there is a duty to speak but no word is spoken).

    Trespass Unwanted, Creator, Corporeal, Life, Free, Independent, State, In Jure Proprio, Jure Divino

  32. Read Matt Tiabbi re pig in a poke that turned out to be a cat in the bag and then remember Neil with his stick analogy – you cant pick up one end of it without picking up the other – not that im sugguesting you plead that, baby steps, at least thats my approach ive been babying along for six years and counting and the bastards will not get me down that i can tell you.

  33. You cant get away from the fact that they jacked up the market price of real property, pumped and dumped and the hell with the fall out. I still find it hard to believe that people made a living out of destroying lives, and for the foreseeable future.

  34. Unfortunately, this analysis by Mr. Garfield is accurate. Theft on a grad scale; unpunished by the Justice Department. A national scandal.

  35. Rock, why are you here if your allegations are true about Mr Garfield ? He could sue you for making such false allegations about him. By the way, I and I hope many are grateful for the information shared here which has kept us in the fight for years now. Thank you, Neil.

  36. Christine, do you really believe thousands of homeowners paid NG money?

  37. Rock, one thing that NG states is entirely accurate. The certificateholders funds were never tendered to any Trust. That is a fact.

    And Neil… the investment bankers were entitled to use the monies as they saw fit.

    See “Use of Proceeds” and the term general corporate purposes.

  38. I wonder how much the Espelands paid Garfield for such a wonderful result. Multiplied by the thousands he’s fleeced that way with completely inadmissible reports and the guy is making a killing screwing homeowners.

    Homeowners who allow it deserve what they get.

  39. Ms. Williams, here just building a case against those harming homeowners.

  40. Rock – you are way too worried and concerned about what Neil is opining on here. WTF are you even on this site then? Move on.

  41. NEIL GARFIELD IS THE MAN.

    NEVER AGAIN

  42. Ms. Wynn, if you’re fine with Garfield’s lies that’s your prerogative, but its also my prerogative to warn homeowners, and expose him as a scammer.

  43. Rock
    I just simply do not get your pre occupation with what mr Garfeild does
    Move on

  44. Neil Garfield Rules.

    NEVER AGAIN

  45. My recollection is that someone has sued some of the bank executives last year, but maybe not.

  46. Again, more total nonsense. Just more lies, and/or incompetence from someone who holds himself out as an expert, but even judges dump on his incompetence:

    “Garfield professed to be an expert on the mortgage crisis and lending law, and his declaration discussed alleged defects in the chain of title for the Espelands’ loan documents. The court declined to consider the declaration, in part because it found the declaration both sworn and unsworn.” Espeland v. OneWest Bank, FSB (Alaska, 2014).

    Note 23 from decision: “The declaration was originally submitted to the court unnotarized, and later when it was notarized the first sentence of the notarized version still read, “My name is Neil Franklin Garfield, and this Declaration is made unsworn under the penalty of perjury.”

    The nitwit doesn’t even know how to draw up a proper affidavit, but brainless homeowners who drink his Kool-Aid believe his lies and lose their homes.

    Educated people who understand our money system, know they have been securitizing notes in this country since the 1700’s.

    Moreover, it was HUD, not the banks as Garfield claims, that created the first modern residential mortgage-backed security, so once again Garfield has no clue what he’s talking about.

  47. Consumer Rights Defenders offer that Neil’s analysis is very helpful.

    However, proving some of his positional points can only be accomplished by robust litigation and discovery within each case. You can prove facts without evidence and you cannot get evidence without very aggressive discovery. This is how Ms. Janeece F. adv. BONY Mellon beat Mellon back in Oct 2014 which we blogged about here and on our site at – CRDefenders.com – ….they were caught without evidence of ownership of the note in a deposition of the person most qualified [who was not] to testify about the BONYM Trust.

    If you need assistance with your matter, let our foreclosure litigation experience be a strong lever in bringing out the facts Neil suggests exist.

    Call us today for short or long term help at 818.453.3585. Sara or Steve will take your call and provide a short free consultation for you.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: