Hat Tip to Patrick Giunta, Esq.
Stumbled across this 5 year old article that supports the view that servicers are the real parties in interest who are protecting only their own interests at the expense of investor and borrower alike. The facts are undeniable. If the loans were modified or worked out, the investors would have done much better than the self inflicted crash imposed by banks posing as servicers on loans for trusts that exist only on paper and not in real life.
The fact remains that if the servicers were eliminated and a new venue was created to intermediate between borrowers and investors, the investors, the borrowers and the taxpayers would all be better off. Only the banks would ,lose out on prospective illegal gains that they have been faking for a decade. The government should have provided this venue. The crash would not have occurred and the economy would be far stronger.
Renewed Message to MBS Investors: Try it out. We will help you. The borrowers who read these pages are not looking for a free house at your expense. They only oppose the banks who up till now you have been thinking are presenting your interests. These borrowers will in most cases sign new documentation free from the claims relating to securitization, without foreclosure and without any of the potential liabilities attached to the defective and illegal originations by phantom entities and/or phantom funding. Anyone interested? Call 954-495-9867 and schedule a conference call with me. No charge. No obligation.
Opening the Bag of Mortgage Tricks
Mortgage-Servicing Methods, Exposed in a Court Case
ALL the revelations this year about dubious practices in the mortgage servicing arena — think robo-signers and forged signatures — have rightly raised borrowers’ fears that companies handling their loans may not be operating on the up and up.
But borrowers aren’t the only ones concerned about potential mischief. Investors who hold mortgage securities are increasingly worried that servicers may be putting their interests ahead of those who own the loans.
A servicer might, for example, deny a loan modification to a borrower because it also owns a second mortgage on the same property and doesn’t want to write down that asset, as required in a modification. Levying outsize default fees is another tactic — the fees typically go to the servicer, not the lender, but they can still propel a property into foreclosure more quickly. And foreclosures aren’t a good outcome for investors.
Last week, a jury in federal district court in Reno, Nev., awarded a group of 50 mortgage investors $5.1 million in punitive damages against defendants in a loan servicing case. Although the numbers in the case aren’t large, its facts are fascinating. Indeed, the case exposed some of the tricks of the servicers’ trade.
See NY Times for the full article. It will help you understand the mess created by the banks — for the purpose of covering up their illegal or criminal activity.
Filed under: foreclosure