The current talking points used by the Banks is that somehow the Trust can enforce the alleged loan even though it is the “investors” who own the loan. But that can only be true if the Trust owns the loan which it doesn’t. And naming the “investors” as the creditor does nothing to clarify the situation — especially when the “investors” cannot be identified.
THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
I know of a case pending now where US Bank allegedly sued as Trustee of what appears to be named Trust. In Court the corporate representative of the servicer admitted that the creditor was a group of investors that he declined to name. I knew that meant two things: (1) neither he nor anyone else knew which investor was tied to the subject loan and (2) the “Plaintiff” Trust had never acquired the loan and therefore had no business being in court.
The article in the above link demonstrates that not even the FBI could figure out the identity of the investors. And as we have seen across the country whenever the homeowner asks for discovery of the identity of the creditor it is met with multiple objections and claims that the information about the identity of the debtor’s credit is proprietary. This is an absurd claim and it seeks to have the court rubber stamp a blatant violation of Federal and State lending laws which require the disclosure of the identity of the “lender.”
The only thing the article gets wrong is the statement that the loans were sold into a trust. That is obviously false. If the investors are the creditors, then their money was used to fund the origination or acquisition of the loan — without the Trust. Otherwise the Trust would be the creditor. And if the Trust is not the owner of the loan as specified by the Prospectus and Pooling and Servicing Agreement, then it follows that it has no status at all, which means that neither the Trustee nor the servicer have any authority to manage, service or otherwise enforce the alleged loan. The entire strategy of asserting the Trust is a holder of the note is thus unhinged when it is confronted with reality. The whole “standing” argument revolves around this point — that no loan actually made it into any Trust. Many cases have been won by borrowers on that point without the extra step of saying that the creditor is completely unknown.
So the upshot is that there is no known, presumed or identified creditor. Although that seems implausible and counter-intuitive, it is nonetheless true. That doesn’t mean that theoretically there couldn’t be an unsecured claim from the investors to collect from the homeowner under a theory of unjust enrichment, but it does mean that the investors are neither named on the note and mortgage nor are they the current owners of any paper instruments that purport to be evidence of the “debt” — i.e., the note and mortgage. If they are not the current owners of the “debt” originated at closing nor the owners of the paper instruments signed at the alleged closing, then there is no evidence of any contract or privity between the investors and the Trustee or servicer at all. The PSA was ignored which means the entity of the Trust was ignored. And THAT means lack of standing and lack of any ability to cure it.
Which brings me to one of my earliest articles for this Blog that announced “You Don’t Owe the Money.” Using the step transaction doctrine and single transaction doctrines arising mostly out of tax courts, it was plain as day to me back in 2007 and 2008 that there was no “debt.” And until someone stepped up with an equitable unsecured claim against the homeowner, there wasn’t even a liability. But nobody ever steps up. The banks tell us that is because the whole securitization scheme is to prevent and even prohibit the investors from even making an inquiry into any specific “loans.”
But the real reason is simple and basic — the Trusts were ignored, which means that investor money was deposited with investment banks under false pretenses — the falsehood being that the investors were buying into a specific Trust (which never received any proceeds of sale of the Trust securities) with a specific Mortgage Loan Schedule. The Mortgage Loan Schedule was therefore a complete illusion as an attachment to the Trust because the Trust never had the money to pay for the “pool” of loans. That is why the Mortgage Loan Schedule shows up mainly in litigation in order to confuse the Judge into thinking that somehow it is “facially valid” instead of being the self-serving fabrication of a stranger to the transaction who is engaged in stealing the loans after they already stole the money from investors.
In fact, the “pool” was an ever widening dark dynamic pool of money in which all the money of all investors was commingled with all the other investors of all the alleged Trusts. As I have previously stated the result can be compared to taking an apple, an orange and a banana and setting a food processor on Puree. At the end of that simple process it is impossible for the chef to produce the original apple, orange or banana.
If securitization was real, the banks could have easily done two things that would have completely knocked out any borrower defenses except payment. The first was to show the money chain and the second would be produce the proof that the Trust owned the debt, not the investors. The current talking points used by the Banks is that somehow the Trust can enforce the alleged loan even though it is the “investors” who own the loan. But that can only be true if the Trust owns the loan which it doesn’t. And naming the “investors” as the creditor does nothing to clarify the situation — especially when the “investors” cannot be identified.
As it stands now, the investors continue to allow the banks to act like they are really intermediaries, stealing both the money and the loans that should have been executed in favor of the investors and even allowing claims for collecting “servicer advances” that were not advances (they were return of investor capital) and never came from the servicer. It was and remains a classic PONZI scheme that government is too scared to do anything about and investors are too ignorant of the false securitization (or unwilling to admit human error in failing to do due diligence on the securitization package).