Anyone defending a foreclosure these days should start with the assumption that the entire infrastructure of “loans” and foreclosures consists of lies. This assists in planning objections and cross examination. More importantly it provides the narrative that casts doubt on the trustworthiness of testimony and documentary evidence — which in turn can deprive the the foreclosing party of the essential ingredient to its case: legal presumptions.
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The concept of false in one, false in all is frequently used across the country in jury instructions in regards to witness testimony. See California Civil Jury Instructions (“CACI”) 107. Witnesses; see also Book of Approved Jury Instructions (“BAJI”) 2.22; See Bandana Trading Co., Inc. v. Quality Infusion Care, Inc., 164 Cal. App. 4th 1440, 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 495 (Ct. App. 2008). See also in a criminal case: State v. Ernst, 32 N.J. 567 (1960). More Civil cases: See Lawnton v. Virginia Stevedoring Co., 50 N.J. Super. 564, 581 (App. Div. 1958), Hargrave v. Stockloss, 127 N.J.L. 262, 266 (E.&A. 1941), Coleman v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 120 N.J.L. 384, 387 (Sup. Ct. 1938). For a full discussion of the use and application of the maxim, see, Vol. 3A Wigmore on Evidence (1970) Sec. 1008 et. seq. “It should certainly not be of importance to tell the ordinary man of the world that he should distrust the statements of a witness whom he believes to be a liar.” (Wallace v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co. (1930) 105 Cal.App. 664, 671 [288 P. 834].)
BAJI 2.22: “A witness, who is willfully false in one material part of is or her testimony, is to be distrusted in others. You may reject the whole testimony of a witness who willfully has testified falsely as to a material point, unless, from all the evidence, you believe the probability of truth favors his or her testimony in other particulars.”
When the conduct of [Plaintiff] in this proceeding is viewed in its entirety, it compels the Court to invoke the ancient and venerable principle of “Falsus in uno, falsus in omni” (Latin; “false in one, false in all”) upon [Defendant] which, after review, is wholly appropriate in the context presented, Deering v. Metcalf 74 NY 501 (1878).Here is footnote 35 from In re Telfair, 745 F. Supp. 2d 536 – Dist. Court, D. New Jersey 2010Latin maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” is neither a provision adopted by means of any United States statute, regulation, etc., nor a legal canon of any kind. Literally translated into English as “false in one thing, false in everything,” the maxim: (a) prompts logical caution as to the entirety of the position taken by the speaker who, as part of his/her position, misrepresents a certain fact; and, as such, (b) has been adopted into the panoply of policies of American jurisprudence related to the propriety of findings made by the trier of fact. See Kanawha & M.R. Co. v. Kerse, 239 U.S. 576, 581, 36 S.Ct. 174, 60 L.Ed. 448 (1916); Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 8 S.Ct. 778, 31 L.Ed. 863 (1888) (“[The falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus] rule does not necessarily mean that the man who falsifies once is a liar; but it means that justice will not rest on testimony a substantial part of which is proved to be false”); Hargrave v. Stockloss, 127 N.J.L. 262, 21 A.2d 820 (N.J. (Ct.E. & App.) 1941) (explaining that the maxim is not a rule of law but a guidance that – if testimony of a witness on a material issue is willfully false and given with an intention to deceive, the jurors may disregard the entirety of that witness’ testimony).Thx,Office: 916.207.6706