Federal Court 2015 Deutsch Bank Case Reveals Bank Willingness to Lie Directly to the Court

A mere glance at the procedure invoked by the attorney supposedly representing Deutsch Bank reveals the arrogance with which the lawyers present false cases based upon false documents and false execution of documents.

“Words matter, especially in real estate transactions. See Univ. Sav. Ass’n v. Springwoods Shopping Ctr., 644 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex.1982) (“the terms set out in a deed of trust must be strictly followed”); see also Mathis v. DCR Mortg. III Sub I, L.L.C., 389 S.W.3d 494, 507 (Tex.App. — El Paso, 2012) (“The rules of interpretation that apply to contracts also apply to notes and deeds of trust.”). Based on the words of the 2011 assignment, MERS was no more acting on its own behalf than was the bank’s own law firm.”

see deutsche-bank-nat27l-trust-co-v-burke2c-117-f-supp-3d-953-dist

So here is an attorney asking the court to vacate a decision in which the homeowner won. The lawyer had already falsely represented the status of Deutsch, the existence of a  trust and any implied transaction by which Deutsch or a trust took an interest in the Burke mortgage.

And here is part of what the court said in response, denying the absurd motion.

judgment was based on findings and conclusions that Deutsche Bank had failed to prove chain of title back to the original lender, now defunct. The sole proof on which the bank relied — a purported assignment from “MERS as nominee for the lender, its successors and assigns” — was held void, because the assignor did not exist when the document was signed.

Deutsche Bank’s first argument is based on a misrepresentation of the trial record. Deutsche Bank claims that it introduced into evidence the Burke note indorsed in blank by the original lender (IndyMac Bank), thereby establishing its right to foreclose as holder of the Note. (Dkt. 84, at 4). This claim is baseless, because, as the trial transcript makes clear, the only version of the Note successfully introduced by Deutsche Bank at trial contained no indorsement of any kind.

Prior to taking testimony, the Court sustained the defendants’ authenticity objections

from the very beginning of trial, Deutsche Bank’s counsel was on notice that if it wanted to introduce its version of the Note indorsed in blank, some proof of authentication would be necessary.

Based on that earlier transaction, Wells Fargo became Cornerstone’s “assign,” and MERS thereby acquired the authority to act as nominee for that entity in transferring the Deed of Trust. In this case, however, that critical element is missing.

There is simply no proof of an existing assignor with an existing right in the property capable of being assigned in 2011. It is undisputed that Indy-Mac Bank had been “dead” since 2008, several years prior to the 2011 assignment. (P. Ex. 6, at p. 1). Thus, any post-mortem transaction by that entity would be a nullity under Pool v. Sneed. [e.s.]

The only apparent “successor” to IndyMac Bank was IndyMac Federal Bank, but that entity was likewise shuttered in March 2009, nearly two years before the 2011 assignment. (P. Ex. 6). Even had that entity survived to 2011, substantially all of its assets had already been disposed of by that time. According to the FDIC notice admitted as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6, “On March 19, 2009, IndyMac Federal was placed in receivership and substantially all of its assets were sold.” (Id. at p. 4) To whom those assets were sold, and whether the Burke Note was among those assets, are matters of sheer speculation on this record. [e.s.]

Logically, there are only two possibilities here, neither of which are any help to Deutsche Bank: either there was no assignee, in which case the 2011 assignment is necessarily void for reasons already given; or, there was an assignee, in which case there is necessarily another, prior assignment not found in this record. In other words, the 2011 assignment would merely be the last link in a chain of title consisting of at least two (and possibly more) links. If indeed there is such a gap in the chain of “assigns,” Deutsche Bank’s claim fails under Texas assignment law. See e.g. Pain Control Institute, Inc. v. GEICO, 447 S.W.3d at 899 (an existing right in the assignor is a precondition for a valid assignment); Leavings v. Mills, 175 S.W.3d 301, 310 *958 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004) (party seeking to enforce note must show “unbroken chain of assignments” to the original mortgagee); Jernigan v. Bank One, Texas, N.A., 803 S.W.2d 774, 777 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1991) (“possibility of an intermediate transfer” precludes judgment as a matter of law concerning bank’s capacity to sue on note).

an agent is one who consents to the control of another, the principal, where the principal manifests consent that the agent shall act for the principal. First Nat’l Acceptance Co. v. Bishop, 187 S.W.3d 710, 714 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 2006). The party claiming agency must prove the principal has (1) the right to assign the agent’s task and (2) the right to control the means and details by which the agent will accomplish the task. Laredo Medical Group v. Lightner, 153 S.W.3d 70, 72 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 2004); Lyons v. Lindsey Morden Claims Mgmt., Inc., 985 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. App. — El Paso 1998); Schultz v. Rural/Metro Corp., 956 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1997). [e.s.][Editor’s note: This requirement is not fulfilled unless the principal is disclosed].

courts have long held that a party has no authority to execute a deed or contract on behalf of unnamed “heirs” or other parties not specifically named in the instrument. [e.s.] See Baldwin v. Goldfrank, 88 Tex. 249, 31 S.W. 1064, 1067 (1895) (upholding exclusion of deed where “names of heirs for whom [the attorney-in-fact] purported to act appeared neither in the body nor the signature to the instrument”); Stephens v. House, 257 S.W. 585, 591 (Tex.Civ.App. — Galveston 1923) (administrator of estate not authorized to bind unnamed heirs, despite recitation in contract that administrator acted “for myself and the heirs to the estate of the aforesaid Mary Owens”); see also Thompson v. Houston Oil Co., 37 F.2d 687, 689 (5th Cir.1930) (conveyance ineffective to pass title as to parties not named either in the body of the instrument or under signature of grantor acting under power of attorney, citing Baldwin).

it was Deutsche Bank’s burden [e.s.] under Texas law to prove the existence of that principal/agency relationship in 2011. Under the precedents cited above, the mere reference to IndyMac Bank’s “successors or assigns” is insufficient, because it fails to specify the names of those persons or entities (assuming they even existed). [e.s.] Nor has Deutsche Bank submitted any extrinsic evidence which might identify MERS’s principal. [e.s.]

 

 

Deutsche Bank’s third argument is a red herring.

The problem here is not a voidable defect that a defrauded assignor might choose to disregard — it is the absence of a valid assignor [e.s.] (i.e. a real entity owning the right to be assigned) in the first place. Cf. L’Amoreaux v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 755 F.3d 748, 750 (5th Cir.2014) (considering homeowner’s challenge to validity of MERS assignment on its merits, implicitly rejecting bank’s “voidable” argument).

Texas law is clear that a party seeking to foreclose on a home equity loan bears the burden to demonstrate its authority to prosecute the foreclosure. See, e.g., Tex.R. Civ. P. Rule 736.1(d)(3)(B) (petition must describe “the authority of the party seeking foreclosure”); Rule 736.6 (“the petitioner has the burden to prove by affidavits on file or evidence presented the grounds for granting the order [allowing foreclosure]”). When the entity seeking to foreclose was not party to the original transaction, then that entity must be able to trace its right to foreclose back to the original mortgagee. [e.s.] See e.g. Leavings v. Mills, 175 S.W.3d 301, 310 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2004) (party seeking to enforce note must show “unbroken chain of assignments” to the original mortgagee); Miller v. Homecomings Financial, LLC, 881 F.Supp.2d 825, 829 (S.D.Tex.2012) (citing cases).

Texas has long followed the common law rule that “in order to convey by grant, the party possessing the right must be the grantor, and use apt and proper words to convey to the grantee, and merely signing and sealing and acknowledging an instrument in which another person is grantor, is not sufficient.” Agric. Bank v. Rice, 45 U.S. 225, 4 How. 225, 242, 11 L.Ed. 949 (1846). Applying this rule in an early case, the Texas Supreme Court declared as “wholly inoperative” a deed signed by a spouse who was not named as grantor in the body of the deed. Stone v. Sledge, 87 Tex. 49, 26 S.W. 1068, 1069 (1894). The bank’s position here is less compelling than that rejected in Stone, because “MERS as beneficiary” appears neither in the signature line nor in the body of the 2011 assignment.

There remains one additional matter. In the last sentence on the last page of its last brief to this court, Deutsche Bank asks to reopen the trial record to provide “the wet ink original of the Note or testimony affirming Deutsche Bank’s status as holder of the Note.” (Dkt. 90, at 7). No authority or excuse is offered for this breathtakingly late request. Even assuming such evidence exists, Deutsche Bank does not pretend that it is “newly discovered”, nor that the bank was excusably ignorant about it until after trial despite using due diligence to discover it. See 11 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2808 (2012). After four years of litigation, including court-ordered mediation and trial on the merits, the time for such a deus ex machina maneuver has long since passed. The Burkes are entitled to the finality of judgment that our judicial process is intended to provide. The bank’s request for a do-over is denied.

“True Lender” Lawsuits Causing Business and Legal Headaches for Banks

hat tip Bill Paatalo

You can’t pick up one end of the stick without picking up the other end as well. Or, if you like, you can’t eat your cake and still have it.

Banks used third party intermediaries all the time, and in non-mortgage loans they are considered as the real lender for purposes of being able to charge the interest rate stated in the consumer loan agreement.

But the situation is quite different and maybe the reverse in most alleged mortgage loans for the past 20 years. Usually a non-bank funding source was using a third party intermediary to originate the loan. Hence the term “originator” which in reality means nothing more than “salesman.”

The actual party funding the loan is not disclosed at all, ever. In most cases it is an investment bank which is different from a commercial bank, but the investment bank is not funding the loan with its own money but rather using money diverted from the advances of investors who thought they were purchasing mortgage backed securities.

In other words the investors think they are getting certificates that are backed by mortgage loans when in fact, in most cases, the certificate holders have no claim on any debt, note or mortgage executed or incurred by a borrower.

Since the loans are mostly originated rather than purchased by a Trust as advertised to investors, the actual ledner is neither disclosed nor shown on any of the closing documents possibly because it is impossible to determine the identity of a “Lender” whose money was  used from an undifferentiated slush fund in which money from investors is intermingled. Information ascertained thus far indicates that the slush fund includes money from the sale of certificates in the name of multiple nonexistent trusts.

Hence the issue of who is the “true lender.” But the Bank’s position in court in unsecured loans may be its undoing when it pretends to litigate a loan in which it was never actually a party to the loan transaction or the loan documents.

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see https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/a-remedy-for-true-lender-lawsuits-already-exists

So if you think about it, you can explain why most documents in foreclosures are pure fabrications reflecting nonexistent transactions. If you look closely at these documents you will nearly always be able to ascertain a gap which makes the documents NOT FACIALLY VALID. Or, in the alternative, if the documents are facially valid, it is because of forgery, robosigning and fabrication.

Such a gap might be the oft-used “attorney-in-fact” designation. Without reference to a specific power of attorney and a warranty that it has not been revoked and that it covers the execution of the proffered document, the reference to “attorney-in-fact” is meaningless. Hence the document signed by Ocwen as attorney in fact, is really just a signature by Ocwen who is not in the chain of title, making the document facially invalid. In most cases Ocwen (or whoever is the claimed “servicer” is executing as attorney in fact for a real entity (like US Bank) with a nonexistent role — trustee of a nonexistent trust. Remember that US Bank is a real bank but is not acting in a real role. 

By attacking the facial validity of such false documents you are also attacking jurisdiction, which is a deal killer for the banks. Bank lawyers are coming to their own conclusions — independently of their arrogant bank clients and independently of the foreclosure mills who blindly follow whatever instructions they receive electronically. Bank lawyers see trouble on the horizon coming from TILA REscission, and the lack of REAL facial validity of the documents being used in foreclosure which are at odds with the documents used to sell derivatives, synthetic derivatives and hedge products all based upon the same loans.

Here is a quote from the above-referenced article on “true lender lawsuits” brought by borrowers who seek to avoid interest from a non-bank as being  contrary to state law:

As a general rule, the fact that a bank subcontracts marketing, loan servicing or other “ministerial,” or nonessential, lending activities to third-party service providers has no effect on the bank’s ability to export its home state’s interest rate under federal law. To this end, the Bank Service Company Act expressly authorizes banks to utilize the services of third-parties. In short, under the federal banking laws, there is no “tipping point” beyond which a servicer becomes the lender in lieu of the bank — so long as the bank remains the party that is performing the primary, or “non-ministerial,” lending activities laid out in the three-part test, the bank is the only lender.

Yet federal bank agency guidance is silent regarding true lender risk, despite the growing number of states in which such lawsuits have arisen. The FDIC published draft third-party lending guidance in July 2016 that had the potential to provide some clarity, but it is still pending. Moreover, the guidance merely observes in a footnote that “courts are divided on whether third-parties may avail themselves of such preemption.”

As to whether a bank’s status as the lender could be undermined by its use of agents, the guidance says nothing. This silence is problematic because, as things stand, one could evaluate the facts of the same loan program and reach opposite conclusions with respect to the program’s status under usury laws depending on whether federal interest rate preemption rules or judge-made, state true lender rules are applied.

Forbes: TBTF Banks have $3.8 Trillion in Reported Loan Portfolios — How much of it is real?

The five largest U.S. banks have a combined loan portfolio of almost $3.8 trillion, which represents 40% of the total loans handed out by all U.S. commercial banks.

See Forbes: $3.8 Trillion in Portfolio Loans

I can spot around $300 billion that isn’t real.

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Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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When interviewing the FDIC receiver back in 2008 he told me that WAMU had originated around $1 Trillion in loans. He also told me that most of them were subject to claims of securitization (i.e., they had been sold). Then when I asked him how much had been sold, he said that Chase had told him the total was around 2/3. Translation: With zero consideration, Chase was about to use the agreement of October 25, 2008 as an excuse to claim ownership and servicing rights on over $300 billion in loans. Chase was claiming ownership when it suited them. By my count they foreclosed on over $100 billion of those “WAMU” loans and, for the most part, collected the proceeds for itself.

Point One: If there really were $300 Billion in loans left in WAMU inventory, there would have been no receivership nor would there have been any bankruptcy.

Point Two: If there were $300 Billion in loans left in WAMU inventory, or even if there was 1/10th that amount, neither the FDIC receiver nor the US Trustee in WAMU bankruptcy would have allowed the portfolio to be given to Chase without Chase paying more than zero. The receiver and the US Trustee would have been liable for civil and even criminal penalties. But they were not liable because there were no loans to sell.

So it should come as no surprise that a class action lawsuit has been filed against Chase for falsely claiming the payments from performing loans and keeping them, and for falsely claiming the proceeds on foreclosure as if they were the creditor when they were most clearly not. whether the lawyers know it or not, they might just have filed the largest lawsuit in history.

see Young v Chase Class Action – WaMu Loans – EDNY June 2018

This isn’t unique. Chase had its WAMU. BofA had its Countrywide. Wells Fargo had its Wachovia. Citi had lots of alter egos. The you have OneWest with its IndyMac. And there are others. All of them had one thing in common: they were claiming ownership rights over mortgages that were falsely claimed to have been “acquired through merger or acquisition using the FDIC (enter Sheila Bair screaming) as a governmental rubber stamp such that it would appear that they purchased over a trillion dollars in residential mortgage loans when in fact they merely created the illusion of those loans which had been sold long ago.

None of this was lost on the insurers that were defrauded when they issued insurance policies that were procured under false pretenses on supposedly non-securities where the truth is that, like the residential loans themselves, the “securities” and the loans were guaranteed to fail.

Simplistically, if you underwrite a loan to an family whose total income is less than the payments will be when the loan resets to full amortization you can be sure of two things: (1) the loan will fail short-term and (2) the “certificates” will fail along with them. If you know that in advance you can bet strong against the loans and the certificates by purchasing insurance from insurers who were inclined to trust the underwriters (a/k/a “Master Servicer” of nonexistent trust issuing the certificates).

see AMBAC Insurance Case vs U.S. Bank

The bottom line is that inside the smoke and mirrors palace, there is around $1 Trillion in loans that probably were sold (leveraged) dozens of times where the debt is owned by nobody in particular — just the TBTF bank that claims it. Once they get to foreclosure, the presumption arises that everything that preceded the foreclosure sale is valid. And its very hard to convince judges that they just rubber stamped another theft.

Wells Fargo “Lending” Securities It Didn’t Own

Translation: WFB was the “custodian” of alleged “mortgage-backed” certificates issued for the benefit of investors who paid billions of dollars for ownership of the certificates. WFB “Loaned” those alleged securities to brokers. The brokers in exchange provided “collateral” the proceeds of which were reinvested by WFB. In short, WFB was laundering the investors money for the sole benefit of WFB and not for the investors who owned the certificates and certainly to the detriment of the brokers and their buyers of derivative instruments based upon the loan of the securities.

This case reveals the flowering of multiple levels arising from false claims of securitization. First WFB issues certificates from a fictitious trust that owns nothing. Then it keeps both the money paid for those certificates and it keeps the certificates as well. On Wall Street this practice is called holding securities in “street name.” Then WFB engages in trading on securities it doesn’t own, but which are worthless anyway because the certificates only represent a promise from the REMIC trusts that exists only on paper.

It is all based upon outright lies. And that is why the banks get nervous when the issue of ownership of a debt, security or derivative becomes an issue in litigation. In this case the bank represented the trades as ownership or derivative ownership of “high grade money market instruments” such as “commercial paper or bank time deposits and CDs.”

None of it was true. WFB simply says that it thought that the “instruments” were safe. The lawsuit referred to in the linked article says they knew exactly what they were doing and didn’t care whether the instruments were safe or not. If the attorneys dig deeper they will find that the certificates’ promise to pay was not issued by an actual entity, that certificates were never mortgage-backed, and that WFB set it up so when there were losses it would not fall on WFB even though WFB was using the named trust basically as a fictitious name under which it operated.

So I continue to inquire: why does any court accept any document from WFB as presumptively valid? Why not require the actual proof?

Let us help you plan your defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

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Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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Hat Tip Bill Paatalo

see  WFB Securities Lending Scheme

The investments by WFB went into “mortgage backed assets.” Really? So let’s see how that works. First they create the certificates and sell them to investors even though neither the investors nor the trust have any interest in mortgage assets. Then they “loan” the same certificates to brokers, who provide collateral to WFB so that WFB can “reinvest” investor money using commingled investor money from a variety of sources.

Then derivatives on derivatives are sold as private contracts or insurance policies in which when the nonexistent trust assets are declared by WFB to have failed, in which WFB collects all the proceeds. The investors from all layers are screwed. And borrowers, as was originally planned, are screwed.

The lender to the borrower in the real world (where money is exchanged) are be the investors whose money was in the dynamic dark pool when the loan of money occurred. But the investors have no proof of ownership of the debt because of the false documents created by the “underwriter” bank.  The money from the second tier of investors is used to “purchase” the certificates WFB is “printing”. And then derivatives and hybrid derivatives and synthetic derivatives are sold multiplying the effect of every certificate issued. Such has the control over currency shifted from central banks who control around $8 trillion of fiat currency to the TBTF banks who boast a shadow banking market of $1 quadrillion ($1,000,000,000,000,000.00).

This every loan and every certificate is multiplied in the shadow banking market and converted into real money in the real world. Based upon prior securities analysis and review of disclosures from the publicly held banks it thus became possible for a “bank” to receive as much as $4.2 million on a $0.1 Million loan (i..e, $100,000). But in order to maintain the farce they must foreclose and not settle which will devalue the derivatives.

Then having done all that through control of a dynamic dark pool of investor money they must of course create the illusion of a robust lending market. True this particular case involves a business acquired when WFB acquired Wachovia. But WFB acquired Wachovia because it was the actual party in control of a false securitization scheme in which Wachovia acted primarily as originator and not lender.

WFB barely cares about the interest rate because they know the loans that are being approved won’t last anyway. But its trading desk secures extra profits by selling loans with a high interest rate, as though the loans had a low interest rate thereby guaranteeing two things: (1) guaranteed defaults that WFB can insure and (2) buying low (with investor money) and selling high (to investors).

All of which brings us back to the same point I raised when I first wrote (circa 2007) about the systemic fraud in securitization not as an idea, but in the way it had been put into practice. Using established doctrines in tax litigation there are two doctrines that easily clear up the intentional obfuscation by the banks: (1) The single transaction doctrine and (2) the step transaction doctrine. Yes it is that simple. If the investors didn’t part with their money then the loan of money would have never reached the desk of the closing agent. If the homeowners had not been similarly duped as to who and what was being done, they would never have signed on the dotted line.

To assume otherwise would be the same as assuming that borrowers were looking for a way to waste money on non-deductible down payments, improvements and furniture in exchange for a monthly payment that everyone knew they couldn’t afford.

 

FDIC “endorsements” of Note or “Assignments of Mortgage”

The FDIC does not want to get into the middle of a court battle over the validity of ownership claims etc. Most endorsements and assignments occurring while the estate of a failed bank is in receivership are of dubious validity and often outright fraud. Chase for example claims ownership of loans when it suits them but denies ownership — or any liability arising out of the loan ads service practices — when it would place Chase in a bad position.

Let us help you plan your case narrative and strategy: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

Register now for Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar. Webinar scheduled for Tomorrow at 1PM EST. You’ll understand this article a lot better when you learn a thing or two about the rules and laws of EVIDENCE.

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https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Here are my instructions  to our paralegals who do there search for our TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) on a case involving the failed bank, BankUnited and the treatment of “loans” claimed to be within the estate of the failed bank. You can pretty much use this wherever the FDIC was involved.

1. Go to FDIC.gov
2. At bottom of page in small letters in FOIA — Freedom of Information Act
3. Then go to reading room
4. Look up BankUnited — find Purchase and Assumption Agreement by whatever bank took over the assets. You might find other documents of interest.

There are two types of note endorsements from FDIC receiverships

1. Execution of endorsement by actual FDIC person with authority — that would be the person who is the FDIC receiver for that particular Bank failure. This is rare if not unheard of. Technically the FDIC owns the estate of the failed bank but does not actually run it. It keep the people in place until it finds a bank to takeover the estate of the failed bank. SO you could have some hybrid, theoretically (I have never seen it) where a person who was working for the failed bank at the time of the receivership executes a document with approval from the FDIC receiver. So you would be looking for whether the endorsement was executed by an employee of thee failed bank while the failed bank was owned in receivership and with approval from the FDIC receiver. This is something that could be included in a report stating that there is no document or other evidence presented, thus far, indicating the endorsement was by someone with authority — and that research of the signatory indicates he/she was employed by whoever (someone else) indicating that there is at the very least an inconsistency between the execution of the endorsement and the employment record of the person who signed.

2. Execution by way of a power of attorney executed supposedly by the FDIC receiver. While some of these are real most are not. The actual person signing is an employee of say, Chase Bank, who claims to be agent for either the failed bank or the FDIC receivership estate. What is missing is a copy of the power of attorney. we are left with just the claim under circumstances where industry practice is to fabricate and forge documentation in order to push through a fraudulent foreclosure.

NOTE: The transfer of the estate of the failed bank does NOT mean that the loans were transferred. In the case of BankUnited it was securitizing the “loans” at a time that either predated the closing (i.e., upon application of the borrower) or the claim of securitization (a lie by the way) originates contemporaneously with the alleged closing of the loan. That means that the failed bank was deriving its income off of fees generated by originations and in some cases (I don’t think BankUnited was a servicer) retaining the servicing rights but not the ownership. AND THAT means that at the time of the failure of the bank it had few, if any, assets that were loans receivable. AND THAT means that their endorsement could be fake for lack of authority (see above) or simply void because at the time of the endorsement they didn’t own the loan.

The illusion of “ownership” is created by the self-serving execution of an endorsement where the courts often presume that the endorsement was real and authorized. THAT presumption leads to another assumption: that the endorser owned the debt and that a transaction took place in which the loan was actually purchased for value, making the endorsement EVIDENCE that the transaction took place. It is circular logic but it is working in the courts for the banks. Our job is to show that the endorsement and the ownership are, at the very least, suspect.

Keep in mind that the original “lender” (the originator) might not have have loaned any money to the borrower, but rather took credit for making the loan without objection from the parties who actually funded the loan. Under common law and the UCC the only party that owns the debt is the one who funded the loan. The endorsements and assignments contribute to the illusion that the originator was in fact the lender. Paper instruments are potentially evidence of a transaction in which money exchanged hands. All paper instruments are hearsay but many can be admitted under exceptions to the hearsay rule. The paper instrument should never be confused with the actual monetary transaction. If there was no transaction, then the paper instrument is a nullity as it refers to a nonexistent transaction.

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