MERS Ownership Intentionally Obfuscated

By The LendingLies Team

In an ongoing California Appeal (that will go unnamed at this time), a homeowner’s attorney obtained a routine MERS corporate disclosure statement in response to an opening appellate brief he had filed.  The attorney shared the disclosure statement with a colleague in Hawaii who noticed that MERS claimed it was owned by its holding company who was owned by Maroon Holding, an LLC.  Further research revealed that Maroon was more than 10% owned by “Intercontinental Exchange, Inc.” (“ICE”).  Additional digging revealed that ICE was listed as the parent corporation for the New York Stock Exchange.  At that point red flags were raised.

The attorney, flabbergasted, after years of trying to peel the layers off of the proverbial MERS onion, discovered that ICE purchased the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) for around 8 billion dollars, and it is now worth over 11 billion dollars (huge profits fueled by trillions of dollars of foreclosures and the unrecognized devaluation of the dollar) ( The attorney discovered that ICE also claims to have purchased MERS (so Maroon could not own MERS if ICE does) and when looking into ICE, it is traded (oddly being the NYSE) on NASDAQ.

NASDAQ lists 51 pages of stock ownership in ICE which includes virtually everyone and anyone involved in the financial fraud and corruption scheme.  The pirates include Black Rock who fabricates the forged documents, to Bank of America, N.A., Bank of New York Mellon Corporation; as well as Rothchilds, Rockefellers, Goldman Sachs, T Rowe Price (largest investor), Wells Fargo, Citi, etc…  The list of participants goes on and on with billions of dollars and half a billion shares outstanding.  Not to mention that the government sponsored GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are owners as well.

The risk is evenly distributed among the Too Big To Fail institutions with no party owning more than 10% ownership in shares requiring disclosure (of course).  ICE’s ownership, like MERS, is buried in Delaware corporations with 3 different entities claiming the exact same name.  This shell game of mergers and name changes makes it nearly impossible to identify who actually owns anything since no court in the country will enforce discovery or any subpoena on them since each county/pension is invested themselves.

For additional information check out these links:

The bank’s attorneys are also playing the obfuscation game by failing to identify who retained them.

This same attorney reports that he has attempted to sanction opposing counsel for claiming to represent parties that (1) do not exist and/or; (2) were not sued.  In this instance, the lead defendant bounced between two firms, and claimed to represent a party that does not exist.  Nine months into litigation the lender finally admitted they represented the wrong party and then claimed to represent the lender the homeowner first sued instead of who they claimed to currently represent.  The lenders use a game of changing entities, names, servicers and trusts to detract from the real issues while creating such a convoluted mess that plausible deniability can be implied at all junctions.  Outside of foreclosure, no Plaintiff in any other type of litigation would be permitted to act in this manner without being sanctioned.

In this particular case, three different law firms have now made misleading statements and the court takes any lie they spin as fact.  False representations of legal representations for trustees who don’t know or don’t care whether their name is used as Plaintiff or beneficiary are now the norm. Yet, there is no clear procedural method of challenging whether the law firm represents the servicer v REMIC trustee. In a  Florida US bank case,  the Plaintiff’s lawyer admitted to having zero contact with US bank and the attorney could not state that US bank retained him.  It is all but impossible to identify who is truly pulling the strings and violates a consumer’s right to know who their creditor is.

The attorney who brought this situation to our attention writes, “Defendants and their counsel are attempting to obfuscate any ability to identify any actual owner, holder or holder-in-due-course of the purported debt, if such ever existed, its extinguishment notwithstanding.”    When the homeowner, their attorney, the bank, opposing counsel and the judge can’t identify who the true creditor and imposters are, this leads to issues of:

  1. Slander and Disparagement of the Title to Plaintiff’s Property
  2. Lender’s Acts are not Privileged and are without Justification
  3. False Claims
  4. Pecuniary Losses
  5. Fraud
  6. Fraud on the Court
  7. Racketeering
  8. FDCPA and FDCPA violations
  9. Claims are barred for Making False, Deceptive and Misleading Representations
  10. Unconscionable Allegations by Plaintiff
  11. Plaintiff had no Standing to bring Lawsuit

These are issues causing real damages and yet, the Judge in this case will likely ignore the blatant fraud, the use of pseudo-parties and the unconscionable consequences caused by a party with no standing to be in the courtroom.  If you’re a bank you are not required to be honest or have any credible evidence of ownership.  The presentation of fabricated and forged documents, shell companies, and a false affidavit is usually sufficient to foreclose.

Neil Garfield will provide more information on the MERS ownership issue in the next several weeks. Stay up to date at LivingLies.

Housing Bubble 2017: Existing Home Sales Tumble As NAR Warns Prices Becoming Increasingly Unaffordable

After starting the year at the fastest pace in almost a decade, existing-home sales slid in February some 3.7%, below the 2.0% drop expected, as 5.48 million existing houses were sold last month which was marked by a paradoxe: on one hand, NAR reported that the median existing-home price in February was $228,400, up 7.7% from February 2016 and was the fastest increase since last January (8.1 percent). On the other hand, as the NAR itself admits, affordability has collapsed which together with too little inventory of homes for sale, meant that buyers and sellers were unable to meet in the middle, leading to the 3rd worst month in the past 6 years, the lowest since September 2016.

As Lawrence Yun, NAR chief economist, said, closings retreated in February as too few properties for sale and weakening affordability conditions stifled buyers in most of the country. “Realtors are reporting stronger foot traffic from a year ago, but low supply in the affordable price range continues to be the pest that’s pushing up price growth and pressuring the budgets of prospective buyers,” he said. “Newly listed properties are being snatched up quickly so far this year and leaving behind minimal choices for buyers trying to reach the market.”

Added Yun, “A growing share of homeowners in NAR’s first quarter HOME survey said now is a good time to sell, but until an increase in listings actually occurs, home prices will continue to move hastily.”

Some other observations:

  • The median existing-home price 2 for all housing types in February was $228,400, up 7.7% from February 2016 ($212,100). February’s price increase was the fastest since last January (8.1 percent) and marks the 60th consecutive month of year-over-year gains.
  • Total housing inventory 3 at the end of February increased 4.2 percent to 1.75 million existing homes available for sale, but is still 6.4 percent lower than a year ago (1.87 million) and has fallen year-over-year for 21 straight months. Unsold inventory is at a 3.8-month supply at the current sales pace (3.5 months in January).
  • All-cash sales were 27 percent of transactions in February (matching the highest since November 2015), up from 23 percent in January and 25 percent a year ago. Individual investors, who account for many cash sales, purchased 17 percent of homes in February, up from 15 percent in January but down from 18 percent a year ago. Seventy-one percent of investors paid in cash in February (matching highest since April 2015).
  • First-time buyers were 32 percent of sales in February, which is down from 33 percent in January but up from 30 percent a year ago. NAR’s 2016 Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers — released in late 2016 4 — revealed that the annual share of first-time buyers was 35 percent.
  • Properties typically stayed on the market for 45 days in February, down from 50 days in January and considerably more than a year ago (59 days). Short sales were on the market the longest at a median of 214 days in February, while foreclosures sold in 49 days and non-distressed homes took 45 days. Forty-two percent of homes sold in February were on the market for less than a month.
  • annual rate of 4.89 million in February from 5.04 million in January, and are now 5.8 percent above the 4.62 million pace a year ago. The median existing single-family home price was $229,900 in February, up 7.6 percent from February 2016.
  • Existing condominium and co-op sales descended 9.2 percent to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 590,000 units in February, but are still 1.7 percent higher than a year ago. The median existing condo price was $216,100 in February, which is 8.2 percent above a year ago.
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Some additional thoughts on the collapsing affordability as a result of rising rates, and – of course- nearly double-digit increases in home prices.

The affordability constraints holding back renters from buying is a signal to many investors that rental demand will remain solid for the foreseeable future,” said Yun. “Investors are still making up an above average share of the market right now despite steadily rising home prices and few distressed properties on the market, and their financial wherewithal to pay in cash gives them a leg-up on the competition against first-time buyers.”

Finally, judging by the collapse in mortgage apps and rising mortgage rates, unless all cash buyers – mostly foreign money laundering oligarchs and members of the US 1% – continue to buy up existing homes without resorting to mortgages, expect a sharp drop off in existing homes in the near future.

9th Circuit Opens Door to Modification Fraud and RESCISSION: Oskoui v Chase

The 9th Circuit has laid bare its frustration — and that of thousands of other judges — with the inability to get a straight answer on modification, the collection of trial payments, and the damage caused by misleading statements or outright misrepresentation, whether negligent or intentional. This explicitly opens the door for homeowner actions in negligent misrepresentation, fraud, breach of implied contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and estoppel. Hundreds of thousands of cases are affected — at least as to claims for money damages. Whether this will bleed over into courts of equity who are hearing foreclosure cases remains to be seen.

Modification Fraud or breach of Contract — even when the “offer” of modification is illusory. This is typical bait and switch practice in the industry. the homeowner thinks they are in a modification when Chase was merely dragging “trial payments” out of her.

Rescission counts, although the court states that the homeowner must raise it in her pleadings against Chase.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345 to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.

see Mahin-Oskoui-v.-J.P.-Morgan-Chase-Bank

I have had many judges express their concerns privately and publicly. They all point to two main things that disturbs them. One is the apparent randomness of modifications and the other is the pattern of musical servicers that change regularly. They worry that this indicates something deeper is going on but that homeowners and their lawyers are not concentrating on these factors.

Modifications are random. Although this case reveals some of the intrinsic objective factors in granting a modifications, the hidden ones still predominate.

The plain fact is that “servicers” are NOT acting in the interest of the investors, the borrowers, or even the loan. Their plan, well executed thus far, is to bring as many cases to foreclosure as possible. Period.

They have been and still are trashing the alleged collateral for the alleged loan. Nobody wins, nobody mitigates their losses under this plan except the Master Servicers/Underwriters who seek two goals: (a) collection of non-existent servicer advances and (b) getting a judge to enter an order allowing foreclosure — thus producing the FIRST LEGAL DOCUMENT in the illusory chain.

The reason why the actual trustee never appears in court is that they are paid to stay away, thus insuring the investors will be screwed.

The following are quotes from this remarkable case:

  • It boils down to this. With its March 1, 2010 letter, Chase deceptively enticed and invited Oskoui into a process with the demonstrably false promise that a loan modification was within her reach if she were to make three monthly payments of $2,988.49 each. The next day – and for the first time – Chase eliminated a HAMP modification from its menu, but neither advised Oskoui what the CHAMP Guidelines required nor suspended additional payments until it could determine her CHAMP eligibility. Chase now says in its brief that the CHAMP Guidelines did not have the HAMP loan balance limitation, but conspicuous by its absence in Chase’s representation is any reference to the NPV test. Chase’s counsel suggested during oral argument that Chase had a valid reason for continuing the process as it did, i.e., that Oskoui’s income situation might have improved. On this record, any such expectation would have been patently unreasonable.
  • The facts in this record would amply support a verdict on this claim in Oskoui’s favor on the ground that she was the victim of an unconscionable process. Chase knew that she was a 68 year old nurse in serious economic and personal distress, yet it strung her along for two years, kept moving the finish line, accepted her money, and then brushed her aside. During this process, Oskoui made numerous frustrating attempts in person and by other means to seek guidance from Chase, only to be turned away.
  • The district court erred in failing to acknowledge Oskoui’s claim for breach of contract in her pro se complaint. She explicitly styled her complaint on its first page as one for “BREACH OF CONTRACT AND BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALINGS
  • The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012), which we identified in Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 728 F.3d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) as “the leading federal appellate decision” on this issue of contract, illuminates the viability of Oskoui’s claim. As in the case now before us, Wells Fargo argued in Wigod that its TPP language was not an enforceable offer because it was conditioned on Wells Fargo’s further review of Wigod’s financial information to ensure that she qualified under HAMP. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 561. The Seventh Circuit dismissed this contention as an unreasonable reading of the TPP. The court pointed out that the TPP spelled out two conditions precedent to Wells Fargo’s obligation to offer a permanent modification, and that Wigod alleged that she fulfilled both conditions. Id. at 560–61.

    Once Oskoui made her three payments, Chase was obligated by the explicit language of its offer to send her an Agreement for her signature “which will modify the loan as necessary to reflect this new payment amount.” Chase did not call it either a HAMP agreement or a CHAMP agreement, just an “Agreement.” What program the Agreement was part of is irrelevant. Chase must abide by its own language. It did not live up to its promise. If Oskoui did not consider the offered modification to be acceptable, at that point she could have extracted herself from this aspect of her difficult situation instead of soldiering on towards a beckoning mirage.

On October 1, 2010, Oskoui sent a $2,988.49 payment to Chase. Nevertheless, on October 25, 2010, a foreclosure notice appeared on her front door, listing a foreclosure sale date of November 18, 2010. Remarkably, Chase allegedly sent her another letter dated November 1, 2010 encouraging her to continue to seek a modification. Chase even told her she might “qualify for monetary incentives that will be used to pay down the principal balance of your loan if you make your modified payments on time.” At this point, Oskoui withdrew from the process. She was now $33,738.00 poorer with nothing to show for her efforts to comply with Chase’s requests.

Notwithstanding Oskoui’s explanation of her understandable withdrawal from the exhausting two-year process, the district court granted Chase’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that she had failed in late 2010 to provide Chase with the “requested documentation to support her loan modification request.” The court declined to entertain her contractual claim because she had only “conclusorily” asserted that the “modification back-and-forth ripened into a contract with Chase” and remarked that she “sensibly” had not included a breach of contract claim in her first amended complaint.

The published HAMP Guidelines disqualified Oskoui from HAMP relief. In an age of computerized records, Chase no doubt had this disqualifying information at its fingertips and could have made this simple determination within a matter of minutes. But instead of determining eligibility before asking for money – a logical protocol called for by HAMP as of January 28, 2010 – Chase asked Oskoui for more payments. See Bushell v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 220 Cal. App. 4th 915, 924 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (citing U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, HAMP Supplemental Directive No. 10-01 (Jan. 28, 2010)). And even when Chase told Oskoui the next day that she did not qualify for HAMP, it did not inform her of her precarious situation concerning unexplained “other alternatives,” preferring instead to accept payments for seven additional months.

Quotes and Comments:

Loan Modification

The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. in Mahin Oskoui’s action seeking damages she allegedly suffered when she unsuccessfully attempted to modify the loan on her home.

The panel held that the facts plainly demonstrated a viable claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law on the ground that Oskoui was a victim of an unconscionable process.

The panel also held that the district court erred in failing to acknowledge Oskoui’s claim for breach of contract in her pro se complaint. The panel remanded with instructions to permit Oskoui to amend if necessary and to proceed with her complaint for a breach of contract.

The panel also remanded with instructions to permit Oskoui to amend her complaint to allege a right to rescind pursuant to Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790 (2015)

The most interesting part of this opinion is that the 9th Circuit Panel decided that Chase was creating a contract when it didn’t mean to do so. And so, not realizing they had created a contract, cumulatively, they breached it.

Mahin Oskoui sued defendant J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) for damages allegedly suffered when she unsuccessfully attempted over a two-year period to modify the loan on her home. Acting as her own attorney, she asserted inter alia claims for a breach of contract, “breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealings,” and a violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200, the latter based on an assertion that she had been victimized by Chase’s unfair or fraudulent business acts or practices. She also attempted to sue Chase for a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1601, the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). Without argument, the district court declined to consider Oskoui’s breach of contract claim and granted summary judgment to defendant Chase.

On May 21, 2009, Chase sent her a letter offering her a “Trial Plan Agreement.” The letter did not advise her of what was required of a borrower or of a loan


for approval under the applicable modification rules, regulations, and guidelines. The letter did advise her that “[i]f you comply with all the terms of this Agreement, we’ll consider a permanent workout solution for your loan once the Trial Plan has been completed.” The only specified term of the Agreement was that Oskoui remit three equal payments of $3,280.05 to Chase between July and September 2009. Oskoui signed the Agreement on June 1, 2009.

Oskoui fully complied with the Agreement’s payment term by timely sending $9,840.15 to Chase, only to be informed on November 10, 2009, that she did not qualify “at this time” for a modification under either the federal Making Home Affordable Program (“HAMP”), 12 U.S.C. § 5219(a), or the Chase Modification Program (“CHAMP”) because “[y]our income is insufficient for the amount of credit you have requested.” Her monthly income during that period was $10,575.00. Chase gave Oskoui no additional reasons for its denial even though its internal paperwork reveals two others, each apparently fatal to her attempt to modify her loan. One barrier was the unpaid principal balance on the loan – $833,000 – which was higher than the amount allowed under the HAMP Guidelines. This factor rendered her ineligible for a HAMP modification. The other barrier, which made her ineligible for CHAMP relief, was the loan’s failure to satisfy Chase’s net present value test (“NPV”).

Not only did Chase fail to advise Oskoui that she was not eligible for these modifications, it told her instead that “we may be able to offer other alternatives to help avoid the negative impact” of foreclosure and a deficiency judgment. Chase failed to explain what its “other alternatives” were or what Oskoui would be required to demonstrate to qualify for them.

Given this enticing invitation, Oskoui tried again, by submitting in January 2010 another application for a loan modification. She had no inkling that Chase had already determined that she was not eligible because of the amount of the unpaid balance of the loan and the NPV problems with it.

On March 1, 2010, Chase responded by letter to Oskoui’s new application. This letter said Chase “wants to help you stay in your home” and confirmed receipt and review of “your verification of income documentation.” Included with the letter were three payment coupons and three return envelopes, each coupon in the amount of $2,988.49, and due on April 1, May 1, and June 1, 2010. The March 1, 2010 letter also stated on the first page: “After successful completion of the Trial Period Plan, CHASE will send you a Modification Agreement for your signature which will modify the Loan as necessary to reflect this new payment amount.” (emphasis added). Chase said not a word about any concerns about her income and did not specify anything in that regard as a condition precedent to a modification. The March 1, 2010 letter says on page 2, however, that “[i]f all payments are made as scheduled, we will consider a permanent workout solution for your Loan.” This language on page 2, which is followed by bold type detailing the manner in which she should remit her payments, when read in the light of Chase’s promise on page 1 creates at best a misleading ambiguity. Page 2 attempts to temper what Chase offered and promised on page 1: a Modification Agreement for her signature. Once again, as with Chase’s November 10, 2009 letter, its March 1, 2010 letter, which Oskoui appended to her complaint as “Exhibit A,” failed to alert her to her apparent ineligibility for a modification.

The next event in this drawn-out process came as quickly as night extinguishes the day. On March 2, 2010, one day after Chase’s letter welcoming Oskoui for a second time to its Trial Period Plan (“TPP”) and acknowledging receipt of her income verification documents, Chase sent her another letter telling her for the first time that she was not eligible for a federal HAMP modification “because the current unpaid principal balance on your Loan is higher than the program limit . . . .” Not only did the letter omit any reference to the fatal NPV test, it said that Chase was “happy” to tell Oskoui that she “may be eligible for other modification programs” and that Chase may be able to offer “other alternatives” to stave off “the negative impact a possible foreclosure may have on [her] credit rating, the risk of a deficiency judgment . . . and the possible adverse tax effects of a foreclosure . . . .” Oskoui took these consequences as menacing threats, not friendly legal advice

Matt Levine: Mortgage Math and Sympathetic Sales

Please refer to Bloomberg news for article about the Goldman Sachs/Fannie Mae non-performing loan purchases at:


NewYorkTimes: How ‘Consumer Relief’ after Mortgage Crisis can Enrich Big Banks

Why would Goldman Sachs buy Delinquent and Defective Mortgages?

By the Lending Lies Staff

Just last year Goldman Sachs entered into settlements with state and federal governments over the sale of toxic mortgage backed securities to investors while subsequently shorting the very same securities they were selling.  Goldman would agree to provide $1.8 billion in debt relief to delinquent borrowers.  However, since Goldman (and likely no other identifiable party) doesn’t owns the debt, Goldman cuts its losses by repackaging the toxic debt, assigning it an AAA rating and selling it to unsuspecting investors and pension funds for a fee, thus off-loading any liability.  Goldman knows the feds won’t do anything to stop its crimes spree- so why not sell mortgage backed securities you know are toxic?

Goldman has once again successfully masterminded a new strategy to satisfy the $1.8 billion settlement without having to fund a dollar of that outstanding obligation, and while also profiting on this RICO scheme.

Goldman’s plan includes buying up billions of dollars of non-performing and defective loans at massive discounts.  Goldman just announced they were purchasing 4.5 billion dollars in non-performing loans from Fannie Mae.  It would be interesting to research if Fannie Mae discloses that these loans have material defects that cannot be remedied.

Goldman then contacts the homeowners and negotiates loan modifications by incentivizing the homeowner to participate by reducing their principle balance.  Most desperate and unsuspecting homeowners have no idea that Goldman is acting as a debt collector and there is no underlying party that owns the debt or has a right to modify the mortgage contract in the first place.  Once the modification is signed, in theory, a “new” loan is issued that rectifies all past endorsement, assignment and trust issues, while whitewashing all prior fraud.

The homeowner is now making payments on a new loan that is less than Goldman’s initial discount on the original purchase.  Goldman than credits the principle forgiveness against its $1.8 billion dollar mortgage relief obligation while making money!  Goldman is able to skirt the punishment and the fine costs them nothing because the debt was acquired at an even larger discount.

Finally, the true ingenuity of this plan emerges.  Once the loan is modified and performing, the loans can be repackaged and resold as Triple-A paper once again to unsuspecting buyers.

The Wall Street Journal reports that the debt scavengers at Goldman Sachs are the largest buyer of Fannie Mae’s non-performing loans, having purchased $5.7 billion worth of unpaid loans over the past several months.  Goldman Sachs should have been barred from ever participating in mortgage backed securities transactions after its last criminal enterprise.

Over the past year-and-a-half, Goldman Sachs has become the largest buyer of severely delinquent home loans from Fannie Mae. In fact, Goldman has acquired nearly two-thirds of $9.6 billion in loans the agency has auctioned off, representing unpaid loan balances in excess of $5.7 billion, according to the Wall Street Journal’s review of government records.

In all, Goldman has spent roughly $4.5 billion on some 26,000 Fannie-owned loans, according to government records. It has also been buying mortgages, from private sellers and Freddie Mac.  Apparently while everyone is unloading zombie mortgage loans, Goldman Sachs is buying as much toxic sludge that is available.

According to the government-sponsored enterprise, the portfolio was split into four pools of loans and auctioned off.

The winning bidder of the smallest of the four pools is Igloo Series II Trust (Balbec Capital). That pool contained 1,465 loans that carry an aggregate unpaid principal balance of $246,748,844.

The pool has an average loan size of $168,429; a weighted average note rate of 4.51%; a weighted average delinquency of 29 months; and a weighted average broker’s price opinion loan-to-value ratio of 78.75%.

The remaining $1.43 billion in unpaid principal balance went to MTGLQ Investors, a “significant subsidiary” of Goldman Sachs.

MTGLQ Investors is now a fixture among the NPL sales from both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Last year, MTGLQ Investors bought billion-dollar pools of NPLs from Fannie and Freddie in several different sales.

In this latest sale, MTGLQ Investors bought the remaining three pools of NPLs.

The first pool contained 3,062 loans that carry an aggregate unpaid principal balance of $496,205,215.

Goldman has an excellent business plan.  By renegotiating and repackaging worthless mortgage loans it can polish high-risk loans into grade-A paper.  The pension funds take on all of the risk if the homeowners default, and Goldman will have kicked the can down the road to the newest suckers in the scheme.

On Tuesday Goldman won the majority of defective loans at Fannie Mae’s latest auction, its largest to date. The bank bought about 8,000 loans with unpaid balances of $1.4 billion.

Goldman has paid between 50 and 90 cents on the dollar for the loans, according to Fannie Mae, however, some (if not all) of these loans are likely not worth a dime until fraudulently modified.

Meanwhile, because Goldman is getting credit toward fulfilling the terms of its settlement, it can afford to pay more for the delinquent loans than other competing bidders, which essentially means they’ve not only created but they have cornered an entire market.


USHUD Predicts Number of Foreclosures Increase Under President Trump.

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National real estate data aggregator and information source of foreclosure homes and property statistics, anticipates an increase in the number of foreclosures under President, Donald Trump.

Real estate magnate turned U.S. President, Donald Trump has come into office with new policies, many of which do not come as a surprise to the American public or the world in general. Economists and public affairs analyst have assessed the policies and have come up with several predictions, especially concerning health care and the real estate industry., a foreclosure aggregation and research company predicts a rise in foreclosures as the Federal Government under President Trump will begin, according to to gradually increase interest rates in the second quarter of 2017.

USHUD CEO, Michael Urbanski reports that all indicators show that the percentage of foreclosures will increase from the current corrected number of 5.5% to 6.5% or higher as interest rates climb,  triggering adjustable rate mortgages (ARM’s) to reset. According to Mr. Urbanski, “The number of foreclosures is poised to spike in the coming years under the Trump administration mainly because of the number of Adjustable Rate Mortgages that will be adjusted upwards as interest rates increase” According to Urbanski ARM’s will necessarily be set higher in next 24 to 48 months after the rates begin to increase. The policy and focus of the current administration tilts toward an increase in interest rates and therefore foreclosures in order to improve the overall economy.

“While an increase in foreclosures is not an absolute, it is far more likely than not” says Urbanski. This will most likely result in more Americans losing their homes, moving to smaller homes or cutting down on other expenses to augment their increased mortgage payment. On the other hand, an increase in the number of homes going to foreclosure will increase the number of foreclosures on the market and provide first time buyers and investors in the real estate sector more home for the same dollar invested, or at least buy the same home at a lower price.

The predicted increase in foreclosures in the coming years could therefore be a positive for savvy home buyers. Interest rates should remain at historically low levels for years to come as they are incrementally corrected over the next several years however, owners with adjustable rate mortgages are urged to refinance into a  fixed rate mortgage sooner rather than later by Mr. Urbanski. provides foreclosure listings and research regarding foreclosures, mortgage rates and other predictors of real estate futures ensuring that key stakeholders in the real estate sectors have free access to information on HUD, VA and other types of foreclosures.

About is a privately held foreclosure data aggregator and research company which  manages the National Cooperative of real estate agents and loan officers. The cooperative was created in 1999 in order to improve and maintain ongoing communication channels between asset management companies that maintain and market foreclosures and the general public to ensure greater transparency and coordination between public and private entities.

Media Contact
Company Name: Heavy Hammer
Contact Person: Michael Urbanski
Phone: 1800-880-8584
Country: United States

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