Insider Lawsuit Summarizes the BIG LIE About “Securitization.”

This is an insider case filed in April 2018. The ironic aspect of this case is the probability that Nationstar probably does not have standing. But that aside, for those who remain skeptics about what I have been writing about, here is an unexpurgated recitation of all the ways that all the loans, debts, notes and mortgages were fabricated based upon pure lies, making foreclosure a legal impossibility.

This is a case where a servicer has sued various parties, some of whom are players in the securitization game. The allegation is that the documents and assertions made by the Defendants were completely false and that none of them, despite the documents, had any nexus, right, title or interest to any of the loans, debts, notes or mortgages.

Lawyers would be doing themselves and their clients a favor by using this case as a drafting guide. But they can only do so after they have a achieved a level of knowledge to make sense out of all the chaos. If they do study the issue, even for a little while, they will have that “AHAH” moment and realize that the entire playing field is low hanging fruit for various types of lawsuits for compensatory and punitive damages.

Hat Tip Bill Paatalo

Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

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Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345 or 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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See Complaint – Nationstar v Soria

Since the perspective is that of a claimed servicer that sometimes claims to be more than a servicer, you should remember that this is not 100% on point. Also not all of the Defendants are what they appear to be, so  don’t leap to conclusions about the specific actors named but rather recognize the truth when you read it. But it is very close. The allegations against these Defendants could just as well be used against all the securitization players.

And the knowledge that the lawyers for Nationstar had when writing this complaint clearly shows that Mr. Cooper and its lawyers had actual knowledge of the fictitious documents, entities and assertions made by the investment banks every day in court starting with “Good Morning your Honor, my name is John Smith and I represent the Plaintiff [a trust that does not exist]. This is a standard foreclosure case.”

Here are some interesting quotes from the allegations by Nationstar (now Mr. Cooper).

Who formed [West H&AJ]?
A: I did… .
Q: Has West H&A ever originated a single loan? A: Funded loan? . . . No. . . .

Q: [Y[ou were a complete stranger to this loan; correct?

A: Yeah. Suree……..

Q: [‘T]he assignment, who drafted it?

A: The assignment deed of trust, I wrote thatt…….. Q: Were you authorized by anyone other than yourself to assign this deed of trust? A: No.

“Defendants, strangers to the subject loans and having never lent a penny to anyone, created a criminal enterprise by which they hijacked ““thousands”” of mortgages via void assignments all in the name of ““helping”” borrowers.”

Q: [YJ]ou didn’t fund a single loan; correct?

A: No. Didn’t fund a single loan.

Q: [Y[ou were a complete stranger to this loan; correct?

A: Yeah, sure …

Q: The assignment, who drafted it?
A: The assignment deed of trust, I wrote that. …. . .

Q: Were you authorized by anyone other than yourself to assign this deed of trust?
A: No.

Over the last four (4) years, for the purpose of executing the scheme to 13 defraud, Defendants, together with others known and unknown, transmitted, and caused the transmission of, by means of wire and radio communication in interstate and foreign commerce, the following writings, signs, signals, and sounds which 16 constitute no fewer than thirty-eight (38) instances: …

Defendants falsely designated themselves as nominees for entities or sometimes used an outright fraudulent designation of another entity in order to gain credibility and trust, thus, purposely confusing the
public. Further, Defendants falsely advertised that they owned the hijacked properties for purpose of defrauding those individuals and creating confusion in the 6 marketplace. Finally, Defendants used the false claims to engage in deceptive practices to further their fraudulent acts. The following are no fewer than fourteen 8 (14) instances of the false information and deceptive acts perpetuated by Defendants.

 

The Role of Dynamic Dark Pools in Ponzi Schemes Masquerading as Securitized Loan Pools

The bottom line is that there are no financial transactions in today’s securitization schemes. There is only fabricated paper. If you don’t understand the DDP, you don’t understand “securitization fail,” a term coined by Adam Levitin.

GET A CONSULT

GO TO LENDINGLIES to order forms and services. Our forensic report is called “TERA“— “Title and Encumbrance Report and Analysis.” I personally review each of them for edits and comments before they are released.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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I received a short question today to which I gave a long answer. The question is “What happens when an investor decides that he or she wants to cash it in does someone redeem their certificate ?”

Here is my answer:

YES they get paid, most of the time. It is masked as a “trade” on the proprietary trading desk of the CMO Dept. which is completely unregulated and reports nothing. As long as the Ponzi scheme is going strong, the underwriter issues money from the investor pool of money (dynamic dark pool -DDP). It looks like a third party bought the “investment.” If the scheme collapses then the underwriter reports to investors that the market is frozen and there are no buyers.

 *
There is no redemption because there are no certificates. They are all digital entries on a server. Since the 1998 law deregulated the certificates, reporting is limited or nonexistent. The entries can be changed, erased, altered, amended or modified at will without any regulator or third party knowing. There is no paper trail. Thus the underwriter will say, if they were ever asked, whatever suits them and there is no way for anyone to confirm or rebut that. BUT in discovery, the investors have standing to ask to see the records of such transactions. That is when the underwriter settles for several hundred million or more.
 *
They discount the settlement based upon “market” values and by settling for pennies on the dollar with small community banks who do not have resources to fight. Thus if they received $2 billion for a particular “securitized pool” that is allocated to a named trust they will instantly make about 10-20 times the normal underwriting fee by merely taking money before or after the money hits the DDP. Money is paid to the investors as long as sales of certificates are robust. Hence the DDP is constantly receiving and disbursing money from many more sources than a fixed group of homeowners or investors.
 *
It is all about gaps and absences. If a debt was properly securitized, the investor would pay money to the underwriter in exchange for ownership of a certificate. The money would then be subject to fees paid to the underwriter and sellers of the certificates. The balance would be paid into a trust account on which the signatory would be a trust officer of the Trustee bank.
 *
If a scheme is played, then the money does not go into the trust. It goes to the DDP. From there the money is funneled through conduits to the closing table with the homeowner. By depositing the exact and expected amount of money into the trust account of the closing agent, neither the closing agent nor the homeowner understands that they are being played. They don’t even have enough information to arouse suspicion so that they can ask questions.
 *
Hence if you combine the proper securitization scheme with the improper one you see that the money is diverted from the so-called plan. This in turn causes the participants to fabricate documents if there is litigation. They MUST fabricate documents because if they produced real documents they would have civil and criminal liability for theft, embezzlement in investor litigation and fraud and perjury in foreclosure litigation.
 *
It is only by forcing a peek around the multiple layers of curtains fabricated by the players that you can reveal the absence of ownership, authority or even an economic interest — other than the loss of continued revenue from servicing and resales of the same loan through multiple investment vehicles whose value is completely derived from the presumed existence of a party who is the obligee of the debt (owner of the debt, or creditor).
 *
That party is the DDP — fund that is partially authorized for “reserve” and which the prospectus and trust instrument (PSA) state (1) that the mortgage loan schedule is not the real one and is presented as an example and (2) that the investors acknowledge that they might be paid from their own money from the “reserve.”
 *
The gap is that the DDP and the reserve are two different accounts. The “reserve” is a pool of money held in trust by, for example, U.S. Bank as trustee for the trust. There is no such account. The DDP is controlled by the underwriter but ownership is intentionally obscured to avoid or evade detection and the liability that would attach if the truth were revealed.
 *
We win cases not by proving theft from investors but by hammering on the fact that the documents are fabricated, which is true in virtually all cases involving a named trust. We will win a large award if we can show that the intended beneficiaries of the foreclosure were parties other than the obligee on the debt.
 *
Thus the attorneys, servicers and trustee are protecting their ill-gotten gains and seeking to grab more money and property at the expense of the unnamed investors and homeowners. They are then transforming an expected revenue stream into the illusion of a secured debt owed not to the funding sources but to the intermediaries.
Go to LENDINGLIES for more help.

BLOOMBERG: Mortgage Crisis Still Unresolved, New Crisis Looming

No two financial crises are ever quite the same. The next one won’t be like the last. But history teaches lessons, and there’s no excuse for ignoring them.

Regulators have done a lot to reform the financial system since the 2008 crisis, but they still haven’t fixed the market where the trouble started: U.S. mortgages. It’s an omission they need to put right before the next crisis hits.

GO TO LENDINGLIES to order forms and services

Let us help you plan your answers, affirmative defenses, discovery requests and defense narrative:

954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult. You will make things a lot easier on us and yourself if you fill out the registration form. It’s free without any obligation. No advertisements, no restrictions.

Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.

Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

GO TO WWW.LENDINGLIES.COM OR https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies toschedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===================================

see https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04-30/america-s-mortgage-market-is-still-broken

David Shipley, Senior Editor for Bloomberg Views has hit the nail on the head. While there are some errors in his article, they are understandable.

He’s right when he says that the servicers lacked the necessary incentives and resources and still lack those incentives and resources. But when he talks about “delinquencies” he fails to grasp the fact that those “delinquencies” are based upon a debt that neither the servicer nor its client is authorized to administer.

This failure of perception is understandable. It is difficult to to accept the fact that the debt went up in smoke and therefore no creditor has authorized the administration or collection of the debt. It is challenging to accept the notion that the banks engineered this scheme so they could step in as if they were creditors without actually saying so.

But he gets very close when he says

Private-label mortgages (which aren’t guaranteed by the government) were packaged into securities with extremely poor mechanisms for deciding who — investors, packagers or lenders — would take responsibility for bad or fraudulent loans.

The whole idea was to make it unclear who would be injured by nonpayment of a debt. That was how the banks, as intermediaries, transformed themselves into apparent principals and how entities created the illusion of self proclaimed servicers. Or as Shipley puts it

The parties involved in securitizations became embroiled in legal battles about who owed what to whom — litigation that goes on to this day.

So even amongst the principals of the scheme coined as “securitization fail” (Adam Levitin) there is no agreement and in fact fierce court battles as to the identity of the injured party. In other words their pleadings in court constitute admissions that are inconsistent with the pleadings in foreclosure cases. If there is no identified party with injury then there is no legal standing.

What is clear now is that the money taken from investors was not used to fund REMIC trusts, that the REMIC Trusts never bought any debts and in fact never bought any of the dubious paper that was issued in connection with origination or transfer of the “loans.” Those investors were largely not becoming beneficiaries of the trust; instead they were becoming creditors of the trust.

Knowing that, investors are stuck — if they blow the whistle on the diversion of their money into a completely different “investment” than the one they thought they were buying, they are undermining their potential claim based upon the “security” offered by the mortgages. And they are undercutting the value of the certificates they bought. That is what threatens a large segment of the shadow banking market.

The fix that Shipley thinks should happen will never come to fruition because the government has been convinced that a fix would eviscerate the shadow banking market where derivatives are traded. Nobody knows what the outcome will be if that market fails.

But in the meanwhile current policy reflects a decision to let investors and borrowers take the entire brunt of the scheme that ultimately left the banks in solid control and rising profits despite small settlements compared to the amount of money siphoned out of the US economy. So the Federal reserve and American taxpayers continue the bailout by lending support to the false presumption that the RMBS derivatives are based upon mortgage loans owned by a trust.

Shipley narrowly misses the point when he says

Advancing payments to investors when loans go delinquent — a core responsibility of servicers — demands a lot of cash. It also requires ample capital to absorb possible losses on servicing rights, an asset whose value can quickly evaporate if defaults and prepayments eat into expected fees.

Think about it. Why would a company guarantee payments from a third party? Who would take that risk on loans known to be at best fragile? Where is the money coming from to make those payments? Is it really the “servicer.” And if the money is “recovered” as “servicer advances” when the property is liquidated, is the foreclosure really a disguised suit to force the recovery of servicer advances rather than a true foreclosure — contrary to the interests of the certificate holders?

And if Ocwen was actually entitled to receive and expected to receive recovery of servicer advances why would it be teetering on the edge of bankruptcy? The more likely scenario is that subservicers like Ocwen have nothing at all to do with servicer advances. They don’t make them, they don’t initiate them and they don’t collect them. The Wall Street playbook has the real puppet masters hidden behind several layers of curtains. Ocwen, like so many others, is just there to get tossed under the bus to make people happy that they extracted a pound of flesh — except there was no skin in the game.

Deloitte and Touche Pays $149.5 Million Settling Claims of Audit Failure of Taylor Bean and Whittaker

One of the first cases I ever handled involved TBW in 2008. As usual they filed a lost note count in their foreclosure complaint. And as is required, they offered to indemnify the homeowner if someone else showed up with the original note. With financial firms dropping left and right, my position was two fold: (1) that an indemnification from a firm that was clearly in trouble as reported in the news was of dubious value and (2) that even if that wasn’t the case neither their complaint  nor their affidavit recited any facts about when the loss occurred, who was in possession of the note, whether the possessor had rights to enforce when the note was “lost” etc. TBW folded, went into bankruptcy shortly thereafter and its principals went to prison.

But throwing TBW under the bus, as much as they deserved it, takes nothing away from the fact that everyone was doing what they did. The only difference was they got caught and could not effectively indemnify the homeowner in the event they were lying about the possession of the original note — something that as proven beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal trial of the execs..

Let us help you plan your discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.
Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.
Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Hat tip to Dan Edstrom

see  Multiple Sales of Same Loans Force Auditor to Cough Up $149.5 Million

PR shows like this one became one of the ways that the banks were able to throw a curtain over the real customs and practices of the industry — most of which were virtually identical to TBW. The impression from the collapse and prosecution of TBW and its executives implies that this was an unusual event — selling the same “loan” multiple times.

But close examination of the many claims of securitization of debt shows that exactly the same thing was happening in the rest of the industry. In fact, that is where the enormous “profits” came from as reported from their “trading desks.” The only difference is that TBW was blatant about it by using copies of notes that were repeatedly sold, not once, but multiple times.

The leverage of making multiple sales went to ridiculous heights — 42 times in the case of Bear Stearns mortgage related activities. Yes you read that right. That $200,000 loan produced around $8 million in “profit.” Of course none of this was disclosed to the borrower whose name and financial reputation would be used directly or indirectly to accomplish these “sales.” They did it by hiding behind “derivative” documents rather than the actual loan documents, but they also did what TBW did. But while TBW was exclusively faking sales, investment banks mixed up the process such that, if caught, they would be able to say that some of these things happened because of a failure of controls and that they will now correct it.

As the MBS marketplace slowed down and had some hiccups many of the contracts or derivatives came due and Bear Stearns simply didn’t have the money to honor them despite the enormous “profits” earned earlier. This also is a possible indicator that leverage was even higher than what has been reported. As the buying frenzy slowed down and investors suddenly became aware that they were holding certificates issued by entities that didn’t exist and were never active, the buying stopped — and like any Ponzi scheme, the entire infrastructure came crashing down.

Practice Note: So what all of this means is that questions should be posed to parties who file foreclosure actions. But you need to wade through the multiple servicers and multiple “assignees” and multiple “endorsees” and multiple “Underwriters of bogus RMBS to ask the simple question: how many contracts or securities have been issued with the respect to the subject loan? It’s relevant because it is asking whether the foreclosing party has sold its rights to an undisclosed third party. In 99% of all cases, the “REMIC Trust” was never used and the underwriter has already entered into various contracts, sales, and issued “derivatives” in which the PAPER was sold but the underlying debt, if it still exists, was never subject to any transfer, contract or derivative.

Financial Industry Caught with Its Hand in the Cookie Jar

Like the infamous NINJA loans, the REMICs ought to be dubbed NEITs — nonexistent inactive trusts.

The idea of switching lenders without permission of the borrower has been accepted for centuries. But the idea of switching borrowers without permission of the “lender” had never been accepted until the era of false claims of securitization.

This is just one example of how securitization, in practice, has gone far off the rails. It is significant to students of securitization because it demonstrates how the debt, note and mortgage have been separated with each being a commodity to sell to multiple buyers.

Let us help you analyze your case: 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

see https://asreport.americanbanker.com/news/new-risk-for-loan-investors-lending-to-a-different-company

Leveraged loan investors are now concerned about whether they are funding a loan to one entity and then “by succession” ending up with another borrower with a different credit profile, reputation, etc. You can’t make this stuff up. This is only possible because the debt has been separated from the promissory note — the same way the debt, note and mortgage were treated as entirely separate commodities in the “securitization” of residential mortgage debt. The lack of connection between the paper and the debt has allowed borrowers to sell or transfer their position as borrower to another borrower leaving the “lender” holding a debt from a new borrower. This sounds crazy but it is nevertheless true. [I am NOT suggesting that individual homeowners try this. It won’t work]

Keep in mind that most certificates issued by investment bankers purportedly from nonexistent inactive trusts (call them NEITs instead of REMICs) contain an express provision that states in clear unequivocal language that the holder of the certificate has no right, title or interest to the underlying notes and mortgages. This in effect creates a category of defrauded investors using much the same logic as the use of MERS in which MERS expressly disclaims and right, title or interest in the money (i.e., the debt), or the mortgages that reregistered by third party “members.”

Of course those of us who understand this cloud of smoke and mirrors know that the securitization was never real. The single transaction rule used in tax cases establishes conclusively that the only real parties in interest are the investors and the borrowers. Everyone else is simply an intermediary with no more interest in any transaction than your depository bank has when you write a check on your account. The bank can’t assert ownership of the TV you just paid for. But if you separate the maker of the check from the seller of the goods so that neither knows of the existence of the other then the intermediary is free to make whatever false claims it seeks to make.

In the world of fake securitization or as Adam Levitin has coined it, “Securitization Fail”, the successors did not pay for the debt but did get the paper (note and mortgage or deed of trust). All the real monetary transactions took place outside the orbit of the falsely identified REMIC “Trust.” The debt, by law and custom, has always been considered to arise between Party A and Party B where one of them is the borrower and the other is the one who put the money into the hands of the borrower acting for its own account — or for a disclosed third party lender. In most cases the creditor in that transaction is not named as the lender on the promissory note. Hence the age-old “merger doctrine” does not apply.

This practice allows the sale and resale of the same loan multiple times to multiple parties. This practice is also designed to allow the underwriter to issue investors a promise to pay (the “certificate” from a nonexistent inactive trust entity) that conveys no interest in the underlying mortgages and notes that supposedly are being acquired.

It’s true that equitable and perhaps legal rights to the paper (i.e., ownership) have attached to the paper. But the paper has been severed from the debt. Courts have inappropriately ignored this fact and stuck with the presumption that the paper is the same as the debt. But that would only be true if the named payee or mortgagee (or beneficiary on a Deed of Trust) were one and the same. In the real world, they are not the same. Thus we parties who don’t own the debt foreclosing on houses because the real parties in interest have no idea how to identify the real parties in interest.

While the UCC addresses situations like this Courts have routinely ignored statutory law and simply applied their own “common sense” to a nearly incomprehensible situation. The result is that the courts apply legal presumptions of facts that are wrong.

PRACTICE NOTE: In order to be able to litigate properly one must understand the basics of fake securitization. Without understanding the difference between real world transactions and paper instruments discovery and trial narrative become corrupted and the homeowner loses. But if you keep searching for things that ought to exist but don’t — thus undercutting the foundation for testimony at deposition or trial — then your chances of winning rise geometrically. The fact is, as I said in many interviews and on this blog as far back as 2007, they don’t have the goods — all they have is an illusion — a holographic image of an empty paper bag.

Fact Check: Robo-witness knows nothing

Information is admitted in evidence only after a proper foundation has been laid. If the witness knows nothing about the foundation the evidence should not be admitted as evidence. Appellate courts will usually reverse a trial court’s error in ruling on evidence UNLESS the appellate panel decides that the error would not have made any difference in the outcome. The fundamental fact at the root of all foreclosures is that the homeowner owes a debt to the foreclosing party and has not paid.

In the passage below a witness supposedly employed by US Bank displays a lack of personal knowledge on anything that would contribute to foundation for establishing the standing of the foreclosing party. I have inserted in brackets the significance of each answer of an actual witness in a court proceeding.

Let us help you prepare for deposition or trial: 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Hat tip Bill Paatalo

Videoconference deposition of JOHN G. RICHARDS,II

Would you please provide your official title for
11 the record.
12 A Yes, I’m the vice president at U.S. Bank within
13 the global corporate trust services group. [The problem that was overlooked here is that his title is not foundation for establishing the existence of a trust that is managed by US Bank as Trustee. Additional questions regarding the existence of any account that is under trust management by US Bank would have revealed lack of knowledge because the witnesses are not given any information that could be used by the homeowner or counsel for the homeowner. In truths I have repeatedly pointed out, if you proceed under the assumption that there is no “account” in existence under which Trust assets are managed for the benefit of beneficiaries, all the pieces fall into place. There is no Trustee because there is nothing that has been entrusted to the trustee for the benefit of beneficiaries. Thus parties claiming authority “from the Trust” to serve as services or master servicers lack any foundation to support the assertion of that authority. This is why no modification is signed by anyone other than the servicer acting as attorney in fact for the purported Trust or other foreclosing party.]

——————

Q I see. Do you know who the beneficiaries are of

10 the WaMu trust?

11 A I do not know the specific beneficiaries — or I

12 would call them certificate holders. I don’t know the

13 identity of those investors or certificate holders. [Here is US Bank whom the attorneys have named as the foreclosing party. The witness is supposedly someone who knows about the USB trust arrangement for a REMIC Trust. Yet on the most basic questions about the existence of a trust — the existence of beneficiaries, he is unable to answer the question regarding their identity. A trust without beneficiaries is not a trust   — i.e., it is not an legal entity. In fact he is saying that there are no beneficiaries but that there are certificate holders. He can’t identify either the beneficiaries or the certificate holders. Note also that he knows nothing about the “certificates, which in most cases expressly state that the holder is NOT entitled to an interest in the loan, debt, note or mortgage. What they have is a promise to pay them money coming from a nonexistent trust.]

14 Q That’s fine. And because you don’t know, do you

15 know who would know or is there a list?

16 A I do not know specifically if there is a list

17 that would have the names of actual individuals or

18 entities who are certificate holders. [This further erodes the foundation for proving that the trust exists, the beneficiaries exist or the certificate holders exist. More importantly it is an admission that even a list of the certificate holders might not exist — thus corroborating a central point on this blog — that the money never went into the trust and that instead it was commingled with the money of other investors in a different entity altogether. I have referred to this scenario as a dark pool or slush fund in which the underwriting banks (who appoint themselves as Master Servicers) take charge of the investor funds instead of the money being administered by a Trust. Remember that in 2008-2009, the banks and servicers were asserting that such Trusts did not exist. That was probably a true statement in that the Trust was never an active trust and the trustee was never an active trustee.] 

19 It is common for many of these certificates to

20 be held. I’m not sure the exact way to hold it, but

21 something that is significant amount to brokerage or some

22 other place for the general holding of investment

23 securities. [He is referring to the practice of holding securities in street name — i.e., in the name of the brokerage house that allegedly completed the transaction on behalf of the investor. This enables the investment banking entity to assert ownership of the certificates for title purposes while supposedly holding the certificates for investors, the only evidence of which would be the end of month brokerage statement telling the investors that they own the rights to certificates even though the certificates are not in their name. Of course the rub here is that most certificates are uncertificated — merely computer entries. But that doesn’t mean that there isn’t a master certificate in electronic or paper form. The witness is saying he doesn’t know where such certificates are held, by whom or for what purpose] It’s a company called DTC that serves that

24 function just generally in the industry. But I don’t

25 have information about the identity of the specific certificate holders.

2 Q So you’re saying that this entity, DTC, holds

3 that information who would know?

4 MS. DARNELL: Objection. Calls for speculation.

5 THE WITNESS: I don’t know. I think I’m using

6 that as an example of sort of how these certificates are

7 commonly held and the entity that might be positioned to

8 communicate with actual certificate holders.

Q So does the trust actually communicate directly

11 with the certificate holders?

12 A I am not familiar with the — with any direct

13 communication between U.S. Bank as trustee for this trust

14 and certificate holders on an individual basis. I’m not

15 familiar with that at all. [This is as close as you will get to the admission that there is no active Trustee and there is no active Trust. If there is no communication or no knowledge of communication between the Trustee and the certificate holders then it is an inescapable conclusion that there is no activity in the alleged REMIC Trust. If there was such activity within the Trust it would need to be disclosed to the “beneficiaries” or “certificate holders.” There isn’t. The master servicer sends out a distribution report with the disclaimer that none of the information on the distribution report has been verified and could be entirely wrong.]

———————

23 Q So with respect to it being vague and

24 ambiguous — and I just want to clarify. Do you manage

25 Chase as the servicer of the trust?

A I would not describe that there is any kind of

2 management or oversight role by the trustee of a servicer

3 in this trust or any other. [So the party claimed to be the servicer is not managed by and need not report to the party named as the Trustee — thus further establishing that the Trustee is inactive and the “trust” is a sham. If there is no “kind of management or oversight role by the trustee of a servicer” then who directs the “servicer” on the distribution of the money collected from homeowners? Some document must exist that is not being produced in court. It would be a document that establishes the duties and responsibilities of the subservicer. It would be executed by the “Servicer” and the Master Servicer but kept secret because the document would establish, once and for all, that for all purposes other than foreclosure the parties conduct business as though the trust did not exist.]

Given the above testimony and commentary, the testimony of the witness should not be admitted into evidence at trial. The reason is lack of foundation. Proper objections on foundation, leading, and hearsay must be repeatedly raised or else the testimony, however riddled with untruth, will be admitted because the objection was” waived” by failing to raise it timely. If the objections are sustained and the witness has managed to spew out an answer as you were objecting then a motion to strike is absolutely required lest the objectionable testimony remain in the record. As Plan B, bring these things out in cross examination and then move to strike the testimony.

 

 

Banks Fighting Subpoenas From FHFA Over Access to Loan Files

Whilst researching something else I ran across the following article first published in 2010. Upon reading it, it bears repeating.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

WHAT IF THE LOANS WERE NOT ACTUALLY SECURITIZED?

In a nutshell this is it. The Banks are fighting the subpoenas because if there is actually an audit of the “content” of the pools, they are screwed across the board.

My analysis of dozens of pools has led me to several counter-intuitive but unavoidable factual conclusions. I am certain the following is correct as to all residential securitized loans with very few (2-4%) exceptions:

  1. Most of the pools no longer exist.
  2. The MBS sold to investors and insured by AIG and the purchase and sale of credit default swaps were all premised on a general description of the content of the pool rather than a detailed description with the individual loans attached on a list.
  3. Each Prospectus if it carried any spreadsheet listing loans, contained a caveat that the attached list was by example only and not the real loans.
  4. Each distribution report contained a caveat that the parties who created it and the parties who delivered it did not guarantee either authenticity or reliability of the report. They even had specific admonitions regarding the content of the distribution report.
  5. NO LOAN ACTUALLY MADE IT INTO ANY POOL. The evidence is clear: nothing was done to assign, indorse or deliver the note to the investors directly or indirectly until a case went into litigation AND a hearing was scheduled. By that time the cutoff date had been breached and the loan was non-performing by their own allegation and therefore was not acceptable into the pool.
  6. AT ALL TIMES LEGAL TITLE TO THE PROPERTY WAS MAINTAINED BY THE HOMEOWNER EVEN AFTER FORECLOSURE AND SALE. The actual creditor who submitted a credit bid was not the creditor. The sale is either void or voidable.
  7. AT ALL TIMES LEGAL TITLE TO THE LOAN WAS MAINTAINED BY THE ORIGINATING “LENDER”. Since there was no assignment, indorsement or delivery that could be recognized at law or in fact, the originating lender still owns the loan legally BUT….
  8. AT ALL TIMES THE OBLIGATION WAS BOTH CREATED AND EXTINGUISHED AT, OR CONTEMPORANEOUSLY WITH THE CLOSING OF THE LOAN. Since the originating lender was in fact not the source of funds, and did not book the transaction as a loan on their balance sheet (in most cases), the naming of the originating lender as the Lender and payee on the note, both created a LEGAL obligation from the borrower to the Lender and at the same time, the LEGAL obligation was extinguished because the LEGAL Lender of record was paid in full plus exorbitant fees for pretending to be an actual lender.
  9. Since the Legal obligation was both created and extinguished contemporaneously with each other, any remaining obligation to any OTHER party became unsecured since the security instrument (mortgage or deed of trust) refers only to the promissory note executed by the borrower.
  10. At the time of closing, the investor-lenders were the real parties in interest as lenders, but they were not disclosed nor were the fees of the various intermediaries who brought the investor-lender money and the borrower’s loan together.
  11. ALL INVESTOR-LENDERS RECEIVED THE EQUIVALENT OF A BOND — A PROMISE TO PAY ISSUED BY A PARTY OTHER THAN THE BORROWER, PREMISED UPON THE PAYMENT OR RECEIVABLES GENERATED FROM BORROWER PAYMENTS, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS, CREDIT ENHANCEMENTS, AND THIRD PARTY INSURANCE.
  12. Nearly ALL investor-lenders have been paid sums of money to satisfy the promise to pay contained in the bond. These payments always exceeded the borrowers payments and in many cases paid the obligation in full WITHOUT SUBROGATION.
  13. NO LOAN IS IN ACTUAL DEFAULT OR DELINQUENCY. Since payments must first be applied to outstanding payments due, payments received by investor-lenders or their agents from third party sources are allocable to each individual loan and therefore cure the alleged default. A Borrower’s Non-payment is not a default since no payment is due.
  14. ALL NOTICES OF DEFAULT ARE DEFECTIVE: The amount stated, the creditor, and other material misstatements invalidate the effectiveness of such a notice.
  15. NO CREDIT BID AT AUCTION WAS MADE BY A CREDITOR. Hence the sale is void or voidable.
  16. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO DEDUCTIONS FOR THIRD PARTY PAYMENTS.
  17. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO AN EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT THAT IS UNSECURED.
  18. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO AN EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR A LIEN TO REFLECT THE INTENTION OF THE INVESTOR-LENDER AND THE INTENTION OF THE BORROWER.  Both the investor-lender and the borrower intended to complete a loan transaction wherein the home was used to collateralize the amount due. The legal satisfaction of the originating lender is not a deduction from the equitable satisfaction of the investor-lender. THUS THE PARTIES SEEKING TO FORECLOSE ARE SUBJECT TO THE LEGAL DEFENSE OF PAYMENT AT CLOSING BUT THE INVESTOR-LENDERS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THAT DEFENSE.
  19. The investor-lenders ALSO have a claim for damages against the investment banks and the string of intermediaries that caused loans to be originated that did not meet the description contained in the prospectus.
  20. Any claim by investor-lenders may be subject to legal and equitable defenses, offsets and counterclaims from the borrower.
  21. The current modification context in which the securitization intermediaries are involved in settlement of outstanding mortgages is allowing those intermediaries to make even more money at the expense of the investor-lenders.
  22. The failure of courts to recognize that they must apply the rule of law results not only in the foreclosure of the property, but the foreclosure of the borrower’s ability to negotiate a settlement with an undisclosed equitable creditor, or with the legal owner of the loan in the property records.

Loan File Issue Brought to Forefront By FHFA Subpoena
Posted on July 14, 2010 by Foreclosureblues
Wednesday, July 14, 2010

foreclosureblues.wordpress.com

Editor’s Note….Even  U.S. Government Agencies have difficulty getting
discovery, lol…This is another excellent post from attorney Isaac
Gradman, who has the blog here…http://subprimeshakeout.blogspot.com.
He has a real perspective on the legal aspect of the big picture, and
is willing to post publicly about it.  Although one may wonder how
these matters may effect them individually, my point is that every day
that goes by is another day working in favor of those who stick it out
and fight for what is right.

Loan File Issue Brought to Forefront By FHFA Subpoena

The battle being waged by bondholders over access to the loan files
underlying their investments was brought into the national spotlight
earlier this week, when the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the
regulator in charge of overseeing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, issued
64 subpoenas seeking documents related to the mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) in which Freddie and Fannie had invested.
The FHFA
has been in charge of overseeing Freddie and Fannie since they were
placed into conservatorship in 2008.

Freddie and Fannie are two of the largest investors in privately
issued bonds–those secured by subprime and Alt-A loans that were often
originated by the mortgage arms of Wall St. firms and then packaged
and sold by those same firms to investors–and held nearly $255 billion
of these securities as of the end of May. The FHFA said Monday that it
is seeking to determine whether issuers of these so-called “private
label” MBS misled Freddie and Fannie into making the investments,
which have performed abysmally so far, and are expected to result in
another $46 billion in unrealized losses to the Government Sponsored
Entities (GSE).

Though the FHFA has not disclosed the targets of its subpoenas, the
top issuers of private label MBS include familiar names such as
Countrywide and Merrill Lynch (now part of BofA), Bear Stearns and
Washington Mutual (now part of JP Morgan Chase), Deutsche Bank and
Morgan Stanley. David Reilly of the Wall Street Journal has written an
article urging banks to come forward and disclose whether they have
received subpoenas from the FHFA, but I’m not holding my breath.

The FHFA issued a press release on Monday regarding the subpoenas
(available here). The statement I found most interesting in the
release discusses that, before and after conservatorship, the GSEs had
been attempting to acquire loan files to assess their rights and
determine whether there were misrepresentations and/or breaches of
representations and warranties by the issuers of the private label
MBS, but that, “difficulty in obtaining the loan documents has
presented a challenge to the [GSEs’] efforts. FHFA has therefore
issued these subpoenas for various loan files and transaction
documents pertaining to loans securing the [private label MBS] to
trustees and servicers controlling or holding that documentation.”

The FHFA’s Acting Director, Edward DeMarco, is then quoted as saying
““FHFA is taking this action consistent with our responsibilities as
Conservator of each Enterprise. By obtaining these documents we can
assess whether contractual violations or other breaches have taken
place leading to losses for the Enterprises and thus taxpayers. If so,
we will then make decisions regarding appropriate actions.” Sounds
like these subpoenas are just the precursor to additional legal
action.

The fact that servicers and trustees have been stonewalling even these

powerful agencies on loan files should come as no surprise based on

the legal battles private investors have had to wage thus far to force

banks to produce these documents. And yet, I’m still amazed by the

bald intransigence displayed by these financial institutions. After

all, they generally have clear contractual obligations requiring them

to give investors access to the files (which describe the very assets

backing the securities), not to mention the implicit discovery rights

these private institutions would have should the dispute wind up in

court, as it has in MBIA v. Countrywide and scores of other investor

suits.

At this point, it should be clear to everyone–servicers and investors
alike–that the loan files will have to be produced eventually, so the
only purpose I can fathom for the banks’ obduracy is delay. The loan
files should, as I’ve said in the past, reveal the depths of mortgage
originator depravity, demonstrating convincingly that the loans never
should have been issued in the first place. This, in turn, will force
banks to immediately reserve for potential losses associated with
buying back these defective mortgages. Perhaps banks are hoping that
they can ward off this inevitability long enough to spread their
losses out over several years, thereby weathering the storm caused (in
part) by their irresponsible lending practices. But certainly the
FHFA’s announcement will make that more difficult, as the FHFA’s
inherent authority to subpoena these documents (stemming from the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008) should compel disclosure
without the need for litigation, and potentially provide sufficient
evidence of repurchase obligations to compel the banks to reserve
right away. For more on this issue, see the fascinating recent guest
post by Manal Mehta on The Subprime Shakeout regarding the SEC’s
investigation into banks’ processes for allocating loss reserves.

Meanwhile, the investor lawsuits continue to rain down on banks, with
suits by the Charles Schwab Corp. against Merrill Lynch and UBS, by
the Oregon Public Employee Retirement Fund against Countrywide, and by
Cambridge Place Investment Management against Goldman Sachs, Citigroup
and dozens of other banks and brokerages being announced this week. If
the congealing investor syndicate was looking for political cover
before staging a full frontal attack on banks, this should provide
ample protection. Much more to follow on these and other developments
in the coming days…
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Posted by Isaac Gradman at 3:46 PM

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