Wells Fargo “Explains” Securitization

YOU NEED AN INFINITE NUMBER OF BASES AND PLAYERS TO PLAY BALL WITH THESE GUYS: The Trustee controls the trust as trustee. Oops, wait, it is the Master Servicer who has all the control. No, wait again, it is the subservicer who has the right to administer the loan. But actually if there is an alleged default it is the special servicer who has exclusive authority over decision making. Except that the “Controlling Class” has the last say in the matter. But actually it is the Controlling Class Representative who has the last word.

I have always felt that there must be some way to force the other side into approving a modification or at least providing access by the borrower to the “lender” to discuss or negotiate the matter. I still believe that. Maybe this article will help spur some ideas. Information is leverage, especially in the world of false claims of securitization.

 

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Hat Tip Bill Paatalo

see Wells Fargo Document – No Lender in Remics

Essentially the banks would have us believe that by magic they created loans without owners or holders in due course. So it might as well be the banks who foreclose under any pretense they choose to offer. The political decision was to let them do it for fear that the banks would bring down the entire system. But if that were true, the bank’s capital would be worthless as would every world currency including the dollar. They bluffed Presidents Bush and Obama and the Presidents blinked. Millions of foreclosures followed because the ordinary guy is just not that important even if it involves a substantial portion of a population.

I will provide my comments and suggestions for discovery or cross examination along with each statement in the above cited article. Keep in mind that the entire article is an exercise in deceit: It is assuming that securitization actually happened. If that were true then they would be more than happy to show that the subject loan was purchased on a certain date by the payment of value to a specific seller by a trust. The trust would then be a holder in due course. But as we have seen numerous times nobody ever refers to the trust as a holder in due course which can only mean there was no such purchase.

The indented portions are direct quotes from the WFDb article cited above.

The thing most borrowers fail to realize about conduit loans is that once a loan has been securitized, they are not working with a “lender” anymore.

That’s the first sentence of the “explanation.” And the first thing that pops out is “conduit loans.” What is a conduit loan? Is the subject loan a conduit loan? In what way is the subject loan a conduit loan? [This also corroborates what I have been writing for years — that Matt Taibbi (Rolling Stone Magazine) got it right when he describes securitization as a monster with multiple tentacles.]

There is no legal definition for a conduit loan. The banks would have us believe that if they present any tentacle, that is sufficient for them to foreclose on a loan. But that isn’t legal standing — it is fraud on the court. A loan is a loan, but Wall Street banks don’t want you thinking about that. But by calling it something different it immediately plays into the bias of the court assuming that the big banks know what they are doing and that only they can explain what is going on.

Corroborating my description of the “Conduit”: remark, WFB explains that you are not dealing with a lender anymore. Is that supposed to make us feel better? There is no lender? Was there ever a lender? If, yes, then please identify the party who loaned their money to the borrower.

Now this on servicer advances:

If a loan becomes delinquent, the Master Servicer is usually obligated to make the first three or four payments to the certificate holders as well as pay trust expenses on delinquent assets…

The Master Servicer is reimbursed when the borrower makes up the payment or when the property goes into foreclosure and is later sold.

So we are being told that the Master Servicer is making payments to investors regardless of whether the borrower makes any payment. First, the payments to investors are made by the Master Servicer because they are the only one with access to a giant slush fund or dark pool created out of money that should have a gone to each trust and been maintained as a trust account, administered by the trustee.

But it is true that the Master Servicer gets paid for the “servicer advances” when the property is sold. So if the investors received 12 months of payments (of at least interest), even though it was taken out of a reserve pool (read the prospectus) consisting of their own money, the Master Servicer gets paid as though it was a reimbursement when in fact it is a windfall. Needless to say the incentive is to let the case languish for years before foreclosure and sale take place.

The longer the time period between the alleged default and the sale of the property, the more money is received by the Master Servicer as “reimbursement” for money it never advanced.

The Special Servicer makes all final decisions about dispositions of defaulted property and Real Estate Owned (REO). Often they are also the holders of the “first loss pieces” of the pool. Because they are taking the most risk, as part of their agreement to take that risk, they usually insist on being the Special Servicer as a requirement of their investment. There are only a handful of special servicers in the country.

Really? So the Master Servicer, the subservicer and the Trustee of the alleged REMIC trust have no say in whether to work out or modify a loan that is economically not feasible but which could be feasible if there was a workout or modification. What is a first loss piece of the pool? What is the account name of the pool supposedly held in a bank somewhere? Does the account name match the alleged REMIC trust in any way? Is there an account administered by the Trustee? Does the Trustee get performance reports or end of month statements?

Oops wait! There are other people with special powers —

The PSA also designates a “Controlling Class” who will provide input on recommendations for Special Serviced Loans and REO.

If the Special Servicer is willing to extend the loan, they have to get permission from the Controlling Class Representative (CCR), who is a fiduciary for all the certificate holders.

Anyone who has seen that famous but from Abbot and Costello in the 1950’s understands what is happening here. The Trustee controls the trust as trustee. Oops, wait, it is the Master Servicer who has all the control. No, wait again, it is the subservicer who has the right to administer the loan. But actually if there is an alleged default it is the special servicer who as exclusive authority over decision making. Except that the “Controlling Class” has the last say in the matter. But actually it is the Controlling Class Representative who has the last word.

So in discovery ask which of those entities was contacted about modification and why the borrower was instructed to send the application and documents to the subservicer when the subservicer had no authority?

And let’s not forget the fact that the certificate holders have no right, title or interest in the loans, the debt , the note or the mortgage. So their “Fiduciary” (who apparently is not the Trustee of the alleged Trust) does what?  How do we contact these intermediaries to whom powers and obligations of a trustee are passed around like free money? How do we know if the subservicer is telling the truth when it reports that the “investor” turned down the settlement or modification.

And by the way, why do we not have recording of the modification agreement? Why does not the Trustee of the REMIC Trust sign the modification agreement? Instead it is ALWAYS the signature of the servicer who, as we already know, has no power to accept or deny requests for modifications — and of course it is never recorded in county records. Why?

Remember, there are no “pockets of money” to use for refinance. Special Servicers, although legally allowed by the PSA to forgive any portion of the debt, rarely do so because often that would negatively affect one or more of the bondholders at the expense of the others. Instead, the Special Servicer, on behalf of the conduit, will almost always foreclose and sell the asset.

Hmmmm. So the Special Servicer (and the CCR?) ordinarily chooses to drive down the price of the collateral and take a larger loss on the subject loan because it “would negatively affect one or more of the bondholders at the expense of the others.” But the principal reduction would positively affect some bond holders more than others by saving the collateral. So exactly what are they saying as Wells Fargo Bank about the roles and rules of securitization?

And lastly, why did WFB task authors to write about this when their experience is limited to manufactured home communities? Probably the same reason why robo-witnesses know nothing.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ocwen Admission Confounds Judges and Experts

This is a blatant attempt at deception  — a deceit without which none of the Trusts would be recognized as legal entities much less the owner of loans. Ocwen is admitting that there is no single owner of the loan it is allegedly “servicing.” “There is no single owner of the account, but rather the account is one of many in a securitized investment trust.”

For the uninitiated, this statement might suffice or at least be threatening enough as a challenge to their experience and intelligence to direct them away from the central false assertion that the trusts own any loan. They don’t.

Let us help you prepare for deposition or trial: 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Hat Tip Bill Paatalo

see Ocwen Responsive Letter – CFPB – 11-03-2017

In this real live case, Ocwen is fulfilling its job that includes obfuscation as one of its paramount duties. After first “answering” the CFPB requests with obfuscation it then states “The ownership status of the account is based upon our review of our records as of the date of this letter.” It doesn’t say that the information is correct or even believed to be correct. It doesn’t say they performed due diligence to determine whether a true chain of ownership exists, combing the various records of “predecessors.”

Nor is there a statement that Ocwen is authorized to service the account. It simply says that it IS servicing the account. And of course then they do not assert the basis of their authority since they never asserted their authority. It is implied. It is assumed. In court, it might well be presumed by the court, the foreclosure mill attorney and even by the borrower and the borrower’s attorney. This is one of the errors that snatches defeat from the jaws of victory. An attack on what is missing instead of trying to dodge what is there would result in far more victories for homeowners.

The attorney’s client is Ocwen. Ocwen is impliedly asserting authority to service but can’t show it. In one recent case of mine, they came in with a Power of Attorney signed by someone who purportedly executed the instrument on behalf of Chase. The problem was that Chase was never mentioned before in any pleading, documents or testimony. The POA was false.

Back to ownership: “there is no single owner” implies that there are many owners. There are several problems with that assertion or implication that involve outright lying. Ocwen is saying that the loan is in a securitized investment trust which certainly would imply that the loan is not in transit nor is it owned by more than one trust.

Further if the reference (omitted) is to investors, that too is a lie in most cases. The certificate indenture usually contains the express statement that the holder of the certificate receives no right, title or interest to the debt, note or mortgage in “underlying” loans (which have never been acquired by the trust anyway).

So what are we left with? No single owner which means that the securitized investment trust doesn’t own it because that is one single entity. Multiple owners does not refer to investors because the express provisions on their certificates say they have no ownership of the debt, note or mortgage in the alleged loan.

The counterintuitive answer is that the bank’s are saying there is no owner. But there is an owner. It is a group of investors whose money was used to fund or acquire the loan. This was not done through any trust, as they intended and as was required by the “securitization” documents. If that was the case then the trust would have been named as lender or as holder in due course. That never happened.

But the holders of worthless securities can claim an equitable interest in the loan and perhaps even the collateral. In order to establish that interest the investors must go to a court of competent jurisdiction. But in order to do that the investors must know about the specific loan transaction(s), which they don’t. The fact that they don’t know about it and can’t exercise their rights does not mean that legally, anyone can intervene and assert ownership rights.

Ten years ago I said get rid of the current servicers and stick a government agency in as intermediary so that investors, as real parties in interest and borrowers as real parties in interest could do what the lending industry normally does best — work this out so that nobody loses everything and nobody gets a windfall. This could have all been over years ago and the impact on the economy would have been a powerful stimulus leaving no inherent weakness in our economy or our currency.

Unfortunately the courts strayed from making legal decisions and instead made a political decision to save the banking industry at the expense of homeowners.

 

 

 

Fact Check: Robo-witness knows nothing

Information is admitted in evidence only after a proper foundation has been laid. If the witness knows nothing about the foundation the evidence should not be admitted as evidence. Appellate courts will usually reverse a trial court’s error in ruling on evidence UNLESS the appellate panel decides that the error would not have made any difference in the outcome. The fundamental fact at the root of all foreclosures is that the homeowner owes a debt to the foreclosing party and has not paid.

In the passage below a witness supposedly employed by US Bank displays a lack of personal knowledge on anything that would contribute to foundation for establishing the standing of the foreclosing party. I have inserted in brackets the significance of each answer of an actual witness in a court proceeding.

Let us help you prepare for deposition or trial: 202-838-6345
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https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Hat tip Bill Paatalo

Videoconference deposition of JOHN G. RICHARDS,II

Would you please provide your official title for
11 the record.
12 A Yes, I’m the vice president at U.S. Bank within
13 the global corporate trust services group. [The problem that was overlooked here is that his title is not foundation for establishing the existence of a trust that is managed by US Bank as Trustee. Additional questions regarding the existence of any account that is under trust management by US Bank would have revealed lack of knowledge because the witnesses are not given any information that could be used by the homeowner or counsel for the homeowner. In truths I have repeatedly pointed out, if you proceed under the assumption that there is no “account” in existence under which Trust assets are managed for the benefit of beneficiaries, all the pieces fall into place. There is no Trustee because there is nothing that has been entrusted to the trustee for the benefit of beneficiaries. Thus parties claiming authority “from the Trust” to serve as services or master servicers lack any foundation to support the assertion of that authority. This is why no modification is signed by anyone other than the servicer acting as attorney in fact for the purported Trust or other foreclosing party.]

——————

Q I see. Do you know who the beneficiaries are of

10 the WaMu trust?

11 A I do not know the specific beneficiaries — or I

12 would call them certificate holders. I don’t know the

13 identity of those investors or certificate holders. [Here is US Bank whom the attorneys have named as the foreclosing party. The witness is supposedly someone who knows about the USB trust arrangement for a REMIC Trust. Yet on the most basic questions about the existence of a trust — the existence of beneficiaries, he is unable to answer the question regarding their identity. A trust without beneficiaries is not a trust   — i.e., it is not an legal entity. In fact he is saying that there are no beneficiaries but that there are certificate holders. He can’t identify either the beneficiaries or the certificate holders. Note also that he knows nothing about the “certificates, which in most cases expressly state that the holder is NOT entitled to an interest in the loan, debt, note or mortgage. What they have is a promise to pay them money coming from a nonexistent trust.]

14 Q That’s fine. And because you don’t know, do you

15 know who would know or is there a list?

16 A I do not know specifically if there is a list

17 that would have the names of actual individuals or

18 entities who are certificate holders. [This further erodes the foundation for proving that the trust exists, the beneficiaries exist or the certificate holders exist. More importantly it is an admission that even a list of the certificate holders might not exist — thus corroborating a central point on this blog — that the money never went into the trust and that instead it was commingled with the money of other investors in a different entity altogether. I have referred to this scenario as a dark pool or slush fund in which the underwriting banks (who appoint themselves as Master Servicers) take charge of the investor funds instead of the money being administered by a Trust. Remember that in 2008-2009, the banks and servicers were asserting that such Trusts did not exist. That was probably a true statement in that the Trust was never an active trust and the trustee was never an active trustee.] 

19 It is common for many of these certificates to

20 be held. I’m not sure the exact way to hold it, but

21 something that is significant amount to brokerage or some

22 other place for the general holding of investment

23 securities. [He is referring to the practice of holding securities in street name — i.e., in the name of the brokerage house that allegedly completed the transaction on behalf of the investor. This enables the investment banking entity to assert ownership of the certificates for title purposes while supposedly holding the certificates for investors, the only evidence of which would be the end of month brokerage statement telling the investors that they own the rights to certificates even though the certificates are not in their name. Of course the rub here is that most certificates are uncertificated — merely computer entries. But that doesn’t mean that there isn’t a master certificate in electronic or paper form. The witness is saying he doesn’t know where such certificates are held, by whom or for what purpose] It’s a company called DTC that serves that

24 function just generally in the industry. But I don’t

25 have information about the identity of the specific certificate holders.

2 Q So you’re saying that this entity, DTC, holds

3 that information who would know?

4 MS. DARNELL: Objection. Calls for speculation.

5 THE WITNESS: I don’t know. I think I’m using

6 that as an example of sort of how these certificates are

7 commonly held and the entity that might be positioned to

8 communicate with actual certificate holders.

Q So does the trust actually communicate directly

11 with the certificate holders?

12 A I am not familiar with the — with any direct

13 communication between U.S. Bank as trustee for this trust

14 and certificate holders on an individual basis. I’m not

15 familiar with that at all. [This is as close as you will get to the admission that there is no active Trustee and there is no active Trust. If there is no communication or no knowledge of communication between the Trustee and the certificate holders then it is an inescapable conclusion that there is no activity in the alleged REMIC Trust. If there was such activity within the Trust it would need to be disclosed to the “beneficiaries” or “certificate holders.” There isn’t. The master servicer sends out a distribution report with the disclaimer that none of the information on the distribution report has been verified and could be entirely wrong.]

———————

23 Q So with respect to it being vague and

24 ambiguous — and I just want to clarify. Do you manage

25 Chase as the servicer of the trust?

A I would not describe that there is any kind of

2 management or oversight role by the trustee of a servicer

3 in this trust or any other. [So the party claimed to be the servicer is not managed by and need not report to the party named as the Trustee — thus further establishing that the Trustee is inactive and the “trust” is a sham. If there is no “kind of management or oversight role by the trustee of a servicer” then who directs the “servicer” on the distribution of the money collected from homeowners? Some document must exist that is not being produced in court. It would be a document that establishes the duties and responsibilities of the subservicer. It would be executed by the “Servicer” and the Master Servicer but kept secret because the document would establish, once and for all, that for all purposes other than foreclosure the parties conduct business as though the trust did not exist.]

Given the above testimony and commentary, the testimony of the witness should not be admitted into evidence at trial. The reason is lack of foundation. Proper objections on foundation, leading, and hearsay must be repeatedly raised or else the testimony, however riddled with untruth, will be admitted because the objection was” waived” by failing to raise it timely. If the objections are sustained and the witness has managed to spew out an answer as you were objecting then a motion to strike is absolutely required lest the objectionable testimony remain in the record. As Plan B, bring these things out in cross examination and then move to strike the testimony.

 

 

Message to Homeowners Who Have Won Their Cases — Your Demands are Too Low

SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS: WHEN THE HOMEOWNER WINS IN LITIGATION, in every case the banks pay amazing amounts of money to the homeowner (and their lawyer) in order to get agreement on sweeping the case under the rug. Homeowners and their lawyers must realize that the settlement value of their case may be worth 1000 times the judgment value of the case.

This asymmetry in settlement negotiations escapes most but not all winning homeowners. It gets especially urgent when the banks made the wrong decision and appealed an unfavorable decision only to find that they not only lost one case, but many thousands as a result of that one case.

Looking to settle or modify your mortgage loan? We provide expert support and assistance to you and your lawyer.
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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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The banks will do anything to sweep bad results under the rug. And that includes eliminating adverse appellate opinions and trial court opinions.
This is a common practice by them — to wipe out any trace that the entire mortgage scheme (and therefore the entire foreclosure scheme) was a scam. Their strategy makes sense for them. By offering you incentives they get the opinion wiped from the face of the earth. Hence hundreds of thousands of other homeowners who might have contested foreclosure walk away in defeat.

As Charles Marshall has repeatedly said, the settlement should reflect a compromise between the value perceived by the Plaintiff and the value perceived by the Defendant. In this case, the value to the banks is perceived as global — i.e., the impact it will have on currently contested foreclosures and the impact it will have on people who might not otherwise contest the foreclosure. That is the multiplier.

The leverage for the homeowner is commonly perceived — even by the lawyers — as the value of the case at bar. But the true leverage is based upon the cost to the banks generally if the decision stands and God forbid other decisions cite to it with approval. The entire “securitization” scheme would unravel. Wrapping your mind around the discrepancy is key to maximizing the settlement value.

Your case might only involve a $300k mortgage, but that one mortgage has effectively been sold many times, perhaps dozens of times when you include claims of securitization of derivative products (securitization on securitization). Hence your one mortgage loan, based upon fraudulent practices that violated various deceptive lending statutes, sits at the bottom of a house of cars larger than you can imagine. So, for example, you see $300k in value whereas the opposition sees it as potentially $6 million in direct cost that must somehow be hidden in yet another fraudulent cover-up (“resecuritization”).

But it doesn’t stop there. When you win your case it serves as a beacon for many thousands of homeowners — thus presenting a threat of unraveling the epic scope of fraudulent claims of securitization. This “value” is difficult to estimate, much less compute. But if you use an arbitrary number like 10,000 other homeowners will take the case to heart and litigate on those principles and assume that half of them successfully present the case in court citing your case as authority, the cost would easily be in range of $1 Billion.

The banks will do anything to distract you from the essential truth of what I have said here. And part of their strategy is always to propose a settlement that is so low it undermines the confidence of both the homeowners and their lawyer. Or they will offer a “modification” that makes no real difference in the bogus economics of the loan. It makes the $1 Billion seem like a fantasy but it isn’t.  Of course settlement value is not going to equal the bank’s risk factor ($1 Billion) but it is based on their perception of the likelihood of that risk crashing in on them.

Thus the give and take of negotiations depend upon how hard the homeowner is willing to push. And it must be kept in mind that at some point (far below $1 Billion) the banks would rather take the hurt of whatever your case brings than let it be known that a homeowner with a $300k mortgage became obscenely rich by exposing the fraudulent nature of the entire consumer mortgage and debt market.

Banks Fighting Subpoenas From FHFA Over Access to Loan Files

Whilst researching something else I ran across the following article first published in 2010. Upon reading it, it bears repeating.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

WHAT IF THE LOANS WERE NOT ACTUALLY SECURITIZED?

In a nutshell this is it. The Banks are fighting the subpoenas because if there is actually an audit of the “content” of the pools, they are screwed across the board.

My analysis of dozens of pools has led me to several counter-intuitive but unavoidable factual conclusions. I am certain the following is correct as to all residential securitized loans with very few (2-4%) exceptions:

  1. Most of the pools no longer exist.
  2. The MBS sold to investors and insured by AIG and the purchase and sale of credit default swaps were all premised on a general description of the content of the pool rather than a detailed description with the individual loans attached on a list.
  3. Each Prospectus if it carried any spreadsheet listing loans, contained a caveat that the attached list was by example only and not the real loans.
  4. Each distribution report contained a caveat that the parties who created it and the parties who delivered it did not guarantee either authenticity or reliability of the report. They even had specific admonitions regarding the content of the distribution report.
  5. NO LOAN ACTUALLY MADE IT INTO ANY POOL. The evidence is clear: nothing was done to assign, indorse or deliver the note to the investors directly or indirectly until a case went into litigation AND a hearing was scheduled. By that time the cutoff date had been breached and the loan was non-performing by their own allegation and therefore was not acceptable into the pool.
  6. AT ALL TIMES LEGAL TITLE TO THE PROPERTY WAS MAINTAINED BY THE HOMEOWNER EVEN AFTER FORECLOSURE AND SALE. The actual creditor who submitted a credit bid was not the creditor. The sale is either void or voidable.
  7. AT ALL TIMES LEGAL TITLE TO THE LOAN WAS MAINTAINED BY THE ORIGINATING “LENDER”. Since there was no assignment, indorsement or delivery that could be recognized at law or in fact, the originating lender still owns the loan legally BUT….
  8. AT ALL TIMES THE OBLIGATION WAS BOTH CREATED AND EXTINGUISHED AT, OR CONTEMPORANEOUSLY WITH THE CLOSING OF THE LOAN. Since the originating lender was in fact not the source of funds, and did not book the transaction as a loan on their balance sheet (in most cases), the naming of the originating lender as the Lender and payee on the note, both created a LEGAL obligation from the borrower to the Lender and at the same time, the LEGAL obligation was extinguished because the LEGAL Lender of record was paid in full plus exorbitant fees for pretending to be an actual lender.
  9. Since the Legal obligation was both created and extinguished contemporaneously with each other, any remaining obligation to any OTHER party became unsecured since the security instrument (mortgage or deed of trust) refers only to the promissory note executed by the borrower.
  10. At the time of closing, the investor-lenders were the real parties in interest as lenders, but they were not disclosed nor were the fees of the various intermediaries who brought the investor-lender money and the borrower’s loan together.
  11. ALL INVESTOR-LENDERS RECEIVED THE EQUIVALENT OF A BOND — A PROMISE TO PAY ISSUED BY A PARTY OTHER THAN THE BORROWER, PREMISED UPON THE PAYMENT OR RECEIVABLES GENERATED FROM BORROWER PAYMENTS, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS, CREDIT ENHANCEMENTS, AND THIRD PARTY INSURANCE.
  12. Nearly ALL investor-lenders have been paid sums of money to satisfy the promise to pay contained in the bond. These payments always exceeded the borrowers payments and in many cases paid the obligation in full WITHOUT SUBROGATION.
  13. NO LOAN IS IN ACTUAL DEFAULT OR DELINQUENCY. Since payments must first be applied to outstanding payments due, payments received by investor-lenders or their agents from third party sources are allocable to each individual loan and therefore cure the alleged default. A Borrower’s Non-payment is not a default since no payment is due.
  14. ALL NOTICES OF DEFAULT ARE DEFECTIVE: The amount stated, the creditor, and other material misstatements invalidate the effectiveness of such a notice.
  15. NO CREDIT BID AT AUCTION WAS MADE BY A CREDITOR. Hence the sale is void or voidable.
  16. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO DEDUCTIONS FOR THIRD PARTY PAYMENTS.
  17. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO AN EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT THAT IS UNSECURED.
  18. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO AN EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR A LIEN TO REFLECT THE INTENTION OF THE INVESTOR-LENDER AND THE INTENTION OF THE BORROWER.  Both the investor-lender and the borrower intended to complete a loan transaction wherein the home was used to collateralize the amount due. The legal satisfaction of the originating lender is not a deduction from the equitable satisfaction of the investor-lender. THUS THE PARTIES SEEKING TO FORECLOSE ARE SUBJECT TO THE LEGAL DEFENSE OF PAYMENT AT CLOSING BUT THE INVESTOR-LENDERS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THAT DEFENSE.
  19. The investor-lenders ALSO have a claim for damages against the investment banks and the string of intermediaries that caused loans to be originated that did not meet the description contained in the prospectus.
  20. Any claim by investor-lenders may be subject to legal and equitable defenses, offsets and counterclaims from the borrower.
  21. The current modification context in which the securitization intermediaries are involved in settlement of outstanding mortgages is allowing those intermediaries to make even more money at the expense of the investor-lenders.
  22. The failure of courts to recognize that they must apply the rule of law results not only in the foreclosure of the property, but the foreclosure of the borrower’s ability to negotiate a settlement with an undisclosed equitable creditor, or with the legal owner of the loan in the property records.

Loan File Issue Brought to Forefront By FHFA Subpoena
Posted on July 14, 2010 by Foreclosureblues
Wednesday, July 14, 2010

foreclosureblues.wordpress.com

Editor’s Note….Even  U.S. Government Agencies have difficulty getting
discovery, lol…This is another excellent post from attorney Isaac
Gradman, who has the blog here…http://subprimeshakeout.blogspot.com.
He has a real perspective on the legal aspect of the big picture, and
is willing to post publicly about it.  Although one may wonder how
these matters may effect them individually, my point is that every day
that goes by is another day working in favor of those who stick it out
and fight for what is right.

Loan File Issue Brought to Forefront By FHFA Subpoena

The battle being waged by bondholders over access to the loan files
underlying their investments was brought into the national spotlight
earlier this week, when the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the
regulator in charge of overseeing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, issued
64 subpoenas seeking documents related to the mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) in which Freddie and Fannie had invested.
The FHFA
has been in charge of overseeing Freddie and Fannie since they were
placed into conservatorship in 2008.

Freddie and Fannie are two of the largest investors in privately
issued bonds–those secured by subprime and Alt-A loans that were often
originated by the mortgage arms of Wall St. firms and then packaged
and sold by those same firms to investors–and held nearly $255 billion
of these securities as of the end of May. The FHFA said Monday that it
is seeking to determine whether issuers of these so-called “private
label” MBS misled Freddie and Fannie into making the investments,
which have performed abysmally so far, and are expected to result in
another $46 billion in unrealized losses to the Government Sponsored
Entities (GSE).

Though the FHFA has not disclosed the targets of its subpoenas, the
top issuers of private label MBS include familiar names such as
Countrywide and Merrill Lynch (now part of BofA), Bear Stearns and
Washington Mutual (now part of JP Morgan Chase), Deutsche Bank and
Morgan Stanley. David Reilly of the Wall Street Journal has written an
article urging banks to come forward and disclose whether they have
received subpoenas from the FHFA, but I’m not holding my breath.

The FHFA issued a press release on Monday regarding the subpoenas
(available here). The statement I found most interesting in the
release discusses that, before and after conservatorship, the GSEs had
been attempting to acquire loan files to assess their rights and
determine whether there were misrepresentations and/or breaches of
representations and warranties by the issuers of the private label
MBS, but that, “difficulty in obtaining the loan documents has
presented a challenge to the [GSEs’] efforts. FHFA has therefore
issued these subpoenas for various loan files and transaction
documents pertaining to loans securing the [private label MBS] to
trustees and servicers controlling or holding that documentation.”

The FHFA’s Acting Director, Edward DeMarco, is then quoted as saying
““FHFA is taking this action consistent with our responsibilities as
Conservator of each Enterprise. By obtaining these documents we can
assess whether contractual violations or other breaches have taken
place leading to losses for the Enterprises and thus taxpayers. If so,
we will then make decisions regarding appropriate actions.” Sounds
like these subpoenas are just the precursor to additional legal
action.

The fact that servicers and trustees have been stonewalling even these

powerful agencies on loan files should come as no surprise based on

the legal battles private investors have had to wage thus far to force

banks to produce these documents. And yet, I’m still amazed by the

bald intransigence displayed by these financial institutions. After

all, they generally have clear contractual obligations requiring them

to give investors access to the files (which describe the very assets

backing the securities), not to mention the implicit discovery rights

these private institutions would have should the dispute wind up in

court, as it has in MBIA v. Countrywide and scores of other investor

suits.

At this point, it should be clear to everyone–servicers and investors
alike–that the loan files will have to be produced eventually, so the
only purpose I can fathom for the banks’ obduracy is delay. The loan
files should, as I’ve said in the past, reveal the depths of mortgage
originator depravity, demonstrating convincingly that the loans never
should have been issued in the first place. This, in turn, will force
banks to immediately reserve for potential losses associated with
buying back these defective mortgages. Perhaps banks are hoping that
they can ward off this inevitability long enough to spread their
losses out over several years, thereby weathering the storm caused (in
part) by their irresponsible lending practices. But certainly the
FHFA’s announcement will make that more difficult, as the FHFA’s
inherent authority to subpoena these documents (stemming from the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008) should compel disclosure
without the need for litigation, and potentially provide sufficient
evidence of repurchase obligations to compel the banks to reserve
right away. For more on this issue, see the fascinating recent guest
post by Manal Mehta on The Subprime Shakeout regarding the SEC’s
investigation into banks’ processes for allocating loss reserves.

Meanwhile, the investor lawsuits continue to rain down on banks, with
suits by the Charles Schwab Corp. against Merrill Lynch and UBS, by
the Oregon Public Employee Retirement Fund against Countrywide, and by
Cambridge Place Investment Management against Goldman Sachs, Citigroup
and dozens of other banks and brokerages being announced this week. If
the congealing investor syndicate was looking for political cover
before staging a full frontal attack on banks, this should provide
ample protection. Much more to follow on these and other developments
in the coming days…
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Posted by Isaac Gradman at 3:46 PM

BAP Panel Raises the Stakes Against Deutsch et al — Secured Status May be Challenged

Fur Further Information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

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ALERT FOR BANKRUPTCY LAWYERS — SECURED STATUS OF ALLEGED CREDITOR IS NOT TO BE ASSUMED

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I have long held and advocated three points:

  1. The filing of false claims in the nonjudicial process of a majority of states should not result in success where the same false claims could never be proven in judicial process. Nonjudicial process was meant as an administrative remedy to foreclosures that were NOT in dispute. Any application of nonjudicial schemes that allows false claims to succeed where they would fail in a judicial action is unconstitutional.
  2. The filing of a bankruptcy petition that shows property to be encumbered by virtue of a deed of trust is admitting a false representation made by a stranger to the transaction. The petition for bankruptcy relief should be filed showing that the property is not encumbered and the adversary or collateral proceeding to nullify the mortgage and the note should accompany each filing where the note and mortgage are subject to claims of securitization or a “new” beneficiary.
  3. The vast majority of decisions against borrowers result from voluntary or involuntary waiver, ignorance and failure to plead or object on the basis of false claims based on false documentation. The issue is not the signature (although that probably is false too); rather it is (a) the actual transaction which is missing and the (b) false documentation of a (i) fictitious transaction and (ii) fictitious transfers of fictitious (and non-fictitious) transactions. The result is often that the homeowner has admitted to the false assertion of being a borrower in relation to the party making the claim, admitting the secured status of the “creditor”, admitting that they are a creditor, admitting that they received a loan from within the chain claimed by the “creditor”, admitting the default, admitting the validity of the note and admitting the validity of the mortgage or deed of trust — thus leaving both the trial and appellate courts with no choice but to rule against the homeowner. Thus procedurally a false claim becomes “true” for purposes of that case.

see 11/24/14 Decision: MEMORANDUM-_-ANTON-ANDREW-RIVERA-DENISE-ANN-RIVERA-Appellants-v.-DEUTSCHE-BANK-NATIONAL-TRUST-COMPANY-Trustee-of-Certificate-Holders-of-the-WAMU-Mortgage-Pass-Through-Certificate-Series-2005-AR6

This decision is breath-taking. What the Panel has done here is fire a warning shot over the bow of the California Supreme Court with respect to the APPLICATION of the non-judicial process. AND it takes dead aim at those who make false claims on false debts in both nonjudicial and judicial process. Amongst the insiders it is well known that your chances on appeal to the BAP are less than 15% whereas an appeal to the District Judge, often ignored as an option, has at least a 50% prospect for success.

So the fact that this decision comes from the BAP Panel which normally rubber stamps decisions of bankruptcy judges is all the more compelling. One word of caution that is not discussed here is the the matter of jurisdiction. I am not so sure the bankruptcy judge had jurisdiction to consider the matters raised in the adversary proceeding. I think there is a possibility that jurisdiction would be present before the District Court Judge, but not the Bankruptcy Judge.

From one of my anonymous sources within a significant government agency I received the following:

This case is going to be a cornucopia of decision material for BK courts nationwide (and others), it directly tackles all the issues regarding standing and assignment (But based on Non-J foreclosure, and this is California of course……) it tackles Glaski and Glaski loses, BUT notes dichotomy on secured creditor status….this case could have been even more , but leave to amend was forfeited by borrower inaction—– it is part huge win, part huge loss as it relates to Glaski, BUT IT IS DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO CHASE/WAMU CASES……….Note in full case how court refers to transfer of “some of WAMU’s assets”, tacitly inferring that the court WILL NOT second guess what was and was not transferred………… i.e, foreclosing party needs to prove this!!

AFFIRMED- NO SECURED PARTY STATUS FOR BK PROVEN 

Even though Siliga, Jenkins and Debrunner may preclude the

Riveras from attacking DBNTC’s foreclosure proceedings by arguing

that Chase’s assignment of the deed of trust was a nullity in

light of the absence of a valid transfer of the underlying debt,

we know of no law precluding the Riveras from challenging DBNTC’s assertion of secured status for purposes of the Riveras’ bankruptcy case. Nor did the bankruptcy court cite to any such law.

We acknowledge that our analysis promotes the existence of two different sets of legal standards – one applicable in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings and a markedly different one for use in ascertaining creditors’ rights in bankruptcy cases.

But we did not create these divergent standards. The California legislature and the California courts did. We are not the first to point out the divergence of these standards. See CAL. REAL EST., at § 10:41 (noting that the requirements under California law for an effective assignment of a real-estate-secured obligation may differ depending on whether or not the dispute over the assignment arises in a challenge to nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings).
We must accept the truth of the Riveras’ well-pled
allegations indicating that the Hutchinson endorsement on the
note was a sham and, more generally, that neither DBNTC nor Chase
ever obtained any valid interest in the Riveras’ note or the loan
repayment rights evidenced by that note. We also must
acknowledge that at least part of the Riveras’ adversary
proceeding was devoted to challenging DBNTC’s standing to file
its proof of claim and to challenging DBNTC’s assertion of
secured status for purposes of the Riveras’ bankruptcy case. As
a result of these allegations and acknowledgments, we cannot
reconcile our legal analysis, set forth above, with the
bankruptcy court’s rulings on the Riveras’ second amended
complaint. The bankruptcy court did not distinguish between the
Riveras’ claims for relief that at least in part implicated the
parties’ respective rights in the Riveras’ bankruptcy case from
those claims for relief that only implicated the parties’
respective rights in DBNTC’s nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings.

THEY REJECT GLASKI-

Here, we note that the California Supreme Court recently

granted review from an intermediate appellate court decision
following Jenkins and rejecting Glaski. Yvanova v. New Century
Mortg. Corp., 226 Cal.App.4th 495 (2014), review granted &
opinion de-published, 331 P.3d 1275 (Cal. Aug 27, 2014). Thus,
we eventually will learn how the California Supreme Court views
this issue. Even so, we are tasked with deciding the case before
us, and Ninth Circuit precedent suggests that we should decide
the case now, based on our prediction, rather than wait for the
California Supreme Court to rule. See Hemmings, 285 F.3d at
1203; Lewis v. Telephone Employees Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537,
1545 (9th Cir. 1996). Because we have no convincing reason to
doubt that the California Supreme Court will follow the weight of
authority among California’s intermediate appellate courts, we
will follow them as well and hold that the Riveras lack standing
to challenge the assignment of their deed of trust based on an
alleged violation of a pooling and servicing agreement to which
they were not a party.

BUT……… THEY DO SUCCEED ON SECURED STATUS

Even though the Riveras’ first claim for relief principally

relies on their allegations regarding the assignment’s violation
of the pooling and servicing agreement, their first claim for
relief also explicitly incorporates their allegations challenging
DBNTC’s proof of claim and disputing the validity of the
Hutchinson endorsement. Those allegations, when combined with
what is set forth in the first claim for relief, are sufficient
on their face to state a claim that DBNTC does not hold a valid
lien against the Riveras’ property because the underlying debt
never was validly transferred to DBNTC. See In re Leisure Time
Sports, Inc., 194 B.R. at 861 (citing Kelly v. Upshaw, 39 Cal.2d
179 (1952) and stating that “a purported assignment of a mortgage
without an assignment of the debt which it secured was a legal
nullity.”).
While the Riveras cannot pursue their first claim for relief
for purposes of directly challenging DBNTC’s pending nonjudicial
foreclosure proceedings, Debrunner, 204 Cal.App.4th at 440-42,
the first claim for relief states a cognizable legal theory to
the extent it is aimed at determining DBNTC’s rights, if any, as
a creditor who has filed a proof of secured claim in the Riveras’
bankruptcy case.

TILA CLAIM UPHELD!—–

Fifth Claim for Relief – for violation of the Federal Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g)

The Riveras’ TILA Claim alleged, quite simply, that they did
not receive from DBNTC, at the time of Chase’s assignment of the
deed of trust to DBNTC, the notice of change of ownership
required by 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g)(1). That section provides:
In addition to other disclosures required by this
subchapter, not later than 30 days after the date on
which a mortgage loan is sold or otherwise transferred
or assigned to a third party, the creditor that is the
new owner or assignee of the debt shall notify the
borrower in writing of such transfer, including–

(A) the identity, address, telephone number of the new

creditor;

(B) the date of transfer;

 

(C) how to reach an agent or party having authority to

act on behalf of the new creditor;

(D) the location of the place where transfer of

ownership of the debt is recorded; and

(E) any other relevant information regarding the new

creditor.

The bankruptcy court did not explain why it considered this claim as lacking in merit. It refers to the fact that the
Riveras had actual knowledge of the change in ownership within
months of the recordation of the trust deed assignment. But the
bankruptcy court did not explain how or why this actual knowledge
would excuse noncompliance with the requirements of the statute.
Generally, the consumer protections contained in the statute
are liberally interpreted, and creditors must strictly comply
with TILA’s requirements. See McDonald v. Checks–N–Advance, Inc.
(In re Ferrell), 539 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2008). On its
face, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(iv) imposes upon the assignee of
a deed of trust who violates 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g)(1) statutory
damages of “not less than $400 or greater than $4,000.”
While the Riveras’ TILA claim did not state a plausible
claim for actual damages, it did state a plausible claim for
statutory damages. Consequently, the bankruptcy court erred when
it dismissed the Riveras’ TILA claim.

LAST, THEY GOT REAR ENDED FOR NOT SEEKING LEAVE TO AMEND

Here, however, the Riveras did not argue in either the bankruptcy court or in their opening appeal brief that the court should have granted them leave to amend. Having not raised the issue in either place, we may consider it forfeited. See Golden v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (In re Choo), 273 B.R. 608, 613 (9th Cir. BAP 2002).

Even if we were to consider the issue, we note that the

bankruptcy court gave the Riveras two chances to amend their
complaint to state viable claims for relief, examined the claims
they presented on three occasions and found them legally
deficient each time. Moreover, the Riveras have not provided us
with all of the record materials that would have permitted us a
full view of the analyses and explanations the bankruptcy court
offered them when it reviewed the Riveras’ original complaint and
their first amended complaint. Under these circumstances, we
will not second-guess the bankruptcy court’s decision to deny
leave to amend. See generally In re Nordeen, 495 B.R. at 489-90
(examining multiple opportunities given to the plaintiffs to
amend their complaint and the bankruptcy court’s efforts to
explain to them the deficiencies in their claims, and ultimately
determining that the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the plaintiffs leave to amend their second amended
complaint).

The Devil is in the Details — The Mortgage Cannot Be Enforced, Even If the Note Can Be Enforced

Cashmere v Department of Revenue

For more information on foreclosure offense, expert witness consultations and foreclosure defense please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688. We offer litigation support in all 50 states to attorneys. We refer new clients without a referral fee or co-counsel fee unless we are retained for litigation support. Bankruptcy lawyers take note: Don’t be too quick admit the loan exists nor that a default occurred and especially don’t admit the loan is secured. FREE INFORMATION, ARTICLES AND FORMS CAN BE FOUND ON LEFT SIDE OF THE BLOG. Consultations available by appointment in person, by Skype and by phone.

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Editor’s Introduction: The REAL truth behind securitization of so-called mortgage loans comes out in tax litigation. There a competent Judge who is familiar with the terms of art used in the world of finance makes judgements based upon real evidence and real comprehension of how each part affects another in the “securitization fail” (Adam Levitin) that took us by surprise. In the beginning (2007) I was saying the loans were securitized and the banks were saying there was no securitization and there was no trust.

Within a short period of time (2008) I deduced that there securitization had failed and that no Trust was getting the money from investors who thought they were buying mortgage backed securities and therefore the Trust could never be a holder in due course. I deduced this from the complete absence of claims that they were holders in due course. Whether they initiated foreclosure as servicer, trustee or trust there was no claim of holder in due course. This was peculiar because all the elements of a holder in due course appeared to be present because that is what was required in the securitization documents — at least in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement and prospectus.

If the foreclosing party was a holder in due course they would merely have to show what the securitization required — a purchase in good faith of the loan documents for value without knowledge of any of borrower’s defenses.  This would bar virtually any defense by the borrower and allow them to get a judgment on the note and a foreclosure based upon the auxiliary contract for collateral — the mortgage. But they didn’t allege that for reasons that I have described in recent articles — they could not, as part of their prima facie case, prove that any party in their “chain” had funded or paid any money for the loan.

After analyzing this case, consider the possibility that there is no party in existence who has the power to foreclose. The Trust beneficiaries clearly don’t have that right. The Trust doesn’t either because they didn’t pay anything for it. The Trustee doesn’t have that right because it can only assert the rights of the Trust and Trust beneficiaries. The servicer doesn’t have that right because it derives its authority from the Pooling and Servicing Agreement which does not apply because the loan never made it into the Trust. The originator doesn’t have the right both because they never loaned the money and now disclaim any interest in the mortgage.

Then consider the fact that it is ONLY the investors who have their money at risk but that they failed to get any documentation securing their “involuntary loans.” They might have actions to recover money from the borrower, but those actions are far from secured, and certainly subject to numerous defenses. The investors are barred from enforcing either the note or the mortgage by the terms of the instruments, the terms of the PSA and the rule of law. They are left with an unsecured common law right of action to get what they can from a claim for unjust enrichment or some other type of claim that actually reflects the true facts of the original transaction in which the borrower did receive a loan, but not from anyone represented at the loan closing.

Now we have the Cashmere case. The only assumption that the Court seems to get wrong is that the investors were trust beneficiaries because the court was assuming that the Trust received the proceeds of sale of the bonds. This does not appear to be the case. But the case also explains why the investors wanted to take the position that they were trust beneficiaries in order to get the tax treatment they thought they were getting. So here we have the victims and perpetrators of the fraud taking the same side because of potentially catastrophic results in tax treatment — potentially treating principal payments as ordinary income. That would reduce the return on investment below zero. They lost.

http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Cashmere-v-Dept-of-Revenue.pdf

I have changed fonts to emphasize certain portion of the following excerpts from the Case decision:

“Cashmere’s investments merely gave Cashmere the right to receive specific cash flows generated by the assets of the trust at specific times. But if the REMIC trustee failed to pay Cashmere according to the terms of the investment, Cashmere had no right to sell the mortgage loans or the residential property or any other asset of the trust to satisfy this obligation. Cf. Dep’t of Revenue v. Sec. Pac. Bank of Wash. Nat’/ Ass’n, 109 Wn. App. 795, 808, 38 P.3d 354 (2002) (deduction allowed because mortgage companies transferred ownership of loans to taxpayer who could sell the oans in event of default). Cashmere’s only recourse would be to sue the trustee for performance of the obligation or attempt to replace the trustee. The trustee’s successor would then take legal title to the underlying securities or other assets of the related trust. At no time could Cashmere take control of trust assets and reduce them to cash to satisfy a debt obligation. Thus, we hold that under the plain language of the statute, Cashmere’s investments in REMICs are not primarily secured by mortgages or deeds of trust.
12
“Cashmere argues that the investments are secure because the trustee is obligated to protect the investors’ interests and the trustee has the right to foreclose. But, this is not always the case. The underlying mortgages back all of the tranches, and a trustee must balance competing interests between investors of different tranches. Thus, a default in one tranche does not automatically give the holders of that tranche a right to force foreclosure. We hold that if the terms of the trust do not give beneficiaries an investment secured by trust assets, the trustee’s fiduciary obligations do not transform the investment into a secured investment.

“In a 1990 determination, DOR explained why interest earned from investments in REMICs does not qualify for the mortgage tax deduction. see Wash. Dep’t of Revenue, Determination No. 90-288, 10 Wash. Tax Dec. 314 (1990). A savings and loan association sought a refund of B&O taxes assessed on interest earned from investments in REMICs. The taxpayer argued that because interest received from investments in pass-through securities is deductible, interest received on REMICs
should be too. DOR rejected the deduction, explaining that with pass-through securities, the issuer holds the mortgages in trust for the investor. In the event of individual default, the issuer, as trustee, will foreclose on the property to satisfy the terms of the loan. In other words, the right to foreclose is directly related to homeowner defaults-in the event of default, the trustee can foreclose and the proceeds from foreclosure flow to investors who have a beneficial ownership interest in the underlying mortgage. Thus, investments in pass-through securities are “primarily secured by” first mortgages.

“By contrast, with REMICs, a trustee’s default may or may not coincide with an individual homeowner default. So, there may be no right of foreclosure in the event a trustee fails to make a payment. And if a trustee can and does foreclose, proceeds from the sale do not necessarily go to the investors. Foreclosure does not affect the trustee’s obligations vis-a-vis the investor. Indeed, the Washington Mutual REMIC here contains a commonly used form of guaranty: “For any month, if the master servicer receives a payment on a mortgage loan that is less than the full scheduled payment or if no payment is received at all, the master servicer will advance its own funds to cover the shortfall.” “The master servicer will not be required to make advances if it determines that those advances will not be recoverable” in the future. At foreclosure or liquidation, any proceeds will go “first to the servicer to pay back any advances it might have made in the past.” Similarly, agency REMICs, like the Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2000-38, guarantee payments even if mortgage borrowers default, regardless of whether the issuer expects to recover those payments. Moreover, the assets held in a REMIC trust are often MBSs, not mortgages.

“So, if the trustee defaults, the investors may require the trustee to sell the MBS, but the investor cannot compel foreclosure of individual properties. DOR also noted that it has consistently allowed the owners of a qualifying mortgage to claim the deduction in RCW 82.04.4292. But the taxpayer who invests in REMICs does not have any ownership interest in the MBSs placed in trust as collateral, much less any ownership interest in the mortgage themselves. By contrast, a pass-through security represents a beneficial ownership of a fractional undivided interest in a pool of first lien residential mortgage loans. Thus, DOR concluded that while investments in pass-through securities qualify for the tax deduction, investments in REMICs do not. We should defer to DOR’s interpretation because it comports with the plain meaning of the statute.

“Moreover, this case is factually distinct. Borrowers making the payments that eventually end up in Cashmere’s REMIC investments do not pay Cashmere, nor do they borrow money from Cashmere. The borrowers do not owe Cashmere for use of borrowed money, and they do not have any existing contracts with Cashmere. Unlike HomeStreet, Cashmere did not have an ongoing and enforceable relationship with borrowers and security for payments did not rest directly on borrowers’ promises to repay the loans. Indeed, REMIC investors are far removed from the underlying mortgages. Interest received from investments in REMICs is often repackaged several times and no longer resembles payments that homeowners are making on their mortgages.

“We affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that Cashmere’s REMIC investments are not “primarily secured by” first mortgages or deeds of trust on nontransient residential real properties. Cashmere has not shown that REMICs are secured-only that the underlying loans are primarily secured by first mortgages or deeds of trust. Although these investments gave Cashmere the right to receive specific cash flows generated by first mortgage loans, the borrowers on the original loans had no obligation to pay Cashmere. Relatedly, Cashmere has no direct or indirect legal recourse to the underlying mortgages as security for the investment. The mere fact that the trustee may be able to foreclose on behalf of trust beneficiaries does not mean the investment is “primarily secured” by first mortgages or deeds of trust.

Editor’s Note: The one thing that makes this case even more problematic is that it does not appear that the Trust ever paid for the acquisition or origination of loans. THAT implies that the Trust didn’t have the money to do so. Because the business of the trust was the acquisition or origination of loans. If the Trust didn’t have the money, THAT implies the Trust didn’t receive the proceeds of sale from their issuance of MBS. And THAT implies that the investors are not Trust beneficiaries in any substantive sense because even though the bonds were issued in the name of the securities broker as street name nominee (non objecting status) for the benefit of the investors, the bonds were issued in a transaction that was never completed.

Thus the investors become simply involuntary direct lenders through a conduit system to which they never agreed. The broker dealer controls all aspects of the actual money transfers and claims the amounts left over as fees or profits from proprietary trading. And THAT means that there is no valid mortgage because the Trust got an assignment without consideration, the Trustee has no interest in the mortgage and the investors who WERE the original source of funds were never given the protection they thought they were getting when they advanced the money. So the “lenders” (investors) knew nothing about the loan closing and neither did the borrower. The mortgage is not enforceable by the named “originator” because they were not the lender and they did not close as representative of the lenders.

There is no party who can enforce an unenforceable contract, which is what the mortgage is here. And the note is similarly defective — although if the note gets into the hands of a party who DID PAY value in good faith without knowledge of the borrower’s defenses and DID GET DELIVERY and ACCEPT DELIVERY of the loans then the note would be enforceable even if the mortgage is not. The borrower’s remedy would be to sue the people who put him into those loans, not the holder who is suing on the note because the legislature adopted the UCC and Article 3 says the risk of loss falls on the borrower even if there were defenses to the loan. The lack of consideration might be problematic but the likelihood is that the legislative imperative would be followed — allowing the holder in due course to collect from the borrower even in the absence of a loan by the so-called “originator.”

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