Deutsch Bank National Trust Company Was Crushed in Texas in 2015. Why isn’t anyone listening?

When a judge looks carefully at the record, the bank loses. The use of Deutsch’s name in the style of the case still shows that Judges are considering the Plaintiff to be the named “Trustee” instead of the named (or named, which is frequently the case) Trust. In fact the Trustee has nothing to do with foreclosures. In this case the Judge wrote the following:

“Judgment (for the homeowner for declaratory relief) was based on findings and conclusions that Deutsche Bank had failed to prove chain of title back to the original lender, now defunct. The sole proof on which the bank relied — a purported assignment from “MERS as nominee for the lender, its successors and assigns” — was held void, because the assignor did not exist when the document was signed.

“Deutsche Bank’s first argument is based on a misrepresentation of the trial record. [i.e. the lawyers were lying to the court about what was in the trial record].

“The Burkes argued that the stamp block containing the Cathy Powers signature was not a part of the Note as originally executed, and instead offered a copy of the unindorsed Note as one of their own exhibits,

“This absence of documentary proof mirrors the lack of any testimonial evidence of holder status. Given its utter failure of proof, Deutsche Bank’s continuing assertion of a right to foreclose as holder of the Note is not just groundless, it is frivolous. On this trial record the current holder of the Burke Note remains a mystery.

“Deutsche Bank introduced no proof whatever of a prior transaction by which it acquired any rights in the Note. Absent such proof, L’Amoreaux is not controlling. Here MERS was acting on behalf of a defunct entity (IndyMac Bank), and its purported assignment was therefore void and invalid under the Texas common law of assignments, as explained below.

“There is simply no proof of an existing assignor with an existing right in the property capable of being assigned in 2011. It is undisputed that Indy-Mac Bank had been “dead” since 2008, several years prior to the 2011 assignment. (P. Ex. 6, at p. 1). Thus, any post-mortem transaction by that entity would be a nullity under Pool v. Sneed.

“In sum, L’Amoreaux does not undermine this court’s judgment in favor of the Burkes because (1) there is no record evidence of a prior assignment of the lender’s interest in the Note or Deed of Trust, (2) there is no record evidence that any purported assignor existed at the time of the 2011 assignment; and (3) there is no record evidence of a principal/agency relationship between MERS and any “successor or assign” of the lender when the assignment was executed.

“Deutsche Bank’s third argument is a red herring

“a homeowner is allowed “to challenge the chain of assignments by which a party claims a right to foreclose….” Id. at 224. It is true that in Texas an obligor cannot defend against an assignee’s efforts to enforce the obligation on a ground that merely renders the assignment “voidable at the election of the assignor,” such as a fraudulent signature by an unauthorized corporate agent. Id. at 225. The problem here is not a voidable defect that a defrauded assignor might choose to disregard — it is the absence of a valid assignor (i.e. a real entity owning the right to be assigned) in the first place. Cf. L’Amoreaux v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 755 F.3d 748, 750 (5th Cir.2014) (considering homeowner’s challenge to validity of MERS assignment on its merits, implicitly rejecting bank’s “voidable” argument).

“A court’s primary duty in construing a written contract is to ascertain the true intention of the parties as expressed in the language of the document itself. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.1983). In this document, the name of the assignor, “Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.” appears three (3) times — in the body of the assignment, above the signature line, and in the corporate acknowledgement. Each time, MERS’s name is immediately followed by the phrase “as nominee for” the lender, IndyMac Bank, its successor and assigns. P. Ex. 2. Nowhere does this document hint that MERS intended to convey its own rights,[8] or that it was acting as principal rather than as agent for other entities.

Words matter, especially in real estate transactions. See Univ. Sav. Ass’n v. Springwoods Shopping Ctr., 644 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex.1982) (“the terms set out in a deed of trust must be strictly followed”); see also Mathis v. DCR Mortg. III Sub I, L.L.C., 389 S.W.3d 494, 507 (Tex.App. — El Paso, 2012) (“The rules of interpretation that apply to contracts also apply to notes and deeds of trust.”). Based on the words of the 2011 assignment, MERS was no more acting on its own behalf than was the bank’s own law firm.

“Deutsche Bank asks to reopen the trial record to provide “the wet ink original of the Note or testimony affirming Deutsche Bank’s status as holder of the Note.” (Dkt. 90, at 7). No authority or excuse is offered for this breathtakingly late request. Even assuming such evidence exists, Deutsche Bank does not pretend that it is “newly discovered”, nor that the bank was excusably ignorant about it until after trial despite using due diligence to discover it. See 11 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2808 (2012). After four years of litigation, including court-ordered mediation and trial on the merits, the time for such a deus ex machina maneuver has long since passed. The Burkes are entitled to the finality of judgment that our judicial process is intended to provide. The bank’s request for a do-over is denied.

Let us help you prepare for trial: 202-838-6345
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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Hat tip Bill Paatalo

see Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Burke, 117 F. Supp. 3d 953 – Dist

 

Christiana Trust/Wilmington Savings Crash and Burn on Standing and More

Florida 4th DCA Opinion:

In this mortgage foreclosure case, the underlying mortgage was passed around like the flu, giving rise to a complexity of ownership that frustrated the appellee’s attempts to demonstrate standing at trial. To the answer brief, the appellee attached a chart of the ownership lineage of the mortgage and note, with different types of arrows pointing in all directions, a valiant effort which demonstrated that the transfer history here defies pictorial representation.

Let us help you prepare your narrative (blue print) for litigation: 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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see J Gross 4th DCA Opinion Goshen Mortgage adv Supria 12-6-17

You can’t make this stuff up. Order to enter JUDGMENT for homeowner not merely dismissal.

On the original note, Centerpointe Financial, Inc. is the lender. There is no blank indorsement from Centerpointe. There was an allonge purporting to effect a transfer, but the allonge was lost and not produced at trial. Appellee conceded at trial that it was not a holder of the note, but contended that it qualified as a nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder.

“A nonholder in possession may prove its right to enforce the note through: (1) evidence of an effective transfer; (2) proof of purchase of the debt; or (3) evidence of a valid assignment.” Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., N.A. v. Conley, 188 So. 3d 884, 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). “A nonholder in possession must account for its possession of the instrument by proving the transaction (or series of transactions) through which it acquired the note.” Id. (citing Murray v. HSBC Bank USA, 157 So. 3d 355, 358 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)).

Therefore, “[t]o prove standing as a nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder, the plaintiff must prove the chain of transfers starting with the first holder of the note.” PennyMac Corp. v. Frost, 214 So. 3d 686, 689 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (citing Murray, 157 So. 3d at 357-58). “Where the plaintiff ‘cannot prove that [a transferor] had any right to enforce the note, it cannot derive any right from [the transferor] and is not a nonholder in possession of the instrument with the rights of a holder to enforce.’” PennyMac, 214 So. 3d at 689 (quoting Murray, 157 So. 3d at 359).

Here, the first assignment of the note was invalid, because nothing in evidence demonstrated that the assignor had the authority to transfer or assign an interest in the note. Similarly, a second assignment was also invalid because nothing demonstrated that the assignor had an interest in the note that it could transfer. Among other problems, the third and fifth assignments transferred the mortgage, but not the note. The fourth assignment was infirm because of the problems with the earlier assignments.

One legal problem created by the third and fifth assignment is that a “mortgage follows the assignment of the promissory note, but an assignment of the mortgage without an assignment of the debt creates no right in the assignee.” Tilus v. Michai LLC, 161 So. 3d 1284, 1286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). “‘[A] mortgage is but an incident to the debt, the payment of which it secures, and its ownership follows the assignment of the debt’— not the other way around.” Peters v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 227 So. 3d 175, 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (quoting Johns v. Gillian, 184 So. 140, 143 (Fla. 1938)). The oblique reference in the assignments of mortgage to “moneys now owing” was not sufficient to transfer an interest in the note. See Jelic v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 178 So. 3d 523, 525 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).

Because appellee failed to establish its standing to foreclose, we reverse the final judgment and remand for the entry of judgment for the appellant.

Financial Industry Caught with Its Hand in the Cookie Jar

Like the infamous NINJA loans, the REMICs ought to be dubbed NEITs — nonexistent inactive trusts.

The idea of switching lenders without permission of the borrower has been accepted for centuries. But the idea of switching borrowers without permission of the “lender” had never been accepted until the era of false claims of securitization.

This is just one example of how securitization, in practice, has gone far off the rails. It is significant to students of securitization because it demonstrates how the debt, note and mortgage have been separated with each being a commodity to sell to multiple buyers.

Let us help you analyze your case: 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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see https://asreport.americanbanker.com/news/new-risk-for-loan-investors-lending-to-a-different-company

Leveraged loan investors are now concerned about whether they are funding a loan to one entity and then “by succession” ending up with another borrower with a different credit profile, reputation, etc. You can’t make this stuff up. This is only possible because the debt has been separated from the promissory note — the same way the debt, note and mortgage were treated as entirely separate commodities in the “securitization” of residential mortgage debt. The lack of connection between the paper and the debt has allowed borrowers to sell or transfer their position as borrower to another borrower leaving the “lender” holding a debt from a new borrower. This sounds crazy but it is nevertheless true. [I am NOT suggesting that individual homeowners try this. It won’t work]

Keep in mind that most certificates issued by investment bankers purportedly from nonexistent inactive trusts (call them NEITs instead of REMICs) contain an express provision that states in clear unequivocal language that the holder of the certificate has no right, title or interest to the underlying notes and mortgages. This in effect creates a category of defrauded investors using much the same logic as the use of MERS in which MERS expressly disclaims and right, title or interest in the money (i.e., the debt), or the mortgages that reregistered by third party “members.”

Of course those of us who understand this cloud of smoke and mirrors know that the securitization was never real. The single transaction rule used in tax cases establishes conclusively that the only real parties in interest are the investors and the borrowers. Everyone else is simply an intermediary with no more interest in any transaction than your depository bank has when you write a check on your account. The bank can’t assert ownership of the TV you just paid for. But if you separate the maker of the check from the seller of the goods so that neither knows of the existence of the other then the intermediary is free to make whatever false claims it seeks to make.

In the world of fake securitization or as Adam Levitin has coined it, “Securitization Fail”, the successors did not pay for the debt but did get the paper (note and mortgage or deed of trust). All the real monetary transactions took place outside the orbit of the falsely identified REMIC “Trust.” The debt, by law and custom, has always been considered to arise between Party A and Party B where one of them is the borrower and the other is the one who put the money into the hands of the borrower acting for its own account — or for a disclosed third party lender. In most cases the creditor in that transaction is not named as the lender on the promissory note. Hence the age-old “merger doctrine” does not apply.

This practice allows the sale and resale of the same loan multiple times to multiple parties. This practice is also designed to allow the underwriter to issue investors a promise to pay (the “certificate” from a nonexistent inactive trust entity) that conveys no interest in the underlying mortgages and notes that supposedly are being acquired.

It’s true that equitable and perhaps legal rights to the paper (i.e., ownership) have attached to the paper. But the paper has been severed from the debt. Courts have inappropriately ignored this fact and stuck with the presumption that the paper is the same as the debt. But that would only be true if the named payee or mortgagee (or beneficiary on a Deed of Trust) were one and the same. In the real world, they are not the same. Thus we parties who don’t own the debt foreclosing on houses because the real parties in interest have no idea how to identify the real parties in interest.

While the UCC addresses situations like this Courts have routinely ignored statutory law and simply applied their own “common sense” to a nearly incomprehensible situation. The result is that the courts apply legal presumptions of facts that are wrong.

PRACTICE NOTE: In order to be able to litigate properly one must understand the basics of fake securitization. Without understanding the difference between real world transactions and paper instruments discovery and trial narrative become corrupted and the homeowner loses. But if you keep searching for things that ought to exist but don’t — thus undercutting the foundation for testimony at deposition or trial — then your chances of winning rise geometrically. The fact is, as I said in many interviews and on this blog as far back as 2007, they don’t have the goods — all they have is an illusion — a holographic image of an empty paper bag.

Lateral Appeal in BKR to District Judge Often Overlooked

The PHH case underscores the statistics and the substance of actions brought in U.S> Bankruptcy Court. The fact is that BKR judges, once called magistrates, do not have the jurisdiction or power of ordinary District Court Judges.

In addition out of the three possible venues for appeal from BKR rulings and decisions, the one that gets the most traction the most often is directly to the sitting District Court judge in whose courthouse the BKR proceedings are pending. District judges are the most likely to find that the BKR “judge” lacked jurisdiction or power to even hear many matters.

Let us write the narrative for your appeal: 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Hat tip to Dan Edstrom

see PHH v Sensenich US Dist Lexis 207801

There are three possible routes for appeal. The one that gets the best results is rarely used for unknown reasons. So here are some pointers on bringing an appeal from a ruling or decision entered by a BKR judge:

  1. Lateral appeal to District Court Judge: Success rate around 50%
  2. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP): Success rate around 15%
  3. Direct appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals: Success rate less than 15%.

This anomaly was first pointed out by a Bankruptcy Court Judge in Arizona who as presenting at a CLE Bar Seminar for Bankruptcy lawyers. The seminar was in 2009 and still we are waiting for BKR practitioners to pick up the ball.

An apparently little known fact is that BKR courts are courts of limited jurisdiction as to what they can hear and how they can hear the issues. Many practitioners avoid an appeal from BKR to the Federal District Court Judge because they think that the District judge is on the same level as the BKR judge. And they think that two judges on the same bench are not going to rule against each other.

This view is simply wrong. They are not on the same bench. District Judges have authority over everything that happens in BKR court. BKR court is itself broken up into two categories. One category is simple rulings on motions in the administrative court proceeding (which is why the BKR “Judges” were called magistrates).

Most of what happens in the administrative phase of a bankruptcy is ministerial. Rulings that cross the line of ruling from ministerial to substantive judgments on the law regarding consumer rights, foreclosures etc. are subject to challenge and are as likely to get overturned by the District Judge as not. This is the part most people have some familiarity.

The other category is Adversary actions. This means someone has filed a lawsuit in Bankruptcy Court that is separately served and subject to the same rules of procedure as an action filed in U.S. District Court. But the similarity ends there. Many adversary actions go far beyond the jurisdiction of the BKR judge.

Lack of jurisdiction means the judgment or ruling is void. Those void judgments are generally reversed by the District Court judge and not necessarily by the BAP or Circuit Court probably because nobody brings up the issue of whether the BKR action was in the correct court.

Generally speaking there are two categories of appeal: procedural and substantive. Appeals citing errors in procedure (including jurisdiction) generally get the most traction. Appeals citing substantive law or worse, citing errors in apprehending the evidence, have the lowest success rate.

In the case cited above, Federal District Court Judge Geoffrey Crawford reversed a bankruptcy judge’s ruling that had imposed sanctions against a creditor “based on Rule 3002.1(i) of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the bankruptcy court’s inherent authority, and Bankruptcy Code section 105.”

The sanctions were awarded in three cases where debtors had to make mortgage payments pursuant to chapter 13 plans.  The mortgage servicer had billed the debtors for fees that the bankruptcy trustee asserted were improper. At a trustee’s request, the bankruptcy court imposed sanctions against the servicer of $375,000: $25,000 for each case under Rule 3002.(i) and $300,000 total for violations of court orders under its inherent powers and section 105.

Rule 3002.1 permits bankruptcy courts to provide relief to debtors when mortgage creditors fail to disclose certain fees and charges. Rule 3002.1(i) allows courts to remedy violations of certain provisions of Rule 3002.1 by (among other things) “award[ing] other appropriate relief, including reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees caused by the failure.” Whether Rule 3002.1 authorizes punitive sanctions was a matter of first impression. Neither the parties nor the court had found a case where a bankruptcy court had invoked the rule to support sanctions in this manner.

Judge Crawford reasoned that, because Rule 3002.1 is a procedural rule, it cannot enlarge the substantive authority of the bankruptcy courts. If bankruptcy courts do not have the substantive authority under statute and case law to issue punitive sanctions, then a mere procedural rule cannot alter the lack of substantive authority. The court thus concluded that the question under Rule 3002.1(i) was reducible to the question under a bankruptcy court’s inherent powers and section 105.

For homeowners this ruling helps. Citing it puts the banks in the position of opposing a ruling that went in their favor, i.e., this PHH case.  This also puts the homeowner on notice to check carefully before filing an adversary action instead of a collateral action that is directly before the District Judge or even State Court.

The problem is that most BKR attorneys who mostly do Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, have little or no litigation experience. Thus it may be necessary to NOT  charge your BKR lawyer with there responsibility of filing an adversary or collateral action and to bring in separate trial counsel even if the decision is made to file an adversary complaint.

 

 

 

Rescission Precision Goes to U.S. Supreme Court Petition for Mandamus

10 years ago, seeing where the foreclosure wave was going and watching court cases, I said on these pages that the only solution to these foreclosures is Mandamus. First to stop judges from applying legal PRESUMPTIONS and second to stop judges from ignoring TILA rescission. Now someone has done it and others might follow suit, if you pardon the pun. Lawyers were not well versed in mandamus and pro se litigants had never heard of it. So for the most part everyone has been screaming and yelling about injustice, fabrication, forgery and perjury.

Ironically it is Dan Junk, pro se, who has done the best legal writing on the issue of TILA Rescission and has chosen, in my opinion, the best route to getting the Supreme Court to issue an order prohibiting judges from disregarding TILA Rescission and requiring judges to follow the law in 15 U.S.C. §1635. The irony is doubled because of Dan’s last name (Junk) and the fact that the securitization scheme arose partly out of the junk bond craze 30 years ago. Except of course that back then Wall Street pirates WERE sent to prison.

SCOTUS has the option of taking any case they want to review. They did take the Jesinoski v Countrywide case from which this Petition for Mandamus arises. And once they take it for review, they can still deny the writ leaving decisions on rescissions in limbo and creating case precedent where Judges have the option of disregarding the law as written in a statute in virtually any kind of case.

This one was filed, as I understand it, last Friday. It may or may not be considered timely. The reason I am publishing the Petition for the Writ of Mandamus is  that it attacks exactly on point what is happening in the courts — namely, “denying” the existence and effect of TILA rescission even after it has taken effect as a nonjudicial remedy.

NEED HELP PREPARING FOR FORECLOSURE DEFENSE? We can help you and your attorney with drafting Motions, Discovery and Compelling Responses to Discovery Requests with Our Paralegal Team that works directly with Neil Garfield! We provide services directly to attorneys and to pro se litigants.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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see

Junk SCOTUS Petition for Writ of Mandamus on TILA RESCISSION

Hiding in Plain Sight_ Jesinoski and the Consumer_s Right of Resc

Jesinoski decision

Dan Junk attended one of my first seminars back in the days when I was co-presenting with Brad Keiser. In litigation for around 9 years, he has followed this blog (and many others) and fought off the “inevitable” foreclosure as long as he could in Ohio. Besides clear evidence of substantive defenses Dan had sent a notice of rescission within the 3 years stated in the TILA Rescission statute.

Like thousands of judges across the country in State and Federal courts, the timely and effective rescission was ignored simply because the judges didn’t like the result. The ultimate decision was against him because the courts continue to allow legal presumptions to apply even though they create “alternate facts” in conflict with reality.

Blind justice supposedly requires courts to apply the law, as written by the Federal and State legislatures. The answer for Dan was not in some attempted appeal but rather to seek a sweeping ruling from the Supreme Court of the United States that specifically requires all judges, whoever situated, to follow the TILA Rescission law. There is adequate evidence to show that this is of great public importance inasmuch as virtually all judges are committing the same “error” to wit: not taking TILA rescission literally or seriously.

We’ll see what happens. But in the meanwhile do give a careful read of the Brief Dan filed. This could be a moment where everything changes.

Short Explanation of TILA RESCISSION vs Common Law Rescission

Quiet title is a lawsuit not a motion. It must be worded correctly to fulfill the elements required for the court to consider the demand for quiet title. Otherwise it will be dismissed.

For quiet title to apply the mortgage must be void not just unenforceable. TILA Rescission is a statutory remedy that is different from common law rescission. Sending of TILA rescission notice by U.S. Mail means that delivery is presumed. If delivery occurred or is presumed the TILA Rescission is effective. Just the opposite in common law rescission based upon fraud. At common law, sending a notice of rescission based upon fraud is only the first step in a long litigation process.

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One must be careful NOT to file a lawsuit or motion seeking to have the court declare it is effective. Either the notice was delivered or it wasn’t delivered. If U.S. Mail is used d delivery is presumed. If it was delivered it is effective. That is what the statute says and that it was SCOTUS said about the statute. The matter should be closed, but judges are resisting following the directive of the highest court in the land from which there is no appeal. (See Jesinoski v Countrywide).

If the notice of rescission is sent within three years of apparent consummation then there is no doubt that it is effective. If it is sent more than 3 years after the note and mortgage were executed then there is a split of opinion. I believe it is still effective until the rescission is vacated by a court order. In either case — before and after the three years — courts are reluctant to apply it.

The appropriate lawsuit could be framed in allegations that the defendants should be stopped from attempting to enforce the void loan documents or stopped from harassing the borrower using the void note and void mortgage. Both are rendered void by virtue of the notice of rescission.

If the lawsuit is filed within 1 year of the date of the notice of rescission it could also include allegations that the defendants (if they are lenders) failed to comply with the three statutory duties in the TILA rescission statute. Or, if they are not lenders nor representatives of the lender that they committed multiple violations of TILA, RESPA and FDCPA as well as fraud and negligence and of course uttering false instruments and recording instruments that are false or fraudulent.

TILA RESCISSION is an statutory event not a claim. No lawsuit is proper to declare an already legally effective instrument to be effective. It happened on the day of mailing. Best to use U.S. Postal Service for the notice.

Common law rescission is a claim not an event. In that sense they are procedural the opposite of one another. A lawsuit is required and the pleader must prove the allegations which ordinarily means that they must prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence.

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Banks Fighting Subpoenas From FHFA Over Access to Loan Files

Whilst researching something else I ran across the following article first published in 2010. Upon reading it, it bears repeating.

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—————-

WHAT IF THE LOANS WERE NOT ACTUALLY SECURITIZED?

In a nutshell this is it. The Banks are fighting the subpoenas because if there is actually an audit of the “content” of the pools, they are screwed across the board.

My analysis of dozens of pools has led me to several counter-intuitive but unavoidable factual conclusions. I am certain the following is correct as to all residential securitized loans with very few (2-4%) exceptions:

  1. Most of the pools no longer exist.
  2. The MBS sold to investors and insured by AIG and the purchase and sale of credit default swaps were all premised on a general description of the content of the pool rather than a detailed description with the individual loans attached on a list.
  3. Each Prospectus if it carried any spreadsheet listing loans, contained a caveat that the attached list was by example only and not the real loans.
  4. Each distribution report contained a caveat that the parties who created it and the parties who delivered it did not guarantee either authenticity or reliability of the report. They even had specific admonitions regarding the content of the distribution report.
  5. NO LOAN ACTUALLY MADE IT INTO ANY POOL. The evidence is clear: nothing was done to assign, indorse or deliver the note to the investors directly or indirectly until a case went into litigation AND a hearing was scheduled. By that time the cutoff date had been breached and the loan was non-performing by their own allegation and therefore was not acceptable into the pool.
  6. AT ALL TIMES LEGAL TITLE TO THE PROPERTY WAS MAINTAINED BY THE HOMEOWNER EVEN AFTER FORECLOSURE AND SALE. The actual creditor who submitted a credit bid was not the creditor. The sale is either void or voidable.
  7. AT ALL TIMES LEGAL TITLE TO THE LOAN WAS MAINTAINED BY THE ORIGINATING “LENDER”. Since there was no assignment, indorsement or delivery that could be recognized at law or in fact, the originating lender still owns the loan legally BUT….
  8. AT ALL TIMES THE OBLIGATION WAS BOTH CREATED AND EXTINGUISHED AT, OR CONTEMPORANEOUSLY WITH THE CLOSING OF THE LOAN. Since the originating lender was in fact not the source of funds, and did not book the transaction as a loan on their balance sheet (in most cases), the naming of the originating lender as the Lender and payee on the note, both created a LEGAL obligation from the borrower to the Lender and at the same time, the LEGAL obligation was extinguished because the LEGAL Lender of record was paid in full plus exorbitant fees for pretending to be an actual lender.
  9. Since the Legal obligation was both created and extinguished contemporaneously with each other, any remaining obligation to any OTHER party became unsecured since the security instrument (mortgage or deed of trust) refers only to the promissory note executed by the borrower.
  10. At the time of closing, the investor-lenders were the real parties in interest as lenders, but they were not disclosed nor were the fees of the various intermediaries who brought the investor-lender money and the borrower’s loan together.
  11. ALL INVESTOR-LENDERS RECEIVED THE EQUIVALENT OF A BOND — A PROMISE TO PAY ISSUED BY A PARTY OTHER THAN THE BORROWER, PREMISED UPON THE PAYMENT OR RECEIVABLES GENERATED FROM BORROWER PAYMENTS, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS, CREDIT ENHANCEMENTS, AND THIRD PARTY INSURANCE.
  12. Nearly ALL investor-lenders have been paid sums of money to satisfy the promise to pay contained in the bond. These payments always exceeded the borrowers payments and in many cases paid the obligation in full WITHOUT SUBROGATION.
  13. NO LOAN IS IN ACTUAL DEFAULT OR DELINQUENCY. Since payments must first be applied to outstanding payments due, payments received by investor-lenders or their agents from third party sources are allocable to each individual loan and therefore cure the alleged default. A Borrower’s Non-payment is not a default since no payment is due.
  14. ALL NOTICES OF DEFAULT ARE DEFECTIVE: The amount stated, the creditor, and other material misstatements invalidate the effectiveness of such a notice.
  15. NO CREDIT BID AT AUCTION WAS MADE BY A CREDITOR. Hence the sale is void or voidable.
  16. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO DEDUCTIONS FOR THIRD PARTY PAYMENTS.
  17. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO AN EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT THAT IS UNSECURED.
  18. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO AN EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR A LIEN TO REFLECT THE INTENTION OF THE INVESTOR-LENDER AND THE INTENTION OF THE BORROWER.  Both the investor-lender and the borrower intended to complete a loan transaction wherein the home was used to collateralize the amount due. The legal satisfaction of the originating lender is not a deduction from the equitable satisfaction of the investor-lender. THUS THE PARTIES SEEKING TO FORECLOSE ARE SUBJECT TO THE LEGAL DEFENSE OF PAYMENT AT CLOSING BUT THE INVESTOR-LENDERS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THAT DEFENSE.
  19. The investor-lenders ALSO have a claim for damages against the investment banks and the string of intermediaries that caused loans to be originated that did not meet the description contained in the prospectus.
  20. Any claim by investor-lenders may be subject to legal and equitable defenses, offsets and counterclaims from the borrower.
  21. The current modification context in which the securitization intermediaries are involved in settlement of outstanding mortgages is allowing those intermediaries to make even more money at the expense of the investor-lenders.
  22. The failure of courts to recognize that they must apply the rule of law results not only in the foreclosure of the property, but the foreclosure of the borrower’s ability to negotiate a settlement with an undisclosed equitable creditor, or with the legal owner of the loan in the property records.

Loan File Issue Brought to Forefront By FHFA Subpoena
Posted on July 14, 2010 by Foreclosureblues
Wednesday, July 14, 2010

foreclosureblues.wordpress.com

Editor’s Note….Even  U.S. Government Agencies have difficulty getting
discovery, lol…This is another excellent post from attorney Isaac
Gradman, who has the blog here…http://subprimeshakeout.blogspot.com.
He has a real perspective on the legal aspect of the big picture, and
is willing to post publicly about it.  Although one may wonder how
these matters may effect them individually, my point is that every day
that goes by is another day working in favor of those who stick it out
and fight for what is right.

Loan File Issue Brought to Forefront By FHFA Subpoena

The battle being waged by bondholders over access to the loan files
underlying their investments was brought into the national spotlight
earlier this week, when the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the
regulator in charge of overseeing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, issued
64 subpoenas seeking documents related to the mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) in which Freddie and Fannie had invested.
The FHFA
has been in charge of overseeing Freddie and Fannie since they were
placed into conservatorship in 2008.

Freddie and Fannie are two of the largest investors in privately
issued bonds–those secured by subprime and Alt-A loans that were often
originated by the mortgage arms of Wall St. firms and then packaged
and sold by those same firms to investors–and held nearly $255 billion
of these securities as of the end of May. The FHFA said Monday that it
is seeking to determine whether issuers of these so-called “private
label” MBS misled Freddie and Fannie into making the investments,
which have performed abysmally so far, and are expected to result in
another $46 billion in unrealized losses to the Government Sponsored
Entities (GSE).

Though the FHFA has not disclosed the targets of its subpoenas, the
top issuers of private label MBS include familiar names such as
Countrywide and Merrill Lynch (now part of BofA), Bear Stearns and
Washington Mutual (now part of JP Morgan Chase), Deutsche Bank and
Morgan Stanley. David Reilly of the Wall Street Journal has written an
article urging banks to come forward and disclose whether they have
received subpoenas from the FHFA, but I’m not holding my breath.

The FHFA issued a press release on Monday regarding the subpoenas
(available here). The statement I found most interesting in the
release discusses that, before and after conservatorship, the GSEs had
been attempting to acquire loan files to assess their rights and
determine whether there were misrepresentations and/or breaches of
representations and warranties by the issuers of the private label
MBS, but that, “difficulty in obtaining the loan documents has
presented a challenge to the [GSEs’] efforts. FHFA has therefore
issued these subpoenas for various loan files and transaction
documents pertaining to loans securing the [private label MBS] to
trustees and servicers controlling or holding that documentation.”

The FHFA’s Acting Director, Edward DeMarco, is then quoted as saying
““FHFA is taking this action consistent with our responsibilities as
Conservator of each Enterprise. By obtaining these documents we can
assess whether contractual violations or other breaches have taken
place leading to losses for the Enterprises and thus taxpayers. If so,
we will then make decisions regarding appropriate actions.” Sounds
like these subpoenas are just the precursor to additional legal
action.

The fact that servicers and trustees have been stonewalling even these

powerful agencies on loan files should come as no surprise based on

the legal battles private investors have had to wage thus far to force

banks to produce these documents. And yet, I’m still amazed by the

bald intransigence displayed by these financial institutions. After

all, they generally have clear contractual obligations requiring them

to give investors access to the files (which describe the very assets

backing the securities), not to mention the implicit discovery rights

these private institutions would have should the dispute wind up in

court, as it has in MBIA v. Countrywide and scores of other investor

suits.

At this point, it should be clear to everyone–servicers and investors
alike–that the loan files will have to be produced eventually, so the
only purpose I can fathom for the banks’ obduracy is delay. The loan
files should, as I’ve said in the past, reveal the depths of mortgage
originator depravity, demonstrating convincingly that the loans never
should have been issued in the first place. This, in turn, will force
banks to immediately reserve for potential losses associated with
buying back these defective mortgages. Perhaps banks are hoping that
they can ward off this inevitability long enough to spread their
losses out over several years, thereby weathering the storm caused (in
part) by their irresponsible lending practices. But certainly the
FHFA’s announcement will make that more difficult, as the FHFA’s
inherent authority to subpoena these documents (stemming from the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008) should compel disclosure
without the need for litigation, and potentially provide sufficient
evidence of repurchase obligations to compel the banks to reserve
right away. For more on this issue, see the fascinating recent guest
post by Manal Mehta on The Subprime Shakeout regarding the SEC’s
investigation into banks’ processes for allocating loss reserves.

Meanwhile, the investor lawsuits continue to rain down on banks, with
suits by the Charles Schwab Corp. against Merrill Lynch and UBS, by
the Oregon Public Employee Retirement Fund against Countrywide, and by
Cambridge Place Investment Management against Goldman Sachs, Citigroup
and dozens of other banks and brokerages being announced this week. If
the congealing investor syndicate was looking for political cover
before staging a full frontal attack on banks, this should provide
ample protection. Much more to follow on these and other developments
in the coming days…
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Posted by Isaac Gradman at 3:46 PM

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