Garfield Goose?

Apparently there has been an “after hours” segment being run by some people who have joined the coalition to create a nationwide association for lawyers and homeowners. They have requested that I post the following regarding tonight’s segment following the Neil Garfield Show: 

(Let’s hear from people who attend)
A gentle reminder – please make an appointment for yourself to join us for Episode [9] of “Garfield’s Goose & Friends” on TalkShoe with your host, greg; TONIGHT, Thursday evening at 6:45 PM Eastern.

This is right after Atty Neil Garfield’s weekly Thursday Night LIVING LIES – FORECLOSURE DEFENSE & ATTACK call which starts at 6:00 PM Eastern, and goes till 6:30 Eastern.

Our call is a 1+ Hour follow-up Q&A call which allows you to ask and answer questions stimulated by Neil’s show; or your own Foreclosure Defense experience…

Details follow:

i think we’ll start off with the Paatalo & Wolf cases…

1) Neil’s Living Lies Call at 6:00PM Eastern (347) 850-1260… on Blogtalk Radio

2) Our interactive Q&A call, “Garfield’s Goose & Friends” on TalkShoe – begins every Thursday night at 6:45PM Eastern, 15 minutes after the conclusion of Neil’s show

Call in at (724) 444-7444 (then use Call ID: 139335) then “1#” for guest
and/or use your computer to blog/type at
6:45 PM Eastern Thursdays (for 60 min)

[Our Calls and Chat Board are recorded for review and sharing…]

Note that computer access will ONLY allow you to hear and type into the blog (Not Speak)…

all are welcome!

if you; or one of your friends; would like to be added and receive email reminders of the call…
please email the host at: []
with the subject line: “please add me to the goose!”

If you would like to be REMOVED from the group…
please email the host at: []
with the subject line: “please pluck my goose”

thank you.
again… if you missed it – here is the complete wolf v wells fargo as collected by kali – but in ONE complete zip file…(saves you 1-1/2 hours downloading 64 discrete pdf files)

For the Doubters on TILA Rescission and Jesinoski READ THIS

NOTE: BILL PAATALO  is an experienced private investigator and forensic analyst. Taking my material to heart and despite being ridiculed by bank lawyers and even some foreclosure defense lawyers, Paatalo took the simple position that once the notice of rescission is sent, that is the end of the matter, to wit: it is effective upon mailing.
The Bank basically took the only road they had available — “That’s ridiculous. Nobody meant for the borrowers to be able to cancel the loan transactions.”
The Court said “Bank, you are wrong. The matter is settled.”
A L E R T | Paatalo v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank et al | TILA RESCISSION | ~OPINION AND ORDER 11-12-2015~ | M-T-D….DENIED | The Supreme Court implicitly rejected defendant’s argument when it declared “rescission is effected” at the time of notice . . . . . The question here is what happens when the unwinding process is not completed and **neither party files suit** within the TILA statute of limitations.





Case No. 6:15-cv-01420-AA



Case 6:15-cv-01420-AA    Document 12    Filed 11/12/15    Page 11 of 18

Defendant argues this reading of Jesinoski cannot be correct
because it means “a borrower’s mere notice of rescission  . . .
automatically converts a secured lender into an unsecured lender,
leaving the lender with no other remedy{?!} but to file suit to
challenge the validity of a borrower’s rescission.”
…..The Supreme Court implicitly rejected defendant’s
when it declared “rescission is effected” at the time of
notice, without regard to whether a borrower files a lawsuit within
the three-year period.


Case 6:15-cv-01420-AA    Document 12    Filed 11/12/15    Page 18 of 18

The timing of Jesinoski is also significant. Although
foreclosing trustees and purchasers at trustee’s sales have a
significant interest in finality, consumers have a countervailing
interest in avoiding wrongful foreclosure. Jesinoski revealed the
majority of federal courts had “misinterpreted the will of the
enacting Congress,” Rivers, 511 U.S. at 313 n.12, in allocating to
borrowers the burden to go to court to enforce their statutory
rescission rights under TILA. Further factual development is
necessary to determine what effect that revelation should have on
the property rights of subsequent buyers of the property.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied with leave for defendant to
renew its arguments about the effect of the trustee’s sale.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss (doc. 6) is DENIED. Defendant’s
request for oral argument is DENIED as unnecessary.

Dated this 12th Day November 2015.

Fla 2d DCA Gets It: Switching or Subsituting Plaintiffs Does Not Eliminate Standing Issue of the Party Who Originally Filed Foreclosure Lawsuit

For General Information Only

For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

Always seek the advice of a licensed   competent attorney before acting on anything you read on the internet.


see Substituted Foreclosure Plaintiff Must Still Prove Standing of the Original Plaintiff

The importance of this case, is that the 2d DCA is showing its discomfort with the musical chairs strategy employed by banks in foreclosure. Standing is required in order to file a lawsuit. You can’t acquire it after the lawsuit is filed and you can’t get around THAT by “substituting” a new party Plaintiff.

I would go further to state that the substitution of the new Party Plaintiff raises questions that MUST be answered in discovery and MUST be part of the prima facie case of the new Plaintiff or the Old Plaintiff. The door is opening on the ability of homeowners to be very aggressive in discovery and pre-trial motions.

And, as I said when I started the blog, these cases will vanish once homeowners start winning motions relating to discovery. The banks cannot comply because they don’t know the answers — ownership of the debt, note and mortgage, consummation, and balance after settlements paid to the alleged “creditor” who is suing to foreclose. Those payments are credits against the amount due to the creditor.

That must mean that as between the designated creditor and the alleged “borrower” the principal and interest have been paid down. The same goes for servicer advances. If the servicers want to argue subrogation then let them plead it — with the result that the debt, the note and mortgage become subject to split ownership.

It is simple contract and commercial instruments (Bills and Notes) law and practice. If a creditor has in fact received part payment or all the payments they were intending to receive, then the amount due from the borrower as to that creditor is correspondingly reduced.

The loan payable from borrower remains unaffected, but the loan receivable on the books of the creditor is reduced. Whoever paid off the creditor MIGHT have a claim to receive the proceeds of foreclosure BUT THAT CLAIM is NOT secured the way the creditor’s claim is secured — i.e., the mortgage.

By ignoring this simple black letter legal proposition, the courts are granting a security interest to a third party who was never in privity with the origination or acquisition of the loan.

COVER-UP: Whatever Happenned to Those Settlements?

This is for general information only.

For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

Consult a lawyer before making any decisions based upon the content of this article or anything else on this blog.



The media and the Bank lobby keep referring to illegal activity, risky or mismanagement. I call it a cover-up that dwarfs Watergate by comparison. Here are some facts:

  1. Foreclosures are still increasing, despite dozens of articles per day that say otherwise. Those articles are writing about a particular city or county whereas the true numbers can only be measured nationally. Wall Street has creatively used its dominance in the press to get them using the terms that would lead one to believe that the foreclosure crisis in behind us.
  2. This wasn’t negligence. It is intentional, it is fraud, it is illegal and probably criminal. The banks didn’t suddenly wake up one morning with amnesia abut how to make a loan and how to account for it. They also didn’t accidentally destroy the original loan papers. It was intentional. Why did they destroy cash equivalent instruments? Because they had made reports to multiple third parties about the loan that would be readily obvious that (a) the loan did not qualify to be approved (b) that the loan did not qualify for the investment criteria needed by the stable managed funds (pension, for example) and (c) it is much easier on bankers if they admit to negligence than to produce proof of fraud (they obviously had made multiple misrepresentations and sales to multiple third parties).
  3. The foreclosures are for the benefit of the intermediary banks whose self-proclaimed status as agents for unidentified creditors makes a mockery of our marketplace and our judicial system.
  4. The banks were found by administrative and law enforcement agencies to have committed fraud on the courts, to have pushed through foreclosures in which they had no ownership or rights to the alleged loans, that probably was never consummated (in the legal sense) in the first place.
  5. The homeowners whose files were reviewed by investigators and found to have fatal defects were never notified by the investigators or anyone else about the finding and the agreement by the banks. This one example of the wrong-headed policies started by Bush and continued by Obama have been wrong headed and bone-headed.
  6. Hundreds of Billions, approaching $1 Trillion have been paid in settlements by the major banks, many with specific provisions that the settlement was to be to the benefit of homeowners who were illegally foreclosed or who were in foreclosure when the foreclosing party was (a) non existent or (b) a sham naked nominee with no interest in the loan, the note or the mortgage and or (c) a party who has never been disclosed in the courts during foreclosure litigation but who was directing the entire false and fraudulent scheme of “securitization”.
  7. The banks make no bones about it — they admit that the Trusts are and always were empty but have been asserting successfully to Judges who didn’t think through that whether there were actual underlying transcriptions where money exchanged hands or not, is irrelevant because they “hold” the note. So they admit that nobody in the chain of custody upon which they rely ever actually had any financial interest in the alleged “loan” with the homeowner and admit further, upon interrogation that they have no privity of contract with the homeowner.  The banks successfully turned the heads of thousands of judges with the myth of the homeowner getting a free house.
  8. Out of hundreds of billions of dollars in settlements, homeowners have seen virtually nothing — disbursements of less than 1% of the alleged principal or their alleged loan.
  9. It is an inescapable conclusion that the funds for the”Settlements” (a) remain unpaid or (b) resulted in payment of an amount equivalent to a nuisance settlement when the issuer was taking hundreds of thousands of dollars without any right, justification or excuse by proceeding with a foreclosure they have admitted, according to their own audit that the foreclosure was wrongful.

In short what is happening here is that the crimes or illegal activities are ongoing every day and not subject to (a) being barred by the statute of limitations and (b) foreclosure is  a behavior to avoid detection (which is a crime in itself) and (c) each time a Judge enters an order allowing or ordering forced sale, the Court itself is complicit in the cover-up, even if the Court is “unaware” of it.

All of this is presumptively true because of the findings of fact by the investigative and regulatory agencies, whether they are admitted or not by the mega banks. The burden should be placed on the foreclosing party, whose history of fabrication, lying under oath, and forgery SHOULD make the testimony, documents, and representations proffered by counsel for banks presumptively NOT CREDIBLE. Instead Judges have treated them like they are holders in due course where the risk falls entirely on the homeowner who also has the burden of proving defenses against a holder in due course who is not subject to those defenses (but who also doesn’t exist).

In my opinion policy makers, regulators and law enforcement are still functioning under the Wall Street myth that if the mega banks fall so does the economy. It is quite the reverse. If the mega banks fall then banking becomes local again, and there is no such thing as too big to fail. There is not single function performed by a mega bank that couldn’t be done by a small community bank or credit union. The current policy has allowed the mega banks to raise a cloud over everything with their unregulated “Shadow banking” sector which now accounts for around 15-20 times the amount of all the money in the world. That being the case, we are allowing our institutions to be marginalized. When the Fed, or Congress or anyone else attempts to address the problems of economic growth and inequality they are using primitive tools without any real effect.

We have replaced income and currency with debt that is “cash equivalent”. As long as allow that, we will forever be on the brink of the worst depression in history — which history tells us frequently leads to war. As a distraction there are those who point to the National Debt without making any reference to the more important household debt. It is an irrefutable fact that out economy is built on consumption. 70% of our gross domestic product is consumption of goods and services by ordinary consumers. Thus the only rational, practical policy is one that increases consumption. Instead politicians are creating ideological talking points. Where does consumption ordinarily come from? Do those people have the money or credit to make purchases? If they don’t, then what policy will put money in their hands in a manner in which overall consumption increases.


Holland and Knight Published General Information on Securitizations

While I was researching securitization of BOAT LOANS I came across the following apparently published by Holland and Knight. Several of their statements could prove helpful especially where one is confronting that law firm as an adversary. I copied some of the more relevant statements.

I also stumbled across this PowerPoint presentation from the American Securitization Forum in 2009 which is available on the Internet. Securitization101ASF2009



The major “players” in the securitization game, all of whom require legal representation to some degree, are as follows (this terminology is typical, but different terms are used; for example the “originator” is often referred to as the “issuer” or “seller”):

Originator – the entity that either generates Receivables in the ordinary course of its business, or purchases and assembles portfolios of Receivables (in that sense, not a true “originator”). Its counsel works closely with counsel to the Underwriter/Placement Agent and the Rating Agencies in structuring the transaction and preparing documents and usually gives the most significant opinions. It also retains and coordinates local counsel in the event that it is not admitted in the jurisdiction where the Originator’s principal office is located, and in situations where significant Receivables are generated and the security interests that secure the Receivables are governed by local law rather than the law of the state where the Originator is located.

Issuer – the special purpose entity, usually an owner trust (but can be another form of trust or a corporation, partnership or fund), created pursuant to a Trust Agreement between the Originator (or in a two step structure, the Intermediate SPE) and the Trustee, that issues the Securities and avoids taxation at the entity level. This can create a problem in foreign Securitizations in civil law countries where the trust concept does not exist (see discussion below under “Foreign Securitizations”).

Trustees – usually a bank or other entity authorized to act in such capacity. The Trustee, appointed pursuant to a Trust Agreement, holds the Receivables, receives payments on the Receivables and makes payments to the Securityholders. In many structures there are two Trustees. For example, in an Owner Trust structure, which is most common, the Notes, which are pure debt instruments, are issued pursuant to an Indenture between the Trust and an Indenture Trustee, and the Certificates, representing undivided interests in the Trust (although structured and treated as debt obligations), are issued by the Owner Trustee. The Issuer (the Trust) owns the Receivables and grants a security interest in the Receivables to the Indenture Trustee. Counsel to the Trustee provides the usual opinions on the Trust as an entity, the capacity of the Trustee, etc.

Investors – the ultimate purchasers of the Securities. Usually banks, insurance companies, retirement funds and other “qualified investors.” In some cases, the Securities are purchased directly from the Issuer, but more commonly the Securities are issued to the Originator or Intermediate SPE as payment for the Receivables and then sold to the Investors, or in the case of an underwriting, to the Underwriters.

Underwriters/Placement Agents – the brokers, investment banks or banks that sell or place the Securities in a public offering or private placement. The Underwriters/Placement Agents usually play the principal role in structuring the transaction, frequently seeking out Originators for Securitizations, and their counsel (or counsel for the lead Underwriter/Placement Agent) is usually, but not always, the primary document preparer, generating the offering documents (private placement memorandum or offering circular in a private placement; registration statement and prospectus in a public offering), purchase agreements, trust agreement, custodial agreement, etc. Such counsel also frequently opines on securities and tax matters.

Custodian – an entity, usually a bank, that actually holds the Receivables as agent and bailee for the Trustee or Trustees.

Rating Agencies – Moody’s, S&P, Fitch IBCA and Duff & Phelps. In Securitizations, the Rating Agencies frequently are active players that enter the game early and assist in structuring the transaction. In many instances they require structural changes, dictate some of the required opinions and mandate changes in servicing procedures.

Servicer – the entity that actually deals with the Receivables on a day to day basis, collecting the Receivables and transferring funds to accounts controlled by the Trustees. In most transactions the Originator acts as Servicer.

Backup Servicer – the entity (usually in the business of acting in such capacity, as well as a primary Servicer when the Originator does not fill that function) that takes over the event that something happens to the Servicer. Depending upon the quality of the Originator/Servicer, the need and significance of the Backup Servicer may be important. In some cases the Trustee retains the Backup Servicer to perform certain monitoring functions on a continuing basis.


Credit enhancements are required in every Securitization. The nature and amount depends on the risks of the Securitization as determined by the Rating Agencies, Underwriters/Placement Agents and Investors. They are intended to reduce the risks to the Investors and thereby increase the rating of the Securities and lower the costs to the Originator. Typical forms of credit enhancement are:

1. Over-collateralization – transferring to the Issuer, Receivables in amounts greater than required to pay the Securities if the proceeds of the Receivables were received as anticipated). The amount of over-collateralization (usually 5% to 10%) is determined by the Rating Agencies and the Underwriters/Placement Agents, and this in turn will depend upon the quality of the Receivables, other credit enhancement that may be available, the risk of the structure (such as the possible bankruptcy of the Originator/Servicer), the nature and condition of the industry in which the Receivables are generated, general economic conditions and, in the case of foreign-based Securitizations, the “Sovereign risk” (see discussion below under “Foreign Securitizations”). If all goes well, it is repurchased at the end of the transaction (see “Anatomy of a Securitization”)or returned as part of the residual interest. This form of credit enhancement is required in virtually all Securitizations.

2. Senior/subordinated structure – issuance of subordinated or secondary classes of Securities, which are lower-rated (and bear higher interest rates) and sold to other Investors or held by the Originator. In the event of problems, the higher rated (senior) Securities receive payments prior to the lower rated (subordinated) Securities. It is not uncommon for there to be a number of classes of Securities that are each subordinated to the more highly rated, resulting in a complex “waterfall” of payments of principal and interest. In the common structure described above, senior and subordinated classes of Notes would be paid, in order of priority, prior to classes of Certificates, and Certificates prior to any residual interest in the Issuer. This form of credit enhancement has become routine, but cannot be used in a grantor trust structure, which is why the owner trust has become most common.

3. Early amortization – if certain negative events occur, all payments from Receivables are applied to the more senior securities until paid. Very common.

4. Cash collateral account – the Originator deposits funds in account with Trustee to be used if proceeds from Receivables are not sufficient. Adjustable depending upon events. May be in the form of a demand “loan” by the Originator to the account. (e.s.)

5. Reserve fund – subordinated Securities retained by the Originator or Trustee and pledged for the benefit of the Trust (and, therefore, the Investors).

6. Security bond – guarantee (or wrap) of all payments due on the Securities. Issued by AAA-rated monoline insurance companies (if available).

7. Liquidity provider – in effect, a guarantee by the Originator (or its parent) or another entity of all or a portion of payments due on the Securities. (e.s.)

8. Letter of credit (for portion of amounts due on Securities) – not used much anymore because of costs. These were common in the late 1980’s when issued by Japanese banks at low rates.


Legal opinions are very important documents in every Securitization and result in considerable negotiations among counsel for the Originator, Underwriter/Placement Agent and Rating Agencies. The opinions given by the Originator’s counsel are the most extensive, frequently running 50 or more pages because of the need for reasoned opinions, as courts have not ruled upon many of the underpinnings of the Securitization structure. In addition to the usual opinions regarding due organization, good standing, corporate power, litigation, etc, others deal with the validity and priority of security interests, true sale vs. secured loan, substantive consolidation in bankruptcy, fraudulent transfer, tax consequences and compliance with securities laws and ERISA. Opinions are also given by counsel for the Trustees and frequently by counsel to the Underwriter/Placement Agent in regard to tax and securities matters. As indicated above, local counsel opinions may be required as well.

For reasons of structuring and such opinions, in addition to attorneys who are experienced in Securitizations, expertise is required in the areas of securities law, tax law, bankruptcy and the UCC. Expertise is also required in many instances in the substantive laws relating the business of the Originator and the nature of the Receivables.

We Need Help Helping People in Georgia

I have several Georgia cases ready to go and no lawyer to do them. One in the Northern District in Federal Court and others ready to be filed. SOMEBODY help me give these people a lawyer NOW. Georgia lawyer who is willing to take these, charge whatever fees he or she wants, we take nothing. If the Lawyer wants litigation support we can give that too at the client’s expense.

Come on folks. Show me some love!



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