About Those PSA Signatures

What is apparent is that the trusts never came into legal existence both because they were never funded and because they were in many cases never signed. Failure to execute and failure to fund the trust reduces the “trust” to a pile of ashes.


From one case in which I am consulting, this is my response to the inquiring lawyer:

I can find no evidence that there is a Trust ever created or operational by the name of “RMAC REMIC Trust Series 2009-9”. In my honest opinion I don’t think there ever was such a trust. I think that papers were drawn up for the trust but never executed. Since the trusts are phantoms anyway, this was consistent with the facts. The use of the trust as a Plaintiff in a court action is a fraud upon the court and the Defendants. The fact that the trust does not exist deprives the court of any jurisdiction. We’ll see when you get the alleged PSA, which even if physically hand-signed probably represents another example of robo-signing, fabrication, back-dating and forgery.

I think it will not show signatures — and remember digital or electronic signatures are not acceptable unless they meet the terms of legislative approval. Keep in mind that the Mortgage Loan Schedule (MLS) was BY DEFINITION  created long after the cutoff date. I say it is by definition because every Prospectus I have ever read states that the MLS attached to the PSA at the time of investment is NOT the real MLS, and that it is there by way of example only. The disclosure is that the actual loan schedule will be filled in “later.”


see https://livinglies.wordpress.com/2015/11/30/standing-is-not-a-multiple-choice-question/

also see DigitalSignatures

References are from Wikipedia, but verified


On digital signatures, they are supposed to be from a provable source that cannot be disavowed. And they are supposed to have electronic characteristics making the digital signature provable such that one would have confidence at least as high as a handwritten signature.

Merely typing a name does nothing. it is neither a digital nor electronic signature. Lawyers frequently make the mistake of looking at a document with /s/ John  Smith and assuming that it qualifies as digital or electronic signature. It does not.

We lawyers think that because we do it all the time. What we are forgetting is that our signature is coming through a trusted source and already has been vetted when we signed up for digital filing and further is backed up by court rules and Bar rules that would reign terror on a lawyer who attempted to disavow the signature.

A digital signature is a mathematical scheme for demonstrating the authenticity of a digital message or documents. A valid digital signature gives a recipient reason to believe that the message was created by a known sender, that the sender cannot deny having sent the message (authentication and non-repudiation), and that the message was not altered in transit (integrity).

Digital signatures are a standard element of most cryptographic protocol suites, and are commonly used for software distribution, financial transactions, contract management software, and in other cases where it is important to detect forgery or tampering.

Electronic signatures are different but only by degree and focus:

An electronic signature is intended to provide a secure and accurate identification method for the signatory to provide a seamless transaction. Definitions of electronic signatures vary depending on the applicable jurisdiction. A common denominator in most countries is the level of an advanced electronic signature requiring that:

  1. The signatory can be uniquely identified and linked to the signature
  2. The signatory must have sole control of the private key that was used to create the electronic signature
  3. The signature must be capable of identifying if its accompanying data has been tampered with after the message was signed
  4. In the event that the accompanying data has been changed, the signature must be invalidated[6]

Electronic signatures may be created with increasing levels of security, with each having its own set of requirements and means of creation on various levels that prove the validity of the signature. To provide an even stronger probative value than the above described advanced electronic signature, some countries like the European Union or Switzerland introduced the qualified electronic signature. It is difficult to challenge the authorship of a statement signed with a qualified electronic signature – the statement is non-reputable.[7] Technically, a qualified electronic signature is implemented through an advanced electronic signature that utilizes a digital certificate, which has been encrypted through a security signature-creating device [8] and which has been authenticated by a qualified trust service provider.[9]


Comes Now Defendants and Move to Dismiss the instant action for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction and as grounds therefor say as follows:

  1. The named plaintiff in this action does not exist.
  2. After extensive investigation and inquiry, neither Defendants nor undersigned counsel nor forensic experts can find any evidence that the alleged trust ever existed, much less conducted business.
  3. There is no evidence that the alleged trustee ever ACTUALLY conducted any business in the name of the trust, much less a purchase of loans, much less the purchase of the subject loan.
  4. There is no evidence that the Trust exists nor any evidence that the Trust’s name has ever been used except in the context of (1) “foreclosure” which has, in the opinion, of forensic experts, merely a cloak for the continuing theft of investor money and assets to the detriment of both the real parties in interest and the Defendants and (2) the sale of bonds to investors falsely presented as having been issued by the “trust”, the proceeds of which “sale” was never received by the trust.
  5. Upon due diligence before filing such a lawsuit causing the forfeiture of homestead property, counsel knew or should have known that the Trust never existed nor has any business ever been conducted in the name of the Trust except the sale of bonds allegedly issued by the Trust and the use of the name of the trust to sue in foreclosure.
  6. As for the sale of the bonds allegedly issued by the Trust there is no evidence that the Trust ever issued said bonds and there is (a) no evidence the Trust received any funds ever from the sale of bonds or any other source and (b) having no assets, money or bank account, there is no possible evidence that the Trust acquired any assets, business or even incurred any liabilities.
  7. Wells Fargo, individually and not as Trustee, has engaged in a widespread pattern of behavior of presenting itself as Trustee of non existent Trusts and should be sanctioned to prevent it or anyone else in the banking industry from engaging in such conduct.

WHEREFORE Defendants pray this Honorable Court will dismiss the instant complaint with prejudice, award attorneys fees, costs and sanctions against opposing counsel and Wells Fargo individually and not as Trustee of a nonexistent Trust for falsely presenting itself as the Trustee of a Trust it knew or should have known had no existence.



https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule, leave message or make payments.

The Chase-WAMU Illusion

In the mortgage world “successor by merger” is simply a living lie that continues as you read this article. Like many other major illusions in our world economy, the Chase-WAMU merger was nothing more than illusion

The reason for the rebellion showing up as votes for Sanders and trump and the impending exit of the UK from the European Union is very simple — every few decades the populace gets a ahead of their elected leaders and yanks their leash so hard that some of them choke.



see FDIC_ Failed Bank Information – WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK – Receivership Balance Sheet Summary (Unaudited)

see wamu_amended_unsealed_opinion

When Bill Clinton was asked how he balanced the budget and came out with a $5 Trillion surplus when he left office his reply was unusually laconic — “Arithmetic.” And he was right, although it wasn’t just him who had put pencil to paper. Many Republican and Democrats had agreed that with the rising economy, the math looked good and that their job was not to screw it up. THAT was left to the next president.

I’m not endorsing Clinton or Trump nor saying that Democrats or Republicans are better that the other. Indeed BOTH major political parties seem to agree on one egregiously erroneous point — the working man doesn’t matter.

The people who matter are those with advanced degrees and who reach the pinnacle of the economic medal of honor when they are dubbed “innovators.”

The reason for the rebellion showing up as votes for Sanders and Trump and the impending exit of the UK from the European Union is very simple — every few decades the populace gets a ahead of their elected leaders and yanks their leash so hard that some of them choke. To say that the BREXIT vote was surprising is the height of arrogance and stupidity. People round the world are voicing their objection to an establishment that doesn’t give a damn about them and measures success by stock market indexes, money supply and GDP activity that is manipulated at this point that it bare little if any resemblance to the GDP index we had come to rely upon, albeit that index was also arbitrarily and erroneously based on the wrong facts.

The fact that large percentages of the populace of many countries around the world are challenged to put food on the table and a roof over their heads doesn’t matter as long as the economic indices are up. But truth be told even when those indices go down, the attitude is the same — working people don’t matter. They are merely resources like gold, coal and oil from which we draw ever widening gaps between the people who run the society and the economy and those who drive the economy and society with their purchases.

In the mortgage world “successor by merger” is simply a living lie that continues as you read this article. Like many other major illusions in our world economy, the Chase-WAMU merger was nothing more than illusion — just like BOA’s merger with BAC/Countrywide (see Red Oak Merger Corp); Wells Fargo’s merger with Wachovia who had acquired World Savings; OneWest’s acquisition of IndyMac;  CitiMortgage acquisition of ABN AMRO, CPCR-1 Trust;  BOA’s merger with LaSalle; Ditech’s acquisition by multiple entities GMAC, RESCAP, Ally,  Walter investment etc.) when DiTech was dead and the name was the only this being traded, and so much more. All these mergers bear one thing in common — they were cover screen for one simple fact: they had not in one instance acquired any loans but then relied on the illusion of the merger to call themselves “successors by mergers.”

Let’s take the example of WAMU. When they went broke they had less than $3 Billion in assets (see link above). This totally congruent with the $2 billion committed by Chase to acquire the WAMU estate form the FDIC receiver Richard Schoppe (located in Texas) and the US Trustee in bankruptcy — especially when you consider the little known fact that Chase received 1/3 of a tax refund due to WAMU.

That share of the Tax refund was, as you might already have guessed, MORE than the $2 billion committed by Chase. whether Chase ever actually paid the $2 billion is another question.But in any event, pure arithmetic shows that the consideration for the purchase of WAMU by Chase was LESS THAN ZERO, which means we paid Chase to acquire WAMU.

This in turn is completely corroborated by the Purchase and Assumption Agreement between WAMU, the FDIC Receiver, the US Trustee in Bankruptcy and of course Chase. On the first page of that agreement is a express recital that says the consideration for this merger is “-$0-.” But before you look up the “Reading Room on the FDIC FOIA cite, here is one caveat: some time after the original agreement was published on the site, a “different” agreement was posted long after WAMU was dead, the US Trustee had been discharged, and the FDCI receiver was discharged as a receiver. The “new” agreement implies that loans were or may have been acquired but does not state which loans or how much was paid for these loans. The problem with the new agreement of course is that Chase paid nothing and was not entitled to nothing, except the servicing rights on some fo those loans.

The so-called new agreement placed there by nobody knows, also stands in direct contrast of the interview and depositions of Richard Schoppe — that if there were loans to sell the principal amount would have been hundreds of billions of dollars for which Chase need pay nothing. I dare say there are millions of people and companies who would have taken that deal if it was real. But Schoppe states directly that the number of assignments was NONE, zero, zilch.

Schoppe also stated that the total amount of loan originations was just under $1 Trillion. And he said that the loan portfolio might have been, at some time, around 1/3 of the total loans originated. Putting pencil to paper that obviously means that 2/3 of all originated loans were either pre-funded in table funded “loans” or that they were immediately sold into the secondary market for securitization. All evidence points to the fact that WAMU never owned the loans at all — as they were table funded  through multiple layers of conduits none of whom were disclosed as required under the Truth in lending Act.  Because the big asset that WAMU retained were (a) the servicing rights and (b) the right to claim recovery for servicer advances. It could be said that the only way they could perfect their claim for “recovery” of “servicer” “Advances” was by acquiring WAMU since Chase was the Master servicer on nearly all WAMU originations.

The interesting point of legal significance is that Chase emerges as the real party in interest even though it it appeared only as the servicer in the background after subsequent servicers were given “powers” of attorney to prevent the new “servicer” (actually an enforcer) from claiming a recovery  for “servicer” “Advances.,” that are recoverable not from the borrower, not from the investor, and not from the trust but in a foggy chaos in which the property was liquidated.

So the assets of WAMU at the time it went belly up was under $3 Billion which means that after you deduct the brick and mortar locations and the servicing rights Chase still got the deal of a lifetime — but one thing doesn’t add up. If WAMU had less than $3 Billion in assets and 99% of that were conventional bank assets excluding loans, then the “value” of the loan portfolio, using FDIC Schoppe estimates was $3 Million. If the WAMU loan portfolio implied by the a,test antics of Chase was true — then Chase acquired $300 BILLION in loans for $3 MILLION. Even the toxic waste loans were worth more than one tenth of one percent.

Chase continues to assert ownership with impunity on an epic scale of fraud, theft and manipulation of the courts, investors and borrowers. The finding that Chase NOT assumed repurchase obligations in relation to the originated loans goes further to corroborate everything I had written here. There seems to be an oblique reference to attempted changes in the “P&A” Agreement, and the finding that the original deal cannot be changed, but the actual finding of two inconsistent agreements posted on the FDIC site is worth investigating. I can assure the reader that I have found and read both.

And lastly I have already published numerous articles on victories in court (one fo which was mine and Patrick Giunta) for the borrower based upon the exact principles and facts written in this article — where the judge concluded that US Bank had never acquired the loan, that the “servicer” in court testifying through a robo-signer had no power over the loan because their power was  derived from Chase who was named as servicer for a REMIC Trust that never acquired the loan nor any rights to the loan.

The use of powers of attorney were found to be inadequate simply because the party who executed the POA had no rights to the money, the enforcement of the loan nor any collection or foreclosure. If Chase had acquired the loan from WAMU they would have won. Their total reliance on deflective legal presumptions based upon presumed fact that were untrue completely failed.

BOTTOM LINE: CHASE ACQUIRED NO LOANS FROM WAMU. Hence subsequent documents of transfer or powers (Powers of attorney) are void.

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Table Funded: The Student Loan Scam

The essential question I pose is this: if the student loan was table funded (and it does appear to me that they were, in many cases), then why is the originator/broker receiving the government guarantee and the exemption from discharge? By definition they didn’t loan any money to the student. It seems to me that government, lawyers, and courts are overlooking the fact that many banks (large and small) have been acting as brokers and not as lenders.

Like the so-called mortgage loans, the underwriting decisions lie outside of the organization that “granted” the alleged loan from an undisclosed third party. Yet they claim and receive and sell government benefits as though they were lenders.

My theory under current law is that if the loan was funded from the sale of student debt pools there are two outcomes, to wit: (1) the government guarantee does not attach because there is no loan or risk of loss to guarantee and because the actual lender is not the broker, pretender who appears on the note, (i.e., they were not entitled to the government protections because they brokered the transaction instead of loaning the money) and (2) since the government guarantee and other conditions are no longer involved, there is no reason to prevent discharge in bankruptcy.



see http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/how-wall-street-profits-from-student-debt-20160414

Wall Street is like that closet in your house where you throw everything in that you probably won’t need for a while or maybe not at all. When you open the closet door everything falls out on top of you. In this case it is $1.2 Trillion on student debt with “default” rates rising sharply and interest rates rising into double digits. We are in effect making it impossible for the brightest minds to get the education we need for the sake of our society. Anyone want a doctor or lawyer who has been poorly education or not educated at all?

It’s all about money in education. Like medical insurance, the more distance you put between the consumer and the the actual delivery of the service, the less people think about it and the the more the vendors charge. In the end education becomes a process of justifying the cost of a commodity rather than creating the best possible education possible.

Somehow the banks managed to intervene between students and institutions of higher learning, such that they enjoy very high interest rates (after the student completes education) and a guarantee from the Federal government or at least a guarantee that the debt cannot be discharged in bankruptcy.

The government loans work the way they are intended and there are many programs to provide relief to students who in many cases are burdened for life with student debt. But the private loans, which now dominate the marketplace, are putting a drag on our prospects as a nation — but still great business for the banks. Most other countries do not allow graduating students to be burdened by this debt; and those countries that provide free tuition (up to a point) or who pay for their citizens to travel and learn in countries who have quality institutions for higher learning, end up with an increasing GDP stemming from the contribution and productivity of highly educated, trained people who became employees, officers and leaders.

But here is the rub — banks making student loans in most cases  enjoy immunity from bankruptcy and so they use all sorts of sales techniques to get the prospective student to borrow as much as possible for tuition and”expenses.” They do this for the same reasons that homeowners or home buyers were encouraged to put as much into  their alleged mortgage loan as possible — landscaping and other improvements to the house that did not raise the value of the home.

The game, once again, is securitization. Even if we assume that the claims of securitization of these loans are true, we see a basic inconsistency in the choices the banks make as to how to deal with the risk of loss. The answer, like the mortgage loans, is that they have no risk of loss. They have already sold the student loans into a secondary market for securitization. That being true, the premise behind the exclusion of student debt from the benefits of bankruptcy is false.

The first premise is that banks would not provide funding for higher education without the guarantee that the loans cannot be discharged in bankruptcy and, in other cases, without the guarantee of repayment by the government. This is not true. By securitizing the loans (or at least subjecting them to claims of securitization in the secondary market), the banks are making tons of money as brokers and conduits without any risk of loss whatsoever. Our previous system of public loans for high learning worked far better than the current one in which private lenders dominate the market despite the “reforms” that have been enacted.

The second premise is that both the loans and these government guarantees are salable to “investors.” This is the controversial part. Given the premise behind the government guarantees, why should a broker be able to sell that government guarantee at a profit? What gives them the right to sell government promises? The object was to provide capital to students — not to increase the number of arcane financial products in the marketplace. If the loans are not salable without those government guarantees, it is because (as we know from the mortgage market) the loans make no sense. These are flawed financial products based upon the same “bad underwriting” we have seen in the continuing mortgage crisis.

Thus my premise and my question are the same: why should a bank or other “lender” make a profit on a bad loan? Why should banks be freed from the risk of loss that the government guarantees are meant to cover? Why have we strayed from existing law in which the “banks” (which we have all presumed to be “lenders”) are the party primarily responsible for the viability of the loan? Why should these bad loans be subject to sale to “investors” whose only interest in the student loans is the elimination of risk because the government has guaranteed benefits? Why should young people, before they get their education, be held to a higher standard of responsibility than the banks who are setting them up for failure?

My proposed legal theory is that once a bank makes the election to sell the student loan into the secondary market, the government guarantees should vanish. My theory under current law is that if the loan was funded from the sale of student debt pools there are two outcomes, to wit: (1) the government guarantee does not attach because there is no risk of loss to guarantee and because the lender is not the broker, pretender who appears on the note, (i.e., they were not entitled to the government protections because they brokered the transaction instead of loaning the money) and (2) since the government guarantee is no longer involved, there is no reason to prevent discharge in bankruptcy.

Then we will have close attention paid to the value of the loans and the manner in which they were sold. Once sold, these loans should be dischargeable in bankruptcy. Once sold these loans should offer no safe haven to investors that the loan will be paid by the U.S. government. Whether this can be done in the courts under current law is debatable. But it can and should be done through Congress and state legislatures. Without these reforms we are essentially eating our young.

MISSION CREEP NOTICE: Wall Street is now looking to “Securitize” health care loans. There is hardly anything they are not claiming to securitize.

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The Beginning or the End for Loan Servicer Ocwen?

By William Hudson
Ocwen Financial, one of the largest subprime mortgage servicers in America, has big problems. Analysts predict that Ocwen will be forced to file bankruptcy as the SEC opens up two more investigations into the loan servicers business practices while the stock goes into free-fall.

A further hurdle will befall homeowners if Ocwen files for bankruptcy protection because another shield is placed between the homeowners and the banks who are the culprits- but just happen to control all of the “loan” information. As Neil Garfield would say, “They have plenty of bodies to throw under the bus.” To date, homeowners and their attorneys in litigation have been frustrated by attempts to discover who the true creditor is especially when the servicer hides behind bankruptcy, mergers and receivership (Fannie and Freddie).

Ocwen reported a $247 million annual loss while revenues tumbled 17.5% last week at the same time the SEC is continuing to scrutinize their shoddy and abusive servicing practices. Despite the fact that Ocwen previously settled with multiple government regulators upon findings of fraudulent servicing practices, apparently it is business as usual for Ocwen as authorities continue to investigate their business practices- without administering any penalty with teeth or consequences.

Only a month ago, Ocwen settled with the SEC for misstating their 2013 and 2014 financial results and were fined a paltry $2 million dollar fine for poor internal controls and failing to disclose the financial conflicts of their former CEO Bill Erby. In 2014 alone, Ocwen would pay a $100 million civil monetary penalty to the New York Department of Financial Services for violations and non-compliance with a prior consent order with a regulator. Last year they paid an additional $2.5 million fine to the California Department of Business Oversight on their servicing practices that ultimately led to Ocwen being barred from acquiring new Mortgage Servicing Rights in the state of California. Predictably, although the Department of Business Oversight had threatened to revoke their mortgage license- and should have- they failed to do so.

On the upside for Ocwen, is that they will remain in the business of servicing Ginnie Mae loans and will also continue to originate and service new Fannie and Freddie loans. My advice would be to steer clear of GSE loans like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac if at all possible since it presents one more ‘layer’ to navigate if at a future time you suspect fraud may have been involved in your loan. Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are quasi-governmental institutions that are immune to Freedom of Information Requests and federal transparency, while still benefiting from being private corporations. The GSE’s have a cushy little deal where they appear to exist outside of both governmental and corporate regulations.

Last year Ocwen demonstrated that they couldn’t effectively service government guaranteed loans, and was forced to sell $45 billion in mortgage servicing rights (MSRs) on loans originated by Fannie Mae to JPMorgan Chase. Ocwen was also forced to sell a total of $34.8 billion in MSR’s on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans to competitor Nationstar Mortgage in two separate deals to unwind servicing legacy agency loans. Although I could go on and on about the abusive servicing practices that have resulted in Ocwen being financially fined and forced to sell its servicing rights, let’s just say these issues are indicative of the regulatory and investor pressures the servicing giants are now facing- across the board. At present, bondholders have requested that Ocwen be removed from servicing 119 different residential mortgage backed securities trusts with more requesting removal weekly.

Last Monday Ocwen was notified that the SEC would launch a new SEC probe into its servicing operations. The SEC is investigating Ocwen’s use of collection agents by the company’s various mortgage loan servicers, a practice that Ocwen has argued is a standard practice across the servicing industry. President Ronald Faris commented that their practices and fees are considered standard and should be of no concern. Faris is correct in that Ocwen’s illegal practices of using forged and fraudulent documents presented to courts across the country in order to foreclose is standard practice among loan servicing agents. However, Faris is delusional if he believes these practices should be of no concern. To whom? The shareholder who has no idea the loans Ocwen services are owned by phantom entities with no standing to foreclose, or the homeowner who is subjected to predatory servicing and foreclosure tactics? If the government agencies would do their jobs- Ocwen would cease to exist tomorrow.

The SEC has opened an investigation into the fees and expenses the company charges in connection with its management of liquidating mortgage loans and real estate properties in different RMBS trusts. Unfortunately, Ocwen is not being investigating for violations against consumers, but only because investors have complained and when investors complain the regulators and government take notice. Groups of investors have a tendency to get better results when they go up against a large corporation and can retain the best representation that money can buy. A homeowner in a small town outside Des Moines with an attorney specializing in family law doesn’t pose much of a threat or incite the same action.

It is unusual for the SEC to investigate business practices. Typically the SEC will only investigate the integrity of financial statements. CEO Ronald Faris spoke on a conference call Monday evening and addressed the investigation. He said what all good CEO’s say to distance themselves from controversy, “I can’t really comment except to say that we feel confident that the fees that are part of the servicing business that are either assessed to borrowers or passed on to RMBS investors are – they’re monitored closely by master servicers and trustees and others. We’ve had various third parties look at them. We have a good sense as to what other servicers have done since we’ve acquired a lot of servicing portfolios and been able to see what industry practice has been. And we feel comfortable that our process is within industry practice. So, we can’t comment on what exactly a regulator may be looking for, but we do believe that our processes are appropriate.” Faris confirms that he is simply going along with industry “best practices”. Best practices that have been revealed to include falsifying affidavits and forging mortgage documents in order to create the illusion of having standing to foreclose.

In January, Ocwen announced that Phyillis R. Caldwell joined the Board of Directors. Caldwell previously served as Chief of the Homeownership Preservation Office at the U.S. Department of the Treasury where she was responsible for oversight of the U.S. housing market stabilization, economic recovery, and foreclosure prevention initiatives established through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Since Caldwell did such an outstanding job with TARP what could go wrong? Under TARP millions of TPP modification agreements were extended and revoked for no reason while the homeowner was in compliance with the terms of the agreement.

Upon announcing Ocwen’s director, the company issued a press release stating, “Phyllis’ character, deep experience in the housing and mortgage markets, and commitment to borrowers and communities makes her the right choice to move Ocwen forward and emerge as a stronger company with the highest standards in our industry.” Unfortunately, we know what commitment to borrowers and communities’ means for homeowners under Ocwen. It means that investors will be able to come in, purchase properties for pennies on the dollar and displace families while Ocwen alters legal instruments to give the illusion of standing and forecloses on properties. Becoming a stronger company refers to cashing in a few favors she has coming her way so Ocwen can escape extinction. Caldwell’s appointment is disturbing and it is obvious what type of ‘help’ she will provide to Ocwen (cronyism and assistance covering their fraud scheme).

Remember, Ocwen was issued a consent order from the CFPB in every state but Oklahoma last year that illustrated the “continued, systemic abuse of the American homeowner.” Ocwen was accused of “violating consumer financial laws at every stage of the mortgage servicing process,” according to CFPB Director Richard Cordray. However, under that settlement, Ocwen executives faced no criminal charges, did not pay the majority of penalties themselves, and were not forced to admit wrongdoing in the case.
Ocwen, like JPMorgan Chase, Citicorp, Bank of America and other bank servicers settled cases of mortgage servicing abuse in the National Morgan Settlement back in 2012 for 25 billion dollars. The banks paid a nominal fine, and transferred or sold their servicing operations to non-bank servicers like Ocwen.

As a non-bank servicer, Ocwen doesn’t own any of the loans. They merely service loans, collecting monthly payments and dealing with loan modifications and foreclosures, for investors who purchased them as part of mortgage-backed securities.  Ocwen makes the erroneous assumption that the loans they are servicing actually made it into the trusts they claim to. Ocwen has no way to verify if the note is where it is supposed to be but makes false assertions that it is simply because the bank “says so”.
Although Ocwen is not a bank, they have engaged in the exact same servicing practices as the big banks. Eric Mains who is suing CitiMortgage likes to call this game of passing around servicing rights while also claiming creditor rights, “Whack-a-Mole.” The entire servicing industry, by design, is about keeping the homeowner in the dark until they can properly execute the foreclosure action. Servicers change, account numbers change, customer service representatives provide account disinformation and banks routinely fail to comply with any statute meant to protect the homeowner from this type of exploitation and predation.

“Too often trouble began as soon as a loan transferred to Ocwen,” said CFPB Director Cordray when he announced the enforcement action last year. Ocwen was accused of charging borrowers more than stipulated in the mortgage contract; forcing homeowners to buy unnecessary insurance policies; charging borrowers unauthorized fees; providing inaccurate information to borrowers when questioned about excessive and unauthorized fees; lying about loan modification options; misplacing documents and ignoring or losing loan modification applications, deliberately causing homeowners to slip into foreclosure; illegally denying eligible borrowers loan modifications, and then lying to cover up their crimes. These activities result in foreclosures and a windfall of profits to the loan servicer who will then reap a free house, insurance proceeds and other undisclosed rewards granted for successfully foreclosing on a home. I wouldn’t be surprised if Ocwen had a Pirate of the Week award that includes a parking spot upfront near the CEO.

Finally, if Ocwen goes into bankruptcy, homeowners who have loans serviced by Ocwen will face further hardships attempting to unravel who their creditor is, if the loan was legitimately transferred, while being subjected to some unsavory servicing practices that appear to be designed to ensure the appearance of homeowner non-compliance. It is time that Ocwen ADMIT wrongdoing so that their executives will not be protected from legal consequences. Ocwen also needs to be forced to pay any penalties with their own money, not the investors. To date, Ocwen has only faced trivial administrative fines while foreclosing on thousands of homeowners under false pretenses, with fraudulent documents, by predatory means. Until the government regulators take real action- this is business as usual for the loan servicers.



Wells Fargo Skewered by Federal Judge For Forgery as a Pattern of Conduct

For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688




What I like about the Federal Judge decisions is that they express the reasons for their orders and judgments with much greater specificity than State Court judges tend to do — probably because they have a lighter case load and when they get promoted it can go pretty high (like the US Supreme Court). So it should come as no surprise that a New York Federal Bankruptcy Judge issued a 30 page opinion that essentially said what people have been saying since 2007 — the entire foreclosure process is an exercise in illegal patterns of conduct to the detriment of the homeowners. Since he also made clear that the debt remains, we have yet to get a definitive opinion from a Judge that questions whether the original closing was valid and enforceable. for that we still need to wait.

But by ruling on the specifics of how to rebut presumptions that are used in cases involving negotiable instruments, this Court has definitely opened the door to requiring the banks to do something that he suspects and I know the banks cannot do — prove the loan transaction, and the loan transfers with actual transactions in which a purchase and sale occurred and money exchanged hands after which there was delivery of the paper. Once THAT cat is out of the bag, the banks are doomed. People are going to start asking the question they have been asking for years — except this time it won’t be a rhetorical question: “If the originator didn’t loan the money then who did? And if there was no consideration for the transfer of the loan documents then whose money was used to originate or acquire the loan?” The answers will surprise even veterans of this war.

see franklin-opinion


The debtor herein (the “Debtor”) has objected to a claim filed in this case by Wells Fargo Bank,

NA (“Wells Fargo”), Claim No. 1‐2, dated September 29, 2010 (amending Claim No. 1‐1), on the basis that Wells Fargo is not the holder or owner of the note and beneficiary of the deed of trust upon which the claim is based and therefore lacks standing to assert the claim.1 This Memorandum of Decision states the Court’s reasons, based on the record of the trial held on December 3, 2013 and the parties’ pre‐ and post‐trial submissions, for granting the Claim Objection….

(i) how could Wells Fargo or Freddie Mac assert a claim under the Note when the Note was neither specifically indorsed to either of them nor indorsed in blank (and was specifically indorsed to ABN Amro, although ABN Amro had subsequently assigned its interest therein to MERS as nominee for Washington Mutual Bank, FA), and (ii) how could Wells Fargo properly assert any rights under the July 12, 2010 Assignment of Mortgage when the person who signed the Assignment of Mortgage from MERS in its capacity “as nominee for Washington Mutual Bank, FA” to Wells Fargo was an employee of Wells Fargo (as well as of MERS),3 and there was no evidence that Washington Mutual Bank, FA authorized MERS to assign…….

if Freddie Mac was the owner of the loan, as both Wells Fargo and Freddie Mac contended, why was Claim No. 1‐1 filed by Wells Fargo not as Freddie Mac’s agent or servicer, but, rather, in its own name? (The ownership/agency issue had practical as well as possible legal consequences because counsel for Wells Fargo contended that Freddie Mac guidelines precluded Wells Fargo from considering loan modification proposals for the Debtor.)….

the parties engaged in discovery disputes that resulted in an order compelling the deposition of John Kennerty, who by then no longer worked for Wells Fargo, see Kennerty v. Carrsow‐Franklin (In re Carrsow‐Franklin), 456 B.R. 753 (Bankr. D. S.C. 2011), and Wells Fargo’s production of a woefully unqualified initial Rule 30(b)(6) witness…..

Wells Fargo responded that it did not need to be the owner of the loan in order to enforce the Note and a secured claim for amounts owing under it. Instead, Wells Fargo relied, under Texas’ version of Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the “U.C.C.”), solely on being the “holder” of the Note indorsed in blank by ABN Amro that appeared for the first time as an attachment to Claim No. 1‐2.7…

In a bench ruling on March 1, 2012, memorialized by an order dated May 21, 2012, the Court agreed with Wells Fargo, concluding that, under Texas law, if Wells Fargo were indeed the holder of the Note properly indorsed in blank by ABN Amro, Wells Fargo could enforce the Note and the Deed of Trust even if it was not the owner or investor on the Note or properly assigned of Deed of Trust,8 citing SMS Fin., Ltd. Liab. Co. v. ABCO Homes, Inc., 167 F.3d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 1999) (under Texas law, “[t]o recover on a promissory note, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of the note in question; (2) that the party sued signed the note; (3) that the plaintiff is the owner or holder of the note; and (4) that a certain balance is due and owing on the note”) (emphasis added), and In re Pastran, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 2237, ….

Perhaps wary of relying on an assignment by the assignee to itself without authorization by the purported assignor, Wells Fargo has waived reliance on the July 12, 2010 Assignment of Mortgage to establish its right to assert Claim No. 1‐2, looking only to its status as a holder of the Note. It indeed appears that Mr. Kennerty’s signature on the Assignment of Mortgage was improper in either of his capacities, as an officer of Wells Fargo or as an officer of MERS, without further authorization from Washington Mutual Bank, FA, because ABN Amro assigned MERS the Deed of Trust solely in MERS’ capacity as nominee for Washington Mutual Bank, FA, without the power of foreclosure and sale in its own right and not for its own successors and assigns as well as Washington Mutual Bank, FA’s; and MERS (through Mr. Kennerty) executed the Assignment of Mortgage solely as nominee for Washington Mutual Bank, FA. Compare Kramer v. Fannie Mae, 540 Fed. Appx. 319, 320 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1310, 188 L. Ed. 2d 305 (2014) (MERS could assign deed of trust made out to it that specifically granted MERS the power to foreclose and assign its rights); Silver Gryphon, L.L.C. v. Bank of Am. NA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168950, at *11‐12 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2013) (same); Richardson v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123445, at *3, *13‐14 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2010) (same), and Nueces County v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93424, at *20 (S.D. Tex. July 3, 2013); In re Fontes, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1792, at *11‐13 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 22, 2011); and In re Weisband, 427 B.R. 13, 20 (Bankr. D. Az. 2010) (MERS as mere “nominee” of mortgage holder lacks power to transfer enforceable mortgage)…..

Because it is undisputed that (a) the Debtor signed the Note (and received the loan proceeds)11 and (b) a properly recorded lien on the Property secures the Debtor’s obligation under the Note (albeit that Wells Fargo does not rely independently on the Deed of Trust assigned to ABN AMRO and then

10 See Supplement to Emergency Motion to Reopen and for Leave to Propound Additional Discovery to Defendant for Additional Evidence Withheld Prior to Trial, dated March 11, 2014.

11 See Trial Tr. at 95‐6 (testimony of the Debtor).


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assigned to MERS as nominee for Washington Mutual Bank, FA (none of which has filed a proof of claim) or the Assignment of Mortgage to sustain its claim), the only issue addressed by the parties is whether Wells Fargo has standing to enforce the Note, and, thus, assert Claim No. 1‐2.12 This is because, as stated above, Texas follows the majority rule that “[w]hen a mortgage note is transferred, the mortgage or deed of trust is also automatically transferred to the note holder by virtue of the common‐law rule that ‘the mortgage follows the note.’” Campbell v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 4030, at *11‐12 (Tex. App. Austin May 18, 2012), quoting J.W.D., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 806 S.W.2d 327, 329‐30 (Tex. App. Austin 1991). See also Kiggundu v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 469 Fed. Appx. 330, 332; Richardson v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177471, at *13 n.4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2014); Nguyen v. Fannie Mae., 958 F. Supp. 2d 781, 790 n.11 (S.D. Tex. 2013); Trimm v. U.S. Bank., N.A., 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 7880, at *14 (Tex. App. Fort Worth July 17, 2014)…..

Wells Fargo’s right to enforce the Note, and thus its standing to assert Claim No. 1‐2, derives from the Note’s status as a negotiable instrument under Texas’ version of the U.C.C. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 3.104(a). The Debtor has not disputed that the Note is negotiable, and the Note in any event satisfies the requirements of a negotiable instrument under Texas law, as it is “an unconditional promise . . . to pay a fixed amount of money . . . payable to . . . order at the time it [was] issued; . . . payable . . . at a definite time; and does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money” except as permitted by the statute. Id. See also Farkas v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190194, at *6‐7 (W.D. Tex. June 22, 2012), aff’d, 544 Fed. Appx. 324 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 628, 187 L. Ed. 411

12 One might argue, although Wells Fargo has not, that the parties’ pre‐bankruptcy course of dealing, including the Loan Modification Agreement signed by the Debtor on February 12, 2008 and attached to Claim No 1‐2 (See also Trial Tr. at 96‐104), would independently support Wells Fargo’s right to assert Claim No. 1‐2; however, if the blank ABN Amro indorsement were forged, the Loan Modification Agreement and course of dealing would ultimately improperly derive from Wells Fargo’s fraudulent assertion of the right to enforce the Note and Deed of Trust.


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(2013); Steinberg v. Bank. of Am., N.A., 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2230, at *12‐14 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. May 30, 2013)…..

“The presumption rests upon the fact that in ordinary experience forged or unauthorized signatures are very uncommon, and normally any evidence is within the control of, or more accessible to, the defendant.”15 Official Comment to Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 3.308 (“Off. Cmt.”). The presumption is effectively incorporated into Fed. R. Evid. 902(9), which provides that no extrinsic evidence of authenticity is required to admit “[c]ommercial paper, a signature on it, and related documents, to the extent allowed by general commercial law,” and it is loosely analogous to the rebuttable presumption of the prima facie validity of a properly filed proof of claim under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f).

While Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 3.308(a) and 1.206(a) provide that the presumption of an authentic signature applies “unless and until evidence is introduced that supports a finding of nonexistence,” they do not state the quantum of evidence to overcome the presumption. The Official Comment to § 3.308, however, refers to “some evidence” and to “some sufficient showing of the grounds for the denial before the plaintiff is required to introduce evidence,” and then states, “[t]he defendant’s evidence need not be sufficient to require a directed verdict, but it must be enough to support the denial by permitting a finding in the defendant’s favor.” Off. Cmt. 1 to § 3.308.16 This suggests that the required evidentiary showing to overcome the presumption is similar to that needed to defeat a summary judgment motion: the introduction of sufficient evidence so that a reasonable trier of fact in the context of the dispute could find in the defendant’s favor. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587‐88 (1986); 11 Moore’s Fed. Prac. 3d § 56.22[2] (2014). Because of the general factual context described in the Official Comment, which recognizes that “in ordinary experience forged or unauthorized signatures are very uncommon,” Off. Cmt. 1 to § 3.308, courts have nevertheless required a significant amount of evidence to overcome the presumption. See In re Phillips, 491 B.R. 255, 273 n. 37 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2013) (“This evidence was inconclusive at best. Against this background, the court is prepared to believe that it is more likely that [the claimant] negligently failed to copy the Note and First Allonge when it filed its [first] Proof of Claim rather than it forged the First Allonge later on. In short, when both are equally likely, the court picks sloth over venality.”); see also Congress v. U.S. Bank. N.A., 98 So. 3d 1165, 1169 (Civ. App. Ala. 2012) (referring to requirement of substantial, though not clear and convincing, evidence to rebut the presumption under U.C.C. §§ 3‐308(a) and 1‐206(a), although directing trial court on remand to apply preponderance‐of‐ the‐evidence standard to whether the presumption was overcome)….

See People v. Richetti, 302 N.Y. 290, 298 (1951) (“A presumption of regularity exists only until contrary substantial evidence appears. . . . It forces the opposing party (defendant here) to go forward with proof but, once he does go forward, the presumption is out of the case.”). Thus, in In re Phillips, 491 B.R. at 273 n. 37, quoted above, if the presumption had been overcome by a preponderance of the evidence and the burden shifted and forgery and negligence were found to be equally likely, the holder of the note should lose.

Because Wells Fargo does not rely on the Assignment of Mortgage to prove its claim, the foregoing evidence is helpful to the Debtor only indirectly, insofar as it goes to show that the blank indorsement, upon which Wells Fargo is relying, was forged. Nevertheless it does show a general willingness and practice on Wells Fargo’s part to create documentary evidence, after‐the‐fact, when enforcing its claims, WHICH IS EXTRAORDINARY…..

Wells Fargo has not carried that burden. To do so, it offered only Mr. Campbell’s testimony and, through him, certain exhibits copied from Wells Fargo’s loan file. That testimony was not helpful to it. Mr. Campbell was not involved in the administration of the Debtor’s loan until he became a potential witness in 2013. Trial Tr. at 37. He was not involved in the preparation of Claim No 1‐2. Id. at 37. He had nothing to say about the circumstances under which the blank ABN Amro indorsement appeared on the Note attached to Claim No. 1‐2, with the exception that he located the earliest entry in the electronic loan file where that version of the Note was recorded, pulled up its image and compared it to the original shown him by Wells Fargo’s counsel. Id. at 33, 36, 49‐50. He was offered, therefore, only to qualify Wells Fargo’s proposed exhibits, copied from Wells Fargo’s loan file, as falling within Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)’s business records exception to a hearsay objection under Fed. R. Evid. 802 and to testify that a copy of the Note with the blank ABN Amro indorsement appears in Wells Fargo’s electronic records before the preparation of Wells Fargo’s initial proof of claim in this case….

In large measure, Mr. Campbell was not up to that task (and Wells Fargo offered no other evidence to meet that standard, were the Court to impose it). Mr. Campbell did not know whether there was any person overseeing the accuracy of how the records in the system were stored and maintained. Id. at 32, 40, 42‐3. He did not know who controlled access to the system or the procedure for limiting access, except to say “[A]ccess is granted as needed.” Id. at 40‐1. He did not know of any procedures for backing up or auditing the system. Id. at 42. He stated, “I am not a technology person” and was not able to answer what technology ensures the accuracy of the date and time stamping of the entry of documents into the imaging system. Trial Tr. at 22. In his deposition, he testified that he did not know whether the dates and times of the entry of documents in the system could be changed, but at trial he stated that, after his deposition, “I attempted to look into this, and, to my knowledge, I am not aware of any way to change or remove attachments into the imaging system,” id. at 43, which, given his general lack of knowledge about how the system works and failure to explain the basis for his assertion, did not inspire confidence….

Moreover, in addition to the fact that the specially indorsed version of the Note appears on its own in the file on March 27, 2007, and not as part of an “origination file,” Wells Fargo has offered no explanation, let alone evidence, of who else, if not Wells Fargo, held the original of the Note with the blank ABN Amro indorsement before December 28, 2009, if, in fact, such a version then existed. The file provided by the transferor should have included it, if it did exist during that period, because Washington Mutual Bank, FA would not have been able to enforce the Note, either, without the blank indorsement, and the Assignment of Deed of Trust attached to the proofs of claim states that both the Note and Deed of Trust were transferred to MERS as nominee for Washington Mutual Bank, FA on June 20, 2002, effective November 16, 2001. In other words, why would only an outdated and unenforceable version of the Note have been logged in by Wells Fargo when it took over the file in February 2007 if the only enforceable version of the Note had in fact existed at that time (and should have existed since 2002)? The far more likely inference, instead, is that when the loan was transferred to Wells Fargo, the Note with the blank ABN Amro indorsement did not exist.

Why would the Note with the blank ABN Amro indorsement have appeared in Wells Fargo’s file only on December 28, 2009, twenty‐two months later? Wells Fargo has not provided an explanation, supported by evidence, replying only that the question is irrelevant. All that matters, Wells Fargo contends, is that the enforceable document was imaged into its records before the Debtor’s counsel started raising questions about Claim No 1‐1.


BAP Panel Raises the Stakes Against Deutsch et al — Secured Status May be Challenged

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I have long held and advocated three points:

  1. The filing of false claims in the nonjudicial process of a majority of states should not result in success where the same false claims could never be proven in judicial process. Nonjudicial process was meant as an administrative remedy to foreclosures that were NOT in dispute. Any application of nonjudicial schemes that allows false claims to succeed where they would fail in a judicial action is unconstitutional.
  2. The filing of a bankruptcy petition that shows property to be encumbered by virtue of a deed of trust is admitting a false representation made by a stranger to the transaction. The petition for bankruptcy relief should be filed showing that the property is not encumbered and the adversary or collateral proceeding to nullify the mortgage and the note should accompany each filing where the note and mortgage are subject to claims of securitization or a “new” beneficiary.
  3. The vast majority of decisions against borrowers result from voluntary or involuntary waiver, ignorance and failure to plead or object on the basis of false claims based on false documentation. The issue is not the signature (although that probably is false too); rather it is (a) the actual transaction which is missing and the (b) false documentation of a (i) fictitious transaction and (ii) fictitious transfers of fictitious (and non-fictitious) transactions. The result is often that the homeowner has admitted to the false assertion of being a borrower in relation to the party making the claim, admitting the secured status of the “creditor”, admitting that they are a creditor, admitting that they received a loan from within the chain claimed by the “creditor”, admitting the default, admitting the validity of the note and admitting the validity of the mortgage or deed of trust — thus leaving both the trial and appellate courts with no choice but to rule against the homeowner. Thus procedurally a false claim becomes “true” for purposes of that case.

see 11/24/14 Decision: MEMORANDUM-_-ANTON-ANDREW-RIVERA-DENISE-ANN-RIVERA-Appellants-v.-DEUTSCHE-BANK-NATIONAL-TRUST-COMPANY-Trustee-of-Certificate-Holders-of-the-WAMU-Mortgage-Pass-Through-Certificate-Series-2005-AR6

This decision is breath-taking. What the Panel has done here is fire a warning shot over the bow of the California Supreme Court with respect to the APPLICATION of the non-judicial process. AND it takes dead aim at those who make false claims on false debts in both nonjudicial and judicial process. Amongst the insiders it is well known that your chances on appeal to the BAP are less than 15% whereas an appeal to the District Judge, often ignored as an option, has at least a 50% prospect for success.

So the fact that this decision comes from the BAP Panel which normally rubber stamps decisions of bankruptcy judges is all the more compelling. One word of caution that is not discussed here is the the matter of jurisdiction. I am not so sure the bankruptcy judge had jurisdiction to consider the matters raised in the adversary proceeding. I think there is a possibility that jurisdiction would be present before the District Court Judge, but not the Bankruptcy Judge.

From one of my anonymous sources within a significant government agency I received the following:

This case is going to be a cornucopia of decision material for BK courts nationwide (and others), it directly tackles all the issues regarding standing and assignment (But based on Non-J foreclosure, and this is California of course……) it tackles Glaski and Glaski loses, BUT notes dichotomy on secured creditor status….this case could have been even more , but leave to amend was forfeited by borrower inaction—– it is part huge win, part huge loss as it relates to Glaski, BUT IT IS DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO CHASE/WAMU CASES……….Note in full case how court refers to transfer of “some of WAMU’s assets”, tacitly inferring that the court WILL NOT second guess what was and was not transferred………… i.e, foreclosing party needs to prove this!!


Even though Siliga, Jenkins and Debrunner may preclude the

Riveras from attacking DBNTC’s foreclosure proceedings by arguing

that Chase’s assignment of the deed of trust was a nullity in

light of the absence of a valid transfer of the underlying debt,

we know of no law precluding the Riveras from challenging DBNTC’s assertion of secured status for purposes of the Riveras’ bankruptcy case. Nor did the bankruptcy court cite to any such law.

We acknowledge that our analysis promotes the existence of two different sets of legal standards – one applicable in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings and a markedly different one for use in ascertaining creditors’ rights in bankruptcy cases.

But we did not create these divergent standards. The California legislature and the California courts did. We are not the first to point out the divergence of these standards. See CAL. REAL EST., at § 10:41 (noting that the requirements under California law for an effective assignment of a real-estate-secured obligation may differ depending on whether or not the dispute over the assignment arises in a challenge to nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings).
We must accept the truth of the Riveras’ well-pled
allegations indicating that the Hutchinson endorsement on the
note was a sham and, more generally, that neither DBNTC nor Chase
ever obtained any valid interest in the Riveras’ note or the loan
repayment rights evidenced by that note. We also must
acknowledge that at least part of the Riveras’ adversary
proceeding was devoted to challenging DBNTC’s standing to file
its proof of claim and to challenging DBNTC’s assertion of
secured status for purposes of the Riveras’ bankruptcy case. As
a result of these allegations and acknowledgments, we cannot
reconcile our legal analysis, set forth above, with the
bankruptcy court’s rulings on the Riveras’ second amended
complaint. The bankruptcy court did not distinguish between the
Riveras’ claims for relief that at least in part implicated the
parties’ respective rights in the Riveras’ bankruptcy case from
those claims for relief that only implicated the parties’
respective rights in DBNTC’s nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings.


Here, we note that the California Supreme Court recently

granted review from an intermediate appellate court decision
following Jenkins and rejecting Glaski. Yvanova v. New Century
Mortg. Corp., 226 Cal.App.4th 495 (2014), review granted &
opinion de-published, 331 P.3d 1275 (Cal. Aug 27, 2014). Thus,
we eventually will learn how the California Supreme Court views
this issue. Even so, we are tasked with deciding the case before
us, and Ninth Circuit precedent suggests that we should decide
the case now, based on our prediction, rather than wait for the
California Supreme Court to rule. See Hemmings, 285 F.3d at
1203; Lewis v. Telephone Employees Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537,
1545 (9th Cir. 1996). Because we have no convincing reason to
doubt that the California Supreme Court will follow the weight of
authority among California’s intermediate appellate courts, we
will follow them as well and hold that the Riveras lack standing
to challenge the assignment of their deed of trust based on an
alleged violation of a pooling and servicing agreement to which
they were not a party.


Even though the Riveras’ first claim for relief principally

relies on their allegations regarding the assignment’s violation
of the pooling and servicing agreement, their first claim for
relief also explicitly incorporates their allegations challenging
DBNTC’s proof of claim and disputing the validity of the
Hutchinson endorsement. Those allegations, when combined with
what is set forth in the first claim for relief, are sufficient
on their face to state a claim that DBNTC does not hold a valid
lien against the Riveras’ property because the underlying debt
never was validly transferred to DBNTC. See In re Leisure Time
Sports, Inc., 194 B.R. at 861 (citing Kelly v. Upshaw, 39 Cal.2d
179 (1952) and stating that “a purported assignment of a mortgage
without an assignment of the debt which it secured was a legal
While the Riveras cannot pursue their first claim for relief
for purposes of directly challenging DBNTC’s pending nonjudicial
foreclosure proceedings, Debrunner, 204 Cal.App.4th at 440-42,
the first claim for relief states a cognizable legal theory to
the extent it is aimed at determining DBNTC’s rights, if any, as
a creditor who has filed a proof of secured claim in the Riveras’
bankruptcy case.


Fifth Claim for Relief – for violation of the Federal Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g)

The Riveras’ TILA Claim alleged, quite simply, that they did
not receive from DBNTC, at the time of Chase’s assignment of the
deed of trust to DBNTC, the notice of change of ownership
required by 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g)(1). That section provides:
In addition to other disclosures required by this
subchapter, not later than 30 days after the date on
which a mortgage loan is sold or otherwise transferred
or assigned to a third party, the creditor that is the
new owner or assignee of the debt shall notify the
borrower in writing of such transfer, including–

(A) the identity, address, telephone number of the new


(B) the date of transfer;


(C) how to reach an agent or party having authority to

act on behalf of the new creditor;

(D) the location of the place where transfer of

ownership of the debt is recorded; and

(E) any other relevant information regarding the new


The bankruptcy court did not explain why it considered this claim as lacking in merit. It refers to the fact that the
Riveras had actual knowledge of the change in ownership within
months of the recordation of the trust deed assignment. But the
bankruptcy court did not explain how or why this actual knowledge
would excuse noncompliance with the requirements of the statute.
Generally, the consumer protections contained in the statute
are liberally interpreted, and creditors must strictly comply
with TILA’s requirements. See McDonald v. Checks–N–Advance, Inc.
(In re Ferrell), 539 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2008). On its
face, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(iv) imposes upon the assignee of
a deed of trust who violates 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g)(1) statutory
damages of “not less than $400 or greater than $4,000.”
While the Riveras’ TILA claim did not state a plausible
claim for actual damages, it did state a plausible claim for
statutory damages. Consequently, the bankruptcy court erred when
it dismissed the Riveras’ TILA claim.


Here, however, the Riveras did not argue in either the bankruptcy court or in their opening appeal brief that the court should have granted them leave to amend. Having not raised the issue in either place, we may consider it forfeited. See Golden v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (In re Choo), 273 B.R. 608, 613 (9th Cir. BAP 2002).

Even if we were to consider the issue, we note that the

bankruptcy court gave the Riveras two chances to amend their
complaint to state viable claims for relief, examined the claims
they presented on three occasions and found them legally
deficient each time. Moreover, the Riveras have not provided us
with all of the record materials that would have permitted us a
full view of the analyses and explanations the bankruptcy court
offered them when it reviewed the Riveras’ original complaint and
their first amended complaint. Under these circumstances, we
will not second-guess the bankruptcy court’s decision to deny
leave to amend. See generally In re Nordeen, 495 B.R. at 489-90
(examining multiple opportunities given to the plaintiffs to
amend their complaint and the bankruptcy court’s efforts to
explain to them the deficiencies in their claims, and ultimately
determining that the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the plaintiffs leave to amend their second amended

Now that you have won your “free “house, what happens next?

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On an upbeat note, we are getting more and more communication from homeowners who have won their cases outright and not subject to confidentiality agreements. Fortunately these happy homeowners have realized that the fight is not yet over but that they are obviously in control of the narrative. A word of caution about the case cited in yesterday’s article where the Judge granted a “free house” to a homeowner. The New Jersey bankruptcy case is potentially persuasive but legal authority that the Judge in your case must obey.

Banks have gone to great lengths in framing the narrative on these mortgages and these foreclosures. Almost everywhere you hear the phrase “free house.” Of course nobody really knows what anyone means by that phrase. “free houses” are a myth, just like the trusts, the assignments and the “holders” of the note and mortgage. Preventing the mortgagee from enforcement does NOT give a free house to anyone, regardless of the circumstances. It is a rare circumstance that the buyer of the new house does not expend thousands of dollars or tens of thousands of dollars or even hundreds of thousands of dollars on the house that they think they now own.

I know thousands perhaps millions put a down payment into a house thinking that their payment was equity they would retrieve when the house was sold or refinanced. A typical case I have witnessed is a home purchased for $500,000 with $100,000 down payment —- 20% of the purchase price based upon appraisals that wildly speculative and untrue.

Then the house gets sold in a short sale for $300,000. If that homeowner had fought the bank and the bank was found not to be the owner of the mortgage or note or debt and the mortgage was found to be unenforceable or even void, did that homeowner get the house for free. $100k down, plus $50k in improvements, furnishings etc. The homeowner is out $150,000 no matter what happens and that is not free. There is no such thing as a free house and there never was. But mortgages and notes are sometimes ab initio (from the start), unenforceable or void and in today’s market most of them fall somewhere in that category.

And there is an area of confusion between property law, bankruptcy law and contract law. Which brings us to the case decided in New Jersey by a bankruptcy court judge. It is the case of Washington versus specialized loan servicing and the Bank of New York Mellon as trustee for the certificate holders of an allegedly asset-backed trust.

This case is far from a cure all that will fix all other foreclosures. I doubt the Judge had jurisdiction to declare the mortgage void. And therein lies a potential problem for the homeowner that won here. The homeowner might lose on appeal or still have a problem even if the bank’s appeal is turned down.

I will point out again that Bank of New York Mellon represents itself as trustee for the certificate holders and old minutes any representation for the trust itself. One might conclude that the trust does not exist and that the certificate holders who obviously are the investors are the real parties in interest as I have repeatedly stated for more than seven years.
And by the way, NJ does not have a homestead exemption, so the debt, which is real and if it can be computed after giving credit for all payments to the creditors from all sources, is still owed and the homestead can still be foreclosed based upon a money judgment. So a free house is just not the right term to describe any of this.

I don’t think the judge realized that the investors were being directly represented by Bank of New York Mellon and that the reference to the bank as a trustee was merely a self-serving statement by the bank in order to block any inquiry into the identity of the certificate holders who were the obvious real parties in interest. In the months and years to come the distinction which I am drawing here will become increasingly important in court rooms across the country.

The bankruptcy judge carefully analyzed the statute of limitations and concluded that there was no way that the loan could be enforced and that therefore the claim in bankruptcy was void. The judge that he didn’t like to give anyone a free house but that was what he had to do in this case in New Jersey.

The foreclosure case in the state court was dismissed for lack of prosecution without prejudice. The effect of that dismissal was one of the things that was in dispute that the bankruptcy judge decided. The bad news is that I am not so sure this decision will be upheld if it is appealed. But even if it is upheld I’m not so sure that the homeowner actually received the free house that the judge expressly said was being given to him by the judges decision. Bankruptcy Judges are known to have an inflated view of their jurisdictional authority. The District Court Judge above him in the same courthouse might have been able to declare the mortgage void, but I doubt if a bankruptcy judge has that authority. But the decision to prevent enforcement of the mortgage in the bankruptcy proceeding and the decision to cause the alleged creditor to be unsecured instead of secured (which is what I have been advocating for 7 years) is probably valid.

The judge decided that both the note and mortgage were unenforceable. He also decided that because they were unenforceable that Bank of New York Mellon did not have a secured claim for purposes of the bankruptcy proceeding. The judge went further than that by stating that the underlying lien is deemed void pursuant to 11 USC 506(a)(1) and (d). So for purposes of that bankruptcy proceeding court made a determination that Bank of New York Mellon did not have secured status. The Court also seemed to accept the agreement of both size that Bank of New York Mellon or a specialized loan servicing had the original note and mortgage.

The Question I have is the same question that Is being asked in many circles today. When all is said and done the mortgage still is present in the county records — it was recorded so it still exists in the county records of the County recorder in the jurisdiction in which the property is located. My question is whether in the absence of a court order stating that the mortgage is void or nullified, and in the absence of the recording of such an order at the county recorders office, will this homeowner be legally correct in assuming that the mortgage will not affect his title and that no payment will be required at the time the homeowner seeks to sell or refinance the property.

It may seem like splitting hairs and maybe It is. But I think there’s a difference between a lien that is in the county records and therefore encumbers the title answer the question of the enforceability of the lean. When you pull up the title chain by hand or by computer, the mortgage will be there. Would you buy that property without getting rid of that mortgage? Would you lend money on that property? In this case the Bankruptcy judge has decided for purposes of the bankruptcy proceeding that the secured status of Bank of New York Mellon did not exist.

I question whether that decision automatically means that the mortgage was in fact nullified or void unless the County recorder accepts the court order for recording and the recorded order is interpreted as nullification unemployed mortgage document. And THAT basically means you need to file a quiet title action, which bring you back to attacking the initial loan transaction ab initio (from the beginning). Unless you can say that the note and mortgage should never have been released from the closing table, much less recorded, I think there is a potential problem lurking in the shadows. The homeowner might be prevented from selling or refinancing the home without the AMGAR program or something like it.

Otherwise what it comes time to sell or refinance the property, the homeowner may find that he still must deal with either paying off somebody claiming to own the mortgage or the homeowner is required to file a quiet title action to resolve the question. Of course the longer the homeowner waits before taking any action to sell or refinance the property, more likely it is that the homeowner will in fact end up with the property unencumbered by the mortgage. My point is that I don’t think that question has been answered and I don’t think that the answer will be consistent across the country.

It is my opinion that nullification of the mortgage as a void instrument that never should’ve been released much less recorded is first required for the Court can consider of cause of action to quiet title in favor of the homeowner and specifically against the encumbrance filed in the county records as a mortgage. I would also Council caution on applying this bankruptcy case to other cases in the State judicial system even in New Jersey.

But I would also say that the distaste of people sitting on the bench for hey results that benefits the homeowner signals bias for which there is no proper foundation. There is no question that these loans, debts, notes, mortgages, assignments and transfers. collection modification and foreclosures are all clouded in obscure schemes created by the banks and not the borrowers. 50 million borrowers did not wake up one morning and meet in some stadium with the idea of defrauding the banks and the federal government and insurers, guarantors and investors. But a handful of Wall Street titans who had become accustomed to their power, did in fact arrogantly pursue a scheme that did defraud borrowers, investors, insurance companies and the U.S. government.

To say that nobody can file a foreclosure is not to say that the debt cannot be enforced. There are causes of action based solely on common law or the note. If a real creditor could step forward showing a real advance of funds, they would probably prevail in at least establishing that the debt is owed from the homeowner and possibly get a money judgment. In states that have little or no homestead exemption the lien can be recorded, attaches the chain of title for the house and can be foreclosed as a judgment lien. But of course that would require the party seeking to enforce the debt to show that they actually advanced the money as a creditor. And THAT is the problem for the banks. If they had that evidence there would be no argument over the enforceability of the alleged loan documents that I call worthless.

They would have produced it long ago if the notes and mortgages were valid documents. They didn’t, they can’t, and that is why Elizabeth Warren is absolutely right in demanding that the principal balance of the debt be corrected downward. And it is stink and no crime for a Judge to apply the law evenly and allow the chips to fall where they may. If that means nobody gets to enforce the mortgage it doesn’t mean the homeowner received a free house.

The debt is due, after all adjustments, and it could be enforced by other means — unless the truth is that the borrowers ARE off the hook because the original debt, upon which all other debts deals rely as their foundation, has already been paid off. Then the homeowner doesn’t owe the money on the original debt and if somebody wants to make a case against the homeowner for recovery of what they actually lost then let them bring that action. Otherwise too bad. If the original debt is paid off through any third party payment (i.e., if the certificate holders have received payment in full directly or indirectly on their investment), then there should be no possibility of a mortgage foreclosure because that is the only debt that is allegedly secured by a mortgage. Other parties who have been lurking in the shadows would have to come into the limelight and allege and prove their case including the allegation that they are losing money as a result of these complex and obscure transactions.

The banks started this and they should suffer the consequences. There is plenty of blame to go around. To have homeowners pay the full price for the bank’s misbehavior, for the servicer’s fraud, and the Wall Street bank’s greedy method of siphoning the life out of our economy is just plain wrong. Even if we want to treat the loan documents as real, the consequences should be spread around and not on banks who are reporting higher and higher profits from aggressive release of reserves that comes from money they stole from investors —- a fact that is now dawning upon securities analysts as they downgraded Wells Fargo and other banks.

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