FDIC Employee Quits and Goes Public With Complaint Against Chase, WAMU, Citi and two law firms

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See Eric Mains Federal Complaint

see Mains – Table of Contents.petition 2 transfer

On Monday Eric Mains resigned from his employment with the FDIC. He had just filed a lawsuit against Chase, Citi, WAMU-HE2 Trust, Cynthia Riley, LPS, WAMU, and two law firms. Since he felt he had a conflict of interest, he believed the best course of action was to resign effective immediately.

His lawsuit, told from the prospective of a true insider, reveals in astonishing detail the worst of the practices that have resulted in millions of illegal foreclosures. Some of his allegations cast a dark shadow over claims of Chase Bank on its balance sheet, as reported to the public and the SEC and the reporting of both Chase and Citi as to their potential liability for wrongful foreclosures. If he is right, and he proves these allegations, much of what Chase has reported as its financial condition will vanish from its financial statements and the liability side of the balance sheets of both Citi (as Trustee) and Chase (as servicer and “owner’) will increase exponentially. This may well have the effect of bringing both giants into the position of insufficient reserve capital and force the government to take action against both entities. Elizabeth Warren might have been right when she said that Citi should have been broken into pieces. And the same logic might apply to Chase.

He has also penned the phrase “wild goose Chase” referring to discovery of the true creditors and processing of applications for modification of loans. And he has opened the door for RICO actions against the banks and individuals who did the bidding of the banks as well as the individuals who directed those actions.

His Indiana lawsuit is filed in federal court. He alleges that

1. WAMU was not the actual lender in his own loan
2. That the loan was part of an illegal scheme from the start
3. That his loan was subject to claims of securitization but that those claims were false
4. That the REMIC Trust was never funded and therefore never had the capacity to originate or buy loans
5. That the intermediaries never followed the law or the documents for securitization of his loan
6. That the REMIC Trust never did purchase his loan
7. That Citi was therefore “trustee” for an unfunded trust
8. That Chase never purchased the loans from WAMU
9. That Chase could not have been the legal servicer over the loan because the loan was not in the trust
10. That Chase has filed conflicting claims as to ownership of the loans
11. That the affidavit of Robert Schoppe, whom Mains worked for, as to ownership of the loans was false when it states that Chase owned the loans
12. That the use of WAMU’s name on the loan documents was a false representation
13. That his loan may have been pledged several times by various parties
14. That multiple payments from multiple parties were likely received by Chase and others on account of the Mains “loan” but were never accounted for to the investors whose money was being used as though it was the Banks themselves who were funding originations and a acquisitions of loans
15. That the industry practice was to reap multiple payments on the same loan — and the foreclose as though there was balance due when in fact the balance claimed was entirely incorrect
16. That the investors were defrauded and that foreclosure was part of the fraudulent scheme
17. That Mains name and identity was used without his consent to justify numerous illegal transactions in which the banks repeated huge profits
18. That neither WAMU nor Chase had any rights to collect money from Mains
19. That Citi had no right to enforce a loan it did not own and had no authority to represent the owner(s) of the loan
20. That the modification procedures adopted by the Banks were used intentionally to force the borrower into the illusions a default
21. That Sheila Bair, Chairman of the FDIC, said that Chase and other banks used HAMP modifications as “a kind of predatory lending program.”
22. That Mains stopped making payments when he discovered that there was no known or identified creditor.
23. The despite stopping payments, his loan balance went down, according to statements sent to him.
24. That Chase has routinely violated the terms of consent judgments and settlements with respect to the processing of payments and the filing of foreclosures.
25. That the affidavits filed by persons purportedly representing Chase were neither true nor based upon personal knowledge
26. That the note and mortgage are void from the start.
27. That Mains has found “incontrovertible evidence of fraud, forgery and possibly backdating as well.” (referring to Chase)
28. That the law firms suborned perjury and intentionally made misrepresentations to the Court
29. That Cynthia Riley “is one overwhelmingly productive and multi-talented bank officer. Apparently she was even capable of endorsing hundreds of loan documents a day, and in Mains’ case, even after she was no longer employed by Washington Mutual Bank. [Mains cites to deposition of Riley in JPM Morgan Chase v Orazco Case no 29997 CA, 11th Judicial Circuit, Florida.
30 That Cynthia Riley was laid off in November 2006 and never again employed as a note review examiner by WAMU nor at JP Morgan Chase.
30. That LPS (now Black Knight) owns and operates LPS Desktop Software, which was used to create false documents to be executed by LPS employees for recording in the Offices of the Indiana County recorder.
31. That the false documents in the mains case were created by LPS employee Jodi Sobotta and signed by her with no authority to do so.
32. Neither the notary nor the LPS employee had any real documents nor knowledge when they signed and notarized the documents used against Mains.
33. Chase and its lawyer pursued the foreclosure with full knowledge that the assignment was fraudulent and forged.
34. That LPS was established as an intermediary to provide “plausible deniability” to Chase and others who used LPS.
35. That the law firms also represented LPS in a blatant conflict of interest and with knowledge of LPS fraud and forgery.

Some Quotes form the Complaint:

“Mains perspective on this case is a rather unique one, as Main is an employee of the FDIC (hereinafter, FDIC) who worked in the Dallas field office of the FDIC in the Division of Resolutions and Receiverships (hereinafter DRR), said division which was the one responsible for closing WAMU and acting as its receiver. Mains worked with one Robert Schoppe in his division, whom the defendant Chase Bank often cites to when pulling out an affidavit Robert signed. This affidavit states that Chase Bank had purchased “certain assets and liabilities” of WAMU in the purchase transaction from the FDIC as receiver for WAMU in 2008. Chase Bank uses this affidavit ad museum to convince the court system in foreclosure cases that this affidavit somehow proves that Chase Bank purchased “every conceivable asset” of WAMU, so it must have standing in all cases involving homeowner loans originated through WAMU, or to put it simply that this proves Chase became a holder with rights to enforce or a holder in due course of the loan as defined by the Uniform Commercial Code. Antithetically, when it wants to sue the FDIC for a billion dollars… due to mounting expenses from the WAMU purchase transaction, it complains that the purchase agreement it signed didn’t really entail the purchase of “every asset and liability” of WAMU… Chase Bank claims this when it is to their advantage in a lawsuit to do so.

Mains worked as team leader in the DRR Dallas field office

[The] violation of REMIC trust rules occurred because the entities involved, for reasons of control, speed of transaction, and to hide what they were actually doing with the investors money

Unfortunately for the investors, many of the banks involved in the securitization process (like Wahoo) failed to perform the securitizations properly, hence as mentioned above, the securitizations were botched and ineffective as to passing ownership of the notes or underlying collateral. The loans purchased were not purchased THROUGH the REMIC. … The REMIC trust entity must be the one actually purchasing the mortgages directly.

This violation of REMIC trust rules occurred because the entities involved, for reasons of control, speed of transaction, and to hide what they were actually doing with the investors funds once received, held the investor funds in the “lender” banks owned subsidiary accounts, instead of funding the REMIC trusts with the money so that the trust could then purchase the loan from the “lender”, making it an actual buy and sell transaction.”

Chase Admits Violations of Consent Order

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see http://dtc-systems.net/2015/03/jpmorgan-chase-admits-failure-comply-april-13-2011-independent-foreclosure-review-consent-order/#more-2157

see also 27_page_settlement2

We already knew that the servicers, banks and trustees were violating the settlements and consent orders that were entered against them for filing fraudulent papers in fraudulent foreclosures. Now the question is what to do about it.

With respect to the 2011 consent orders Chase admitted the wrongdoing and the settlement was supposed to compensate and give notice to borrowers who had been defrauded.

In the proposed settlement, Chase acknowledges that it filed in bankruptcy courts around the country more than 50,000 payment change notices that were improperly signed, under penalty of perjury, by persons who had not reviewed the accuracy of the notices.  More than 25,000 notices were signed in the names of former employees or of employees who had nothing to do with reviewing the accuracy of the filings.  The rest of the notices were signed by individuals employed by a third party vendor on matters unrelated to checking the accuracy of the filings.

The first question that SHOULD come to mind is WHY a multi trillion dollar bank would need or want to engage in such practices? After all they were committing perjury by their own admission. The second question is why borrowers who were hurt by this behavior have not used the admissions to win their foreclosure cases? And the third question is what is the effect of these admissions?

The answer lies in the lies. The plain truth is, based upon my direct knowledge in several cases, that Chase did not own the loans, the Trusts therefore could not have purchased the loans and that not only Chase was lying but so was US Bank when it was named in foreclosure actions as Trustee for a Trust that plainly did not purchase the loans nor was any of the paperwork showing a transfer authentic. The underlying transaction simply isn’t there and Chase (and other banks) successfully hoodwinked courts into applying legal presumptions that were plainly contrary to the facts.

I think the admission could be used as an argument that the banks are not entitled to the legal presumptions that normally apply because of the wrongful behavior that they have admitted. If they want to show that the Trust bought the loan then they must prove it and not just produce a self-serving piece of paper that says it happened. we know it didn’t happen. Why should the burden of proof fall on a homeowner with limited resources?

The bank, with virtually unlimited resources and exclusive access to all the information, should be able to show the transaction date, amount and proof of payment (wire transfer receipt, wire transfer instructions, canceled check etc.) for the loans that were allegedly acquired and/or conveyed by the assignor and the assignee. With obviously unclean hands, the banks should not be rewarded for their subterfuge. The bank should not be allowed to claim any presumptions, legal or otherwise, that are normally applied to documents or commercial paper. If they really have a case, let them prove it — or at least respond to discovery without objection on various spurious grounds.

When I represented banks if someone had said that we didn’t own the loan or never funded the loan I would have stopped them dead with proof of the actual movement of money and that would have ended the discussion. Instead we are splitting hairs in court with the banks saying they don’t want to produce actual proof. All they need, according to them, is some self-serving piece of fabricated paper with a forged signature containing perjurious statements and the court is bound to accept such paper and apply legal presumptions that what is written on the paper is true. They have the temerity to argue that when we all know that the paper is inherently untrustworthy and not credible, given their admissions and continuous behavior.

I think discovery directed at compliance with the settlements and consent orders ought to be pressed against the banks, on the grounds that they could not have fulfilled all conditions precedent because among the conditions precedent are the requirements set forth in the settlements and consent orders. At trial I think the argument should be made, using the settlements and consent orders as exhibits, with Judicial notice, that the banks are not entitled to the presumptions and that they must prove every fact they would otherwise have the court “presume” or “assume.”

Comments invited

see also Katie Porter on servicing

Do you know where your loan payments are going? Bet you Don’t!

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Submitted from a person who is an anonymous source but who works deep inside an organization where the raw data is available and just to be clear —- I told you so:

Bonding experience

Subject: Bonding experience

Sorry for the title line, low hanging fruit……Anyway, I thought you both will find this of interest.) From the Citibank Trustee website you both have access to per my prior e-mail (or anyone, it is public….) you will find below the listing of the original principal balance of the loans in the various traunches for the WAMU-HE-2 Trust. The balances below are from the PSA on page 8; they track almost identically to the balances as of the funds 1st reporting date on the Citibank website (I have attached below from May 2007); Directly above the May 2007 balances is the current January 2015 balances. Notice anything strange? All principal balances are lower or gone, and reduced by half in the largest traunch (1-A). How can this be you ask?  Did that many loans default and have the homes liquidated and proceeds applied to the loans? OR,  did insurance payments, credit default swaps, TARP money, or buy backs on the loans by Chase (as likely forced by the investors who have that right for non-conforming loans) pay off the loan balances that are now gone? The answer is likely a bit of all the above.

Not to bore you with the details, but if you look at the January 2015 certificate holder statement on Page 5 you will see detail on who lost what, other pages break out reasons for reductions (yes, some of this is due to repurchase, Chase? maybe, unknown). The M-Series traunches appear to have been wiped out completely, which tracks to PSA which shows 1-A-II A’s get distributions 4th (AFTER credit default swaps and derivative holders mind you, who may be from entirely different funds! Like that, your loan payment is not even going to the fund that claims to hold it 1st, 2nd, or 3rd time around), losses last, Hence if you are M-series you are screwed.

So why does this matter in a typical homeowner foreclosure? As XXX and I pointed out to judges too lazy to want to dive into this, if your loan is in Traunch 1-IIA, which report no principal loss (any losses?) the fund has a hard time claiming standing if the certificate holders of your loan suffered no loss. Due to commingling of funds, and cross defaults, when peoples loan payments are distributed to the Servicer (Chase), it puts your payment in the loan pool, and it is likely used to pay someone else’s loan payment (ditto with foreclosure proceeds, if your loan was in M Traunch, a 100% loss was realized years ago, your proceeds go to make someone else’s loan payment). This was never disclosed to the homeowner at loan signing, your payment goes to another, your home is cross collateralized, your home may be covered by a pool level insurance policy, credit default swaps, your payment does not go to whom you bargained it would (TILA, RESPA, REG Z violations anyone?). If your loan was repurchased, the fund is not even the correct foreclosing party anymore, and if servicer advances and credit default swaps cover your loan payments (from swap holders in other funds!!) you are not even in default nor has the fund suffered a claimed loss. You can see what a mess this is, and why Chase and other “Servicers” don’t want to open the books on what happens to the Trust funds money to anyone. Investors in current lawsuits have to sue their own Trustee’s (like Citigroup) to try to get to the “real” books, sound crazy, it’s happening….  since Chase and the fund never legally held my loan due to multiple forgeries and botched assignments, they in essence committed theft through conversion of my loan payments when I made them, because they never held the legal right to accept payments from me.Like I said, this happens thousands of times daily to thousands of homeowners, and no one, not the government, regulators, judiciary, and especially the banks, want to discuss this mess. LOL, if this all gives you a headache, it should! Same process is now happening on credit cards and auto loans, anything they can securitize…..

see http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-24/justice-department-probing-auto-loan-securitization-yates-says
 

REMIC 3
As provided  herein, the Trustee shall  make an election  to treat the segregated  pool of assets consisting of the REMIC 2 Regular Interests as a REMIC for federal income tax purposes, and such segregated pool of assets shall be designated as “REMIC 3.”  The Class R-3 Interest represents  the  sole  class  of  “residual  interests”  in  REMIC  3  for  purposes   of  the  REMIC Provisions.The following  table sets forth (or describes)  the Class  designation,  Pass-Through  Rate and Original Class Certificate Principal Balance for each Class of Certificates that represents one or more of the “regular interests” in REMIC 3 and each class of uncertificated  “regular  interests” inREMIC 3:

Class designation Original Class Certificate Principal Balance Pass-Through

Rate

Assumed Final

Maturity Date1

1-A $             491,550,000.00 Variable May25, 2047
II-AI $              357,425,000.00 Variable2 May25, 2047
II-A2 $              125,322,000.00 Variable2 May25, 2047
II-A3 $              199,414,000.00 Variable2 May25, 2047
II-A4 $              117,955,000.00 Variable2 May 25,2047
M-1 $                50,997,000.00 Variable2 May25, 2047
M-2 $                44,623,000.00 Variable2 May25,  2047
M-3 $                27,092,000.00 Variable2 May25, 2047
M-4

M-5

M-6

$                23,905,000.00

$                23, I 08,000.00

$                21,514,000.00

Variable2

Variable2

Variable2

May25, 2047

May25, 2047

May25,  2047

M-7 $                20,718,000.00 Variable2 May25,  2047
M-8 $                12,749,000.00 Variable2 May25, 2047
M-9 $                17,531,000.00 Variable2 May25,  2047
Swap 10 N/A Variables May25, 2047
FM Reserve 10

Class C lnterese

N/A

$                59,762,058.04

Variables

Variable2

May25, 2047

May25, 2047

Class P Interest $                            100.00 N/A4 May25,  2047

Title After Wrongful Foreclosure: Martha Coakley Getting to Heart of the Problem of Fraudulent Foreclosures

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see Massachusetts Settlement: Fine PLUS Curing Title Defects

Martha Coakley gets it. She is the attorney general of Massachusetts. And she alone has enforced the law the way it should be enforced. When a bank or anyone else files a fraudulent foreclosure action they should pay for it AND the title should be corrected. If the foreclosure was false then the title is defective as shown in the county records. All previous national and state settlements were for money only. In this case four banks have agreed that they will pay a fine AND take all necessary steps to cure title. The four banks are the usual suspects — Bank of America (BOA), Chase, Citi, Wells Fargo.

Bank of America, Citi, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo were accused of violating Massachusetts foreclosure laws and the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act by foreclosing on properties in the Commonwealth when they did not hold the rights to the mortgages, and therefore did not legally have the right to foreclose….

The Massachusetts AG office alleges in the amended complaint that the four banks ignored a fundamental legal mandate established in the Supreme Judicial Court’s Ibanez decision in January 2011 that mortgagees must strictly comply with the Commonwealth’s foreclosure laws. The Massachusetts foreclosure law states that a mortgage is void if whoever initiates the foreclosure does not hold the mortgage through valid assignment or is not the mortgagee of record at the time the foreclosure notice is published.

The complaint further alleges that the four banks did not obtain a valid assignment of the mortgage prior to publishing foreclosure notices on the properties and therefore the foreclosures should be invalidated. Also according to the complaint, the banks’ actions adversely affected the marketability and insurability of titles to numerous properties in the Commonwealth.

As part of the settlement, the banks will be required to assist consumers who claim the title to his or her residence is void from an unlawful foreclosure. Assistance will likely include conducting a thorough title review, providing curative documents, releasing junior leans held by banks, and paying costs associated with the title cure in cases where consumers do not have title insurance, according to the Massachusetts AG office.

UNFUNDED TRUSTS: WHY IT MATTERS

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On tonight’s show we will talk about the alleged trusts that allegedly own the loans. In most cases, they do not own the loan nor do they represent the interests of the owners. The owners of the DEBT are the investors who advanced money to the investment bank that sold mortgage bonds to the investor (pension fund). There are two main reasons why this is important:

  1. An unfunded trust has no money to buy or originate loans. Therefore it is an improper party to bring any action to collect or enforce the debt. This is especially true when the unfunded trust has no legal claim to enforce the loan on behalf of the owners. The REMIC Trust should not be allowed to cause a foreclosure, or interfere with the rights of borrowers and investors. Its “servicers” have no right to collect money and when they do collect money from the borrower, they owe the money back to the borrower who paid it to the servicer. This has been discussed in cases highlighted on this blog over the last week.
  2. The unfunded trust is evidence of a fraudulent scheme in which the investors (pension funds) were tricked into advancing money to an investment bank who then misused the money, didn’t deliver it to the trust that issued the mortgage bonds that were sold, and then acted as a conduit between the investors and the borrowers — without either one knowing what was really happening. In a foreclosure, this means that the alleged enforcement of the loan is really furtherance of the fraudulent scheme against investors. Raising this issue does NOT mean there is no debt. It means, in most cases, that foreclosure is not an option because the perpetrators of the fraud and the initiators of the collection and enforcement of the alleged “loan” are one and the same. Hence the Court SHOULD be interested in not being part of a fraudulent scheme. It is a classic case of unclean hands.

The issue is proof and mores specifically the willingness of the court to let you prove your case. This comes down to pleading, discovery, motions to compel that spell out your narrative for the case and investigation through forensic auditors and private investigators. Unfunded REMIC Trusts represent a potential attack against the party initiating foreclosure that can be fatal to their claim if properly presented.

As a general observation these attacks are met with claims of presumptions when dealing with negotiable paper, and the claim that the borrower has no standing to raise the issue. But the borrower clearly does have standing to raise the issue if the borrower is claiming return of all money paid and claiming that the foreclosure action is part of a fraudulent scheme to the detriment of the real creditor and the detriment of the borrower, both of whom under Federal Law are required to pursue options for modification or settlement.

And the legal presumptions only apply to paper that is truly negotiable and where there is no evidence of trustworthiness or lack of credibility. The recent transfers from Chase and other entities to SPS are not really transfers of servicing rights. The “loan” is clearly already declared to be in default — making the claim of negotiable paper (and the presumptions) moot. So the entrance of SPS or another “servicer” under these circumstances is just another layer to fool the court and the borrower.

They are merely hiring SPS to

(a) enforce, because SPS is not processing payments from the borrower nor making payments to the investors (that is done by Chase or whoever is the the named servicer in the PSA) and

(b) create the illusion of business records by having an SPS representative testify that the business records of SPS should be admitted because SPS examined the prior records of the prior servicers and found them to be correct in what they call a “boarding” process. This is a blatant attempt to circumvent the rules of evidence. Both the attempt at creating legal presumptions regarding the note and mortgage and the attempt to use the business records of an “enforcer” posing as a “servicer” should be rejected.

THIS ARTICLE IS MY OPINION AND SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ADVICE FROM AN ATTORNEY LICENSED TO PRACTICE IN THE JURISDICTION IN WHICH YOUR PROPERTY IS LOCATED.

BAP Panel Raises the Stakes Against Deutsch et al — Secured Status May be Challenged

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ALERT FOR BANKRUPTCY LAWYERS — SECURED STATUS OF ALLEGED CREDITOR IS NOT TO BE ASSUMED

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I have long held and advocated three points:

  1. The filing of false claims in the nonjudicial process of a majority of states should not result in success where the same false claims could never be proven in judicial process. Nonjudicial process was meant as an administrative remedy to foreclosures that were NOT in dispute. Any application of nonjudicial schemes that allows false claims to succeed where they would fail in a judicial action is unconstitutional.
  2. The filing of a bankruptcy petition that shows property to be encumbered by virtue of a deed of trust is admitting a false representation made by a stranger to the transaction. The petition for bankruptcy relief should be filed showing that the property is not encumbered and the adversary or collateral proceeding to nullify the mortgage and the note should accompany each filing where the note and mortgage are subject to claims of securitization or a “new” beneficiary.
  3. The vast majority of decisions against borrowers result from voluntary or involuntary waiver, ignorance and failure to plead or object on the basis of false claims based on false documentation. The issue is not the signature (although that probably is false too); rather it is (a) the actual transaction which is missing and the (b) false documentation of a (i) fictitious transaction and (ii) fictitious transfers of fictitious (and non-fictitious) transactions. The result is often that the homeowner has admitted to the false assertion of being a borrower in relation to the party making the claim, admitting the secured status of the “creditor”, admitting that they are a creditor, admitting that they received a loan from within the chain claimed by the “creditor”, admitting the default, admitting the validity of the note and admitting the validity of the mortgage or deed of trust — thus leaving both the trial and appellate courts with no choice but to rule against the homeowner. Thus procedurally a false claim becomes “true” for purposes of that case.

see 11/24/14 Decision: MEMORANDUM-_-ANTON-ANDREW-RIVERA-DENISE-ANN-RIVERA-Appellants-v.-DEUTSCHE-BANK-NATIONAL-TRUST-COMPANY-Trustee-of-Certificate-Holders-of-the-WAMU-Mortgage-Pass-Through-Certificate-Series-2005-AR6

This decision is breath-taking. What the Panel has done here is fire a warning shot over the bow of the California Supreme Court with respect to the APPLICATION of the non-judicial process. AND it takes dead aim at those who make false claims on false debts in both nonjudicial and judicial process. Amongst the insiders it is well known that your chances on appeal to the BAP are less than 15% whereas an appeal to the District Judge, often ignored as an option, has at least a 50% prospect for success.

So the fact that this decision comes from the BAP Panel which normally rubber stamps decisions of bankruptcy judges is all the more compelling. One word of caution that is not discussed here is the the matter of jurisdiction. I am not so sure the bankruptcy judge had jurisdiction to consider the matters raised in the adversary proceeding. I think there is a possibility that jurisdiction would be present before the District Court Judge, but not the Bankruptcy Judge.

From one of my anonymous sources within a significant government agency I received the following:

This case is going to be a cornucopia of decision material for BK courts nationwide (and others), it directly tackles all the issues regarding standing and assignment (But based on Non-J foreclosure, and this is California of course……) it tackles Glaski and Glaski loses, BUT notes dichotomy on secured creditor status….this case could have been even more , but leave to amend was forfeited by borrower inaction—– it is part huge win, part huge loss as it relates to Glaski, BUT IT IS DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO CHASE/WAMU CASES……….Note in full case how court refers to transfer of “some of WAMU’s assets”, tacitly inferring that the court WILL NOT second guess what was and was not transferred………… i.e, foreclosing party needs to prove this!!

AFFIRMED- NO SECURED PARTY STATUS FOR BK PROVEN 

Even though Siliga, Jenkins and Debrunner may preclude the

Riveras from attacking DBNTC’s foreclosure proceedings by arguing

that Chase’s assignment of the deed of trust was a nullity in

light of the absence of a valid transfer of the underlying debt,

we know of no law precluding the Riveras from challenging DBNTC’s assertion of secured status for purposes of the Riveras’ bankruptcy case. Nor did the bankruptcy court cite to any such law.

We acknowledge that our analysis promotes the existence of two different sets of legal standards – one applicable in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings and a markedly different one for use in ascertaining creditors’ rights in bankruptcy cases.

But we did not create these divergent standards. The California legislature and the California courts did. We are not the first to point out the divergence of these standards. See CAL. REAL EST., at § 10:41 (noting that the requirements under California law for an effective assignment of a real-estate-secured obligation may differ depending on whether or not the dispute over the assignment arises in a challenge to nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings).
We must accept the truth of the Riveras’ well-pled
allegations indicating that the Hutchinson endorsement on the
note was a sham and, more generally, that neither DBNTC nor Chase
ever obtained any valid interest in the Riveras’ note or the loan
repayment rights evidenced by that note. We also must
acknowledge that at least part of the Riveras’ adversary
proceeding was devoted to challenging DBNTC’s standing to file
its proof of claim and to challenging DBNTC’s assertion of
secured status for purposes of the Riveras’ bankruptcy case. As
a result of these allegations and acknowledgments, we cannot
reconcile our legal analysis, set forth above, with the
bankruptcy court’s rulings on the Riveras’ second amended
complaint. The bankruptcy court did not distinguish between the
Riveras’ claims for relief that at least in part implicated the
parties’ respective rights in the Riveras’ bankruptcy case from
those claims for relief that only implicated the parties’
respective rights in DBNTC’s nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings.

THEY REJECT GLASKI-

Here, we note that the California Supreme Court recently

granted review from an intermediate appellate court decision
following Jenkins and rejecting Glaski. Yvanova v. New Century
Mortg. Corp., 226 Cal.App.4th 495 (2014), review granted &
opinion de-published, 331 P.3d 1275 (Cal. Aug 27, 2014). Thus,
we eventually will learn how the California Supreme Court views
this issue. Even so, we are tasked with deciding the case before
us, and Ninth Circuit precedent suggests that we should decide
the case now, based on our prediction, rather than wait for the
California Supreme Court to rule. See Hemmings, 285 F.3d at
1203; Lewis v. Telephone Employees Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537,
1545 (9th Cir. 1996). Because we have no convincing reason to
doubt that the California Supreme Court will follow the weight of
authority among California’s intermediate appellate courts, we
will follow them as well and hold that the Riveras lack standing
to challenge the assignment of their deed of trust based on an
alleged violation of a pooling and servicing agreement to which
they were not a party.

BUT……… THEY DO SUCCEED ON SECURED STATUS

Even though the Riveras’ first claim for relief principally

relies on their allegations regarding the assignment’s violation
of the pooling and servicing agreement, their first claim for
relief also explicitly incorporates their allegations challenging
DBNTC’s proof of claim and disputing the validity of the
Hutchinson endorsement. Those allegations, when combined with
what is set forth in the first claim for relief, are sufficient
on their face to state a claim that DBNTC does not hold a valid
lien against the Riveras’ property because the underlying debt
never was validly transferred to DBNTC. See In re Leisure Time
Sports, Inc., 194 B.R. at 861 (citing Kelly v. Upshaw, 39 Cal.2d
179 (1952) and stating that “a purported assignment of a mortgage
without an assignment of the debt which it secured was a legal
nullity.”).
While the Riveras cannot pursue their first claim for relief
for purposes of directly challenging DBNTC’s pending nonjudicial
foreclosure proceedings, Debrunner, 204 Cal.App.4th at 440-42,
the first claim for relief states a cognizable legal theory to
the extent it is aimed at determining DBNTC’s rights, if any, as
a creditor who has filed a proof of secured claim in the Riveras’
bankruptcy case.

TILA CLAIM UPHELD!—–

Fifth Claim for Relief – for violation of the Federal Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g)

The Riveras’ TILA Claim alleged, quite simply, that they did
not receive from DBNTC, at the time of Chase’s assignment of the
deed of trust to DBNTC, the notice of change of ownership
required by 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g)(1). That section provides:
In addition to other disclosures required by this
subchapter, not later than 30 days after the date on
which a mortgage loan is sold or otherwise transferred
or assigned to a third party, the creditor that is the
new owner or assignee of the debt shall notify the
borrower in writing of such transfer, including–

(A) the identity, address, telephone number of the new

creditor;

(B) the date of transfer;

 

(C) how to reach an agent or party having authority to

act on behalf of the new creditor;

(D) the location of the place where transfer of

ownership of the debt is recorded; and

(E) any other relevant information regarding the new

creditor.

The bankruptcy court did not explain why it considered this claim as lacking in merit. It refers to the fact that the
Riveras had actual knowledge of the change in ownership within
months of the recordation of the trust deed assignment. But the
bankruptcy court did not explain how or why this actual knowledge
would excuse noncompliance with the requirements of the statute.
Generally, the consumer protections contained in the statute
are liberally interpreted, and creditors must strictly comply
with TILA’s requirements. See McDonald v. Checks–N–Advance, Inc.
(In re Ferrell), 539 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2008). On its
face, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(iv) imposes upon the assignee of
a deed of trust who violates 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g)(1) statutory
damages of “not less than $400 or greater than $4,000.”
While the Riveras’ TILA claim did not state a plausible
claim for actual damages, it did state a plausible claim for
statutory damages. Consequently, the bankruptcy court erred when
it dismissed the Riveras’ TILA claim.

LAST, THEY GOT REAR ENDED FOR NOT SEEKING LEAVE TO AMEND

Here, however, the Riveras did not argue in either the bankruptcy court or in their opening appeal brief that the court should have granted them leave to amend. Having not raised the issue in either place, we may consider it forfeited. See Golden v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (In re Choo), 273 B.R. 608, 613 (9th Cir. BAP 2002).

Even if we were to consider the issue, we note that the

bankruptcy court gave the Riveras two chances to amend their
complaint to state viable claims for relief, examined the claims
they presented on three occasions and found them legally
deficient each time. Moreover, the Riveras have not provided us
with all of the record materials that would have permitted us a
full view of the analyses and explanations the bankruptcy court
offered them when it reviewed the Riveras’ original complaint and
their first amended complaint. Under these circumstances, we
will not second-guess the bankruptcy court’s decision to deny
leave to amend. See generally In re Nordeen, 495 B.R. at 489-90
(examining multiple opportunities given to the plaintiffs to
amend their complaint and the bankruptcy court’s efforts to
explain to them the deficiencies in their claims, and ultimately
determining that the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the plaintiffs leave to amend their second amended
complaint).

Business Records Exception — The Loophole That Needs Closing

For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

———————————————-

see AppellateOpinion Holt v Calchas 4th DCA decision

The clear assumption in this case is that Wells Fargo had stepped into the shoes of the lender and that if Wells Fargo did not win or if its surrogate did not win, it was assumed that the homeowner would be getting a free house, a free ride and a windfall at the expense of Wells Fargo Bank. Despite years of articles and treatises written on the subject, the courts have still not caught up with the basic fact that both the lenders and borrowers were victims of an illegal and fraudulent scheme. At the very least, the court owes it to our society and to all parties involved in foreclosure litigation, to enforce the laws that already exist —  especially the rules concerning the burden of proof in a foreclosure action.

—-

The Holt decision is a curious case. There are a number of unique factors that occurred in the trial court and again in the appellate court. The first judge recused herself shortly into the trial and was replaced by a senior judge. There is no transcript of the proceedings prior to the point where the senior judge took over. At the same time the homeowners attorney was also replaced. So my first question is how anyone could have reached any decision. In the absence of the transcript of the proceedings leading up to the recusal of the original judge I find it troublesome that either the judge or the attorney for the homeowner could come to a decision or develop any trial strategy or theory of the case for the defense of this foreclosure case.

The second thing that I have trouble with is that the homeowner filed the appeal based on three different theories, to wit:

(1) the proffered promissory note, mortgage, and assignment of mortgage should not have been admitted into evidence—  an argument that the appellate court rejects;

(2)  the homeowner’s motion to dismiss should have been granted for failure to prove compliance with paragraph 22 [default, reinstatement and acceleration] of the mortgage —  with which the appellate court agreed. Since the appellate court agreed with this point and reversed the trial court it would seem that the case should have been dismissed, but instead the 4th District Court of Appeal chose to remand the case for further proceedings thus giving a second bite of the apple to the party who was claiming the right to foreclose —  despite the finding that the trial was over and on appeal and the foreclosing party had failed to make its case. If the homeowner had failed to prove its defenses, would the appellate court have issued legal advice to the homeowner and remanded for another bite at the apple?

(3)  the payment history should not have been admitted into evidence over the hearsay objection raised by the homeowner. The court goes into great lengths essentially tying itself into knots over this one, but eventually sides with the homeowner. Instead of ordering the entry of judgment for the homeowner, the court remanded the action for further proceedings in which the foreclosing party, having received legal advice from the District Court of Appeal, is now permitted to retry the case to fill in the blanks that the appellate court had pointed out with great specificity and particularity.

While I agree with much of the reasoning that is stated in this appellate decision, I still find it very troublesome that there remains an assumption and perhaps even a bias in favor of the foreclosing party. This is directly contrary to the rules of court, common law, and statutory law. The party bringing a claim for affirmative relief (like foreclosure) must bear the burden of proving every element required in their cause of action. This is not a motion to dismiss where every allegation is taken as true. At trial, it is the opposite — there is no case for the homeowner to defend unless the foreclosing party establishes all elements of its right to foreclose. If they fail to do so, the other side wins. In the interest of justice as well as finality courts do not easily allow either side to have another trial unless there are exceptional circumstances.

(In non-judicial states, this is particularly perplexing — the homeowner is required to sue for a TRO (temporary restraining order). In actuality the homeowner probably should have sued immediately upon the notice of the purported “substitution of trustee.” But the point is that the homeowner is required to prove a negative as the non-judicial statutes are construed. What SHOULD happen is that if the homeowner sues for the TRO and objects to the notices filed, challenges the standing of the “new” beneficiary on the deed of trust, and otherwise denies the elements of a foreclosure action, then the parties should be realigned with the new beneficiary required to plead and prove its standing, ownership and ability to prove the default and the balance owed.)

The next thing I find potentially troublesome is that the tactic of inserting a new entity as plaintiff or as servicer in order to shield the actual perpetrator was clearly employed in this case, although it seems not to have been mentioned in the trial court or on appeal. In this case an entity called Consumer Solutions 3 LLC was substituted for Wells Fargo. Then Wells Fargo was substituted for Consumer Solutions. This is a game of three card monte in which everyone loses except for the dealer — Wells Fargo.

As long as they are going back to trial, it would seem that the homeowner would be well served to do some investigations into the parties, and to determine what transactions if any had actually occurred. If there were no transactions, which I think is the case, then any paperwork generated from those fictitious transactions would be completely worthless, lacking in any foundation and could never be enforced against anybody —  with the possible exception of a holder in due course.

 BUSINESS  RECORDS EXCEPTION:

I am continually frustrated by the fact that most people simply do not consider the elements of the business records exception to the hearsay rule within the context of why the hearsay rule exists. By its very nature hearsay tends to be untrustworthy, untested and usually self-serving. That is why the rule exists. It bars any document or testimony offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted unless the person who spoke or wrote the words is present in court to be cross examined as to their personal knowledge, whether they had an interest in creating one appearance or another,  or whether the entire statement could be impeached.

Instead most people on all sides of foreclosure litigation seem to think that the business record should be admitted into evidence unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary. This is incorrect. And if you just scratched the surface of any of these claims you will find that the party who is seeking to introduce these hearsay statements into evidence has a vested interest in the outcome of the case and absolutely no direct knowledge of any of the facts of the case.

Like Chase Bank does with SPS, Wells Fargo has inserted this entity that is essentially run by a hedge fund (Cargill) to prevent any employee or contract party from testifying on behalf of Wells Fargo, because Wells Fargo knows that it has already been sanctioned millions of dollars for telling lies in court.

So instead they have somebody else come in to tell the lies, and that witness is trying to say that they are familiar with the record-keeping of their own company which includes the record-keeping of the previous company, Wells Fargo. Consumer Solutions is a shame shell that never did anything but rent its name for foreclosures while its parent, Cargill, received compensation  (a piece of the pie) for doing nothing.

This obvious ploy has worked for nearly a decade but is coming under increasing scrutiny — with Judges musing out loud about the shuffling of “servicers” and “lenders” and creditors. In an effort to stifle any real challenge to foreclosures courts have often held that the securitization documents are “irrelevant.”

So the courts take jurisdiction over the action and the parties by virtue of claims of securitization, authority allegedly granted by a pooling and servicing agreement, and ownership “proven” merely by claiming it on the basis of self-serving fabricated documents not subject to scrutiny, and a default and balance that excludes the payments received by the creditors from servicer advances and other third party payments paid without right of subrogation.

Then the courts limit discovery, overrule objections and allow the party initiating foreclosure to “prove” its case by using dubious legal “presumptions” instead of facts, most of which were denied by the homeowner.

And now that the Wall Street banks perceive a risk in having real people with real knowledge testify, because they might admit or testify to things that might hurt them, they insert a complete stranger to the process and double down on “business record exception” to get paperwork into evidence, much of which is completely fabricated and nearly all of which contains errors in computation by exclusion of (a) the fact that the creditors were paid every payment despite the declaration of default by the “servicer” and (b) deducting those payments from the original debt owed to those investors who advanced funds for the origination or acquisition of “loans.”

In the Holt decision the 4th DCA declares that the assignment was properly allowed into evidence because it was a “verbal act” and not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Once in evidence however, the contents were taken as true shifting the burden of proof to the homeowner who was stone walled in discovery. The homeowner in many cases is not allowed to compel the production of evidence of payment or consideration for the assignment — without which the assignment is merely an empty document conferring no rights greater than the assignor had at the time of the alleged “assignment”. Most often the assignor did not require payment for the simple reason that they too had no money in the deal.

PAYMENT  HISTORY HEARSAY OBJECTION

The court inserts Florida Statute 90.803(6)(a), which is part of the evidence code, providing for exceptions to the hearsay rule for business records. In that statute is the general wording for the types of records that might qualify for the exception. But the court completely ignores the last words of that statute — “unless the sources of information or other circumstances show lack of trustworthiness.” (e.s.)

The question is why should we trust a servicer or its “professional witness”? The witness is there and was often hired for the sole purpose of testifying in foreclosure trials. If they lose, they risk their jobs. The “servicer” whether they are designated in the PSA or have been slipped in as another layer of obfuscation, has an interest that is in conflict with the the actual creditors — recovery of “servicer advances” (which were paid from funds provided by the Master Servicer — often the underwriter and seller of mortgage bonds to investors) and to make more money because they are allowed to collect a vast amount of “fees” for enforcement of a “non-performing” loan.

The fact is that the servicer advances negates the default and might give rise to a new cause of action for unjust enrichment against the homeowner but that claim would not be secured. This in turn leads to the unnatural conclusion of aggravating the the alleged damages by forced sale of the property as opposed to modification and reformation of the loan documents to (a) name the true creditor and (b) use the true balance owed to the creditors.

Thus both the specific witness and the company he or she represents have a vested interest in seeing to it that the foreclosure results in a forced sale for their own benefit and contrary to creditors who have no notice of the pending action. At the very least, this certainly raises the question of trustworthiness. Add to that the fraudulent servicing practices, the lies told during the “modification” process, and I would argue that the source and circumstances raise a presumption that the testimony and business records not trustworthy.

Quoting Florida Statute 90.803(6)(a) the court goes not to set forth the elements of the business records exception — the issue being that ALL elements must be met, not just some or even most of them:

  1. The record was made at or near the time of the event [so in many cases where SPS was inserted as the “servicer” when in fact it was merely an enforcer without knowledge of prior events, it is impossible for the records of SPS  to contain entries that were made at or near the time of any relevant event].
  2.  the record was made by or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge [ if the court permitted proper discovery, voir dire, and cross examination is doubtful that any witness would be able to testify that the record was made by a particular person who had actual knowledge]
  3.  the record was kept in the ordinary course of a regularly conducted business activity [ while it might be true that the actual servicer could claim that it’s records were in the ordinary course of a regularly conducted business activity, it is not true where the witness is a representative of a “new” servicer for plaintiff —  neither of whom were processing any data concerning the loan from the moment of origination through the date that the foreclosure was filed]
  4.  that the record was a regular practice of that business to make such a record [ here is where the courts are in my opinion making a singular error —  by accepting proof of only the fourth element required for the business records exception, trial court and appellate courts are ignoring the other elements and therefore allowing untrustworthy documents into evidence.  “While it is not necessary to call the individual who prepared a document, the witness to open a document is being offered must be able to show each of the requirements for establishing a proper foundation.” Hunter v  or Aurora loan services LLC, 137 S 3d 570 (Fla 1st DCA 2014).

The Holt Court then goes on to analyze several cases:

  1. Yisrael v State 993 So 2d 952, 956 (FLA 2008) — a Florida Supreme Court decision quoting the elements of the business records exception. see sc07-1030
  2. Glarum v LaSalle Bank, N.A. 83 So 3d (Fla 4th DCA 2011) — where the witness was unable to lay the proper foundation for the business records exception  because the witness testified that he “did not know who, how, or when the data entries were made into [ the previous mortgage holders’] system and he could not stated the records were made in the regular course of business.” ( My only objection to this is the wording that was used. The predecessors in the document chain are referred to as “mortgage holders” —  indicating an assumption which is probably not true). see Glarum v. LaSalle
  3. Weisenberg v Deutsch Bank N.A. 89 So 3d 1111 (FLA 4th DCA 2012) — Where the court held that “the deposition excerpts show that [the witness] knew how the data was produced and her testimony demonstrated that she was familiar with the bank’s record-keeping system and had knowledge about data is uploaded into the system.” (My problem with the Weisenberg decision is that the word “familiar” is used generically so that the witness is allowed to testify about the business records — without any personal knowledge about the trustworthiness of the data in those records — again with the apparent assumption that the foreclosing party SHOULD win and the second assumption being that the homeowner should not be allowed to take advantage of hairsplitting technicalities to get a free house.  In fact it is the servicer that is taking advantage of such technicalities by getting business records into evidence without verification that those are all the business records. For example, the question I often ask is who did the servicer pay after receiving payment from the borrower or anyone else? The records don’t show that — thus how can the court determine the balance on the creditor’s books and records? The underlying false assumption here is that the servicer records ARE the creditor’s records even though the creditors have not even been identified.)
  4. WAMCO v Integrated Electronic Environments 903 So 2d 230 (Fla 2d DCA 2005) —  Where another appellate court held that “a document which contains the amount of money owed on the loan was admissible under the business records exception even where the testimony as to the amount owed was based on information from a bank that previously held the loan.” (I think this decision was at least partially wrong. The witness testified that it was part of his duties to oversee the collection of loans that the bank urges and the initial members he used his calculations were provided by the previous bank.  In my opinion the court properly concluded that the witness to testify —  that he should have been limited to the business records of the company that employed him. Witness knew nothing about the previous bank practices and did not employ any verification processes. see 2D04-2717
  5. Hunter v Aurora Loan Services 137 So 3d 570 (Fla 1st DCA 2014) — where the witness was incompetent to testify and could not lay a proper foundation for the business records exception and in which the HOLT Court quotes from the Hunter decision with obvious approval:  “At trial, a witness who works for the current note holder, but never worked for the initial note holder, attempted to lay the foundation for the introduction of records pertaining to prior ownership and transfer of the note and mortgage as business records. The witness testified that based on his dealings with the original note holder, the original note holders business practice regarding the transfer of ownership of loans was standard across the industry. He could not testify, based on personal knowledge, who generated the information. He also testified, in general fashion and without any specifics, that some of the documents sought to be introduced were generated by a computer program used across the industry  and that records custodian for the loan servicer was the person who usually it puts the information obtained in the documents. The trial court admitted the documents into evidence.” see hunter-v-aurora-loan-servs-llc

The most interesting quote from the Hunter decision is “absent such personal knowledge, the witness was unable to substantiate when the records were made, whether the information they contain derived from a person with knowledge, whether the original note holder regularly make such records, or indeed, whether the records belong to the original note holder in the first place. The testimony about standard mortgage industry practice only arguably established that such records are generated and kept in the ordinary course of mortgage loan servicing.” 

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