TONIGHT! How to Win Eviction/UD Actions

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Charles Marshall will discuss today two seminal unlawful detainer (UD) cases, in which respectively in each case the lower Court there found per usual for the institutional UD Plaintiff against the ‘former’ homeowner who was foreclosed on by an institutional trust, aka ‘lender-in-succession’. Yet on appeal of the UD judgment, in both these separate cases, the appellate courts reversed the judgment and remanded the cases.

First up for discussion today is Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM) v. Preciado, the appeal decided in August 2013. The second case is US Financial, L.P. v. McLitus, decided on appeal in August of 2016, which appeal decision was published in November 2016.

Both appellate courts found that neither UD Plaintiff had perfected title, as required by CCC 2924. Will discuss the reasons for this on today’s show.

The courts are meandering back to application of basic law, now that their fears of causing global collapse seem behind them. In Hawai’i the Supreme Court decided that subjective criteria used to dismiss homeowner claims were inapplicable and added that a wrongful foreclosure action could be filed BEFORE the foreclosure was finalized.

In Unlawful Detainer (UD) actions brought in nonjudicial foreclosure states (the majority) there has always been tension between the lawsuit that must be filed by the party claiming possession and the burden of proof. Judges seem to perceive it in the past as just another action for TRO where the homeowner must essentially assert defenses to pleadings that are not filed by the foreclosing party and then prove assertions without having access to the records of the opposing party.

Make no mistake about it. The UD proceeding is the first time anyone makes allegations about the change of title through the foreclosure process and therefore is the first time the homeowner is entitled to frame a narrative defense to real allegations ultimately relating to “perfecting title.”

But the key is the willingness to fight despite  apparently long odds against the homeowner. It’s not as bad as it looks, but it is still an uphill battle. 99% of all UD actions are resolved by the homeowner defaulting on either answering the complaint or failing to prosecute the defenses. Of the cases that are hotly contested, my perception is that somewhere between 25%-35% of homeowners actually win. That figure could be low because of the lack of definition of what constitutes a hotly contested case.

Note that the cases scheduled to be outlined by Charles are appellate cases in which the homeowner lost at the trial level. That means a commitment to persist in the fight is the primary factor in winning homeowner cases, one by one.

Tricks of the Trade: Banks’ Playbook Behind the scenes

For those who are willing to do the work, events after the “sale” of the foreclosed property will probably reveal the puppets and at least point to the puppet-masters.

As you investigate each named party leads to a dead end without any legal entity who is responsible for the actions taken.

I have a client who is in a predicament that is usually the way things go in the world of false claims of securitization and false paperwork, false sales, and transfers after sales of the property. Taking my advice she has admitted nothing and she assumes that whatever “information” is proffered by the attorneys handling the foreclosure is a lie. So she continued to follow the trail even after the property was supposedly sold and a deed was issued supposedly to the trust who according to the foreclosure mill was the owner of the “loan” (or at least the debt.

Part of her problem is that when she looks up the “owner” on the website of the county recorder, a name pops up that was never in the foreclosure, never in litigation and never in the chain of title.

Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

I provide advice and consent to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key elements of a scam. If you have a foreclosure or a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM. A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.

PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.

Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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In this case American Home Mortgage Investment Company (AHMIC) suddenly shows up on the website of the recorder’s office at the time when an eviction or unlawful detainer is about to be filed.
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Note that there is a difference between judicial states where defenses have theoretically at least been tried and decided and nonjudicial foreclosure states where the first time that the “foreclosing party” is forced to  make and prove allegations is in the unlawful detainer action. In nonjudicial states many intrepid homeowners and lawyers have achieved either victory or settlement, in some cases causing the case to drag out for 10 years or more.
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This gets into the tricks of their trade. They use their corrupt influence with clerks at the office to show whatever name is given to the clerk who makes entries on the website. I have personally seen this in action in a Citi case where the clerk in a corrupt Florida county changed the name of the Plaintiff multiple times without admitting to why she did so and from whom she had received her instructions — because there certainly was no pleading filed that changed the name of the Plaintiff. The corrupt county is the only county government ever audited by the state auditor and which resulted.
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The website is not the official record although it is usually treated as such. A frequent ploy of the mill lawyers is to ask the court to take judicial notice of what is on the recorder’s website, or what is on the sec.gov website.
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In both cases the entries are made by the lawyers or the servicers and are entirely self serving. Judicial notice is NOT to be applied just because data or documents appear on an agency website.
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Judicial notice is an economical way of proving a fact that everyone knows to be true, is not contested and was generated from a credible source which by definition is NOT a party who would benefit from the entry or uploading.
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The only way AHMIC could be the owner of the property is if one of the following  conditions was met:
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  1. AHMIC  entered into a transaction with the trust, with Deutsche Bank as Trustee in which the property was purchased for value from the Trust. If a deed exists that says that it is very recent because it did not come to me as part of the foreclosure chain of title.
  2. AHMIC  entered into a transaction with the trust, with Deutsche Bank as Trustee, but signed by Ocwen as “attorney in Fact” in which the property was purchased for value from the Trust. If a deed exists that says that it is very recent because it did not come to me as part of the foreclosure chain of title. Without a power of attorney attached, in accordance with industry standards, or at the very least identified by date and parties, the execution of such an instrument must be further investigated to determine if the execution of the deed was valid and not void.
  3. A person whose employment is uncertain executed a deed to AHMIC on behalf of either the trust, the trustee and /or Ocwen (as attorney in fact — see preceding paragraph on power of attorney). There is no consideration or value paid although the deed may state something like $10 and other valuable consideration. This is the most likely scenario.
    1. If the facts conform to this, then the transfer without value indicates that AHMIC was a conduit or alleged principal (most likely conduit) at the time of the sale. Your opposition will state that the bid by the trust was a credit bid on behalf of a “creditor”.
    2. The transfer without value indicates that the foreclosing trust was only a placeholder for an undisclosed party. AHMIC could not be a creditor unless it had an actual financial stake in the purported loan. In actuality AHMIC is stepping into the nonexistent shoes of American Brokers Conduit, which is merely a fictitious name.

In other words their games, often revealed after the foreclosure sale and mostly overlooked reveal the misrepresentations of fact that were knowingly made to the Judge, the homeowner, and indeed the world through recording instruments that should never have been drafted, much less executed and recorded.

Why Everyone (except SCOTUS) is Wrong About TILA Rescission

All contrary arguments are erroneous since they would insert a contingency where the statute contains no room for any contingency. The language of the statute bars any such contingency when it says that the TILA Rescission is effective upon delivery, by operation of law. If anyone wants the statute to say or mean anything different they must get their remedy from the legislature, not the courts, who have no authority whatsoever to interpret the statute otherwise. The status of any case involving foreclosure is that it does not exist. Hence the court is left ONLY with the power to perform the ministerial act of dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Let us help you plan your TILA RESCISSION strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.

Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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So in answer to questions about putative “modifications”, eviction or unlawful detainer, bankruptcy, and TILA Rescission this is what I have written in response to some inquiries.

Should the rescission be recorded? Not necessarily but

YES. I would like to see it recorded. You need to check with the clerk in the recording office or an attorney who understands recording procedure. Generally recording a document with an old date must be attached to an affidavit that is recorded with the notice of rescission attached. The affidavit explains that the attachment was inadvertently not recorded at the time it was created.

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Should a copy of the notice of rescission be filed in the court record also?

YES. If there is any way to get the recorded document into the court record, it should be pursued.

This presents title issues because if you are recording this long after events have transpired, some of which are also recorded as memorializing transactions, fake or real. Any recorded instruments that purports to be a memorialization of a transaction before the rescission was recorded would generally be given priority.
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The lawyer sent me an answer to my notice of rescission. Now what?
Either file to enforce the duties to be performed (if you are within one year of the date of delivery of the notice of rescission), or file a quiet title action if the one year has expired. There are several different scenarios actually, but this is the one I would focus upon.
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I am getting kicked out of bankruptcy court. Now what?
Getting “kicked out” of BKR court probably means that you are back in the state court system which might open some opportunities for you to get more into the court record. (Like an old rescission).
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My property is being sold. Does that mean that I have to get out?
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They can’t get you out without filing an unlawful detainer (eviction in some jurisdictions) based upon an asserted change of title. There might be a period of time between the sale and the attempt to get you out of the home (eviction or unlawful detainer). If the property is sold to a “third party” they want want rent from you, which could allow you to stay.
The unlawful detainer action presents another opportunity to raise the issue of rescission, since the entire action is based upon a valid change of title. It also sets off potentially another round for appeal, especially on the issue of rescission. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel do not apply to jurisdictional issues. If the rescission was mailed then by operation of the law the note and mortgage are void.
The defense is ordinarily that the “sale” was a fabrication based upon fictional claims and was contrary to the notice of rescission, which voided the note and mortgage upon which they were relying. The time for challenging the rescission has long passed. Hence all enforcement actions after the date of the 2009 rescission are void since they were based upon various claims attendant to paper instruments that were void, effective the day of delivery of the rescission.
Note that delivery of TILA Rescission notice is complete when dropped in a USPS mailbox and your testimony that it was sent via US Postal Service is all that is necessary as foundation.
I sent 2 notices of rescissions. Is that better or worse for me?
If I was defending against your claim of rescission I would argue that sending the 2016 rescission was either an admission that the earlier one had not been sent or that it was a concession that, for whatever reason, the 2009 rescission notice had been abandoned.
Hence I suggest you put very little emphasis on the new rescission and maximum emphasis on the old rescission.
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I sent the rescission less than 3 years after the modification but more than 3 years since the alleged consummation. Hoes my rescission affect my loan in that instance?
In most cases “modifications” are not treated as new loans. But the fact that something is called a modification and it really changes everything including the “lender” it may be possible to characterize it as a new loan subject to TILA Rescission. TILA Rescission hinges on whether the “modification” was a new loan — a fact, we would argue — that must be determined by trial. Since intent is part of the analysis of a contract, this could present another opportunity to force them to admit they don’t know the identity or intent of the creditor and whether said creditor had given them authority to make a new contract.
And the underlying narrative for this approach is that as a new contract, the “lender” was required to comply with disclosure requirements at the time of the new contract, thus triggering the three day right of rescission and the the three year limitation. Under my theory, based on Jesinoski, it doesn’t matter whether the three years has expired or not.
We know for certain that the notice of rescission is effective upon mailing; it is not based upon some contingent event or claim or court order. The date of consummation is itself a factual issue that can be in the pleading of the creditor (who is the only one with standing, the note and mortgage having been rendered void) claiming that the notice of rescission should be vacated based upon the three years, the date of consummation etc. 
Any alternative theory that puts the burden on the property owner would be contrary to the express wording of the statute and the SCOTUS ruling in Jesinoski. The statute 15 USC §1635 and SCOTUS are in complete agreement: there is no law suit required to make rescission effective. It would make the statutorily defined TILA Rescission event indefinite, requiring a court ruling before any rescission would be treated seriously. In other words, the opposite of what the statute says and the opposite of what SCOTUS said in Jesinoski. 
All contrary arguments are erroneous since they would insert a contingency where the statute contains no room for any contingency. The language of the statute bars any such contingency when it says that the TILA Rescission is effective upon delivery, by operation of law. If anyone wants the statute to say or mean anything different they must get their remedy from the legislature, not the courts, who have no authority whatsoever to interpret the statute otherwise. The status of any case involving foreclosure is that it does not exist. Hence the court is left ONLY with the power to perform the ministerial act of dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
All this is important because we ought to be heading toward any defensive strategy that reveals the absence of a creditor. We are betting that the fight to conceal the name of the creditor is a cover for not knowing the the identity of the creditor, hence fatally undermining the authority as holder, servicer, trustee or anything else.
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What if consummation never occurred?
It may turn out that consummation between the parties to the note and mortgage never occurred. It’s important to remember that would mean the rescission is irrelevant since the loan contract does not exist. But such a finding by a court of competent jurisdiction would negate the legal effect of the note and mortgage; this is true as long as the note was not purchased for value in good faith by a buyer without knowledge of the borrower’s defenses.
In that case, the burden does shift to the homeowner and it is entirely possible that under that scenario there could be no consummation but nevertheless homeowner liability would continue on the falsely procured note and potentially the mortgage as well. The reason is simple: that is what the State statute says under Article 3 and Article 9 of the UCC, as adopted by all 50 states. The homeowner’s remedy in such a scenario would be limited to actions for damages against the intermediaries who perpetrated the the fraudulent and fictitious “transaction” in which the named lender failed to loan anything.

Breaking it Down: What to Say and Do in an Unlawful Detainer or Eviction

Homeowners seem to have more options than they think in an unlawful detainer action based upon my analysis. It is the first time in a nonjudicial foreclosure where the foreclosing party is actually making assertions and representations against which the homeowner may defend. The deciding factor is what to do at trial. And the answer, as usual, is well-timed aggressive objections mostly based upon foundation and hearsay, together with a cross examination that really drills down.

Winning an unlawful detainer action in a nonjudicial foreclosure reveals the open sores contained within the false claims of securitization or transfer.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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HAT TIP TO DAN EDSTROM

Matters affecting the validity of the trust deed or primary obligation itself, or other basic defects in the plaintiffs title, are neither properly raised in this summary proceeding for possession, nor are they concluded by the judgment.” (Emphasis added.) (Cheney v. Trauzettel (1937) 9 Cal.2d 158, 159-160.) My emphasis added

So we can assume that they are specifically preserving your right to sue for damages. But also, if they still have the property you can sue to get it back. If you do that and file a lis pendens they can’t sell it again. If a third party purchaser made the bid or otherwise has “bought” the property you probably can’t touch the third party — unless you can show that said purchaser did in fact know that the sale was defective. Actual knowledge defeats the presumptions of facially valid instruments and recorded instruments.

The principal point behind all this is that the entire nonjudicial scheme and structure becomes unconstitutional if in either the wording of the statutes or the way the statutes are applied deprive the homeowner of due process. Denial of due process includes putting a burden on the homeowner that would not be there if the case was brought as a judicial foreclosure. I’m not sure if any case says exactly that but I am sure it is true and would be upheld if challenged.


It is true that where the purchaser at a trustee’s sale proceeds under section 1161a of the Code of Civil Procedure he must prove his acquisition of title by purchase at the sale; but it is only to this limited extent, as provided by the statute, that the title may be litigated in such a proceeding. Hewitt v. Justice’ Court, 131 Cal.App. 439, 21 P.(2d) 641; Nineteenth Realty Co. v. Diggs, 134 Cal.App. 278, 25 P.(2d) 522; Berkeley Guarantee Building & Loan Ass’n v. Cunnyngham, 218 Cal. 714, 24 P.(2d) 782. — [160] * * * In our opinion, the plaintiff need only prove a sale in compliance with the statute and deed of trust, followed by purchase at such sale, and the defendant may raise objections only on that phase of the issue of title

So the direct elements are laid out here and other objections to title are preserved (see above):

  • The existence of a sale under nonjudicial statutes
  • Acquisition of title by purchase at the sale
  • Compliance with statutes
  • Compliance with deed of trust

The implied elements and issues are therefore as follows:

  • Was it a Trustee who conducted the sale? (i.e., was the substitution of Trustee valid?) If not, then the party who conducted the sale was not a trustee and the “sale” was not a trustee sale. If Substitution of Trustee occurred as the result of the intervention of a party who was not a beneficiary, then no substitution occurred. Thus no right of possession arises. The objection is to lack of foundation. The facial validity of the instrument raises only a rebuttable presumption.
  • Was the “acquisition” of title the result of a purchase — i.e., did someone pay cash or did someone submit a credit bid? If someone paid cash then a sale could only have occurred if the “seller” (i.e., the trustee) had title. This again goes to the issue of whether the substitution of trustee was a valid appointment. A credit bid could only have been submitted by a beneficiary under the deed of trust as defined by applicable statutes. If the party claiming to be a beneficiary was only an intervenor with no real interest in the debt, then the “bid” was neither backed by cash nor a debt owed by the homeowner to the intervenor. According there was no valid sale under the applicable statutes. Thus such a party would have no right to possession. The objection is to lack of foundation. The facial validity of the instrument raises only a rebuttable presumption.

The object is to prevent the burden of proof from falling onto the homeowner. By challenging the existence of a sale and the existence of a valid trustee, the burden stays on the Plaintiff. Thus you avoid the presumption of facial validity by well timed and well placed objections.

” `To establish that he is a proper plaintiff, one who has purchased property at a trustee’s sale and seeks to evict the occupant in possession must show that he acquired the property at a regularly conducted sale and thereafter ‘duly perfected’ his title. [Citation.]’ (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251,255, 142 Cal.Rptr. 414,572 P.2d 28; see Cruce v. Stein (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 688,692,304 P.2d 118; Kelliherv. Kelliher(1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 226,232,225 P.2d 554; Higgins v. Coyne (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 69, 73, 170 P2d 25; [*953] Nineteenth Realty Co. v. Diggs (1933) 134 Cal.App. 278, 288-289, 25 P2d 522.) One who subsequently purchases property from the party who bought it at a trustee’s sale may bring an action for unlawful detainer under subdivision (b)(3) of section 1161a. (Evans v. Superior Court (1977) 67 Cai.App.3d 162, 169, 136 Cal.Rptr. 596.) However, the subsequent purchaser must prove that the statutory requirements have been satisfied, i.e., that the sale was conducted in accordance with section 2924 of the Civil Code and that title under such sale was duly perfected. {Ibid.) ‘Title is duly perfected when all steps have been taken to make it perfect, i.e. to convey to the purchaser that which he has purchased, valid and good beyond all reasonable doubt (Hocking v. Title Ins. & Trust Co, (1951), 37 Cal.2d 644, 649 [234 P.2d 625,40 A.L.R.2d 1238] ), which includes good record title (Gwin v. Calegaris (1903), 139 Cal. 384 [73 P. 851] ), (Kessler v. Bridge (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d Supp. 837, 841, 327 P.2d 241.) ¶ To the limited extent provided by subdivision (b){3) of section 1161a, title to the property may be litigated in an unlawful detainer proceeding. (Cheney v. Trauzettel (1937) 9 Cal.2d 158, 159, 69 P.2d 832.) While an equitable attack on title is not permitted (Cheney, supra, 9 Cal.2d at p. 160, 69 P.2d 832), issues of law affecting the validity of the foreclosure sale or of title are properly litigated. (Seidel) v. Anglo-California Trust Co. (1942) 55 Cai.App.2d 913, 922, 132 P.2d 12, approved in Vella v. Hudgins, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 256, 142 Cal.Rptr. 414, 572 P.2d 28.)’ ” (Stephens, Partain & Cunningham v. Hollis (1987) 196 Cai.App.3d 948, 952-953.)
 
Here the court goes further in describing the elements. The assumption is that a trustee sale has occurred and that title has been perfected. If you let them prove that, they win.
  • acquisition of property
  • regularly conducted sale
  • duly perfecting title

The burden on the party seeking possession is to prove its case “beyond all reasonable doubt.” That is a high bar. If you raise real questions and issues in your objections, motion to strike testimony and exhibits etc. they would then be deemed to have failed to meet their burden of proof.

Don’t assume that those elements are present “but” you have a counterargument. The purpose of the law on this procedure to gain possession of property is to assure that anyone who follows the rules in a bona fide sale and acquisition will get POSSESSION. The rights of the homeowner to accuse the parties of fraud or anything else are eliminated in an action for possession. But you can challenge whether the sale actually occurred and whether the party who did it was in fact a trustee. 

There is also another factor which is whether the Trustee, if he is a Trustee, was acting in accordance with statutes and the general doctrine of acting in good faith. The alleged Trustee must be able to say that it was in fact the “new” beneficiary who executed the substitution of Trustee, or who gave instructions for issuing a Notice of Default and Notice of sale.

If the “successor” Trustee does not know whether the “successor” party is a beneficiary or not, then the foundation testimony and exhibits must come from someone who can establish beyond all reasonable doubt that the foreclosure proceeding emanated from a party who was in fact the owner of the debt and therefore the beneficiary under the deed of trust. 

WATCH FOR INFORMATION ON OUR UPCOMING EVIDENCE SEMINAR COVERING TRIAL OBJECTIONS AND CROSS EXAMINATION

 

Eviction Immediately After Foreclosure?

Lenders who foreclose and take ownership of security property via credit bid at the foreclosure sale often confront a tenant whose lease has been extinguished, but who would rather not vacate the property.

Just how quickly can the lender serve a notice to quit and start the eviction ball rolling?

A recent decision from California’s Second Appellate District — Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center — clarifies the timing requirements.

Facts: lender forecloses, serves notice to quit immediately, then later records Trustee’s Deed and sues for unlawful detainer

Westlake Village Property, L.P. owned property containing a skilled nursing facility.  Westlake Village leased the facility to Westlake Health Care Center, an affiliated corporation.

The lease was for a 20-year term, and contained an automatic subordination clause, as many commercial leases do.

Six years into the lease, Westlake Village took out a loan from TomatoBank, secured by a deed of trust on the nursing facility property.  Westlake Village defaulted on the loan and declared bankruptcy.

The bank sold the loan to Dr. Leevil, LLC.  Leevil obtained relief from the bankruptcy stay, instituted a nonjudicial foreclosure sale (trustee’s sale), and purchased the nursing facility via credit bid.

The day after the trustee’s sale, Leevil served Westlake Health with a notice to quit.  Leevil recorded the Trustee’s Deed five days later.

Westlake Health refused to vacate the property, and Leevil sued for unlawful detainer.  Westlake Health claimed that its lease was senior to the deed of trust and that the notice to quit was invalid because it was served before the Trustee’s Deed was recorded.

Trial court’s judgment

The trial court ruled that the lease was subordinate to the deed of trust and was extinguished by the trustee’s sale.

The court also found that the notice to quit was valid, and ordered eviction.

Westlake Health appealed.

Court of Appeal’s opinion

The court of appeal affirmed the judgment in favor of Leevil.

If a lease executed before the recordation of a deed of trust does not contain a subordination clause, then the lease will survive a subsequent foreclosure — meaning the foreclosure purchaser takes the property “subject to” the lease.

But here, the court observed that the lease contained an automatic subordination clause.  As such, Leevil’s foreclosure sale extinguished Westlake Health’s lease.

The court also held that the Code of Civil Procedure (section 1161a) “does not require that title be perfected (i.e., that the trustee’s deed be recorded) before service of the three-day notice.  It requires that title be perfected before a tenant ‘may be removed’ from the property.”

In other words, a notice to quit (a prerequisite to an unlawful detainer lawsuit) is valid as long as the trustee’s deed is recorded before the owner files a lawsuit for unlawful detainer.

Lesson

When a lease is extinguished by a foreclosure sale due to a subordination clause, the foreclosure sale purchaser may immediately serve a notice to quit.  Under the Dr. Leevil decision, the notice to quit will be held valid as long as the trustee’s deed is recorded before the owner files a lawsuit for unlawful detainer.

[View source.]

http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/eviction-immediately-after-foreclosure-16755/

VA Court Finally Recognizes Circular Reasoning of the Banks

“Because I said so” or “because I already did it” is not a recognizable legal ground for possession of property even after the forced sale of the property. In an action for possession of property, the taker must establish that it is the legal owner and that the ownership was obtained lawfully and properly. The fact that a prior judgment was entered allowing the foreclosure sale is not dispositive.

The “presumed facts” are directly contrary to the actual facts. Or, as I have stated it in other circumstances, the money trail does not match the paper trail. There are no real transactions in most instances.

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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see http://4closurefraud.org/2016/06/28/parrish-v-fnma-subject-matter-jurisdiction-unlawful-detainer-supreme-court-of-virginia-va%c2%adcates-foreclosure-judgement/

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For ten years — about the same amount of time that I said the rescission is valid upon mailing and did not require lawsuit or tender — I have advocated and encouraged lawyers for homeowners faced with eviction, writ of possession, or unlawful detainer to adopt a simple logic. Eviction is proper when the owner and possessor merely leases the property or grants some sort of title that has expired. That is certain and it is final and nobody disagrees with it.

The problem in the Courts is that judges have routinely ignored one simple basic fact: the current occupier of the property had legal title and the total right to possession of the property before this new party came into the picture and claimed the right to title and now claims the right to possession. Final Judgments entered in the Court records are not dispositive as pointed out by this Virginia court and as pointed out by the Supreme Court of the State of California in Yvanova.

It is the second part of the “formula” that came up in a Virginia Court, which has been one of the most difficult states in the nation for homeowners contesting the baseless actions of foreclosing parties. The logic is simple. Where the homeowner was clearly the owner of record and the possessor, the party seeking foreclosure must assert (nearly always absent) and prove that it came into title ownership lawfully and properly.

The interesting thing about this is that if the homeowner contests the eviction or unlawful detainer and does so with sufficient grounds as to create doubt as to whether the party seeking eviction lawfully acquired title, THEN the burden shifts to the party seeking eviction to prove that everything that happened before was lawful and proper. And we all know that without legal presumptions being improperly applied practically none of the evictions were or could be proper.

Like other things this is not a magic bullet. But it provides some daylight. The Virginia court held that as long as the homeowner successfully raises a question about title, the court hearing the eviction claim must dismiss the claim immediately because it has no right or jurisdiction actually try a case based upon title claims. I think you would find similar laws in other states where, for example, if County court the jurisdiction is far more limited than it is in Circuit Court. The County Court may hear and decide and eviction but as soon as the Court sees a bona fide question about title, it must dismiss the case leaving the parties to sort out their differences elsewhere. That might be in state Circuit Court or Federal District Court.

The party seeking eviction would need to go to a court of competent jurisdiction and plead that (a) they are the lawful title owner (b) they are entitled to possession and (3) the current occupants have lost their right to possession even though they had both title and possession before the foreclosure. Any allegation based in actual fact must be proven by actual facts and legal presumptions clearly should not apply once the lower court has already determined that there is doubt as to whether the documents for title were validly issued. This might prevent the party seeking to confirm title and seeking the eviction from using any legal presumptions since the documents themselves have already been determined by a lower court to lack trustworthiness or authenticity or legal effect.

One thing to keep in mind is that without legal presumptions none of the foreclosures could go forward because there is no proof in existence, in most cases, of the existence of an executed loan contract between the homeowner and the “originator.” The “presumed facts” are directly contrary to the actual facts. Or, as I have stated it in other circumstances, the money trail does not match the paper trail. There are no real transactions in most instances. The paper trail creates legal presumptions but as soon as a court orders that the foreclosing party open its books to determine whether there were actual transactions, actual loans by the parties upon whom the forecloser relies, the bank case falls to pieces.

… a conundrum because some actions for unlawful detainer necessarily turn on the question of title. Unlawful detainer is an action against a defendant who lawfully entered into possession of real property but whose right to lawful possession has since expired. It is brought by a plaintiff lawfully entitled to possession at the time of suit, which the defendant is then unlawfully withholding. Allen v. Gibson, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 468, 473 (1826). The validity of the plaintiff’s right of possession is an issue that, when disputed, must be determined in the adjudication of the unlawful detainer action. Id. at 474. The plaintiff must show either (1) prior actual possession, which was then yielded to the defendant under some temporary or defeasible estate that has ended, or (2) a right of possession acquired after the defendant’s entry. Id. at 474-76.

Whether the plaintiff has a right of possession will not always present a question of title. Such a question will never arise in the first class of cases, where the plaintiff’s right is based on prior actual possession. For example, a landlord may bring an action for unlawful detainer against a tenant who holds possession of the leased premises in violation of the lease or after it has expired. In such cases, the defendant’s possession is derivative of the plaintiff’s title, and the defendant is not permitted to challenge it. [e.s.]

Emerick v. Tavener, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 220, 223 (1852). However, a plaintiff in the second class of cases, who claims a right of possession acquired after the defendant’s original, lawful entry, must show the validity of that right. When the plaintiff’s after-acquired right of possession is based on a claim of title, the plaintiff may be required to establish the validity of that title. Corbett v. Nutt, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 624, 648 (1868).2 Actions for unlawful detainer in the foreclosure context generally fall into this category. [e.s.]

Where the right of possession depends solely upon a claim of title, the question of whether that title is valid is a threshold question in an unlawful detainer action. While a court’s resolution of that question in an unlawful detainer action may not, by statute, be preclusive in actions for ejectment or to quiet title, the court trying the unlawful detainer action nevertheless must weigh the parties’ competing arguments about validity to determine whether a plaintiff’s prima facie right of possession evidenced by a trustee’s deed has been rebutted by the defendant. [e.s.]

In most foreclosure cases, a trustee’s deed will satisfy the foreclosure purchaser’s burden to establish that it acquired a right of possession after the homeowner’s original, lawful entry, and the homeowner will have no good-faith basis to contest it. However, in limited circumstances, the homeowner could allege facts sufficient to place the validity of the trustee’s deed in doubt. In such cases, the general district court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction to try title supersedes its subject matter jurisdiction to try unlawful detainer and the court must dismiss the case without prejudice. Warwick, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) at 542 (“[O]n being convinced that the case involves a bona fide claim of title to real estate,” a court not of record “is bound to dismiss [the proceeding] immediately.”).

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Does Yvanova Provide a Back Door to Closed Cases?

That is the question I am hearing from multiple people. My provisional answer is that in my opinion there is a strong argument for using it if the property has not been liquidated after the foreclosure auction. There might be a grey area while the property is REO and there might be a grey area where the property has been sold but the issue of a void assignment is raised in an eviction procedure. It will strain the minds of judges even more, but these issues are certain to come up. As things continue to progress Judges will shift from looking askance at borrowers and thinking their defenses are all hairsplitting ways to get out of a debt and get a free house. Upon reflection, over the next couple of years, you will see an increasing number of judges taking the same cynical view and turning it toward the banks and servicers who in most cases function neither as banks or servicers.

The Yvanova court took great pains to say that this was a very narrow ruling. Starting with that one might argue it only applied to that specific case. But they went further than that and we all know it. SO it stands for the proposition that a void assignment can be the basis of a wrongful foreclosure. AND most BANK LAWYERS agree that is a huge problem for them, at least in California but they think it will adopted across the country and I agree with the Bank lawyers on that assessment.

The reason is simple logic. If the foreclosure is wrongful then it seems stupidly simple to say that it was wrong in the first place. If it was “wrong” the questions that emerge in legal scholarship arise from two main paths.

What does “wrong” mean. Or to put it in Yvanova language is wrong the same as void or is it voidable. This would have a huge impact on issues of jurisdiction, res judicata, collateral estoppel etc. Does it mean that it was wrong and you can get damages or does it mean that it was wrong and therefore the homeowner still owns the house. I lean towards the former not by preference but by what I think the court was saying between the lines. The whole point of nonjudicial foreclosure (amongst two other points that are obvious) is to provide stability and confidence in the title system. So if a wrong foreclosure occurs the title would most likely remain in whoever bought it at auction — although the purgatory in which many properties remain (REO) might create a grey area in which there is no prejudice in vacating the sale. Indeed if the party holding the “FINAL” title did so by fraud (using a void assignment) then equity would seem to demand return of title to the homeowner. AND THEN you still have the problem of evictions or writs of possession or whatever they are called in your state. Title is one thing but possession is another. If you raise the void assignment can you defeat possession even if you can’t defeat the title transfer? It would SEEM not but equity would demand that a thief not further the rewards of his ill-gotten gains.

Next path. Procedure, evidence and objections. Going back in time the homeowner might have objected or even alleged things that the Yvanova court now finds to have merit. So a lay person might think that is all they need is to show the void assignment and presto they have title or money or both in their hands. Not so fast. Due process is intended to allow a person to be heard and the justice system is designed and created to FINALIZE disputes, whether the decision is right or wrong. SO questions abound about what happened at the trial court level. But there was a remedy for that. It is called an appeal. And there are choices to even go to Federal Court if the state court is rubber stamping void instruments. But the time for doing that has expired on all but a few cases and the judicial doctrine of finality is the most difficult to overcome. Even a condemned man usually will be put to death even if there is actual evidence of innocence after a period of time has expired and a number of appeals have been exhausted.

SO that is my long winded way of saying I don’t know. If Yvanova opens the door to many new openings of closed cases, it certainly doesn’t say so. But a defense of a current case — even one amended to cite Yvanova, might fare much better.

The real answer: pick a path and try it.
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