Fla 2d DCA: HELOC Instrument Not Self-Authenticating Article 3 Note

Just because an instrument is not self-authenticating doesn’t mean it can’t be authenticated. Here the Plaintiff could not authenticate the note without the legal presumption of self-authentication and all the legal presumptions that follow.  And that is the point here. They came to court without evidence and in this case the court turned them away.

Florida courts, along with courts around the country, are gradually inching their way to the application of existing law, thus eroding the dominant premise that if the Plaintiff is a bank, they should win, regardless of law.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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see HELOC Not Negotiable Instrument and Therefore Not Self Authenticating

This decision is neither novel nor complicated. A note can be admitted into evidence as self-authenticating without extrinsic evidence (parol evidence) IF it is a negotiable instrument under the State adoption of the UCC as State Law.

The inquiry as to whether a promissory note is a negotiable instrument is simple:

  • Does the body of the note claim to memorialize an unconditional promise
  • to pay a fixed amount
  • (editor’s addition) to an identified Payee? [This part is assumed since the status of the “lender” depends upon how and why it came into possession of the note.]

A note memorializing a line of credit is. by definition, not a fixed amount. Case closed, the “lender” lost and it was affirmed in this decision. There was no other choice.

The only reason why this became an issue was because counsel for the homeowner timely raised a clearly worded objection to the note as not being a negotiable instrument and therefore not being self-authenticating. And without the note, the mortgage, which is not a negotiable instrument, is meaningless anyway.

This left the foreclosing party with the requirement that they prove their case with real evidence and not be allowed to avoid that burden of proof using legal presumptions arising from the facial validity of  a negotiable instrument.

The typical response from the foreclosing party essentially boils down to this: “Come on Judge we all know the note was signed, we all know the payments stopped, we all know that the loan is in default. Why should we clog up the court system using legal technicalities.”

What is important about this case is the court’s position on that “argument” (to ignore the law and just get on with it). “This distinction is not esoteric legalese. Florida law is clear that a “negotiable instrument” is “an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order.”§ 673.1041(1), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added).”

So THAT means that if the trial court is acting properly it will apply the laws of the state and THAT requires the court to rule based upon the UCC and cases involving
negotiable instruments.

But none of that invalidated the note or mortgage, nor should it. THAT is where it gets interesting. By denying the note as a self authenticating instrument the court was merely requiring the foreclosing party to proffer actual evidence regarding the terms of the note, including the manner in which it was acquired and how the foreclosing party is an injured party — a presumption that is no longer present when the note is denied admission into evidence as a self authenticating negotiable instrument.

The foreclosing party was unable to produce any testimony or exhibits demonstrating the prima facie case. Why? Because they are not and never were a creditor nor are they agent or representative of the actual party to whom the subject underlying DEBT was owed.

 

Florida law requires the authentication of a document prior to its admission into evidence. See § 90.901, Fla. Stat. (2012) (“Authentication or identification of evidence is required as a condition precedent to its admissibility.”); Mills v. Baker, 664 So. 2d 1054, 1057 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); see, e.g., DiSalvo v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., 115 So. 3d 438, 439-40 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (holding that unauthenticated default letters from lender could not be considered in mortgage foreclosure summary judgment). Proffered evidence is authenticated when its proponent introduces sufficient evidence “to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” § 90.901; Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1000 (Fla. 2006) (“While section 90.901 requires the authentication or identification of a document prior to its admission into evidence, the requirements of this section are satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the document in question is what its proponent claims.”).

There are a number of recognized exceptions to the authentication requirement. One, as relevant here, relates to commercial paper under the Uniform Commercial Code, codified in chapters 678 to 680 of the Florida Statutes. “Commercial papers and signatures thereon and documents relating to them [are self-authenticating], to the extent provided in the Uniform Commercial Code.” § 90.902(8); see, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n for BAFC 2007-4 v. Roseman, 214 So. 3d 728, 733 (Fla 4th DCA 2017) (reversing the trial court’s denial of the admission of the original note in part because the note was self-authenticating); Hidden Ridge Condo. Homeowners Ass’n v. Onewest Bank, N.A., 183 So. 3d 1266, 1269 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (stating that because the endorsed note was self-authenticating as a commercial paper, extrinsic evidence of authenticity was not required as a condition precedent…

We cannot bicker with the proposition that “for over a century . . . the Florida Supreme Court has held [promissory notes secured by a mortgage] are negotiable instruments. And every District Court of Appeal in Florida has affirmed this principle.” HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n v. Buset, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D305, 306 (Fla. 3d DCA Feb. 7, 2018) (citation omitted). That is as far as we can travel with Third Federal.

The HELOC note is not a self-authenticating negotiable instrument. By its own terms, the note established a “credit limit” of up to $40,000 from which the Koulouvarises could “request an advance . . . at any time.” Further, the note provided that “[a]ll advances and other obligations . . . will reduce your available credit.” The HELOC note was not an unconditional promise to pay a fixed amount of money. Rather, it established “[t]he maximum amount of borrowing power extended to a borrower by a given lender, to be drawn upon by the borrower as needed.” See Line of Credit, Black’s Law Dictionary, 949 (8th ed. 1999).

This distinction is not esoteric legalese. Florida law is clear that a “negotiable instrument” is “an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order.”§ 673.1041(1), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added).

Ocwen Boarding Process Was Shot Down Last Year

As foreclosure defense lawyers have been saying for years, the Ocwen Boarding process is a sham. “This boarding process is a legal fiction, and it means something different to every entity,” Butchko ruled from the bench during a March 17 hearing.

Ocwen does not verify any of the data. It downloads it and then “calls it a day.”

“I have done this investigation for a long time,” he said, noting, “The appellate courts are going under this presumption that there is some type of meaningful auditing and verification.” But Jacobs maintained, “You just heard it from a lawyer who knows how to properly phrase the questions that she’s basically testifying to all — all of this is still hearsay.

”Butchko granted an involuntary dismissal in HSBC Bank USA’s suit against Miami homeowner Joseph Buset, whose loan was initially serviced by Litton Loan Servicing LP, which Ocwen acquired in 2011.

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See Home Foreclosure Fails on OCwen Servicing Records

Bruce Jacobs, a Foreclosure defense lawyer won this case. It was in 2016 and was, as usual, under-reported. The case hinged on the prior records of Litton Loan Servicing that Ocwen had acquired. The robo-witness could only testify that Ocwen employees had matched fields and columns on the payment history and had done nothing else. Hence verification was nonexistent.

[Judge] Butchko had to decide how to treat loan documents that became part of Ocwen’s business records but remained subject to hearsay objections unless the company could show it independently verified the data after transferring the loans. She considered evidence on Ocwen’s boarding process — the procedure by which financial services companies transfer account data from one lenders’ management system to another after trading loan portfolios.

Witnesses for lenders in foreclosure cases must show they did independent fact-checking to qualify their files as business records and not hearsay.

All records in  digital or hard copy are hearsay by definition. The only issue is whether a proper foundation has been offered by the robo-witness to claim that the “documents” qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule and that therefore they should be admitted into evidence. This case on Ocwen clearly shows that the testimony by dozens of Ocwen robo-witnesses has been false.

Based upon information I have received from credible sources I think the problem is worse than that. My sources tell me that the records are not uploaded or transferred. The only thing that happens is that the user name and password is changed. That is why the records of the prior servicer are NEVER introduced. It may be that Ocwen changes the fields and columns to make it appear that the records have been processed, but based upon my information the Ocwen records are often taken from the same database. That being the case, the robo-witness should have been an employee of the former Litton servicing.

 

 

PROOF OF STANDING REQUIRED: SEFFAR v. RESIDENTIAL CREDIT SOLUTIONS INC

It is NOT enough to ALLEGE standing. They must PROVE it. Judges across the country are making mistakes with this simple concept. Standing to SUE is presumed if you allege (in words or by incorporation of exhibits) that you have it. Possession of the “original note” can be alleged but at trial the foreclosing party must PROVE (not argue) that (1) they have the original note and (2) they have the right to enforce it either because they own it or because they have been authorized by a person who owns it or a person who has the right to enforce it. 

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In the end we are closing in on the unthinkable: that anyone who was entitled to be treated as creditor was severed from the transactions leaving all other parties floating and leaving legal analysts to wonder (the borrower, that is) or make fraudulent representations (the banks and servicers) that the putative creditors cannot refute.
In the end, with very few exceptions, none of the trusts own anything and none of the servicers or trustees have any authority over any loans. This is the direct result of asymmetry of knowledge. The investors, the borrowers and the closing agents and even the sales agents do not have sufficient information to know what is going on — forcing everyone to look to the “Bank” who appears to be the source of funding.
And the Banks get to explain it in whatever way benefits them the most. They are thus permitted to explain away any hint that they were stealing investor money on an unprecedented scale. That is what happened in the TARP bailout and that is what happens in court.
Here is a 4th DCA case in Florida that spells out the difference between alleging a case and proving it.

SEFFAR v. RESIDENTIAL CREDIT SOLUTIONS INC

Taoufiq SEFFAR, Appellant, v. RESIDENTIAL CREDIT SOLUTIONS, INC., Appellee.

No. 4D13–3514.

    Decided: March 25, 2015

David H. Charlip of Charlip Law Group, LC, Aventura, for appellant. Raymond Hora of McCalla Raymer, LLC, Orlando, for appellee.

Appellant challenges a final judgment of foreclosure, claiming that the court erred in denying his motion for involuntary dismissal. He claimed that appellee did not prove standing to foreclose at the time suit was filed. We agree that the evidence is insufficient to show the plaintiff had standing and reverse. (e.s.)

Appellant executed a note and mortgage to ABN Amro Mortgage Group [EDITOR’S NOTE: SEARCH ABN AMRO ON THIS BLOG]. (“ABN”) in 2006. In 2009, appellant received a letter from CitiMortgage informing him that the servicing of his note and mortgage was being transferred from CitiMortgage to Residential Credit Solutions (“RCS”). RCS also sent a letter informing appellant of the transfer of the servicing of the loan. When he defaulted on the mortgage, RCS sent him a notice of default and subsequently filed suit, alleging that it had the right to enforce the note and mortgage. [EDITOR’S NOTE: HOMEOWNER DID NOT DEFAULT ON ANY OBLIGATION DUE RCS]

Attached to the complaint was the mortgage and note to ABN. The note was stamped “original” and did not contain any endorsements or allonges. Also attached was an assignment of the mortgage from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), as receiver for Franklin Bank, to Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems (“MERS”), as nominee for RCS. [EDITOR’S NOTE: THE PRESENCE OF EITHER FRANKLIN OR MERS TELLS US THAT THE SUBJECT LOAN IS SUBJECT TO FALSE CLAIMS OF SECURITIZATION WHERE THE SOURCE OF FUNDS HAS BEEN CUT OFF FROM ITS INVESTMENT DESTROYING ITS STATUS AS A CREDITOR]

About nine months after filing the complaint, RCS filed what it claimed was the “original” note. Filed with this note was an undated, blank allonge, payable to the bearer, allegedly executed by a vice president of ABN. Nothing about the appearance of this allonge, as contained in the appellate record, shows that it was affixed to the note with which it was filed. (e.s.) [EDITOR’S NOTE: NO PROOF THE “ALLONGE” WAS ATTACHED? THEN THE ALLONGE IS  A NULLITY. NO PRESUMPTION APPLIES].

Just two weeks before the foreclosure trial, RCS moved to substitute Bayview Loan Servicing as the plaintiff, alleging it had transferred servicing of the loan to Bayview. The documents attached to the motion do not mention that the ownership of the loan or mortgage was also transferred. The trial court allowed the substitution over appellant’s objection. (e.s.)

At trial, a litigation manager for Bayview testified. He was not a records custodian for RCS or for Bayview. He was not familiar with the computer systems that either of the prior servicers, CitiMortgage and RCS, used for compiling information on the loan or how it was inputted into the systems. He had no information as to whether the information on the loans was inputted into the prior servicers’ systems correctly. He could not testify to the truth or accuracy of RCS’s records, just that they were provided to Bayview. (e.s. [EDITOR’S NOTE: THESE ARE ELEMENTS OF PROOF THAT ARE ABSENT FROM THE TESTIMONY OF NEARLY EVERY ROBO-WITNESS]

He testified that Bayview was the servicer and holder of the note. He believed that Bayview had acquired the note through a purchase agreement with RCS, but he had not seen the agreement, nor did he have a copy of it. His belief that Bayview was the owner of the note under the purchase agreement was based on “a screen shot of our capital assets systems, which has information in regards to the status of the loan with us.” This screen shot was not produced at trial.

[Editor’s NOTE: Recent case decisions state that screen shots are hearsay and do not fall within any exceptions to the hearsay rule and are therefore barred from being admitted into evidence. The most important point to take away from this is that the witness nearly always knows absolutely nothing other than the script that he was required to memorize. Getting to that is actually fairly easy if you know how to do cross examination.]

 

As to the allonge with the blank endorsement from ABN, he did not know when it was executed or whether the signature on it was a “wet ink” signature or a stamp. He did not know whether the allonge was affixed to the note prior to it being filed in the court file. He did not know if the vice president who signed the allonge on ABN’s behalf was in the employ of ABN in November 2009, when Bayview’s records showed that servicing of the loan had been transferred from ABN to Franklin Bank. (e.s.)

The manager agreed that on January 29, 2010, when RCS mailed appellant a notice of intent to take legal action on the note and mortgage, RCS was not the owner and holder of the note by way of the September 30, 2009 assignment of mortgage, but testified, “[t]here may have been a purchase agreement or some other document.” He testified that, on that date, “I only know that RCS was servicing. I don’t know for a fact who was the holder of the note at the time.” While he did testify that RCS owned the note and mortgage on the date the complaint was filed, he then inconsistently stated that RCS had brought the suit as the servicer of the loan, not its owner. (e.s.)

Although appellant moved for involuntary dismissal on the ground that Bayview had not proved standing because it had not shown that it had the right to enforce the note and foreclose the mortgage, the trial court rejected this claim. It entered a final judgment of foreclosure in which it found that Bayview was due and owing the unpaid balance of the note. This appeal follows.

Appellant argues that Bayview failed to prove that it was the owner or holder of the note and that it had the right to foreclose. Based upon this confusing record, we agree that it presented no competent evidence that RCS was the holder of the note at the time it filed suit or that it was a nonholder in possession and entitled to enforce the note. Therefore, Bayview failed to prove standing.

Standing of the plaintiff to foreclose on a mortgage must be established at the time the plaintiff files suit. See McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 79 So.3d 170, 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). McLean set forth the requirements that a plaintiff may prove standing in a mortgage foreclosure:

Standing may be established by either an assignment or an equitable transfer of the mortgage prior to the filing of the complaint ․ For example, standing may be established from a plaintiff’s status as the note holder, regardless of any recorded assignments․

If the note does not name the plaintiff as the payee, the note must bear a special endorsement in favor of the plaintiff or a blank endorsement․ Alternatively, the plaintiff may submit evidence of an assignment from the payee to the plaintiff ․

Even in the absence of a valid written assignment, the mere delivery of a note and mortgage, with intention to pass the title, upon a proper consideration, will vest the equitable interest in the person to whom it is so delivered.

Id. at 173 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Appellant notes several deficiencies in Bayview’s proof which result in a failure to show standing to foreclose the mortgage. First, while the note and mortgage were originally held by ABN, the only assignment of mortgage attached to the complaint and introduced at trial was one from FDIC as receiver for Franklin Bank to MERS as nominee for RCS. There is no proof of any transfer of the note or mortgage from ABN to Franklin Bank. Second, while Bayview contends that the undated allonge supplies the connection, as it shows a transfer payable to bearer, there was no proof that the allonge was attached to the note, and Bayview presented no proof of when it was executed. (e.s.) [EDITOR’S NOTE: THE ENDORSEMENT MEANS NOTHING IF IT WASN’T ON THE NOTE. IT WASN’T ON THE NOTE UNLESS THE ALLONGE WAS AFFIXED TO THE NOTE. THE ENDORSEMENT MEANS NOTHING WITHOUT FOUNDATION TESTIMONY PROVING THAT THE ENDORSER HAD THE AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE ENDORSEMENT] Finally, there was no competent evidence of what rights Bayview acquired from RCS.

We recently addressed how a plaintiff may show it is entitled to foreclose on a promissory note in Murray v. HSBC Bank, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D239 (Fla. 4th DCA Jan. 21, 2015):

“Because a promissory note is a negotiable instrument and because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note, the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be ․ a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder.” Mazine v. M & I Bank, 67 So.3d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

A “person entitled to enforce” an instrument is: “(1) [t]he holder of the instrument; (2)[a] nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder; or (3)[a] person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to s[ection] 673.3091 or s[ection] 673.4181(4).” § 673.3011, Fla. Stat. (2013). A “holder” is defined as “[t]he person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession.” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). Thus, to be a holder, the instrument must be payable to the person in possession or indorsed in blank. See § 671.201(5), Fla. Stat. (2013).

Although, nine months after filing the complaint, RCS filed what purported to be the original note with an allonge payable to bearer, it was undated and there is no proof it was affixed to the promissory note. “An allonge is a piece of paper annexed to a negotiable instrument or promissory note, on which to write endorsements for which there is no room on the instrument itself. Such must be so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof.” See Booker v. Sarasota, Inc., 707 So.2d 886, 887 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 76 (6th ed.1990)); see also Isaac v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 74 So.3d 495, 496 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). The litigation manager did not know when the allonge was executed, or whether it was affixed to the note prior to filing. No evidence was presented that the allonge was executed and attached to the note prior to the filing of the initial complaint. Indeed, RCS did not allege in the complaint that it owned and held the mortgage. It merely alleged that it had the right to foreclose the note and mortgage. Therefore, the allonge provided no evidence that RCS was a “holder” at the time it filed the complaint.

Alternatively, Bayview argues that RCS was a nonholder in possession. However, Murray shows the fallacy of that claim. In Murray, we held that the lender, HSBC, had not proved standing where it had alleged that it was a nonholder in possession of the note and mortgage, because it did not prove that each prior transfer of the note conferred the right to enforce it: (e.s.)

HSBC was thus left to enforce the note under section 673.3011(2) as a nonholder in possession of the instrument with the rights of a holder. The issue then is whether HSBC is a nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder.

Anderson v. Burson, 424 Md. 232, 35 A.3d 452 (2011), is instructive. There, the court held that the plaintiff was a nonholder in possession and analyzed whether it had rights of enforcement pursuant to a Maryland statute that employs the same language as section 673.3011, Florida Statutes. Anderson, 35 A.3d at 462. “A transfer vests in the transferee only the rights enjoyed by the transferor, which may include the right to enforce [ment],” through the “shelter rule.” Id. at 461–62.

A nonholder in possession, however, cannot rely on possession of the instrument alone as a basis to enforce it․ The transferee does not enjoy the statutorily provided assumption of the right to enforce the instrument that accompanies a negotiated instrument, and so the transferee “must account for possession of the unendorsed instrument by proving the transaction through which the transferee acquired it.” (e.s.) [EDITOR’S NOTE: NO PRESUMPTIONS AND THEREFORE NO CASE FOR ENFORCEMENT IF NO TRANSACTION PROVEN. THE TRANSACTION IS NOT PRESUMED] Com. Law § 3–203 cmt. 2. If there are multiple prior transfers, the transferee must prove each prior transfer. Once the transferee establishes a successful transfer from a holder, he or she acquires the enforcement rights of that holder. See Com. Law § 3–203 cmt. 2. A transferee’s rights, however, can be no greater than his or her transferor’s because those rights are “purely derivative.” (e.s.)

Murray, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D239 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). Because HSBC did not offer evidence of one of the prior transfers of the note, we held it did not prove that it was a nonholder in possession.

Similarly, in this case, Bayview did not prove that either RCS or itself was a nonholder in possession. It never connected FDIC as receiver of Franklin Bank, from which RCS acquired an assignment of mortgage, to ABN, the original note holder.

As alternative proof of its “ownership” of the note and mortgage, Bayview relied on a letter from RCS to the appellant, notifying him of the transfer of servicing rights to RCS, and a similar one from Bayview when it became the servicer of the loan. Neither letter addressed a right to enforce the note. None of the servicer agreements were placed in evidence to prove what rights either RCS or Bayview acquired under those agreements. (e.s.) [EDITOR’S NOTE: It is very rare that the servicer agreements are proffered by “Plaintiff” Trust (or other sham nominee) in evidence because those agreements, like Assignment and Assumption Agreements contain information that the securitization players don’t want the borrower, the court or government regulators or enforcers to see].Finally, as to the transfer between RCS and Bayview, the litigation manager testified that while he believed that Bayview purchased the note and mortgage from RCS, he had never seen a purchase agreement, and no document memorializing the purchase was entered into evidence. Therefore, because there is a gap in the transfer of the note and mortgage, Bayview did not prove that RCS, and subsequently Bayview, were nonholders in possession. See Murray, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D239. 

Simply stated, the evidence presented was woefully inadequate to prove standing to foreclose. It was quite apparent from the record that Bayview’s litigation manager did not have the requisite knowledge, nor did he produce documentary evidence, to support the claim.

We thus reverse and direct judgment in favor of the appellant dismissing the foreclosure on the mortgage for failure of the appellee to prove its standing.

Reversed and remanded.

WARNER, J.

CIKLIN and GERBER, JJ., concur.

“Resecuritization”

the basic thrust of the defense is to point out what is absent rather than attack what is not absent.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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As predicted on my blog back in 2008, we are seeing new names of Trusts emerge in foreclosure cases — involving old loans that were declared in default years ago by parties asserting they represent the alleged servicer of either a named bank or servicer or an old trust. What happened? As our sources had revealed, the alleged trusts had nothing in them and were the source of extreme liability of the Master Servicer acting as underwriter to the investors and third parties who traded in securities based upon the representation that the Trust actually owned the debts of millions of homeowners.
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We have not seen the agreements, but we are told, and our analysis confirms, that the old trusts were “retired” and that new trusts, also empty, are now being used wherein the paperwork for the new “Trusts” is far more complete than what we have previously seen.
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As far as we have determined thus far the mechanics of the change of trust name are along the following lines:
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  1. There is probably a purchase and sale agreement between the old trust and the new trust. Like previous documentation there are no warranties of ownership but ownership of the debts is implied.
  2. Like the old Trusts, foreclosures are brought in the name of the new trusts, using US Bank or other major institution as the “Trustee.”
  3. Investors in the old trusts are given certificates in the new trust as settlement of claims brought by investors for malfeasance in the handling of their money — namely the origination of loans instead of the acquisition of loans and the granting of loans that were far lower in quality than agreed and far higher risks than allowed for stable managed funds.
  4. This “resecuritization” process is a sham just like the original old trust. But it follows the playbook the banks have been using for over a decade. By adding another level of paper to fabricated documents based upon nonexistent transactions, it promotes the illusion of valid transactions and valid documents.
  5. Like all other trusts and hybrid situations in which trusts were involved but not named, the entire scheme is based upon a simple premise. The banks have managed information and data such that there remains a false sense of security that they are still credible sources of information — despite all evidence to the contrary. The additional layer of documents then adds to the illusion because it is counterintuitive to believe that these high level complex documents represent transactions in the real world that don’t exist.
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Defense strategies remain the same, however. The issues in evidence laws and rules are foundation, and hearsay.The basic defects in the bank’s credibility must be revealed even if it does not get to the point where everything is revealed. The rent-a-name practice for appointment of trustees that have no obligations or duties continues. The “apparent authority” of the servicers is based upon a trust document of an entity in which there is no asset. But the website of US Bank and others suggest that they have business records — which in actuality do not exist. Hence, the basic thrust of the defense is to point out what is absent rather than attack what is not absent.
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This takes strict logical analysis by the attorney representing the homeowner — an exercise that in most cases cannot be accomplished by a pro se litigant. It may be beyond the confidence of the lawyer too, but there are many people in the country who provide services that assist with the logical analysis and factual analysis — including but not limited to the team at LivingLies and LendingLies. The analyst should be well-steeped in the three classes of securitization — concept, written documents and actual practice in order to come to conclusions that are not only correct but are likely to give traction in court.
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While tempting, attacking the existing documentation on the basis of authenticity or validity is a rabbit hole. The only parties that actually have the proof as to the fabrication of any one particular transaction are the parties with whom you are in litigation and the parties who created them and use them as sham conduits. They resist by all means available any attempt to provide access tot he real information and the real monetary transactions which look very different from the ones portrayed in court.
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By making an allegation you are now required to prove what you have said by evidence that the other side simply will not give up. This is not to say that there is no value in sending a QWR (Qualified Written Request), (DVL) Debt Validation Letter, or a complaint to the state AG or the CFPB. Much of the inconsistent statements come from those responses and can be used in court. And there is also considerable value in seeking discovery even if we know that in most cases, while it should be allowed, the judge will issue protective orders or sustain objections to requests seeking the identity of the owner of the debt.
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The value of those apparently futile endeavors can be that at trial the foreclosing party will almost certainly rely on legal presumptions that depend upon information contained in your discovery request.
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OBJECTIONS AT TRIAL: This requires research and analysis of potential objections and how they should be used. While a motion in limine before trial would seem to be the better practice, the real traction seems to come at trial when the homeowner raises objections and moves to exclude evidence that relies upon data contained in discovery they refused to answer and which the court ruled was irrelevant. It is of utmost importance, however, that in order to use the discovery exchanges, you must file a motion to compel and set it for hearing and get it heard. The risk of a motion in limine is that the court is more likely to deny it and then when raised at trial in an objection will regard your objection as a second bite an apple that has already been the subject of a dispositive ruling.
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Cross examination of the robo-witness should be aggressive and relentless pointing to the actual lack of knowledge of the witness about anything other than the script from which he was trained to testify.

JUDICIAL NOTICE EXPOSED

JUDICIAL NOTICE is just one more legal device by which Banks and Servicers introduce fake documents or documents they can’t get because they are “lost”.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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The use of Judicial notice is widespread. Banks attempt to use it in order to get something into evidence they could not otherwise prove. Homeowners use it for the same reason. Usually both are mistaken in the use of Judicial notice and the Court is in error for accepting it unless the other side fails to raise a proper objection. Like most things, if you fail to object the document or record will be in evidence. That still leaves the issue of how much weight to give the document as evidence.
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Generally Judicial Notice is meant to allow introduction of a document that is in the Public Domain and which is maintained by a government institution. Technically the only proof issue that is satisfied by granting judicial notice is that the document exists. What is written on the document or record introduced by way of Judicial Notice is NOT in evidence — only that the document exists. Thus when homeowners try to use judicial notice of something derogatory about the banks or servicers, all they have is a recognition that this document or report is in the public domain — not that the words themselves are true or even in evidence.
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The strategy of the Banks and servicers is to file something somewhere in the public domain and then ask for judicial notice without proper foundation for the documents or its contents. The banks and servicers extend this even further if they can get away with it — by getting the Court to take judicial notice of the note, mortgage or assignment. Or by getting the court to accept into evidence the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.
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Objections raised on the basis of lack of notice, hearsay, hearsay on hearsay, lack of foundation, and other rules of evidence should be employed aggressively. However this is a two-edged sword. If the Banks get it in they will then argue that since the homeowner is not a party to the PSA the homeowner is barred from raising violations of the PSA as a trust instrument. If the Banks fail to proffer the PSA or fail to get the Court to accept judicial notice they will proceed anyway arguing that the provisions of the PSA are irrelevant anyway.
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In fact if you drill down in cross examination you will probably find that it is the self-proclaimed servicer who is the real party in interest with apparent possession of the original note and mortgage, but which in truth are newly minted, doctored or entirely fabricated, instruments that appear at trial.
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If you look at the Florida Rules (most states are the same or similar) you will see that even the SEC site is questionable as a source of documents because the documents are not certified. In truth ANYONE can file ANYTHING on the SEC site and then try to get it accepted into evidence — even though the document (PSA) is not even signed or is not even complete.
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But regardless of the action by the court the proponent of a document or record introduced by Judicial Notice must still prove the truth of the matter asserted in the document. it is no different than introducing the document using as foundation the testimony of a witness (usually a robo-witness). But there again the testimony of the witness is going to be that the document is some sort of business record. The actual source of the document is almost always guarded and concealed by the Banks and Servicers.
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The reason is that many or most of the Bank and Servicer documents are fabricated, forged, robo—signed instruments that are self-serving and not based upon anything that happened in real life. The truth, difficult to prove but nonetheless true, is that the document the so-called business records of the servicer are neither business records of the servicer nor of the alleged REMIC Trust but rather come into real life by way of a printer that prints records and documents fabricated and maintained by a third party “vendor” like LPS/Black Knight in Jacksonville, Florida.
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The change in servicer thus involves no actual “boarding” process, since LPS operates like MERS. Anyone can have access and the transfer of the records is really a transfer of access to the IT platforms of LPS where the data and documents are manipulated to create the illusion of generally accepted and facially valid records or documents.
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Florida Statute §90.202 Matters which may be judicially noticed.—A court may take judicial notice of the following matters, to the extent that they are not embraced within s. 90.201:
(1) Special, local, and private acts and resolutions of the Congress of the United States and of the Florida Legislature.
(2) Decisional, constitutional, and public statutory law of every other state, territory, and jurisdiction of the United States.
(3) Contents of the Federal Register.
(4) Laws of foreign nations and of an organization of nations.
(5) Official actions of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.
(6) Records of any court of this state or of any court of record of the United States or of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.
(7) Rules of court of any court of this state or of any court of record of the United States or of any other state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.
(8) Provisions of all municipal and county charters and charter amendments of this state, provided they are available in printed copies or as certified copies.
(9) Rules promulgated by governmental agencies of this state which are published in the Florida Administrative Code or in bound written copies.
(10) Duly enacted ordinances and resolutions of municipalities and counties located in Florida, provided such ordinances and resolutions are available in printed copies or as certified copies.
(11) Facts that are not subject to dispute because they are generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
(12) Facts that are not subject to dispute because they are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be questioned.
(13) Official seals of governmental agencies and departments of the United States and of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.
History.—s. 1, ch. 76-237; s. 1, ch. 77-77; s. 1, ch. 77-174; ss. 3, 22, ch. 78-361; ss. 1, 2, ch. 78-379.
Florida Statutes § 90.203 Compulsory judicial notice upon request.—A court shall take judicial notice of any matter in s. 90.202 when a party requests it and:
(1) Gives each adverse party timely written notice of the request, proof of which is filed with the court, to enable the adverse party to prepare to meet the request.
(2) Furnishes the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter.
History.—s. 1, ch. 76-237; s. 1, ch. 77-77; s. 22, ch. 78-361; s. 1, ch. 78-379.

Evidence: No Magic Bullet

Information is not the same as Evidence. It’s only evidence if the Judge (1) rules it is evidence and (2) admits it into evidence into the court record. Once admitted, the Judge is free to consider the information with as much or as little weight as it chooses.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Nearly all pro se litigants and too many lawyers combine a shotgun approach on legal argument and a single focus on unprovable facts. More than judicial bias, the presentation of information in court lies at the heart of “bad” decisions by the the courts. Combining presentation deficiencies with bad pleading and an utter failure to control the narrative, such litigants and their lawyers are doomed to failure.
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This is a summary of the subject of evidence at trial, as I see it. Information, testimony, documents and the public domain are the sources of information from which litigants and their lawyers draw conclusions and develop a narrative of the case. None of these constitute “evidence” and will therefore be ignored or ruled irrelevant by a court of law unless a court rules that the data or information is somehow connected to the case at hand. Even allegations of patterns of conduct are insufficient to support the proffer of such information unless the information is coupled with direct evidence (testimony, documents) connecting the behavior of the bank or servicer with the case at hand.
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Nothing is evidence that can be considered by the trier of fact (Judge, jury) unless the judge rules that it is evidence AND that it is admissible in the case at hand. Unless the homeowner can show that the preferred evidence is relevant to a defense or avoidance, the Judge has no choice but to exclude the information from evidence and thus from the Court record.
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My observation is that there are four levels of “EVIDENCE:”
  • General information not directly related to the case at hand
  • Specific information that is relevant to the defenses raised.
  • Persuasive evidence supporting either defenses or avoidance
  • Conclusory evidence that inescapably leads to a result either by logic or rule of law.
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INFORMATION AND BELIEF: Pro se litigants understandably don’t understand the difference between general information and the rules of evidence. They come to court with information from the media or other sources showing what they think is evidence of wrong-doing and they are frequently right. But information about wrong-doing in OTHER cases is not evidence of wrongdoing in your case.
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RELEVANT INFORMATION and EVIDENCE: Testimony, such as those cases where the bank or servicer mislead the homeowner by steering them into default through assertions that a workout or modification is only possible if they are 90 days behind is information. It is also evidence that the court will generally allow in evidence. But allowing it into evidence doesn’t mean that the trier of fact will give it any weight when coming to a decision. The well-versed lawyer will ask for the recordings of the conversations in which such misleading representations were made. More often than not the recordings are said not to exist. Their alleged nonexistence can be challenged by information, ruled as evidence by the court, that all other conversations had been recorded. The absence of conversations regarding the modification MIGHT be used as evidence of concealment and corroboration of the homeowner’s testimony that he/she was mislead into stopping payments and thus going into default.
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PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE: Just because information is allowed into the record as evidence doesn’t mean the trier of fact will use it in making a decision. As related in the preceding paragraph you can see how raw information becomes relevant evidence and then evolves into persuasive evidence. You are always working against the beginning supposition that no bank would want a loan to become non-performing. And you probably can’t prove that policy, although there have been occasions where testimony or recordings were admitted into evidence showing that the purpose of the alleged servicing company was to obtain a foreclosure judgment and foreclosure sale. Even then, the Judge is left wondering why such a policy would exist, using the reasonable man foundation for believing that the rational thing to do as a lender is to collect on a debt, not to waste the collateral or the debt. Thus the level of persuasion in order to win is much higher in that context.
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CONCLUSORY EVIDENCE: This falls into two categories — legal presumptions that are outside the judge’s scope of discretion and “weight of the evidence”that remains within the scope of the judge’s discretion. It is rare that you can introduce anything that requires the judge to rule in favor of the homeowner. But the reason why “greater weight of the evidence” is the rule is that the trier of fact is receiving evidence that cumulatively leads inescapably to the conclusion that the foreclosure is defective. Evidence does not rise to this level unless the robo-witness on the witness stand acts or says irrational things. I call this the “Perry Mason moment.” This is eminently possible in a proper cross examination because the robo-witness’ knowledge is intentionally limited and usually nonexistent as to the workings of the REMIC Trust, the distribution of income from servicer to the “creditor”, and the agreements in which servicing has been created or changed.
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Actual Example from My Recent Trial in Orlando:
Q: Here is the Power of Attorney you introduced as evidence that is signed by Chase. And here is the Pooling and Servicing Agreement. Can you show me where Chase is mentioned as being in the chain of ownership or authority?
A: NO.
Q: NO?
A: NO.
Q: Don’t you want to look?
A: NO.
At that moment the court was left with the inescapable conclusion that Chase had no authority to execute the POA and that the Plaintiff’s case had failed.

The Affiant who googled Bank of New York Mellon had “Standing”

By William Hudson

Just because you can thread a needle and replace the button on your shirt, doesn’t mean you should attempt your own vasectomy. Furthermore, just because you faithfully read LivingLies on a daily basis doesn’t mean you should organize a national Qui Tam foreclosure defense action. Despite the sophisticated knowledge necessary to testify about complex financial matters, The Bank of New York Mellon called on servicer Wells Fargo’s “loan verification analyst” to testify about the Bank’s standing on a note bearing a blank indorsement. The loan verification analyst testified that she had learned about the transfer through research she had done “on the internet” and furthermore claimed that “the internet will illustrate the transfer occurred in 2006.” Like I said, it might be best to leave the heavy-financial analysis to the experts.

 
In SOSA v THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON | FL 4DCA – the extent of the witness’s knowledge on the subject of standing and holder status is what she claims she learned from a search on “the internet.” Although this type of evidence is insufficient to establish a bank’s standing (as nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder in this particular case) the trial court thought otherwise. Sadly, millions of people have lost their homes because a bank “employee” with no personal knowledge and who didn’t possess the necessary expertise is allowed to testify on matters they are unqualified to testify upon. In Sosa, the witness didn’t even work for the Bank or servicer and was unable to describe the relationship between the parties.

 
Attorneys who fail to challenge the testimony of such a witness, fail to file a motion to strike or allow an Affidavit to stand that is proffered by an unqualified individual- are not defending their client’s interests. In light of this case it might be wise to remember that an affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, should set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated. Specifically, an affidavit used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment must be made on: a) personal knowledge b) must be based on facts that are admissible in evidence, and must c) show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated in the affidavit.

 
Personal Knowledge
Absent personal knowledge, statements in an affidavit are hearsay and generally inadmissible as evidence. In the case of Sam’s Riverside, Inc. v. Intercon Solutions, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. Iowa 2011), outlines the significance of the personal-knowledge requirement for affidavit evidence in a trademark-infringement lawsuit. The judge in Sam’s Riverside rejected the plaintiff’s employee’s declaration that stated that Internet screen shots were true and accurate representations of certain web pages operated by the defendant because the affidavit did not establish the declarant’s personal knowledge of that information.

 

 

An employee testifying on behalf of a bank who glances at a computer screen does not possess the necessary personal experience to have an understanding of complex financial instruments as well as the private side of the mortgage transaction. The employee should be deposed and asked more than the usual, “Did you read the defendant’s account screen?” The court noted in Sam’s Riverside that the declaration did not state that the declarant had ever visited the web pages or that he had personal knowledge about the contents of the websites mentioned. Sam’s Riverside teaches that a good affidavit should not merely state that it is based on personal knowledge, but instead, it must show how the affiant obtained such personal knowledge. In the world of mortgage securitization- the people who created the system most likely couldn’t explain it to a judge, let alone an employee low on the totem pole.

 

 

It is well settled that statements in affidavits based “on information and belief” violate the personal-knowledge requirement of Rule 56(c). Other qualifying statements, however, like stating “to my knowledge” or “I believe,” cause confusion when assessing whether the personal-knowledge requirement is satisfied. Because of this “to my knowledge” qualifier, the court should hold that there is no admissible evidence to establish that most servicers own the debt and should be paid, let alone should summary judgment be issued in favor of a lender when the rules of evidence are not satisfied. Courts have uniformly ruled that the term “to my knowledge” is redundant and legally insignificant-especially when the bank employee has absolutely no knowledge about the complex financial transactions they are being called to testify upon.

 
Facts—Not Opinions
“‘The affidavit is no place for ultimate facts and conclusions of law.’” A.L. Pickens Co., Inc. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 650 F.3d 118, 121 (6th Cir. 1981) (quoting 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, Part 2, ¶ 56.22(1) at 56-1316 (Supp. 1979)). Yet, too often an affidavit is based on opinions or false conclusions. An unqualified affiant’s opinion on legal questions should not be entitled to any weight whatsoever when it comes to testifying about a loan that was most likely never consummated and was securitized and delivered to a fictitious trust. Only the wire instructions or ledgers can legally demonstrated the transaction happened as reported. Unfortunately instead of compelling discovery so the homeowner can get to the actual facts, the homeowner will be stonewalled while the court relies on inaccurate and incompetent testimony in the form of a low-level bank employee.

 
Only when the testimony of an affiant is challenged by a knowledgeable attorney does the homeowner have a chance of refuting legal conclusions that are not supported by facts. Frequently, a judge will allow the bank employee to make legal conclusions or offer impermissible opinions, while the homeowner’s own attorney fails to defend against the false testimony. An affidavit, for example, should stay with the facts of a case. When an affiant declares, for example, that “the homeowner was in default” when there is no indication that the investor was not being paid by servicer advances, insurance proceeds or other coverage- the homeowner’s attorney must interject or forever let that testimony stand as fact.

 
Admissible Evidence
In federal courts, statements in an affidavit must be excluded if they do not comply with Federal Rules of Evidence. See:Reed v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 160 F.R.D. 572, 575 (N.D. Ind. 1995). Hearsay statements in an affidavit are not admissible unless the statement complies with a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. A hearsay exception that is routinely used in morgage-tort cases is the business-record exception. Reliance on “business records” does not violate the personal-knowledge requirement, as long as the affiant is qualified to, and does, set forth the detailed foundation for the business-record exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). The issue in mortgage foreclosure cases is that the business records of loan servicers are seriously deficient as far as what is going on behind the scenes. Although the database may show the homeowner stopped paying, there is unlikely an actual default. The screenshot that banks usually rely as evidence is fatally defective and should be challenged. Until the attorney has the ledgers, confirmation that the servicer paid for the note, and other evidence nothing should be assumed. Relying on copies of documents that don’t exist- like notes that are created when the borrower goes into default should not be permissible.

 
The latest type of fraud on the court consists of the bank possessing a signature and other elements in a computer file that enable them to reconstruct a mortgage note that doesn’t actually exist until the loan goes into default. A technician than compiles the pieces together to recreate the note. The bank employee will then attest that they have in their possession the physical “wet-ink” note. When the homeowner compels the bank to see the note they claim to have in their possession, the note will then be reported lost. How convenient. It is much easier to explain away a lost note than it is to have actual evidence that a felony has been committed.

 
The affiant attesting to the foundation for the business-record exception should be compelled to explain how he or she obtained such knowledge and to explain indepth what the records mean starting at the beginning of the chain of assignments. The bank records, county records are often fabricated to create the illusion of assignment. However, if you look closely at the documents, inconsistencies can be found. It is also important that homeowners monitor affidavits submitted in their case. In a recent case the Lending Lies team is aware of, counsel for CitiMortgage altered an affidavit and forged an indorsement on a note contained in an appeal. Only after the judge based her ruling on the fraudulent Affidavit, did the homeowner discover that documents presented in the lower court had been altered and submitted in the appellee brief. The homeowner is proceeding with criminal charges against CitiMortgage and their counsel.

 
It is imperative that the homeowner and attorney leave no stone unturned in order to get to the “real story”. It is also important that both homeowner and attorney keep an eye on case documents to ensure the bank doesn’t resort to altering documents mid-trial. In most foreclosure defense cases the bank cannot meet the burden of proof if challenged and unless the judge accommodates an unqualified witness whose testimony will be used to foreclose on an unsuspecting homeowner.

 
Competent Witness
The affiant must establish that he or she is competent to lay the foundation or make the statements in the affidavit. See Fed. R. Evid. 602. Information regarding the affiant’s position with the company, job duties, and responsibilities, as well as that person’s knowledge of the company’s record-making and record-keeping practices should be documented. The witness should be examined on the company’s computer systems, how and when information is put into the computer system, and especially about the ledger, who the homeowner’s payments are forwarded to (if any) and if they are aware if the investors are being paid. Typically all a bank witness can testify about is a computer file containing information they have no control over.

 

Personal knowledge is often inferred by the judge based on an affiant’s position and the nature of the matters to which he or she testifies in the affidavit. For example, an employee who indorses mortgage notes as Vice President may be a contract employee with a rubber stamp. The majority of bank employees testifying on behalf of the bank are not competent to testify on complex legal and financial matters. An affiant’s personal knowledge and competence should not be presumed.

 

Challenging Affidavits
To challenge an affidavit that does not meet the standard requirements, requires that litigants file a motion to strike the affidavit in a timely manner and be specific as to the portions of the affidavit that are being challenged. See, e.g., Jones v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 69 F.3d 712, 718 (4th Cir.1995). Failing to strike a motion waives your right to challenge the affidavit on appeal. This can be a fatal failure and all elements of an appeal should be vetted. An appeal that is too general can be struck. An affidavit made in bad faith or done to delay a case can result in an award including attorney’s fees (see: Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(h)). In the case of a fraudulent affidavit intended to deceive the court, sanctions and a judgment against the bank should be issued.

 
Merely alleging that documents have been robo-signed in order to obtain a new cause of action will not be granted, and attorneys who have attempted to do so have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Me Lee v. LNV Corp., 2012 WL 1203403 (C.D. Cal. April 10, 2012-dismissing robo-signing allegations couched as an attempt to plead fraud claim). Singer v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 2011 WL 2940733, *2 (D. Ariz. July 21, 2011- holding that allegations of robo-signing do not constitute a plausible claim for relief). Homeowners must present more than bare allegations of ‘robosigning’ without any other factual support. Forensic document examiner Gary Michaels has built a successful practice finding document irregularities including digital alteration, forged signatures, metadata left on original documents and jpeg distortion that the naked eye cannot see. Again, when the homeowner obtains hard evidence of fraud, challenges bank affidavits and demands to see the actual evidence- the banks have a tendency to back down and start negotiating with the homeowner.

 
Conclusion
Obviously, it is critical for affidavit statements to be truthful, but it is equally important that the procedural aspects of obtaining evidence ensure its reliability and admissibility, especially with evidence that the banks are engaging in gross fraud to create the illusion of ownership through fraudulent documents and false affidavits. Banks that have taken shortcuts like the bank did in Sosa v. Bank of New York Mellon will lose if the affiant’s knowledge is challenged. Furthermore, banks that attempt to automate the process will eventually get sloppy and slip up if a competent foreclosure attorney authenticates documents, and attacks the witnesses qualifications. It is also important that an attorney ensure that the affiant is testifying on the documents submitted in the case, not a new set of documents that bank counsel slipped into the record unbeknownst to the homeowner. Conducting an investigation on the documents and affiant in a foreclosure case, now takes the skill of an attorney prosecuting a criminal. Also make sure the affiant has the documents properly notarized and that the affidavit is done under penalty of perjury.

 
In the case of Sosa v. Bank of New York Mellon, the judge ruled that the evidence submitted was not competent to establish the bank’s standing as nonholder in possession with the rights of the holder, but getting to this point took skill on the part of the attorney. Had the attorney allowed the affiant’s testimony to stand the homeowner would have lost on appeal. Judges May and Judge Gerber are judges that apparently understand that when the rule of law is followed the right party will prevail.
See more at: http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2016/03/24/sosa-v-the-bank-of-new-york-mellon-fl-4dca-the-witnesss-entire-body-of-knowledge-on-the-subject-was-limited-to-what-the-witness-learned-from-a-search-on-the-internet-su/#sthash.BmGMLqB7.dpuf

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