The Fed to sell $20 Billion in Defective Mortgage-Backed Securities

by the LendingLies team

The Federal Reserve announced Wednesday it plans to slowly sell off the pile of Treasury and mortgage-backed securities trash it accumulated during three asset purchase sessions (aka QE 1, 2 and 3), marking an end to a key strategy in response to the financial crisis.  The sale of defective Mortgage-backed securities is the Fed’s “pass the potato” to the next sucker scheme and it will eventually end up badly for someone holding the bag.


Fed officials outlined separate paths for shrinking Treasury and mortgage-backed assets in its portfolio.  But WHY would the Fed sell off profitable, if defective, Mortgage Backed Securities?  It is likely because the Fed knows that it is only a matter of time before its racketeering scheme is fully exposed and it is attempting to distance itself before the next housing bubble pops, or the Fed is preparing for the next financial disaster that will require additional quantitative easing.

The Fed said it will sell off its mortgage-backed “assets” more slowly, at a rate of $4 billion a month, with the caps rising by $4 billion every three months until reaching $20 billion a month.  However, who will the buyers be?  Unsuspecting foreign governments, foreign banks or American pension funds?  It will be fascinating to see who is actually misinformed enough to purchase billions of dollars of  nonMortgage-unbacked securities.  It is considered fraud to pawn off securities you know are defective and are not backed by anything- not even an empty paper bag.

The Fed said the moves would begin later this year “once normalization of the level of the federal-funds rate is well under way,” but did not specify a date.  What is “normalization of the level of the federal funds rate” mean anyways?  There is nothing normal or logical about raising interest rates when the job report is poor, the economy sluggish,  inflation is in line, and the average American is barely getting by.

The Fed didn’t specify the final size of the balance sheet but said it would be “appreciably below that seen in recent years but larger than before the financial crisis.” The Fed gave themselves an out and stated they reserved the right to halt the balance sheet sale-off if there is an economic downturn, as well as lower interest rates once more if needed.  It is obvious the Fed is unable to predict economic changes because never in the history of mankind have fiat currencies ended well and never before has a “bank” “purchased” trillions of debt with money it printed out of thin air.

In a separate move, Fed officials also voted to raise its benchmark federal-funds rate Wednesday to a range of between 1% and 1.25%.  A move that will quickly impact America’s working poor and middle class who are barely making ends meet even with record low interest rates.  This decision should negatively impact auto and home loans, and create a new wave of defaults on adjustable-rate mortgages.

Three rounds of asset purchases, known as quantitative easing, swelled the Fed’s portfolio to $4.5 trillion in the years following the financial crisis. Since then, officials have been reinvesting securities as they matured in order to keep the balance sheet level.  It is mind blowing that the Fed purchased trillions of dollars in unsecured debt, but even more mind blowing that there are people/organizations who are willing to purchase this defective debt with the belief that the securities are backed by real estate.

At some point the Fed’s strategy is not going to work.  Then what?

The economy has been on life support since the 2008 financial crisis. The Fed has artificially pumped it up with unprecedented amounts of “stimulus.” This has created enormous distortions and misallocations of capital that need to be flushed.

Meanwhile, with zero and even negative interest rates in many countries, rates are the lowest they’ve been in 5,000 years of recorded human history.  This is uncharted territory. (Interest rates were never lower than 6% in ancient Greece and ranged from 4% to over 12% in ancient Rome.)

The too-big-to-fail banks are even bigger than they were in 2008. They have more derivatives, and they’re much more dangerous.   Allegedly, the Fed has been taking these actions to save the economy.  Right.  The Federal Reserve deliberately creates real estate bubbles to strip wealth, maintain control and make money. The actions of the Fed are in direct conflict with the goals of consumers (low inflation, low interest rates, lending availability).

In reality, the Fed is the primary cause of most of the harmful distortions in the economy.

You can blame the Fed for…

✔ Unlimited Fiat money printing

✔ Artificially low interest rates

✔ The boom/bust cycle

✔ Bailout funds to “fix” their errors

✔ The War on Cash

✔ Asset bubbles and Market Manipulation

Today the Fed raised interest rates and it is expected to further bolster the massive bubbles in real estate, stocks and bond markets.   The US government currently requires over $400 billion from taxpayers just to pay the interest on its debt. Tax receipts now exceed $2 trillion.

Even more dangerous are the social and political implications of the Fed’s actions as economic classes become more divided and wealth and wage disparity continues to broaden.  Remember that EVERYTHING the Federal Reserve does creates larger government, compromised freedom and the overall life quality decreases for EVERYONE but the 1%.

Fed Up: The Foreclosure Crisis that Caused the 2008 Crash Is Now Ending

Below is another “fake news” report from your friendly St. Louis Federal Reserve.  The Foreclosure Crisis isn’t even close to being resolved.  Pensions are failing, houses are being foreclosed with fake documents and housing prices have reached unaffordable levels while wages remain flat.  This isn’t even close to being the end of the crisis.  Until the real issues are resolved America cannot recover.

Fed Reserve PDF

The St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank study, “The End Is in Sight for the U.S. Foreclosure Crisis” states:

The Foreclosure Crisis at a National Level

Mortgage Bankers Association data show that the U.S. foreclosure crisis started in the fourth quarter of 2007, when the combined rate reached 2.81 percent, a level that exceeded its five-year moving average by 0.67 percentage points, more than any other previous level. Given that the combined rate stood at 3.2 percent in the third quarter of 2016, this suggests that the nationwide foreclosure crisis has not yet quite ended. However, based on the rate of decline in recent quarters, the data-defined end of the crisis on a national scale is likely to occur as soon as the first quarter of 2017. (See Table 1.) Indeed, comparable data from Lender Processing Services, as shown in the recently released Housing Market Conditions report from the St. Louis Fed, also suggest the foreclosure crisis is nearing its end.

The Foreclosure Crisis in the St. Louis Fed’s Eighth District 
Figure 1 displays the share of mortgages that are seriously delinquent or in foreclosure in all seven Eighth District states for the period 1980 through 2016. To determine the duration of state-level foreclosure crises, we examine two thresholds: a nationwide benchmark and a threshold unique to each state.3
Table 1 provides beginning and ending dates for the foreclosure crisis nationwide and for Eighth District states using the nationwide benchmark. 
That study, by William Emmons, was dated December 2016, and it predicted that the trendline nationally was that the “end of the crisis on a national scale is likely to occur as soon as the first quarter of 2017. (See Table 1.)”; so, one can reasonably assume that the end of the cause of the ‘recession’ of 2008-2009, is finally being reached, just about now.
However, unfortunately, after mortgage-debt having soared to unprecedented heights right before the 2008 crash, it has remained overall (irrespective of foreclosures) rather stable at or near that peak, and has been slightly rising again since 2013:

RESCISSION: It’s time for another slap on the wrist for state and federal judges.

50 years ago Congress decided to slap punitive measures on lenders who ignore or attempt to go around (table-funded loans) existing laws on required disclosures — instead of creating a super agency that would review every loan closing before it could be consummated. So it made the punishment so severe that only the stupidest lenders would attempt to violate Federal law. That worked for a while — until the era of securitization fail. (Adam Levitin’s term for illusion under the cloak of false securitization).

Draconian consequences happen when the “lender” violates these laws. They lose the loan, the debt (or part of it), their paper is worthless and the disgorgement of all money ever paid by borrower or received by anyone arising out of the origination of the loan.

But Judges have resisted following the law, leaving the “lenders” with the bounty of ill-gotten gains and no punishment because judges refuse to do it —even after they received a slap on their wrists by the unanimous SCOTUS decision in Jesinoski. Now they will be getting another slap — and it might not be just on the wrists, considering the sarcasm with which Scalia penned the Jesinoski opinion.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345 to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.

TILA rescission is mainly a procedural statute under 15 USC §1635. Like Scalia said in the Jesinoski case it specifically states WHEN things happen. It also makes clear, just as the unanimous court in Jesinoski made clear that no further action was required — especially the incorrect decisions in thousands of cases where the judge said that the rescission under TILA is NOT effective until the borrower files a lawsuit. What is clear from the statute and the regulations and the SCOTUS decision is that rescission is effective on the date of notice, which is the date of mailing if the borrower uses US Mail.

There are several defenses that might seem likely to succeed but those defenses (1) must be filed by a creditor (the note and mortgage are void instruments the moment that rescission notice is sent) (2) hence the grounds for objection are not “defenses” but rather potential grounds to vacate a lawful instrument that has already taken effect. Whether the right to have sent the notice had expired, or whether the right to rescind the putative loan is not well-grounded because of other restrictions (e.g. purchase money mortgage) are all POTENTIAL grounds to vacate the rescission — as long as the suit to vacate the rescission is brought by a party with legal standing.

A party does not have legal standing if their only claim to standing is that they once held a note and mortgage that are now void. {NOTE: No party has ever filed an action to vacate the rescission because (1) they have chosen to ignore the rescission for more than 20 days and thus subject to the defense of statute of limitations to their petition to vacate and (2) they would be required to state the rescission was effective in order to get relief and (3) there is a very high probability that there is no formal creditor that was secured by the mortgage encumbrance of record. The latter point about no formal creditor would also mean that the apparent challenge to the rescission based upon the “purchase money mortgage” “exception” would fail.}

The premise to this discussion is that the so-called originator was not the source of funds. This in my opinion means that there never was consummation — despite all appearances to the contrary.

The borrower was induced to sign a note and mortgage settlement statements and acknowledgement of disclosures and right to rescind under the false premise that the originator was the lender, as stated on the note and mortgage.

The resulting execution of documents thus produced the following results: (1) the putative borrower has signed the “closing documents” and (2) the originator neither signs those documents nor lends any money. This results in an executory contract without consideration which means an unenforceable partially completed documentary trail that creates the illusion of a normal residential loan closing.

TILA Rescission is effective at the time that the borrowers notify any one of the players who represent themselves as being servicer, lender, assignee or holder. The effect of rescission is to cancel the loan contract and that in turn makes the note and mortgage void, not voidable. That the note and mortgage become void is expressly set forth in the authorized regulations (Reg Z) promulgated by the Federal Reserve and now the Consumer Financial Protection Board (CFPB). There is no lawsuit that is required or even possible for the putative borrower to file — i.e., there is no present controversy because the loan “contract” to the extent it exists has already been canceled and the note and mortgage have already been rendered void.

The US BANK-BOA-LaSalle-CitiGroup Shell Game

‘The bottom line is that the notice of substitution of Plaintiff in judicial states, or notice of substitution of Trustee in non-judicial states should be the first line of battle. Neither one of them is valid and in both cases you have a stranger to the transaction being allowed to name itself as creditor, name its own controlled entity or subsidiary as trustee, and then ignore the realities of the money paid to the real creditor. They are claiming damages from the borrower — all for a debt that in the ordinary course of things has already been paid several times over. But it is true that it wasn’t paid to THEM because THEY were never and are not now the creditor fulfilling the definition of a creditor who could bid at the foreclosure auction. It is not that the borrower doesn’t owe money when he borrows it, it is that he doesn’t owe it to any of the people who are claiming it. And that is what gives rise to liability of law firms to borrowers.” Neil F Garfield,

If our information can be corroborated through discovery with a corporate representative of US BANK or Chase Bank as the servicer, it is possible that a solid cause of action can be filed against the law firm that brought the action, particularly if the law firm took its instructions from the Desktop system of LPS.

In that system law firms are instructed to file foreclosures without contact with the actual client. We saw several cases where sanctions were levied against lawyers and their alleged clients, but none so stark as the one in Florida where the lawyer for US Bank as Trustee for XXX, when faced with questions he couldn’t answer admitted that he had never spoken with anyone from U.S> Bank and didn’t know who had retained his firm.

The law firm that brought the foreclosure action and especially the law firm that is demanding an assignment of rent to protect a creditor who has already been paid through non stop servicer advances was most likely not authorized to demand the assignment of rents which might be why there was no written demand as required by statute. I am considering the possibility of an actual lawsuit against one such law firm for interference with contract on both the foreclosure and the assignment of rents issue.

The Banks are being very cagey about this system — one which they would never use for their own portfolio loans, which begs the question of why they would have two entirely different system of accounting and legal process. But the long and the short of it is that LPS in Jacksonville, Florida is used much the same way as MERS. It maintains a database service that requires a user name and password and that gives unlimited access to the client folders. Anyone can go in and authorize the foreclosure based upon a default that is invested by the person entering the data. They leave out any servicer advances or other third party payments and arrive at an amount to reinstate that is just plain wrong. So virtually all notices of default are wrong which means that the required notice is defective.

You should know that many judges appear unimpressed that there was no valid assignment of the mortgage. I think that it is clearly reversible error. The assignment frequently is clearly fabricated and back-dated because of references to events that happened a year after the assignment was executed. The assignment clearly did not exist at the time of the lawsuit and the standing issue is clear under Florida law although some courts are balking at the idea that standing cannot be cured after the lawsuit. The reasoning is quite simple — if it were otherwise, you could file suit against a grocery store for a slip and fall, and the go over to the store to have your slip and fall.

In one of my cases involving multiple properties, they have an assignment that was prepared and executed by Shapiro and Fishman supposedly dated in 2007 —- but it refers to Bank of America as successor by merger to LaSalle. it is backdated, fabricated and fictional, which is to say, fraudulent.

The assignment has two problems –— FACIALLY DEFECTIVE FABRICATION OF ASSIGNMENT:  the first problem is that the alleged BOA merger with LaSalle could not have happened before 2008 — one year after the assignment was executed. So the 2007 assignment refers to a future event that was not reported by BOA until 2008, and was not approved by the Federal Reserve until 2008. On its face, then, based upon public record, the assignment is void as a total fabrication.

The second problem is that it is unclear as to how the merger could have occurred between BOA and La Salle, to wit:. you might need to read this a few times to understand the complexity of the issues involved — issues that few judges or lawyers are interested enough to master.

Since neither entity vanished in the deal it is an acquisition and not a merger. LaSalle and ABN AMRO did a reverse merger in 2007.

That means that while LASalle was technically the acquirer, because it “bought” ABN AMRO, and ABN AMRO became a subsidiary — the reality is that LaSalle issued so many shares for the acquisition of ABN AMRO that the ABN AMRO shareholders received the overwhelming majority of LaSalle Shares compared to the former owners of LaSalle shares.

Hence in substance LaSalle Bank was a subsidiary of ABN AMRO and the consolidated financial statements show it. But in form it appears as the parent.

So if someone, like BOA, was to say they merged with or acquired LaSalle, they would also be saying that included its subsidiary ABN AMRO — and they would have to do the deal with the shareholders of ABN AMRO because those shareholders control LaSalle Bank, which brings us to CitiGroup —-

CITIGROUP MERGER WITH ABN AMRO: Also in 2007, CitiGroup announced and continues to file sworn statements with the SEC that it had merged with ABN AMRO, which means, if you followed the above, that CitiGroup actually owned LaSalle. It looks more like an acquisition than a merger to me but the wording makes it unclear. This would mean that LaSalle still technically exists as a subsidiary of  CitiGroup.

ALLEGED BOA MERGER WITH LASALLE: In 2008 the Federal Reserve issued an order approving the merger of BOA and LaSalle, in which case LaSalle vanishes — but ABN AMRO is the one with all the assets. BUT LaSalle is named as Trustee of the asset pool. And the only other allowable trustee would be another bank that merged with LaSalle as a successor without the requirement of filing more papers to be a Trustee and BOA clearly qualifies on all counts for that. Section 8.09 of PSA.

But the Federal Reserve order states that the identities of ABN AMRO and LaSalle are the same and the acquisition of one is the acquisition of the other — thus unintentionally ratifying CitiGroup’s apparent position that it owns ABN AMRO and thus LaSalle.

Findings of fact by an administrative agency are presumptively true although subject to rebuttal.

Here is the kicker: there is no further mention in any SEC filings of a merger between BOA and LaSalle, unless I missed it. There is no reference to the fact that CitiGroup controlled LaSalle and ABN AMRO at the time of the Federal Reserve order approving the BOA merger with LaSalle Bank in 2008.

CitiGroup has not, to my knowledge ever reported the sale or loss or merger of LaSalle. Since Citi made the acquisition before BOA, and since BOA apparently did not buy LaSalle from Citi, how could BOA claim to be a successor by merger with LaSalle?

Hence there are questions of fact as to whether BOA ever consummated any transaction in which it acquired or Merged with LaSalle, which while technically possible, makes no business sense. UNLESS the OBJECTIVE was to transfer the interest of LaSalle as trustee to BOA, as a precursor to a much wider deal in which BOA then sold its position as Trustee to US Bank as a  commodity and then filed in the Kalam cases a notice of substitution of Plaintiff without amending the pleadings.

US BANK Notice of Substitution of Plaintiff without Any Motion to Amend Pleadings: The reason they filed it as a notice was that they obviously did not want to allege the purchase of “being a trustee”, which would have been a contested issue in the pleadings. But the amendment is required in my opinion and there should be a motion to strike the notice of substitution of Plaintiff without amendment. The motion to strike should state that no objection to granting the order to amend, but that the circumstances should be pled and we should be able to respond with a denial and affirmative defenses if you choose.


I’ve talked about this before. It is why we offer a Risk Analysis Report to Community Banks and Credit Unions. The report analyzes the potential risk of holding MBS instruments in lieu of Treasury Bonds. And it provides guidance to the bank on making new loans on property where there is a history of assignments, transfers and other indicia of claims of securitization.

The risks include but are not limited to

  1. MBS Instrument issued by New York common law trust that was never funded, and has no assets or expectation of same.
  2. MBS Instrument was issued by NY common law trust on a tranche that appeared safe but was tied by CDS to the most toxic tranche.
  3. Insurance paid to investment bank instead of investors
  4. Credit default swap proceeds paid to investment banks instead of investors
  5. Guarantees paid to investment banks after they have drained all value through excessive fees charged against the investor and the borrowers on loans.
  6. Tier 2 Yield Spread Premiums of as much as 50% of the investment amount.
  7. Intentional low underwriting standards to produce high nominal interest to justify the Tier 2 yield spread premium.
  8. Funding direct from investor funds while creating notes and mortgages that named other parties than the investors or the “trust.”
  9. Forcing foreclosure as the only option on people who could pay far more than the proceeds of foreclosure.
  10. Turning down modifications or settlements on the basis that the investor rejected it when in fact the investor knew nothing about it. This could result in actions against an investor that is charged with violations of federal law.
  11. Making loans on property with a history of “securitization” and realizing later that the intended mortgage lien was junior to other off record transactions in which previous satisfactions of mortgage or even foreclosure sales could be invalidated.

The problem, as these small financial institutions are just beginning to realize, is that the MBS instruments that were supposedly so safe, are not safe and may not be worth anything at all — especially if the trust that issued them was never funded by the investment bank who did the underwriting and sales of the MBS to relatively unsophisticated community banks and credit unions. In a word, these small institutions were sitting ducks and probably, knowing Wall Street the way I do, were lured into the most toxic of the “bonds.”

Unless these small banks get ahead of the curve they face intervention by the FDIC or other regulatory agencies because some part of their assets and required reserves might vanish. These small institutions, unlike the big ones that caused the problem, don’t have agreements with the Federal government to prop them up regardless of whether the bonds were real or worthless.

Most of the small banks and credit unions are carrying these assets at cost, which is to say 100 cents on the dollar when in fact it is doubtful they are worth even half that amount. The question is whether the bank or credit union is at risk and what they can do about it. There are several claims mechanisms that can employed for the bank that finds itself facing a write-off of catastrophic or damaging proportions.

The plain fact is that nearly everyone in government and law enforcement considers what happens to small banks to be “collateral damage,” unworthy of any effort to assist these institutions even though the government was complicit in the fraud that has resulted in jury verdicts, settlements, fines and sanctions totaling into the hundreds of billions of dollars.

This is a ticking time bomb for many institutions that put their money into higher yielding MBS instruments believing they were about as safe as US Treasury bonds. They were wrong but not because of any fault of anyone at the bank. They were lied to by experts who covered their lies with false promises of ratings, insurance, hedges and guarantees.

Those small institutions who have opted to take the bank public, may face even worse problems with the SEC and shareholders if they don’t report properly on the balance sheet as it is effected by the downgrade of MBS securities. The problem is that most auditing firms are not familiar with the actual facts behind these securities and are likely a this point to disclaim any responsibility for the accounting that produces the financial statements of the bank.

I have seen this play out before. The big investment banks are going to throw the small institutions under the bus and call it unavoidable damage that isn’t their problem. despite the hard-headed insistence on autonomy and devotion to customer service at each bank, considerable thought should be given to banding together into associations that are not controlled by regional banks are are part of the problem and will most likely block any solution. Traditional community bank associations and traditional credit unions might not be the best place to go if you are looking to a real solution.

Community Banks and Credit Unions MUST protect themselves and make claims as fast as possible to stay ahead of the curve. They must be proactive in getting a credible report that will stand up in court, if necessary, and make claims for the balance. Current suits by investors are producing large returns for the lawyers and poor returns to the investors. Our entire team stands ready to assist small institutions achieve parity and restitution.


BLK | Thu, Nov 14

BlackRock with ETF push to smaller banks • The roughly 7K regional and community banks in the U.S. have securities portfolios totaling $1.5T, the majority of which is in MBS, putting them at a particularly high interest rate risk, and on the screens of regulators who would like to see banks diversify their holdings. • “This is going to be a multiple-year trend and dialogue,” says BlackRock’s (BLK) Jared Murphy who is overseeing the iSharesBonds ETFs campaign. • The funds come with an expense ratio of 0.1% and the holdings are designed to limit interest rate risk. BlackRock scored its first big sale in Q3 when a west coast regional invested $100M in one of the funds. • At issue are years of bank habits – when they want to reduce mortgage exposure, they typically turn to Treasurys. For more credit exposure, they habitually turn to municipal bonds. “Community bankers feel like they’re going to be the last in the food chain to know if there are any problems with a corporate issuer,” says a community bank consultant.

Full Story:

Bailout Treachery Sequel?

BUSINESS DAY | Five Years Later, Poll Finds Disapproval of Bailout

The simple answer is yes, there will be another bailout attempt and it appears likely that the Banks will continue to confuse things enough so that it again happens only “this time” there will be some “stern regulations”. The reason is not some esoteric financial mumbo jumbo, nor does it take brilliant economic insight — and shame on Democrats who “concede” the bailout was necessary. A little realism from my fellow Democrats in joining with Republicans on this pervasive issue might just be the stepping stone to loosening the idiotic gridlock being engineered by Republicans, who are dead right about the last bailout, and dead right about the next one.

The reason the attempt will be made is because the last one worked. The banks got trillions of dollars as compensation for creating the illusion that they had lost the entire economy. It was a lie then, it is a lie now and it will be a lie when they try it again. I agree that magicians as entertainers are worth whatever the market will bear. But I don’t agree that Wall Street bankers are entertainers and I agree with the vast majority of Americans who say the bankers or gangsters. They belong in jail. They won’t go to jail because of agreements made by law enforcement under Political pressure.

The last bailout worked because nobody understood securitization other than the investment bank collateral debt obligation (CDO) managers. If your sole source of information, analysis and interpretation is the perpetrator, it should come as no surprise that they lead you down a path that belongs in fiction, not reality. The result was we turned over the control of our currency to the bankers and we have never retrieved it. We gave them the country and indeed the world because our leaders were ignorant of the true facts and failed to ferret out the real ones, and therefore never had a chance to refute or corroborate the narrative from Wall Street.

Things haven’t changed much. Even the witnesses and lawyers for the banks in Foreclosures don’t understand securitization. When they say this is a Fannie Mae loan, everyone but me thinks that is the end of it. Nobody can answer my questions because they don’t understand them. Fannie is not a lender. If the statement is that “this is a Fannie Mae loan”, the question is how did it get that way? There are only one of two possibilities: (1) it was guaranteed by Fannie and then sold into the secondary market to a REMIC pool where in the master Trustee is Fannie and the individual trustee is the manager of the asset pool or (2) Fannie paid the loan or the loss off and is considered to own the loan even though the documents are absent showing the transfer. Either way you want to see reality — the movement of money to determine who is the lender, and to determine the real balance owed rather than the fabricated story of the subservicer.

So as long as ignorance prevails in government, there will be yet another bailout for losses that never happened on fictional transactions. Regulators will see no choice because they see no facts and have learned nothing from the last round of securitization. The new round is already underway and the stealing, lying, and treachery continues while pensioners’ money is flushed down the toilet for processing at the Wall Street money conversion plant where losses are turned into pure profit.

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