Reminder: President of DOCX Pled Guilty to Fabricating and Forging Documents

WE HAVE REVAMPED OUR SERVICE OFFERINGS TO MEET THE REQUESTS OF LAWYERS AND HOMEOWNERS. This is not an offer for legal representation. In order to make it easier to serve you and get better results please take a moment to fill out our FREE registration form https://fs20.formsite.com/ngarfield/form271773666/index.html?1453992450583 
Our services consist mainly of the following:
  1. 30 minute Consult — expert for lay people, legal for attorneys
  2. 60 minute Consult — expert for lay people, legal for attorneys
  3. Case review and analysis
  4. Rescission review and drafting of documents for notice and recording
  5. COMBO Title and Securitization Review
  6. Expert witness declarations and testimony
  7. Consultant to attorneys representing homeowners
  8. Books and Manuals authored by Neil Garfield are also available, plus video seminars on DVD.
For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688. You also may fill out our Registration form which, upon submission, will automatically be sent to us. That form can be found at https://fs20.formsite.com/ngarfield/form271773666/index.html?1452614114632. By filling out this form you will be allowing us to see your current status. If you call or email us at neilfgarfield@hotmail.com your question or request for service can then be answered more easily.
================================

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

—————-
Article by Lynn Symoniak

On November 20, 2012, Lorraine O’Reilly Brown, the former president of mortgage-document mill, DocX, LLC, a subsidiary of Lender Processing Services, pleaded guilty in federal court in Jacksonville, Florida to conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud.  DocX produced over one million mortgage assignments.  These assignments were used in foreclosures across the country. Brown admitted that she knew that these assignments were being prepared to use in foreclosures.

In tens of thousands of cases, these fraudulent documents were used by mortgage-backed trusts to show that the trust acquired a mortgage.  The information on these assignments was false – the trusts did not acquire the mortgages on the date set forth on these DocX Assignments.

Signatures were forged, notarizations were wrongly added to create an appearance of authenticity.  Job titles were falsely claimed.

Which trusts used these phony DocX-prepared mortgage assignments?  The trusts that used these Mortgage Assignments to foreclose include those listed below, with the name of the trustee following the name of the trust.

ABFC TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

ABFC 2004-OPT4 (Wells Fargo Bank)

ABFC 2005-OPT1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

ABFC 2005-HE1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

ABFC 2006-HE1 (U.S. Bank)

ABFC 2006-OPT1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

ABFC 2006-OPT2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

ABFC 2006-OPT3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

 

ACE SECURITIES CORP. HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST & TRUSTEES

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2004-OP1 (HSBC Bank)

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2006-NC1 (HSBC Bank)

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2006-OP1 (HSBC Bank)

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2006-OP2 (HSBC Bank)

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2007-HE5 (HSBC Bank)

 

AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE ASSETS TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

AHM Assets Trust, 2005-1 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2005-2 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2006-1 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2006-2 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2006-3 (Citibank Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2006-4 (Citibank Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2006-5 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2006-6 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2007-1 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2007-2 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2007-3 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2007-4 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2007-5 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2007-6 (Deutsche Bank)

 

AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE INVESTMENT TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

AHM Investment Trust, 2004-2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2004-3 (Citibank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2004-4 (Bank of NY)

AHM Investment Trust, 2005-1 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2005-2 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2005-3 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2005-4 (U.S. Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2006-1 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2006-2 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2006-3 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2007-1 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2007-2 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2007-SD1 (Deutsche Bank)

 

AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE SECURITIES TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-5 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-8 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-AR1 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-R3 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-R7 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-R9 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R1 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R2 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R3 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R4 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R5 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R6 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R7 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R8 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R9 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R10 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R11 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust ARSI 2006-M3 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-R1 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-R2 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-R7 (Deutsche Bank)

 

ARGENT SECURITIES INC. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Argent Securities, Inc. 2003-W3 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2003-W6 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2004-W10 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2004-W11 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2005-W1 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2005-W2 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2005-W3 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2005-W4 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2005-W5 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-M1 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-M2 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-W1 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-W2 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-W3 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-W4 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-W5 (Deutsche Bank)

 

ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES CORP. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

AB Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-HE6 (Wells Fargo Bank)

AB Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-HE3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

AB Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-HE5 (U.S. Bank)

AB Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series OOMC 2005-HE6 (Wells Fargo Bank)

AB Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series OOMC 2006-HE3 (U.S. Bank)

AB Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series OOMC 2006-HE5 (U.S. Bank)

 

BANC OF AMERICA FUNDING CORP. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Banc of America Funding Corp. Mort. PT Certs., 2008-1 (U.S. Bank)

 

BEAR STEARNS AB SECURITIES I TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Bear Stearns AB Securities I Trust 2006-AC3 (U.S. Bank)

 

CARRINGTON MORTGAGE LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT2 (Deutsche Bank)

Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-OPT1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

 

CITIGROUP MORTGAGE LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-OPT1 (Wells Fargo)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT3 (Deutsche Bank)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT4 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-AMC1 (Deutsche Bank)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-HE2 (U.S. Bank)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-SHL1 (HSBC Bank)

 

DEUTSCHE ALT-A SECURITIES MORT. LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mort. Loan Trust, 2006-AR6 (HSBC Bank)

Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mort. Loan Trust, 2007-1(HSBC Bank)

 

DEUTSCHE ALT-B SECURITIES MORT. LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mort. Loan Trust, 2006-AB2 (HSBC Bank)

Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mort. Loan Trust, 2006-AB3 (HSBC Bank)

Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mort. Loan Trust, 2006-AB4 (HSBC Bank)

Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mort. Loan Trust, 2007-AB1 (HSBC Bank)

 

GSAA HOME EQUITY TRUST & TRUSTEES

GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-6 (U.S. Bank)

GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-9 (U.S. Bank)

GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-10 (Deutsche Bank)

GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-11 (Deutsche Bank)

 

GSAMP TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

GSAMP 2004-OPT (Deutsche Bank)

 

GSR NORTGAGE LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR1 (U.S. Bank)

GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-OA1 (Deutsche Bank)

 

HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-7 (Deutsche Bank)

Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-14 (Deutsche Bank)

Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-2 (Deutsche Bank)

Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-5 (Deutsche Bank)

 

HSI ASSET SECURITIZATION CORP. “OPT” TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2005-OPT1 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2006-OPT1 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2006-OPT2 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2006-OPT3 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2006-OPT4 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2007-HE1 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2007-OPT1 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Loan Obligation Trust, 2007-AR1 (Deutsche Bank)

 

IXIS TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

IXIS Real Estate Capital Trust 2006-HE1 (Deutsche Bank)

 

JP MORGAN ACQUISITION CORP. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

JP Morgan Acquisition Corp. 2005-OPT1 (U.S. Bank)

JP Morgan Acquisition Corp. 2005-OPT2 (U.S. Bank)

 

LUMINENT MORTGAGE TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Luminent Mortgage Trust 2006-7 (HSBC Bank)

 

MASTR ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGES TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2006-OA1 (U.S. Bank)

MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2007-1 (U.S. Bank)

 

MASTR ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2006-2 (Bank of New York)

 

MASTR ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

MASTR Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2003-OPT2 (Wells Fargo)

MASTR Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2004-OPT2 (Wells Fargo)

MASTR Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2005-OPT1 (Wells Fargo)

 

MERRILL LYNCH MORT. INVESTORS TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Merrill Lynch Mort. Investors Trust, 2004-OPT1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Merrill Lynch Mort. Investors Trust, 2006-OPT1 (U.S. Bank)

 

MORGAN STANLEY ABS CAPITAL I, INC. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Morgan Stanley ABC Capital I, Inc. Trust 2004-OP1 (Deutsche Bank)

Morgan Stanley ABC Capital I, Inc. Trust 2005-HE1 (Deutsche Bank)

Morgan Stanley ABC Capital I, Inc. Trust 2005-HE2 (Deutsche Bank)

Morgan Stanley ABC Capital I, Inc. Trust 2007-NC3 (Deutsche Bank)

 

NOMURA HOME EQUITY TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Nomura Home Equity Loan 2005-HE1 (HSBC Bank)

 

NOVASTAR MORTGAGE FUNDING TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Novastar Mortgage Funding Trust 2007-2 (Deutsche Bank)

 

OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2003-1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2003-2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2003-3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2003-4 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2004-1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2004-2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2004-3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2005-1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2005-2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2005-3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2005-4 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2006-1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2006-2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2006-3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-4 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-5 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-6 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-CP1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-FXD1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-FXD2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-HL1 (HSBC Bank)

 

QUEST TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Quest Trust 2006-X1 (Deutsche Bank)

 

SAXON ASSET TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2005-2 (Deutsche Bank Americas)

 

SECURITIZED ASSET-BACKED RECEIVABLES, LLC TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

Securitized AB Receivables, LLC 2004-OP1 (Wells Fargo)

Securitized AB Receivables, LLC 2004-OP2 (Wells Fargo)

Securitized AB Receivables, LLC 2005-OP2 (Wells Fargo)

Securitized AB Receivables, LLC 2006-OP1 (Wells Fargo)

 

SECURITIZED ASSET INVESTMENT LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Securitized Asset Investment Loan Trust 2004-4

 

SG MORTGAGE SECURITIES TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-OPT1 (HSBC Bank)

SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-OPT2 (HSBC Bank)

SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-OPT2 (HSBC Bank)

 

SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN “OPT” TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2005-OPT1 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2005-OPT2 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2005-OPT3 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2005-OPT4 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2006-OPT1 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2006-OPT2 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2006-OPT3 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2006-OPT4 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2006-OPT5 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2007-OPT1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2007-OPT2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2007-OPT3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2007-OPT4 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2007-OPT5 (Wells Fargo Bank)

 

STRUCTURED ASSET INVESTMENT LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-BC9 (Bank of America)

Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2004-11 (Bank of America)

Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-3 (U.S. Bank)

 

STRUCTURED ASSET MORTGAGE INVESTMENTS II , INC. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Structured Asset Mort. Investments II, Inc. 2006-AR5 (JP Morgan Chase)

 

STRUCTURED ASSET SECURITIES CORP. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2003-BC10 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2003-BC11 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2004-3 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2005-OPT1 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2005-SC1 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2006-BC2 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2006-BC6 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2006-OPT1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

 

Bank of New York Mellon

WE HAVE REVAMPED OUR SERVICE OFFERINGS TO MEET THE REQUESTS OF LAWYERS AND HOMEOWNERS. This is not an offer for legal representation.
Our services consist mainly of the following:
  1. 30 minute Consult — expert for lay people, legal for attorneys
  2. 60 minute Consult — expert for lay people, legal for attorneys
  3. Case review and analysis
  4. Rescission review and drafting of documents for notice and recording
  5. COMBO Title and Securitization Review
  6. Expert witness declarations and testimony
  7. Consultant to attorneys representing homeowners
  8. Books and Manuals authored by Neil Garfield are also available, plus video seminars on DVD.
For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688. You also may fill out our Registration form which, upon submission, will automatically be sent to us. That form can be found at https://fs20.formsite.com/ngarfield/form271773666/index.html?1452614114632. By filling out this form you will be allowing us to see your current status. If you call or email us at neilfgarfield@hotmail.com your question or request for service can then be answered more easily.
================================

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

—————-
I have periodically reminded people that they should be carefully watching litigation between the perpetrators of the massive false securitization scheme. You really should see those cases, including tax cases, where the admissions and allegations in some cases directly contravene allegations by the same parties in foreclosure cases. It doesn’t bother them taking inconsistent positions because (a) nobody looks and (b) they will get away with it anyway, as long as Judges presume that all is well with the paperwork.
The prime issues in these cases revolve around a simple proposition. If the Trustee of a REMIC Trust was the Trustee of a REMIC Trust, why didn’t they act like it — demanding buy-backs, damages etc. for horrendous underwriting criteria that was opposite to what was promised in the prospectus, what was reported to the rating agencies and what was disclosed through press releases?
The answer is simple — there was no Trust, REMIC or otherwise. Investors who believed that the money would be managed by the Trust were intentionally deceived by the Underwriter/Master Servicer. The money did not go under Trustee management. Instead it went into the pocket of the Wall Street Bank that acted as the underwriter/master servicer.
While the terms of the Trust duties as spelled out in the prospectus and the Pooling and Servicing Agreement are craftily worded, it is apparent that the duties of the Trustee shrink as you read further and further. But under common law and apparently the TRUST INDENTURE ACT, a named Trustee who  accepts the assignment and is named in the Trust has duties that transcend the caveats that essentially leave the so-called Trustee with no duties at all.
Normally this would bother a prospective Trustee (US Bank, DEUTSCH, BONY/MELLON, Citi, BOA, Wells Fargo etc.). But what is STILL not being recognized is that the initial premise of the transaction never occurred. The money from the sale of the MBS to investors never made it into any account under management by the Trustee. It really was THERE that the named Trustee failed to act, even though they were recruited for their name (leasing their brand) for a monthly fee with no Trustee responsibilities. Upon issuance of the MBS from the Trust, the Trust was owed the proceeds. It never received the proceeds and the Trustee either didn’t know, didn’t care or both.
Josh Yager writes the following:

 

The preamble to the Uniform Prudent Investor Act notes, “The tradeoff in all investing between risk and return is identified as the fiduciary’s central consideration.”  For most trustees determining the return that was produced by the assets held in trust is a fairly straightforward exercise. Most investment managers are required to produce performance data that is SEC-compliant. However, defining whether the return experienced was appropriate, given the level of risk that was taken, is more complicated.

The Bogert treatise states, “The trustee cannot assume that if investments are legal and proper for retention at the beginning of the trust, or when purchased, they will remain so indefinitely. Rather, the trustee must systematically consider all the investments of the trust at regular intervals to ensure that they are appro­priate” (A. Hess, G. Bogert, & G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees §684, pp.145–146 (3d ed. 2009)).

To fulfill this duty to monitor the risk and return of the trust assets a prudent trustee, acting in good faith, will make the following inquiries:

Target Return: The manager’s actual performance will initially be compared to the trustee’s stated return objective. This begs the question whether the trustee has taken steps to define a targeted rate of return for the assets of which they are responsible. If they have not, they are encouraged to do so. The Target Return is stated as an absolute number (e.g., 7.0%) or as a real, inflation-adjusted number (e.g., Inflation + 4.0%).

Strategic Benchmark: The manager’s actual performance will be tested to determine whether any strategic value has been added by the manager.  This test answers the specific question, “Have the manager’s strategic investment choices produced a better outcome than a simple investment in a few major asset classes?”  This is done by comparing the actual performance and risk to that of a simple “vanilla” Strategic Benchmark that is historically consistent with the trustee’s stated Target Return (see above).  The Strategic Benchmark is a combination of Russell 3000 (US Stock), MSCI ACWI ex-US (Int’l stock including Emerging Markets), and Barclays 1-10 Yr Muni (Bonds).  For tax-deferred/free accounts, the bond component will be the BOFAML US Corp/Govt 1-10 Yr.

  1. The stock-to-bond ratio used is a mix of stocks and bonds which historically matched the client’s Target Return over the last 50 years.
  2. The Russell 3000 and MSCI ACWI ex-US are intended to represent the entire stock universe.  For example, the Russell 3000 includes US Small Cap stocks, US Value stocks, etc., and the MSCI ACWI ex-US includes Emerging Market stocks.
  3. The US-to-Int’l ratio is fixed at 70/30 to represent the “home bias” that investors of any given country typically exhibit and to recognize that the client usually spends US Dollars.
  4. For example, if the client’s Target Return is 7.0% (or Inflation + 4.0%), the Strategic Benchmark will be 40% Barclays 1-10 Yr Muni, 42% Russell 3000 and 18% MSCI ACWI ex-US.

Risk: In addition to measuring the manager’s performance against these two benchmarks, there must be an evaluation of the risk that has been accepted by each manager. Some forms of risk are quantitative and can be discovered through statistical analysis. Other types of risk cannot be deduced from statistical inquiry and require a more subjective analysis.

  1. Quantitative Risk Measures
  • Standard Deviation / Downside Deviation
  • Value-at-Risk
  • Beta
  • Max Drawdown
  • High Month Return / Low Month Return
  • Sharpe Ratio (risk-adjusted return)
  • M-Squared (risk-adjusted return)
  • Information Ratio (risk-adjusted return)
  1. Qualitative Risks
  • Lack of Liquidity: The % of the trust that cannot be liquidated within 5 business days
  • Concentration: The % of the trust held in the single largest security
  • Leverage: The % of leverage used by the trust as reflected in a debt-to-equity ratio
  • Lack of Valuation: The % of the trust assets that do not have daily valuation

Most investment managers, if provided with this overview, can help the trustee create a record that these factors have been considered and documented. If the investment manager is unable to help the trustee develop such a record, a prudent trustee will take steps to independently evaluate these factors or find an investment manager that is willing and able to do so.

Colorado County Court Judge Gets It

WE HAVE REVAMPED OUR SERVICE OFFERINGS TO MEET THE REQUESTS OF LAWYERS AND HOMEOWNERS. This is not an offer for legal representation.
Our services consist mainly of the following:
  1. 30 minute Consult — expert for lay people, legal for attorneys
  2. 60 minute Consult — expert for lay people, legal for attorneys
  3. Case review and analysis
  4. Rescission review and drafting of documents for notice and recording
  5. COMBO Title and Securitization Review
  6. Expert witness declarations and testimony
  7. Consultant to attorneys representing homeowners
  8. Books and Manuals authored by Neil Garfield are also available, plus video seminars on DVD.
For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688. You also may fill out our Registration form which, upon submission, will automatically be sent to us. That form can be found at https://fs20.formsite.com/ngarfield/form271773666/index.html?1452614114632. By filling out this form you will be allowing us to see your current status. If you call or email us at neilfgarfield@hotmail.com your question or request for service can then be answered more easily.
================================

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

—————-

see Ruling on Motion RE Hearing December 4, 2015

Hat Tip Eric Mains

I have already commented on this case but there are issues that are becoming more clear as to jurisdiction and so a review of this case is warranted, where the Judge correctly declined to rule until a court of competent jurisdiction ruled on the issue of ownership. In so doing the court refused to grant the eviction order even though the sale had taken place and a deed was issued.

The Judge realized that as a county court judge he lacked jurisdiction to even hear the issue of whether the foreclosure sale was void. Hence he deferred any action on granting eviction until the issues of ownership were resolved. Why? Because eviction can only be granted to the owner of a the property. In this case there was a rescission in the mix. Hence any action after the rescission was mailed was void if it involved enforcing the alleged loan contract, note or mortgage.

As far as I know, there is no law or judicial doctrine that says that if the statutory or common law prohibits you from doing something, and then you do it anyway, that suddenly it becomes lawful because you did it anyway. Breaking the law would thus be changing the law.

The sub-point here that has reared its head and which virtually nobody is paying any attention is in the bankruptcy courts. People think of BKR judges as Federal Judges. Not so fast. They once were called magistrates and still rule subject to an appeal to the Federal District Judge.

It is doubtful, to say the least, that any bankruptcy action, whether 7, 11 or 13, can be continued where the home is a significant part of the estate if the there is a question of ownership, authority or balance raised by the Petitioner. Trustees, Judges and lawyers on all sides are missing the point here. The current trend of ignoring the defenses of the borrower are probably going to lead to a line of decisions that over-rules that practice. But more than anything, the question is whether the BKR judge has any jurisdiction to do anything other than follow the procedures in TILA Rescission as confirmed by SCOTUS.

————————–

This case raises another huge potential problem for the banks on the TILA front, and on the possession front, in a nutshell: They ignored rescission, went ahead with foreclosure sale anyway. The State court ignores the rescission or the borrower does not raise TILA rescission in State Court, whatever. The property goes to sale, BUT, guess who credit bids? Hint, like usual , it ain’t the party who said they held the loan, oopsy! Homeowner won’t move out of the house, “Creditor” files for an eviction.

Think of situations like this where a Homeowner responds to eviction notice in court, “Your honor, First, I issued a TILA rescission before sale and they failed to respond, Second, they are not the proper owners, just look at the credit bid and see for yourself.”

Court says, “You are correct, we don’t have jurisdiction to hear such a claim”, OR they respond “OK we do have jurisdiction, but you can appeal this decision to a higher court”, either way, this is going to be a long haul for the claimed Plaintiff/owner, because getting the foreclosure in their favor does not equal possession, it may take them years and they may LOSE.

So trying to pretend like the rescission does not exist means you may not get possession. You may in fact be liable for quite a bit of damages, or lose even after winning a foreclosure action because a ruling in favor of TILA rescission in a federal or district court action may mean the foreclosure ruling can be overturned, potentially by quiet title, a rule 60 motion, or otherwise.

This opens a whole other dimension for homeowners, and against the banks. They have a judgment, but they can’t get the house, and are in limbo for a long time with possibly being overturned at a later date. Lesson here for them: Don’t mess with TILA, and don’t try to sneak in a credit bid post ruling that shows you were lying to the judge about ownership of the loan.

Getting Your Goals Set on the Right Conclusions

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I was responding to a client about the goals in opposing the wrongful foreclosures. These are hard to write or say. It might seem to be a contradiction in terms to walk away with a waiver of deficiency or some other “Settlement” or “Modification” with a party whom you know (but may not be able to prove) is false party with fake papers.

You might believe there might be as much as $50,000 in equity if and when repairs are made. My concern is that we don’t get pulled into reverse logic here. If the house is barely break-even without the repairs, then it could be wise to pursue short-sale or modification.  The real question is how much will it really cost to make the required repairs and where would you get the money from?

This is where most lay people put the cart before the horse. Equity in the home is not a matter for speculation, nor should it be calculated from a starting point of “after repairs.”

If you are looking for the pretenders to pay you damages sufficient to pay for the repairs and for them to give up on the foreclosure, it would be a mistake to assume that is going to happen without full scale litigation for wrongful foreclosure seeking money damages. That would require a lot of money in fees, costs and other expenses. You should determine whether  you have any appetite for that.

If you did have the money for repairs, then it would seem that you would have made the repairs and then sold the house, taking your equity and paying off whoever is claiming to own the loan, even if they don’t. If you don’t have the repair money, that leaves the only source of money to fix the house as the parties who wish to foreclose on it.

I have never seen them  agree to anything like that for one simple reason: They are not interested in either the house or the money. They want a foreclosure judgment and sale — that is the only path that will give them some protection against accusations of stolen money and stolen homes.

 

Since the goal of your opposition is NOT to break-even or minimize damages on the loan itself, and since their real goal is more closely related to off-record transactions in which your loan was sold multiple times, they obviously are not going to make it easier for you to save the home, save the equity, and especially [not] save the loan. They want the loan to fail not succeed. They want the foreclosure sale.

 

Now the anger and frustration nationwide with all forms of institutions flows in large part from the simple fact that we all know that the banks committed serious fraud and other illegal acts in creating these loans. We all know that there was nothing but pretense and presumption in transferring these loans and steering loans to foreclosure — rather than a workout where the original loan investments were protected, and of course foreclosure with fabricated, forged, back-dated documentation that included notes and sometimes mortgages — even if they were rescinded.

“We all know” is insufficient to prove a case or a defense. The courts have added to the problem by restricting discovery, restricting evidence on the basis that the off-record transactions (even in discovery) are irrelevant, that the money trail for the subject loan is irrelevant, and then entering orders and judgments consistent with the conclusion that might be stated as follows: “Judgment is entered in favor of the one with the most paper even if the paper does not speak the truth.”

 

My tentative conclusion, if all of my presumptions are correct, is that in situations where this analysis is relevant, on an individual basis, as a life decision, the only real goal might be to walk away without a deficiency judgment and leave it at that. Any other course of action in litigation will lead to a judgment in the trial court that statistically speaking is going to be against the homeowner, leaving the issues to be decided on appeal. That is process that will likely take at least one year and probably 2 years to complete.
From my perch of course I want all notes and mortgages to be contested if there are any claims of securitization or sale. And the proof of concept is already established — those who truly litigate all the way down to trial, have a much better chance to see a much better result than those who simply walk away. But that costs money, time and energy. And that is why I often tell lawyers and homeowners that the only right decision is what the homeowner decides to do and is willing to pay for.

Federal and State Judges Think they Can Overrule the US Supreme Court

Jeff Barnes has put into words what I have been thinking about for several weeks. Barnes is a lawyer who has concentrated on foreclosure defense and has won many cases across the country. He is a good lawyer, which means that he understands how to get traction. So when he complains about Judges, people ought to sit up and take notice.

I think he has hit the nail on the head:

DISTURBING NEWS: CERTAIN JUDGES CLAIM THAT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ARE NOT BINDING ON THEM
Posted on October 22, 2015

October 22, 2015

In recent months, we have been advised by homeowners in different states that certain Judges in those states have taken the position that decisions by either the Supreme Court of that state or decisions of the United States Supreme Court are not binding on them. Taking such a position violates the Judge’s duties as an officer of the Court, erodes confidence in the judiciary, and renders the public more suspicious of the court system than it already is.

A Judge is duty-bound to follow the “law of the land” whether they agree with it or not. A Judge cannot impose his or her own personal views as to whether the state or US Supreme Court made the correct decision on an issue: when a state Supreme Court or the US Supreme Court decides a specific legal issue, the law is established and Judges must follow it. State supreme courts (other than as so denominated in New York, as the “Supreme Court” is a lower level court in NY) and the US Supreme Court are the highest appellate courts, and their decisions establish “the law of the land”: a state Supreme Court decision establishes the law for that State, while the US Supreme Court establishes the law for the country.

In our experience, the overwhelming majority of Judges are fair, honest, considerate of the position of both sides, and take the law into account when rendering their decisions. The examples below are isolated, but the fact that two such examples have been recently brought to our attention is disturbing.

One of the cases which we were advised of concerned the use of Mr. Barnes’ successful appeal of the MERS issues in the Supreme Court of Montana, which by its decision established that MERS was not the “beneficiary” of a Deed of Trust despite claiming to be so. Although this decision was issued two years ago, the homeowner advised that when that decision was presented to a local Montana county Judge, the Judge took the position that he was not bound by the Supreme Court of Montana’s decision.

Another homeowner advised us that in a prior foreclosure-related hearing before a state court Judge that the Judge told the homeowner that he was not bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court.

This contempt and disrespect for state Supreme Courts and the US Supreme Court is beyond disconcerting.  There is no reason why homeowners facing foreclosure should be treated adversely when a decision of a state or the US Supreme Court is in favor of them and presented to the Judge. “And Justice for All” means just that: it does not mean “except no justice for homeowners in foreclosure.”

Jeff Barnes, Esq.

see http://foreclosuredefensenationwide.com/?p=612

We see it in many cases involving rescission. It is isn’t that the Judge doesn’t understand. As pointed out by Justice Scalia in the Jesinoski decision the wording of the Federal statute on TILA Rescission could not be more clear and could not be less susceptible to judicial construction. In that unanimous decision of the US Supreme Court in January, 2015, the Court said that like it or not, notice of rescission is effective by operation of law when mailed and nothing else is required to make it effective. The court specifically said that common law rescission is different than the statutory rescission in the Truth in Lending Act.

In fact, the court was perplexed as to how or why any judge would have found otherwise. Thousands of Judges in hundreds of thousands of cases had refused to apply the plain wording of the TILA statute 15 USC 1635. Then came Jesinoski in which the Supreme court said there is no distinction between disputed and undisputed rescissions — they are both effective upon mailing by operation of law. That became the law of the land.

And yet, trial judges and even appellate court are again leaning toward NOT upholding the law and NOT forcing the banks to comply with statute. Many more are “reserving ruling” denying the homeowner remedies that are readily available through TILA Rescission. These courts don’t like TILA rescission. They don’t want to punish the banks for bad behavior. But that is what Congress wanted when they passed TILA 50 years ago.

As many Judges have said in their own written findings and opinions — if you don’t like the law then change it; don’t come to a court of law and expect a judge to change the law. Whether this will lead to some sort of discipline for Judges or simply make them vulnerable to being removed from the bench is unknown. What I do know is that when ordinary people come to realize that the foreclosure crisis could end now, thus stimulating our limping economy, they will likely vote accordingly.

Any Judge who refuses to follow the law as it is written and passed by a legislative body and signed into law by the executive branch (the {President or the Governor) has no right to be on the bench and should resign if his “moral compass” makes following the law so onerous that he or she cannot uphold the laws. In the absence of resignation, then momentum will likely rise and push the agenda of those people who want such judges removed involuntarily. Those Judges are acting against the most basic thrust of our society — that we are a nation of laws and not of men. We have a very well defined process of passing laws and that does not include any one person (on or off the bench) deciding on their own the way the law should read.

Patricia Rodriguez Tonight on the Neil Garfield Show

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Patricia Rodriguez returns tonight to talk about her Seminar on October 31, 2015.. Patricia is a good lawyer and particularly good at organizing cases. She will be talking about Foreclosure Defense, Rescission, Intakes of Clients, and of course the latest in what is happening on the ground in Southern California. One of her strong points is organization — something that most lawyers are not so great at doing. Her seminar will focus on the bricks and mortar of setting up a case for litigation or modification.

Compelling Discovery and Explaining Why You want Answers

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I have always said that these cases will be won in discovery. Discovery must of course be preceded by proper pleading. Typically borrowers ask all the right questions and get no answers. They are met with objections that are, to say the least, disingenuous. The motion to compel better answers or to overrule the objections of the party seeking foreclosure is the real battle ground, not the trial. And speaking from experience, just noticing the objections for hearing or using a brief template and then  relying on oral argument will not, in most cases, cut to the quick.  The motions and hearings aimed at forcing the opposition to answer fairly simple questions (yes or no responses are best) should be accompanied with a brief that states just why the question was relevant, and why you need the answers from the opposition and why you can’t get it any other way. This involves educating the judge as to the fundamentals of your position, your defenses and your claims as the backdrop for why the discovery requests you filed should be compelled.

Practically every case in which there was a major settlement under seal of confidentiality involves an order from a judge wherein the servicer or bank was required to answer the real questions about the actual money trail and the accounting and management of the money from soup to nuts. So if a judge says that the borrower gets all the information about the loan starting with the source of funding at the alleged time of origination and the judge says that the borrower is entitled to know where the borrower’s money was sent after being received by a servicer, and the judge says the borrower can know what other payments were made on account of the subject loan, the case is ordinarily settled in a matter of hours.

The only money trail is the one starting with investors who thought they were buying mortgage backed securities, the proceeds of which sale would go to a REMIC trust, but were instead diverted to the coffers of the investment bank who created and sold those mortgage backed securities. And it ends with a “remote” vehicle sending money to a clueless closing agent who assumes that the money came from the originator. BECAUSE THE MONEY DIDN’T COME FROM THE ORIGINATOR, THERE IS NO MONEY TRAIL AFTER THE ALLEGED “CLOSING.” Who would pay an originator for a loan they know the originator never funded? Who would pay an assignor when they know the assignor never paid any money to acquire the loan, debt, note or mortgage? Answer nobody. And that is why the servicers and banks cannot open their books up — the entire scheme is an illusion.

What follows is an abstract from my notes on one such case: (The trial was bifurcated in time)

What we are seeing here is a master at obfuscation. In one case I have in litigation, Wells Fargo wants to assert that it can foreclose on the mortgage in its own name. It has alleged in the complaint that it is the owner of the loan and then testified that it is not the owner but rather the servicer. It has testified that Freddie Mac was the investor from the start but it has produced an assignment from a nonexistent entity in which Wells Fargo was the assignee.

Nobody testified that they were in court on behalf of any investor and the only thing we have is the bare assertion from the witness stand that Freddie Mac is the investor from the start. And yet during this whole affair, Wells posed as the lender, owner and then servicer of the loan without any authority to do so. And they posed as a party who could foreclose on the borrower without any evidence and probably without any knowledge as to what was showing on the books and records of whoever actually did the funding of this loan (or if the funding was in the amount claimed at closing) or whoever is claimed to be the owner of the loan.

A Motion to Compel should be filed citing their response to Yes or No questions — objection vague and ambiguous etc.

The point should be made that the defendants are the sole source of records, data and witnesses by which the Plaintiff’s case can be proven as to liability, damages and punitive damages. We have limited discovery to asking about their procedures as they relate to this particular alleged loan.

The issue at hand is that our position is that they knew that the alleged originator could not have been the lender because they did not exist, did not have bank account etc. And they have admitted that the named successor was not the lender either and  admit that the foreclosing party did not buy the loan, the debt, the note or the mortgage.. Not until the first part of trial did the representative from Wells state that contrary to the pleading they were acting as servicer not the creditor or owner of the loan. And they stated that the real lender was Freddie mac “from the start.”

So we are asking how it happened that Wells entered the picture at all as servicer or representative for any actual creditor — the only indication we have that some creditor exists is the surprise testimony from the designated representative of Wells in which he admitted that the named originator was not the lender, could not explain how such an “originator” was put on the note and mortgage and that Wells Fargo was not the lender or owner of the loan either. But we have no documentary evidence or data or witness from them explaining why they proceeded to assert any right to collect any money much less enforce a loan of money that came from somewhere but we don’t know from where.

The corporate representative of Wells says Freddie Mac was the “investor from the start.” But we have the direct refusal of Wells Fargo to produce a servicing, agency or representative agreement that applies to this loan.

We know that Freddie Mac was never a lender in the sense that they never originated any loans. So now we are asking for how they did get involved. The charter of Freddie Mac allows them to be two things: (1) guarantor and (2) Master trustee for REMIC Trusts. Freddie can buy loans with either cash or mortgage backed bonds issued by the REMIC Trust if such bonds were issued by one or more Trusts to Freddie Mac.

But all of that still leaves the question of where did the money come from — the money that was used to give to the borrower? It appears that the money came from investors who bought mortgage backed securities from REMIC Trust if Freddie Mac was really involved (A fact that is unknown at this time) or that the money came from investors who bought mortgage backed securities from a private label REMIC trust that is not registered with the SEC. But the money came from somewhere and we want to know the identity of the source because it will tell us who was really involved. And it is only in the context of knowing who was really involved that we assess the behavior of Wells Fargo and why they did what they did.

We ask them about their risk of loss and they respond by saying that they deny that they would not incur damages if the borrower defaults on the loan. Since they have said they didn’t provide funding and that they were not the investor (they say Freddie Mac was the investor (from the start), and they have no servicing agreement or at least not one they are willing to produce, then exactly how would they suffer damages on “default” on the loan?

They should be compelled to answer our discovery requests in a more forthright manner. If they are answering truthfully, which we must assume they are, for the moment, then that could only mean that there is a deal somewhere in which they have some potential exposure and which has never been disclosed. That exposure has nothing to do with the debt, note or mortgage that was originated in the name of the alleged originator. And THAT goes to the essence of their motivation to lie to the borrower and to interfere with her ability to sell the property and pay off the loan.

The exposure relates to the fact that without a foreclosure judgment and subsequent sale of the property, they lose their ability to recover servicer advances. Servicer advances are the exact opposite of the basis for a foreclosure action. In a foreclosure action it is based upon the fact that the creditor experienced a default — i.e., the creditor did not receive payments. With servicer advances, the investor gets the money regardless of whether or not the borrower pays. They are volunteer payments because the borrower is not in privity with the advancer of payments to the creditor and in fact is completely unaware of the fact that such payments are being made.

It also hints at another proposition: that some third party would hold them responsible unless they got a foreclosure judgment. We are left with equivocating answers that continue the pattern of obscurity as to the nature of the origination of the loan and the ownership or authority to represent anything. So it might just be that they they could not give a payoff figure and that their motivation was obtain the foreclosure judgment at all costs, even if they had to lie and dodge to get it. It would also explain why they lured her into the default. Certainly their turnover of SOME of the audio files which did not include the call in which she was told she needed to be 90 days behind (contrary to HAMP) in order to get some sort of relief.

And there is another issue that comes up when you consider borrower’s testimony that she did receive a forbearance 2 years earlier. Did they have authority to do that? What changed, if anything? Did some other party intervene? Was there a change in internal Wells Fargo policy?

All these things could be answered if they would be more forthright in their answers and if they reconciled the obvious discrepancy between not being the owner of the loan, but alleging that they were, not being the servicer or unwilling to state the source of their authority to represent another party, and testifying that they were the servicer, and testifying about Freddie Mac involvement without any records showing that involvement (indicating that the witness did NOT have access to the entire file). This also goes to the issue of whether there was any default at all if there is a PSA for a trust that claims ownership and if that PSA shows that through servicer advances or other payments means the real creditors — the investors — were NOT showing any default at all.

The point of this diatribe is that this case highlights the fact that in virtually all Wells Fargo cases (and with other banks), the real party seeking a foreclosure judgment is the servicer (since they are the only ones showing up at trial anyway), but that whatever the servicer’s interest is or whatever their risk of loss is, it relates to a claim either not against the borrower or not based upon the mortgage which is either void or owned by someone else.

If the self-proclaimed servicer is saying they will suffer damages upon default and they admit they have no ownership of the loan nor did they fund the original loan transaction, then any recovery would be based upon a cause of action other than a foreclosure of a mortgage where they are neither the mortgagee, successor or creditor. Their claim if caused by volunteer payments (servicer advances) to the creditors, it is based upon unjust enrichment not breach of the contractual duty to pay the loan.

Remember that the witness testified to being the corporate representative of Wells Fargo as servicer and not to being a corporate representative of the “investor.” And the witness testified that the records of the investor were never available to him, so how can he testify that the creditor has experienced a default? Since the borrower never had any privity with Wells Fargo as servicer or lender how else could they be exposed to a loss? And more importantly, why are they suing the borrower for collection on the note and enforcement of the mortgage when the actual creditor has not experienced any default?

THAT is the draft of the memo or brief that should accompany the Motion to Compel answers to simple questions. It is almost comical that their answer to a yes or no question was an objection that it was too broad, ambiguous etc. What IT platform are you using? Answer: None of your business. But it is written as an objection to the form or content to the question. That is how the servicers stonewall borrowers and that is how borrowers are prevented from ever knowing the truth about the origination or management of their loan.

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