Why Zombie Houses? Local government budget deficits

The appearance of zombie homes and the destruction of hundreds of thousands of them thus destroying entire neighborhoods and subdivisions illustrates a fundamental truth about the foreclosure tidal wave that hit in 2007-2008: the banks didn’t care about the property, they just wanted the record to reflect a foreclosure sale. This alone represents probative evidence that the banks, pretending to act as intermediaries, were actually players in an illegal scheme wherein they were working against both investors and borrowers.

Local governments have been missing the mark in nearly every case. Instead of challenging the lenders as having committed multiple violations of state, county and municipal law including initiating false foreclosures forcing the burden of loss onto the restricted budget of local governments, they are following in the footsteps of pretender lenders and foreclosing on their tax liens, from which they gain nothing in most cases. Were they confront the banks with reality, their budget problems could be cured.

 

Zombie homes occur when “banks” foreclose and then walk away from the property as unsalable or too expense to maintain and insure. The entry of a Foreclosure Judgment or a certificate of sale is actually the first “legal” document in a long chain of nonexistent events. The foreclosure raises the presumption that all that previously transpired was real even when the courts and the borrowers and their attorneys were presuming facts that were simply untrue. In cases where securitization claimed it is fair to say that none of them were real and the foreclosure was initiated based upon fraudulent representations.

For a true lender or creditor the worst possible thing for them is to end up with nothing. That is exactly what happens in the current marketplace. Investors are left in a position of having an empty unenforceable promise to pay from the nonexistent trust that would be empty even if it did exist. Investors think their investment is secured but it isn’t. They have received a promise to pay from the nonexistent trust that is secured by nothing.

And the ability of the trust to pay them never existed because none of the money went through the trust. The entire plan of giving the investors a secured investment was a ruse. And that is why I have said that investors would do far better firing and terminating all relationships and illusions and forming their own servicing entities who would act in the best interests of the investors with respect to the “underlying loans” that the intermediary banks are claiming as their own.

Since the trusts were never used it is fair to say that the trust instruments are irrelevant and that volunteer payments by third parties were neither from a servicer nor were they advances. Without foreclosures the execution of workout agreements would preserve home ownership preserve neighborhoods, maintain the tax base, and most importantly preserve the value of the loan as an asset.

Before the late 1990’s the custom and practice of the industry was to do a workout, if at all possible rather than foreclose. This was true in commercial and residential lending. In commercial loans the business borrower could force the workout in Chapter 11 but homeowners rarely can get any traction in bankruptcy court.

Now, even faced with a cash payoff conditioned on revealing the creditor(s) the servicers relentlessly pursue foreclosure because that is what they are instructed to do by the TBTF banks. No servicer would “lose” the paperwork on a modification 10 times if they were really interested in working things out. Many attorneys representing the servicer and the alleged trust have actually argued that they have no obligation to take the money and that they would rather have the foreclosure.

The fundamental issue is that having committed dozens of illegal acts with respect to each alleged loan neither the servicer nor the broker dealers have the slightest interest in preserving the property or the loan. To the contrary, it is only when the house is foreclosed that the Master Servicer gets to “recover” something called “servicer advances” that neither come from the servicer nor are they an advance since they are paid from the investor’s capital.

The bigger issue is that a foreclosure sale frequently closes the door on attacks from the dozens of traders , investors, hedge funds and insurance companies who remain ambivalent about coming out and saying point blank that they were defrauded, and that there was no underlying loan for the loan documents that were executed.

The actual debt was left hanging without the knowledge of investors or borrowers. The banks created that situation and then grabbed the debts as if they were owned by the banks who held RMBS in street name as nominee for the investors. To all the world it looked like the banks owned the first layer of derivatives, whose value was intended to be derived from “underlying loans.” In truth, the debt relationship arose between the borrower and the capital sunk into a slush fund of investor capital. The source of funds were the investors. The note could only have been legally executed in favor of the investors or an authorized existing entity. That entity could have been the named trust, but it wasn’t.

Look for any indication of any kind that any transaction was ever completed using the name of the trust as a principal. You won’t find it. So in addition to Zombie houses, we have zombie investors, and zombie borrowers.

Homeowners Sue SPS in Class Action Over Failure to Mitigate

Thousands of cases like this one have pointed out that SPS and other servicers like Ocwen do not consult with any investor, do not evaluate the case for settlement, modification or mitigation. The answer to questions arising from the unwillingness of those companies to comply with law stems from the fact that the  vast majority of their income comes from undisclosed third parties (the TBTF Banks).

TBTF Banks (BofA, Chase, Wells Fargo, Citi, etc.) do not want settlements or modifications or anything that will make the loan start performing. Subservicers like SPS and Ocwen are used as conduits to other conduits that provides window dressing for claims of compliance or efforts to comply.

Contrary to common sense nobody wants a settlement or modification. The players would rather have the value of the alleged loan reduced to zero or less in the case of foreclosures requiring the bank to maintain the property without any hope of selling it. Common sense says that faced with a value of ZERO versus a value of $200,000, for example, any normal business would select the obvious —- $200,000.

The most extreme cases are where the modification is deemed approved and a new servicer comes in to dishonor it and forecloses, even though the homeowner made the trial payments. Yet Petitions to Enforce the modification agreement are rare; but when they are filed they are usually successful. And in many of those cases the modification is modified for a greater principal reduction than was originally offered.

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Whether or not the class gets certified or settled the suit brings up certain salient points which again give rise to the most common question of all, to wit: “Why is that?”

The answer is hiding in plain sight: None of these parties represent a creditor or owner of the debt . All of them represent undisclosed third parties who are making money hand over fist in the shadow banking market. A completed foreclosure represents the first and only valid legal document in their long train of lies promulgated by piles of fabricated, forged, robo-signed paper. The justice system isn’t always right but it is always final. That is the game the banks are playing.

If SPS or Ocwen actually was set up to help homeowners avoid foreclosure and preserve the value of the loan receivable they would lose virtually all their business. A performing loan would change the makeup of the pools that the players claim to have created. All the re-sales of the same loan would be based upon a loan, even if it existed at one time, that doesn’t exist presently.

So the players NEED that foreclosure not for investors or a trust that doesn’t exist, but for themselves because most of the proceeds of the re-sales of the same loan went the TBTF Banks. They want to preserve their ill-gotten gains rather than do anything that could possibly benefit investors. And the best way they can do that is with an Order or Judgment signed by a duly authorized judge in a court of competent jurisdiction — not with a modification.

Practice Hint: If you see a case that has been ongoing for 8-10 years that is a strong indicator that the investors have received a settlement and no loner have any claim for payment and/or that the “Master Servicer” is continuing to allow payments to investors out of a pool of investor money — i.e., a Ponzi scheme. Those continuing payments have been inappropriately named “servicer advances.” They are not “advances” because it is merely return of investor capital. And since the payments come from an investor pool of cash the payments are not from the servicer since the money came from the same or other investors.

They are called servicer advances because using that name fictitiously allows the “Master Servicer’ (actually the underwriter of the certificates) to claim a “recovery” of “servicer advances.” The recovery is ONLY allowed after sale of the property after a foreclosure where the buyer is a BFP.

So for example if payments to investors attributed to the subject loan are $2,000 per month, 10 years worth of “servicer advances” results in a “recovery claim” of $240,000. Generally that is enough to wipe out any equity. The investors get nothing. The foreclosure was actually for the sole interest and benefit of the banks, not the investors. And the homeowner again finds himself used as a pawn for others to make money over the rotting carcass of what was once his home.

Hence the trial strategy suggested would be drilling down on whether the trust is receiving payment from a “third party,” whether that party has rights of subrogation or is satisfied by some other fee or revenue. If you get anywhere near this issue the bank will fold up like a used tent. They will pay for confidentiality.

39 Million Americans can’t afford their Housing

Nearly 39 million households can’t afford their housing, according to the annual State of the Nation’s Housing Report from Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies.

Experts generally advise budgeting about 30% of monthly income for rent or mortgage costs.

But millions of Americans are far exceeding that guideline.

One-third of households in 2015 were “cost burdened,” meaning they spend 30% or more of their incomes to cover housing costs. Of that group, nearly 19 million are paying more than 50% of their income to cover their housing needs.

When so much of your paycheck is going toward keeping a roof over your head, it forces sacrifices in other budget areas, including food, health care and transportation.

“It depends on household type: Families with kids … they cut back pretty severely on food,” said Jennifer Molinsky, a senior research associate at the center. “Older adults cut back a lot on health care.”

In 2015, there were almost 25 million children living in cost-burdened households.

Low-income families with children that are paying more than half their incomes to cover housing cut back the most on food, according to the report. They spend less than $300 a month, compared to households with no cost burdens, which spend about $500.

“To make ends meet, these families often do not buy enough food for their households or they substitute cheaper but less nutritious foods, either of which can jeopardize their children’s health and development,” the report stated.

Low-income households are also more likely to compromise on the quality of housing, including living in places with structural issues.

Low housing inventory levels have helped push up home prices as many markets struggle with a supply and demand imbalance. Bidding wars are common in some places.

Home prices fell off a cliff after the 2007 housing crash, but they have been rising and last year surpassed their pre-recession peak.

That price appreciation has scared away many wanna-be buyers, who have been forced to rent. Demand for rental units has increased and pushed up prices.

As a result, the report found, more than 11 million renter households pay more than half their income on housing — a 3.7 million increase from 2001.

Miami has the highest percentage of cost-burdened renters, at nearly 62%, followed by Los Angeles and Deltona-Daytona Beach, Florida at 57%.

 http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/16/real_estate/rising-home-costs-affordability-harvard/index.html

The Housing Recovery Illusion

What Housing Recovery? Real Home Prices Still 16% Below 2007 Peak

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-06-16/what-housing-recovery-real-home-prices-still-16-below-2007-peak

Since the financial crisis, home equity has gone from being America’s biggest driver of (illusory) wealth to one of the biggest sources of economic inequality.

And while the post-crisis recovery has returned the national home price index to its highs from early 2007, most of this rise was generated by a handful of urban markets like New York City and San Francisco, leaving most Americans behind.

To wit: home prices in the 10 most expensive metro areas have risen 63% since 2000, while home prices in the 10 cheapest areas have gained just 3.6%, according to Harvard’s annual State of the Nation’s Housing report. And while nominal prices may have returned to their pre-recession levels, when you adjust for inflation, real prices are as much as 16 percent below past peaks.

Despite seven years of rock-bottom interest rates, valuations in 3 out of 5 metropolitan areas remain below their pre-recession peak. Outside, of a few rich coastal cities, the only advantage that this “housing recovery” has brought is that some homes remain affordable for some Americans. However, thanks to the disproportionate rise in home valuations in certain densely populated areas, the number of Americans paying more than 50% of their income in rent is near a record high.

US house prices rose 5.6 percent in 2016, finally surpassing the high reached nearly a decade earlier. Achieving this milestone reduced the number of homeowners underwater on their mortgages to 3.2 million by year’s end, a remarkable drop from the 12.1 million peak in 2011.But as Bloomberg reports, nationally, just 1 in 3 homes has recovered peak value. Meanwhile, in the country’s most densely-populated markets, housing supplies are incredibly tight following nearly a decade of historically low construction.

The lack of inventory for sale is evident in both the new and existing segments of the market. In 2016, the typical new home for sale was on the market for 3.3 months, well below the 5.1 months averaged since record keeping began in 1988. Meanwhile, only 1.65 million existing homes were for sale in 2016, the lowest count in 16 years. And with sales volumes picking up, the inventory represented just 3.6 months of supply, an 11-year low.

Conditions are particularly tight at the lower end of the market, likely reflecting both the slower price recovery in this segment and the fact that fewer entry-level homes are being built. Between 2004 and 2015, completions of smaller single-family homes (under 1,800 square feet) fell from nearly 500,000 units to only 136,000. Similarly, the number of townhouses started in 2016 (98,000) was less than half the number started in 2005.

Renters, it seems, are bearing the brunt of the US housing stock crunch. Despite a relatively strong pickup in multi-family housing, rental markets are tighter than they’ve been in more than 30 years, though there has been some softening on the high end.

According to the Housing Vacancy Survey, the rental vacancy rate fell for the seventh straight year in 2016, dipping to 6.9 percent—its lowest level in more than three decades. MPF Research reports that the vacancy rate for professionally managed apartments was also just 4.4 percent. While some rental markets showed signs of softening in early 2017—most notably in San Francisco and New York—there is generally little indication that increases in supply are outstripping demand.

Meanwhile, the number of Americans exceeding the 30%-of-income “affordability threshold” has declined for five straight years, but while homeowners have enjoyed greater financial freedom, rates for renters have barely budged.

Indeed, 11.1 million renter households were severely cost burdened in 2015, a 3.7 million increase from 2001. By comparison, 7.6 million owners were severely burdened in 2015, up 1.1 million from 2001. The share of renters with severe burdens varies widely across the nation’s 100 largest metros, ranging from a high of 35.4 percent in Miami to a low of 18.4 percent in El Paso. While most common in high-cost markets, renter cost burdens are also widespread in areas with moderate rents but relatively low incomes. Augusta is a case in point, where the severely cost-burdened share of renters was at 30.3 percent in 2015.

In summary, the US housing market’s gains since the crisis have disproportionately benefited certain cities, which creates two problems:

Renters in markets that have seen the strongest comebacks are being squeezed as wages fail to keep up with runaway rents; and,

Cities in the south and midwest, typically post-industrial towns, are filled with homeowners who might still be struggling with an underwater mortgage, and with only tepid gains in housing prices, many are trapped in their homes.

Millennials Want to Buy Homes but Aren’t Saving for Down Payments

https://www.wsj.com/articles/millennials-want-to-buy-homes-but-arent-saving-for-down-payments-1495731583?mod=e2fb

One of the frequent reasons cited for the failure of the US housing sector to rebound to its pre-recession levels, is the lack of household formation among young American adults and specifically the unwillingness, or inability, of Millennials, which last year overtook Baby Boomers as America’s largest generation…

… to move out of their parents’ basement, or stop renting, and purchase their own home. Now, a new study from Apartment List confirms the underlying problem: nearly 70% of young American adults, those aged 18 to 34 years old, said they have saved less than $1,000 for a down payment. This is similar to what a recent GoBanking Survey found last year, according to which 72% of “young millennials”- those between 18 and 24 years old – had $1,000 in their savings accounts and 31% have $0; a sliver (8%) have over $10,000 saved. Of the “older millennials”, those between 25 and 34, 67% had less than $1,000 in their savings accounts, 33% have nothing at all, and 15% have over $10,000.

As the WSJ frames it, with most millennials having saved virtually nothing for a down payment on a home “many will face steep obstacles to homeownership in the years ahead.” It also means that the US housing market, traditionally the bedrock of middle-class American wealth, may never recover to levels seen during the prior economic cycle which incidentally peaked as the housing bubble burst, scarring an entire generation with the vivid memories of what happens when millions of Americans rush to overpay for homes.

Which is not to say that US housing is languishing, on the contrary. As we showed earlier this week, in the first quarter of 2017, the number of California homes that sold for $1 million or more totaled 10,562 up 11.7% year over year and the highest on record for a first quarter.

However, while the 1% (or even 10%) of America’s wealthiest buy and sell trophy real estate among each other (or to Chinese oligarchs) with impunity, creating another bubble in luxury real estate, for the vast majority of America, it’s “middle class”, homeownership is becoming an increasingly elusive dream, forcing many to contend with renting indefinitely.

And, going back to the original study, the culprit appears to be the inability, or unwillingness, or America’s youth to save because according to Apartment List, even senior members of the age group are falling short. Nearly 40% of older millennials, those age 25 to 34, who by historical measures should already own or be a few years away from homeownership, said they are saving nothing for a down payment each month.

Here is the punchline: the vast majority—some 80%—of millennials said they eventually plan to buy a home. But 72% said the primary obstacle is that they can’t afford it.

That’s a pretty big obstacle as the study’s creator admitted. “It’s encouraging that millennials do want to buy homes. It suggests that they are delaying forming households but they’re not giving it up,” said Andrew Woo, director of data science and growth at Apartment List. “The biggest reason [they aren’t buying] is because of affordability.”

This is how America’s most troubled generation sees the problem in their own words: Catie Peterson, a 22-year-old graphic designer in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., said she doesn’t expect to start saving for a down payment for another five years or so. “I barely have enough savings to cover my car if it were to break down,” she said. Peterson said she pays $975 a month in rent for a small one-bedroom apartment, which is about one third of her paycheck, leaving little room to save.

“Once I get settled in my career and settled in my family, I think buying a house would be reasonable.” It would, but good luck finding something that is affordable enough for the bank to give you a mortgage.

As for the main reasons cited by Millennials why they are unable to save any money, these should be familiar to regular readers: they include student loan debt, rising rents and the slow starts many got to their careers during the recession. Furthermore, with many living in vibrant urban centers with ready access to restaurants, bars and entertainment might, saving seems less urgent. Furthermore, many are children of the affluent baby boomer generation and some expect their parents to give them a boost when the time comes, i.e., they expect to inherit their parents wealth. In total, some 25% of millennials ages 25 to 34 expect to receive help from friends or family, according to the survey. Still, three-quarters said they expect to receive less than $10,000, which might not be enough to close the gap.

* * *

It was not all bad news: the study found that some young people, if not nearly enough, may be saving more. On average, millennials who make more money save a smaller share of their incomes. Those making less than $24,000 save about 10% of their incomes, for example, while those making more than $72,000 save just 3.5%, according to the survey. Also, more millennials are finding a way to buy homes than a few years ago. First-time buyers have accounted for 42% of buyers this year, up from 38% in 2015 and 31% at the lowest point during the recent housing cycle in 2011, according to Fannie Mae (still, a first-time buyer is anyone who hasn’t owned a home in the past three years, a group that could include older people as well.)

Unfortunately for the generation that represents America’s future, the bad news dominates, and as the WSJ concludes many millennials face daunting odds: “less than 30% of 25- to 34-year-olds can save enough for a 10% down payment in the next three years, while just 15% could save that much within a year, according to the Apartment List survey.”

Of course, there is a loophole. As we reported last week, programs are being rolled out to allow first-time buyers to purchase homes with even smaller down payments.  In fact, none other than the bank which had to be bailed out less than a decade ago, Bank of America, recently announced intentions to slash down payments to help Millennials. Speaking to CNBC, BofA CEO Brian Moynihan, the proud owner of Countrywide Financial, said that his mission is to reduce mortgage down payment requirements to 10% for traditional loans.  Per CNBC:

“But, you know, I think at the end of the day is people forget that, at different points in your life and different points on what you’re doing in life requires you to think about housing differently as a place for you and your friends, as a place for you and maybe your significant other, and then ultimately, a place for family. That drives change. And so yes, it’s taken more time. And we talked a lot about this, you know, four or five years ago, that if you require a 20% down payment, it takes just a little more time to accumulate 20% than it would 3% or none, which is what the rules were for a short period of time.”

“So our goal, going back to regulatory reform, is should you move the down payment requirement from 20% to 10%? Wouldn’t introduce that much risk.”

Of course, as we pointed out last week, we are certain that Moynihan’s sole purpose for wanting to
lower down payments is to help those poor millennials living in mom’s basement, and has nothing to do with the fact that’s Bank of America (and Wells Fargo) has lost a ton of fee revenue to government-backed loans that only require a 3% down
payment.

FHA

Why not?  Gradually destroying lending standards worked out really well last time around.

But we digress, so here is 33-year-old data analyst Gina Fontana who explained her problem so simply, even a Fed president could get it: she said she has saved a bit for a down payment but doubts she will use it anytime soon because home prices are so far out of reach. She added that she had saved enough for a 10% down payment on a $200,000 house when she was living in Philadelphia, but couldn’t buy anything in the neighborhoods she liked.

Now she has moved to Berkeley, Calif., and said the area’s home prices—where starter homes can go for close to $1 million—make the odds of buying a home essentially zero. “I don’t see that ever happening,” she said. “I just prefer to travel.”

Which is why it is only a matter of time before everyone throws in the towel on the housing recovery, and Goldman launches its first millennial travel-collaterialized securitization product (and its synthetic derivative

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-05-26/70-millennials-have-less-1000-saved-buying-house

The Housing Moment Investors Dread Is Here

By Danielle DiMartino Booth

Amid the carnage in the auto sector, economists have sought solace in the comforts of home, sweet home. A recent Census release suggests that Millennials, long sidelined, have finally started to tiptoe into the home-buying market. The reception to the data was so effusive that other reports, suggesting housing has reached a much different sort of turning point, were lost in the fray.

The good news is that the trend is unequivocal, based purely on supply and demand. The bad news is in the actual message. The May University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment survey showed a six-year low among those who think it’s a good time to buy a house and a 12-year high among those who say it’s a good time to sell. Disparities of this breadth tend to coincide with break points and that’s just where we’ve landed in the cycle.

The beginning of May officially marked the advent of a buyers’ market, defined simply as sellers outnumbering buyers by a wide enough margin to trigger falling prices. Yes, it’s the moment buyers have been waiting for. It is also the moment private equity investors, those who’ve crowded out natural buyers, have been dreading.

Three factors determine home sales: interest rates, unemployment and prices.

The recent decline in interest rates has provided some semblance of relief; purchase applications have bounced off April’s levels, when they were down four percent over last year. April and May are obviously critical to the spring sales season.

The low unemployment rate would seem to be a huge plus if it wasn’t for the stress building around thousands of layoff announcements across the retail and auto sectors that won’t find their way into this most lagging of economic indicators for months. That is not to say those getting pink slips don’t know their fate, which should influence home sales going forward.

Price is the one bright spot, with one glaring caveat: Falling home prices tend to be associated with a negative macroeconomic backdrop, which does not bode well for any buyer of, well, anything. Dig into the Federal Reserve’s recently released first quarter Senior Loan Officer Survey and you will see nothing of note on the residential mortgage side — banks reported that both loan demand and lending standards remained unchanged in the first three months of the year.

But that is the here and now. Demand and supply in the auto sector, where pricing has been under pressure for some time, looked quite similar to that for houses several months back.

According to the Fed survey, at minus 13.3 percent, demand for auto loans flat-lined in deeply negative territory, as was the case in last year’s fourth quarter, the worst levels of the current expansion. This data point corroborated the Michigan survey, which showed that those who said it was a good time to buy a car fell to the lowest level since August 2014. Meanwhile, demand for credit card loans slid to minus 10.2 percent from minus 8.3 percent in the last three months of last year. In the event you’re detecting a trend, households are sending out distress signals that have just begun to be picked up in housing, even as household debt levels recapture their pre-crisis highs.

The silver lining in the dynamic that’s just beginning to play out is what pricing pressures on the home front imply for the future of household finances — that is after the recession comes and goes. The cost to rent and buy has never been as high as it is today for the average working young American. The preponderance of apartments constructed in the current cycle has been luxury units. At the same time, private equity investors with deep pockets swooped in and bid up the price of rental homes, leaving many would-be first-time homebuyers and renters alike with no choice but to remain at home with their parents after graduating from college.

A quick glance at the average household budget shows that sky-high housing costs bite more than any other line item. Housing devours a third of average household spending, while auto payments command half that amount. More than any other considerations, these costs matter — where to sleep at night and the means by which to get to and from work.

Hence the good long-term news building in the coming decline in housing costs as record supplies of apartments coming online collide with falling home prices and private equity investors growing increasingly uncomfortable with their huge inventories of overpriced homes. As for cars, a new report from J.D. Power showed continued deterioration in the auto sector, driven by falling used car prices, sliding car sales and a further rise in incentive spending.

There is budgetary relief building in the pipeline for Millennials. It just might not be in the form they’d prefer to see, nor will it arrive in time to offset the broader macroeconomic damage inflicted by two key areas of support for the U.S. economy.

Perhaps most regrettable is that policy makers inside the Federal Reserve were aware of the pitfalls of being complicit in hampering the clearing of the housing market and providing incentives for subprime car lending. The sad truth is the optics of stifling clearing and encouraging borrowing among those who could ill afford payments was better than the alternative. Again.

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-05-20/housing-moment-investors-dread-here

Fake Agreements Between Sham Conduits Try to Preempt Courts from Ruling on Evidence

the parties are creating the illusion that they are essentially entering into an agreement to purchase paper from the seller where there is no original paperwork and no indication that the purchase ever actually took place.

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THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Bill Paatalo, a private investigator who has concentrated his efforts on the fraud committed by banks for the past 15 years, has alerted me to a factor that ties in closely with my article yesterday on evidence. He gives a link for an example of an agreement that is designed to pull the wool over the eyes of judges, lawyers and their clients.

Note that the agreement says it is a “Correspondent” Purchase and Sale Agreement. No such thing exists. Either the Seller is a Correspondent in which case the loan “Closing” they originated was for the benefit of the superior bank or the originator was the source of funds, in which case the paperwork is at a minimum defective because it names the wrong party as lender. He writes:

Along these lines, you might find this interesting. I found the following SEC filing by WaMu, FA and one of its correspondent lenders. I can only guess there are hundreds more of these types of agreements.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/883476/000119312503037807/dex105.htm

CORRESPONDENT PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT

This is a Correspondent Purchase and Sale Agreement (“Agreement”), dated as of March 5, 2003 by, and between WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA (“Purchaser”), and Crescent Mortgage Services, Inc., a Georgia Corporation (“Seller”).

Section 8.11 Reproduction of Documents. This Agreement and all documents relating thereto, including, without limitation, (a) consents, waivers and modifications which may hereafter be executed, (b) documents received by any party at the closing, and (c) financial statements, certificates and other information previously or hereafter furnished, may be reproduced by any photographic, photostatic, microfilm, micro-card, miniature photographic or other similar process. The parties agree that any such reproduction shall be admissible in evidence as the original itself in any judicial or administrative proceeding, whether or not the original is in existence and whether or not such reproduction was made by a party in the regular course of business, and that any enlargement, facsimile or further reproduction of such reproduction shall likewise be admissible in evidence.

Apparently these parties don’t feel that a judge decides what is admissible evidence, they themselves do.

Bill Paatalo

This is indeed interesting. It is easy to over look as boilerplate language that nobody reads.

Might be good to discuss on the radio show. Like the Purchase and Assumption Agreement (see below) between the “originator” and the sham conduit for the Underwriter of bogus mortgage bonds, this is an agreement that anticipates violation of law. It might conceivably be binding on the parties to the agreement, but it essentially preempts the court from ruling on the admissibility of evidence.

The other interesting aspect is that it anticipates that the original will not be found anywhere. This also is like the P&A. Thus the parties are creating the illusion that they are essentially entering into an agreement to purchase paper from the seller where there is no original paperwork and no indication that the purchase ever actually took place.

In all probability the “seller” never had ownership of the DEBT. It only had “ownership” of the paper. The fact that the paperwork was at best worthless and most probably is some evidence of fraud or fraudulent intent, does not diminish the “ownership” interest claimed by the “purchaser.”

They skirt the law by saying that the paper is being sold even though the debt is obviously not being sold because the seller doesn’t own it. But ti creates the illusion and for many judges the presumption that this is facially valid paper even though it violates the best evidence rule. The entire document is thus designed to skirt the best evidence rule and substitute copies of documents that can be changed at any time, since they are copies. As copies, it would be impossible to tell from the face of the “document” how many times the parties or terms had been changed.

This is the sleight of hand pattern that runs through all the “loans” that are subject to false claims of securitization. The illegal and wrongful acts, starting with the “origination” and moving forward through void transfers, assignments and endorsements are buried under what appears to be valid documentation. But like every lawyer knows — if you want copies to be treated as originals, they must all be the same and executed at least by initials and distributed to all parties to the alleged agreement.


The Purchase and Assumption Agreement was first noticed back in 2006. It was the document that gave me the first notion of how the mortgage loan documents were not merely defective, but rather nonexistent in relation to the actual debt. This is an agreement dated before the first loan is originated by the “originator.” It spells out how the consumer should not and will not know the identity of their lender in direct contravention of the entire intent and provisions of the Federal Truth in lending Act. As outlined above, this too is an agreement between two sham conduits. It’s facially validity and the laziness of lawyers and judges who don’t read it leads to the false conclusion that the banks and servicers have dotted their i’s and crossed their t’s. In truth it is just part of the mountain of false paperwork and false claims presented to courts, lawyers and their clients.

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