The West Coast Radio Show with Attorney Charles Marshall: JPMorgan Chase & its Witnesses who know Nothing

To listen to archived show

Charles Marshall Logo_001

Thursdays LIVE! Click in to the The West Coast Foreclosure Show with Charles Marshall.

Or call in at (347) 850-1260, 6pm Eastern Thursdays

MAIN NUMBER: 202-838-NEIL (6345).

Get a Consult! https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule, leave message or make payments.

A Witness to What?  Fake documents, affidavits and depositions rule at JPMorgan Chase.

See: McCormick Deposition

See: Objection_to_Notice_of_Errata_Martin Deposition JPMC

Investigator Bill Paatalo joins California attorney Charles Marshall on the West Coast Foreclosure Show, and continues his ongoing analysis of the Washington Mutual/Chase ‘merger’ that appears to be little more than an elaborate ruse to keep homeowners and the courts from recognizing that the emperor has no clothes.

In April 2017, California Attorney Ronald Freshman of Newport Beach, California deposed Chase witness Rosemary Martin.  Ms. Martin inundated the court with a ream of mortgage documents and statements that had the appearance of validity, but when placed under oath had no information relevant to the Plaintiff’s loan.  Martin had been coached poorly and the plaintiff’s attorney, Ronald Freshman, annihilated her testimony.

Chase witnesses, or ‘persons most knowledgeable’ universally testify that they don’t know when the endorsements were/are placed on the notes, or by who, and that they are unaware of anyone up the corporate chain of command who could answer questions regarding the notes, assignments and investors.  Yet, this information is in the “DOCLINE” database and reports, as testified by Chase witness Rosemary Martin.  Martin said, “”AO1,” this was in 1-24 of ’07. That’s when Washington Mutual still had the file. So I don’t know what their codings are.”

Martin’s typical and pathetic responses included:

“I think I’ve done possibly one or two (referring to an affidavit).”

“I’m able to understand different screens and different documents that we use in regards to normal bank practices with loans.”

“When this specific document was entered into

our system, I do not.  I do know that I did see it in

our system.”

Eventually the witness surrendered that they had no knowledge of anything of importance.  The Chase litigation strategy is to play coy and hope the judge won’t catch on.  The Martin deposition reveals that the codes and names of the ‘investors’ do exist in Chase’s ‘LISA system’ database, despite JPMorgan Chase’s attempts to claim ignorance.

And that folks, that is how a poorly coached bank ‘witness’ is permitted to steal your home. The Martin deposition is 200 pages documenting a witness’s attempts to come off credible while failing spectacularly.  Meanwhile, the bank’s attorney objects constantly to prevent the admission that the witness can read a computer screen, but knows nothing of value regarding the loan.

Livinglies recently received a copy of an Errata motion filed by JPMorgan Chase.  The motion was a request to remove sections of former JPMorgan Chase in-house attorney, Michael McCormick’s deposition. Not because there was en error or ‘Scribner’s error, but because Chase attempted to use an Errata motion to censor information that was potentially harmful to them- not because it contained an error.

An Errata (“error”) motion is typically used to correct minor errors or omissions in a pleading such as the late submission of a missing exhibit or page from a declaration or motion, or a replacement page that is necessary by a glitch in photocopying.  By filing a Errata motion, Chase attempted to ‘get around’ opposing counsel’s ability to challenge the motion.  Fortunately the judge refused to grant the motion.   Chase use of an Errata motion was an underhanded strategy to remove potentially harmful information contained in its former attorney’s deposition.

It isn’t just low-level employees that are coached-up by Chase prior to a deposition, but also prior in-house attorneys too.

Former JPMorgan Chase in-house counsel Michael McCormick provided a deposition that confirmed that the “AO1” investor-designation refers only to Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu) ‘loans’, and yet, JPMorgan Chase has adamantly denied that this code refers exclusively to WaMu loans.

Despite working for JPMorgan Chase for five years (2011-2016), McCormick stated he knew nothing about the systems he was supposed to be trained to operate.  Despite this lack of knowledge, McCormick was the attorney submitting and approving affidavits and loan verifications, but knew nothing beyond what he read on a computer screen or was coached by Chase attorneys to parrot, “Chase is the investor, Chase is the investor…..awk…Bank owned. Bank owned.  Polly wants a real backer.”

Furthermore, JPMorgan Chase is in violation of the National Mortgage Settlement consent judgment that required Chase to stop it’s illegal practices including forging endorsements, manufacturing documents, filing fabricated documents in county recorders offices and providing false testimony.  Former FDIC team-member Eric Mains has encouraged homeowner who have been harmed by an unscrupulous loan servicer to file FOIAs with their state Attorney Generals offices in order to determine compliance with the consent judgments, and if that fails, to contact the ACLU.

McCormick’s deposition has been used in other cases investigator Bill Paatalo has been involved in, to document that ‘AO1’ is an investor code designating WaMu loans, and that Chase relies on speculation and imagination instead of facts, real documentation and hard evidence to convince the court they are valid creditors:

  1. As an example, attached as Exhibit 6 is a transcript of JPMorgan Chase’s witness taken from a deposition in “comparable case #2.” (Note: Per Bill Paatalo, this case involves two WMB loans with “Investor Codes ‘AO1’” that JPMC denied belonged to WMAAC.) The witness, Michael McCormick, a former in-house attorney for JPMC, testified that he had never seen the “original” note (P.114, L.13-16), that he had seen different images of the same note (P.115, L.20-24), that he had seen a copy of the 2005 WMB note without the endorsement in 2011 (P.117, L. 13-25 & P.118, L. 2-5), and that he had no knowledge of who placed the endorsement upon the note and when (P.119, L. 17-19, P.121, L. 8-12, & P.123, L. 18-24). However, when asked if there was a way to find out when the notes were endorsed within the servicing system(s), McCormick responded, “perhaps.” And when asked if he knew where to look to find that information, McCormick responded, “sure.” (P.123, L. 18-25 & P.124, L. 2-6).

-and-

  1. In hundreds of cases I have investigated involving WMB (WaMu) endorsed notes proffered by JPMC, or an assignee from JPMC, no witness has attested to, or has been willing to attest to anything specific regarding the endorsements and/or allonges; who endorsed the notes and when? Answers are much like that of McCormick; evasive, with no knowledge or recollection. With McCormick, he testified that he knew of no one at JPMC who could answer the questions as to the endorsements. Yet, he personally knew where to find these answers but deliberately chose to play coy.

JPMorgan Chase’s strategy is a plausible-deniability defense where there is no one (not even counsel) that can confirm nor deny the securitization process, the purchases, sales, transfers, assumptions- or anything else.  Therefore, Chase’s use of compartmentalization keeps everyone ignorant of the real truth.  In fact, by now, the only ‘evidence’ of ownership Chase can provide on acquisition of WaMu loans is the account number listed on a computer screen.

Attorney Stephen Wright in Connecticut did an exemplary job of digging deep and providing a plethora of evidence damning to Chase.

Charles Marshall, Esq.
Law Office of Charles T. Marshall
Fax 866.575.7413

Bill Paatalo
Oregon Private Investigator –
BP Investigative Agency, LLC

LIVE NOW! 3pm Pacific/ 6pm Eastern: The West Coast Foreclosure Show with Attorney Charles Marshall, Investigator Bill Paatalo and former FDIC team-member Eric Mains

Thursdays LIVE! Click in to the The Neil Garfield Show

Or call in at (347) 850-1260, 6pm Eastern Thursdays

MAIN NUMBER: 202-838-NEIL (6345).

Get a Consult!

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule, leave message or make payments.

See Nordolillo v. JPMorgan Chase: Nardolillo v. Chase

This session of the Charles Marshall’s West Coast Foreclosure Show features former FDIC team leader Eric Mains who will discuss FOIA strategies in regards to the LPS/BlackKnight consent judgment.  Eric Mains originally introduced the FOIA BlackKnight LPS concept during the August 3, 2017 broadcast here.

Mains urges listeners to immediately contact their state AG offices to obtain information about the LPS/Black Knight consent judgment in your state, and to demand answers why LPS is not in compliance with the judgement.  The information you discover may allow you to file suit on a prior foreclosure, or provide an opportunity to obtain information that will help you in current litigation.  See articles here and here.

Investigator Bill Paatalo will discuss Nardolillo v. JPMorgan Chase, a northern California case scheduled for trial in April 2018.  JPMorgan Chase’s Motion to Dismiss was recently denied based on its failure to demonstrate ownership of the note and Deed of Trust.  Chase relies exclusively on a Purchase and Assumption Agreement (PAA) as proof of ownership, but the court has stated that the PAA does not by itself, “establish as an incontrovertible fact that Chase is entitled to enforce the note.”  Nardolillo alleges that the Note and DOT were already securitized prior to the FDIC receivership of Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu), and therefore WaMu could not convey what it did not own.

Attorney Charles Marshall serves the state of California.  Please contact him to discuss your foreclosure issue:

Charles Marshall, Esq.

Law Office of Charles T. Marshall

415 Laurel St., #405

San Diego, CA 92101

cmarshall@marshallestatelaw.com

Phone 619.807.2628

 

Investigator Bill Paatalo of BP Investigative Agency can be contacted at:

BP Investigative Agency, LLC
P.O. Box 838, Absarokee, MT 59001

www.bpinvestigativeagency.com

Office: (406) 328-4075

info.bpia@gmail.com

 

 

Investigator Bill Paatalo BlockBuster Finding: WaMu Investor Code “AO1″ Revealed – Chase Stipulates It Represents “WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp.”

 http://bpinvestigativeagency.com/wamu-investor-code-ao1-revealed-chase-stipulates-it-represents-wamu-asset-acceptance-corp/

(DISCLOSURE: This article is not intended to be construed as legal advice. Seek advice from a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction regarding any of the information provided below.)

High praise to Attorney Ron Freshman in San Diego, CA and his paralegal Kimberly Cromwell who recently obtained this remarkable “Stipulation of Fact” from JPMorgan Chase Bank’s counsel. (See #8 – Chase Stipulated Fact – AO1 – WMAAC).  Last November, I wrote the following article seeking the identity of private investor “AO1.” (See: http://bpinvestigativeagency.com/who-is-private-investor-ao1-jpmorgan-chase-refuses-to-reveal-the-identity-of-this-investor/).

Thanks to the aggressive prosecution and discovery efforts put forth by Attorney Freshman and his team, the answer has now been revealed. JPMorgan Chase’s counsel has stipulated in paragraph #8, “Investor code AO1 in the Loan Transfer History File represents WaMu Asset Acceptance Corporation.

Folks, I have opined against Chase for years now that this investor code does not signify “banked owned” loans on the “books of Washington Mutual Bank,” but rather a securitization subsidiary of Washington Mutual, Inc. I’ve been attacked by Chase who has argued vehemently that my opinion is simply dead wrong, and has sought to have my testimony stricken. Well it appears as though I’ve now  been vindicated! This stipulated fact runs contrary to Chase’s long standing position, in thousands of foreclosures across the United States, that it acquired “AO1″ loans because they were “on the books” of  “Washington Mutual Bank” per the Purchase & Assumption Agreement (PAA) with the FDIC. This has been a lie, as these “AO1″ loans could not have been a part of the PAA due to the sale and securitization of said loans by WMB through its “off-balance sheet activities.” More so, Chase’s use of the FIRREA argument against homeowners for loans not on WMB’s books may have suffered a tremendous blow here.

It has long been my opinion that testimony put forth by Chase witnesses, like the following by Peter Katsikas, have been downright false. Again, more vindication. Here’s what Katsikas had to say under oath regarding investor code “AO1″:

PETER KATSIKAS,

called as a witness, having been duly sworn, testified as follows:

(Beginning – P. 43):

Q. And do you know whether or not at the time of the acquisition of the assets that are identified in the purchase and assumption agreement with the FDIC to Chase dated September 2008, did it include a list of the loans that Chase was acquiring?

A. I mean, I didn’t see an actual list, but there’s — it’s in the system. It’s in the MSP servicing — that’s a system the bank uses to service the accounts.

Q. Is it your testimony that the Freeman loans were owned by Washington Mutual F.A. at the time the bank failed?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it your testimony that Washington Mutual Bank or some subsidiary of the bank was not servicing those loan at the time?

MR. HERMAN: Can you read that back, please.

(Question read)

MR. HERMAN: At what time?

MR. WRIGHT: Prior to September 25, 2008, between the time they were made and September 25, 2008.

A. The servicer was Washington Mutual F.A.

Q. Okay. Was there an investor?

A. It was bank-owned. It’s always been bank-owned.

Q. It’s always been bank-owned?

A. Correct.

Q. And you know that because?

A. I reviewed Chase’s books and records.

Q. What in the books and records would indicate to you that it was

bank-owned versus not bank-owned?

A. Well, they’re through the investor screens and also the ID codes,investor ID codes.

Q. Okay. And the ID codes are letters, aren’t they?

MR. HERMAN: Objection.

A. They consist of letters and numerals.

Q. Okay. And what letters would indicate an investor?

A. There’s three digits or three characters.

Q. Two letters and a number?

A. No, it could be a mixture of.

Q. So what three characters — well, let’s put it another way. What characters would indicate a Chase-owned asset — a WaMu-owned asset?

Excuse me.

A. For these two loans?

Q. Yes.

A. AO1.

Q. AO1?

A. Yeah.

Q. And that AO1 stands for what?

A. That’s just the three digit code, which is bank-owned.

Q. AO1?

A. Uh-huh.

(Recess)

Katsikas Depo Transcript

Bill Paatalo – Private Investigator – OR PSID# 49411
BP Investigative Agency, LLC
P.O. Box 838
Absarokee, MT 59001
Office: (406) 328-4075

SEC “Cease & Desist” Reveals Deception – Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB as Trustee / “Transfer Agent” Was Acting On Behalf Of Unknown Investors

SEC “Cease & Desist” Reveals Deception – Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB as Trustee / “Transfer Agent” Was Acting On Behalf Of Unknown Investors

On September 22, 2016, the SEC issued the following “Cease & Desist” order against “Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB” who was the successor to “Christiana Bank & Trust Company.” (See: Wilmington Savings Fund Society – SEC Cease and Desist 2016 ). The following excerpts spell out quite clearly that this entity has been operating as a Trustee / “Transfer Agent” on behalf of unverifiable investors. WSFS’ failure to maintain “books and records,” as well as its filing of records that were “inaccurate and/or incomplete,” means it is very likely that this Trustee represented no one.

 

I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate that cease-and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), against Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB (“WSFS” or “Respondent”).

 

Summary

1. These proceedings arise from WSFS’ fundamental failure to comply with the rules and regulations that govern the conduct of transfer agents. Transfer agents are gatekeepers who provide critical services to issuers and their shareholders, including maintaining accurate shareholder records, timely processing of transfers, and responding to shareholder inquiries. To that end, issuers of securities, including corporations with securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, engage transfer agents to perform various recordkeeping functions.
2. Pursuant to Section 17A of the Exchange Act, the Commission promulgated rules governing services provided by registered transfer agents (the “Transfer Agent Rules”). As a registered transfer agent, WSFS was required to, among other things: (1) keep its registration current and accurate and to file annual reports regarding its transfer agent services; (2) make and maintain certain books and records for each issuer to which it provided transfer agent services; and (3) have written policies and procedures with respect to certain of its transfer agent services.
3. WSFS commenced acting as a transfer agent in 2010. From that time through 2013, however, WSFS failed to keep its registration current and accurate and failed to file an accurate annual report of its services. In addition, although WSFS maintained some records for issuers to which it provided transfer agent services, it did not maintain all of the records or create all of the reports required by the Transfer Agent Rules. Further, those records WSFS did maintain were inaccurate and/or incomplete. Finally, during this period, WSFS did not have any written policies or procedures to ensure compliance with the Transfer Agent Rules and WSFS employees were unaware of the Rules and received no training regarding the Transfer Agent Rules until 2013.

 

Background

7. On December 3, 2010, WSFS acquired Christiana Bank & Trust Company (“CB&T”). CB&T ceased to exist and WSFS began performing the services formerly performed by CB&T, including transfer agent services, under the name Christiana Trust. WSFS provided transfer agent services, as defined by Section (3)(a)(25) of the Exchange Act, to a number of clients, including to at least one issuer with a security that was registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act.
8. The transfer agent services undertaken by WSFS included maintaining master securityholder files (i.e., official lists of individual securityholder accounts), registering ownership and the transfer of ownership of securities, monitoring the issuance of securities, and handling, processing and storing paper securities certificates. WSFS Filed Inaccurate Transfer Agent Registration and Annual Reporting Forms in Violation of Sections 17A(c)(1) and 17A(d)(1) and Rules 17Ac2-1 and 17Ac2-2 Thereunder
9. Section 17A(c) of the Exchange Act requires transfer agents to register with the Commission or, if the transfer agent is a bank, with a bank regulatory agency, before providing transfer agent services. Pursuant to Section 17A(c)(2), to register, a bank transfer agent files a registration form (Form TA-1), which provides basic information about the transfer agent’s business and activities. The Form TA-1 must be kept current and updated on an as-needed basis. If any of the information on the Form TA-1 becomes inaccurate, misleading or incomplete, Rule 17Ac2-1(c) requires the transfer agent to file an amendment to the form within 60 days of the occurrence. Rule 17Ac2-2(a) requires each registered transfer agent to also file an annual report with the Commission on Form TA-2, describing its transfer agent activities. These forms provide important information about the organization and activities of registered transfer agents, which allows the Commission to more effectively and efficiently monitor the activities of registered transfer agents and to evaluate compliance with the Transfer Agent Rules.
10. On December 3, 2010, WSFS acquired CB&T and immediately began performing the transfer agent services that had previously been performed by CB&T. However, although it was required to amend its Form TA-1 within 60 days of any change that would render the form “inaccurate, misleading, or incomplete,” WSFS did not file a Form TA-1 until June 22, 2011, six months later. Moreover, when WSFS filed its untimely Form TA-1, it inaccurately listed the name of the entity performing transfer agent services as “Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB,” rather than “Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB D/B/A Christiana Trust.” This is inaccurate because WSFS markets its transfer agent services under the name Christiana Trust.
11. In addition, WSFS did not file an annual Form TA-2 for the year ending December 31, 2010, even though it had operated as a transfer agent since acquiring CB&T earlier that month.
12. Further, when WSFS finally filed its first annual Form TA-2 on April 16, 2012, for the year ending December 31, 2011, WSFS failed to identify the correct number of individual securityholder accounts for which it maintained master securityholder files. WSFS was unable to provide the correct number on its Form TA-2 because it could not identify all of the issuers to which it provided transfer agent services. WSFS Failed to Maintain Accurate Books and Records in Violation of Sections 17(a) and 17A(d)(1) and Rules 17Ad-10 and 17Ad-11.
13. Pursuant to Rule 17Ad-10(e), a recordkeeping transfer agent must keep an accurate control book, which is a record or other document that shows the total number of shares (in the case of equity securities) or the principal dollar amount (in the case of debt securities) authorized and issued by the issuer.

 

14. In addition, Rule 17Ad-10(a) requires a recordkeeping transfer agent to accurately post transactions to the master securityholder file with details, such as the certificate number, number of shares or principal dollar amount, the securityholder’s registration, the address of the registered securityholder, and the issue and cancellation dates for the security (“Certificate Detail”), about the securities issued, purchased, transferred or redeemed. When there is a discrepancy between the Certificate Detail for a security transferred or redeemed and the Certificate Detail posted to the master securityholder file, Rule 17Ad-10(a)(1) requires that the details of that discrepancy must be maintained in a subsidiary file. The transfer agent must diligently and continuously seek to resolve those differences and then promptly update the master securityholder file.
15. A transfer agent’s failure to perform its duties promptly, accurately, and safely can compromise the accuracy of an issuer’s securityholder records, disrupt the channels of communication between issuers and securityholders, disenfranchise investors, and expose investors, securities intermediaries, and the securities markets as a whole to significant financial loss.
16. WSFS maintained master securityholder files for several issuers to which it provided transfer agent services; however, those files contained multiple inaccuracies. For example, for certain issues, WSFS failed to maintain accurate records of the outstanding balances and registered incorrect securityholder names in the master securityholder files.

 

17. Further, WSFS did not maintain subsidiary files or a control book for any issuers to which it provided transfer agent services and, therefore, WSFS could not determine whether, for any issuers, there were differences between the total number of shares or total principal dollar amount of securities in the master securityholder file for a particular issue and the number of shares or principal dollar amount in the control book for that issue (one type of a “Record Difference”). WSFS was required to report Record Differences that existed for more than 30 days (“Aged Record Differences”) and exceeded certain aggregate dollar thresholds that are established by Rule 17Ad-11 of the Transfer Agent Rules. WSFS was unable to determine whether Aged Record Differences existed and, therefore, was unable to determine whether it was required to report any Aged Record Differences. Indeed, WSFS’ account administrators did not even know that WSFS was required to maintain subsidiary files or a control book.

 

This comes as no surprise to those of us who have been fighting these “straw-man Trustees.” I believe, based on further “Transfer Agent – TA-2″ filings I have reviewed, that this is common amongst all trustees. For example, take a look at this “TA-2″ filing for Transfer Agent – U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. from back in 2008 which reported over 8,000 “Lost Securityholder Accounts.”

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1145893/000114589309000002/xslFTAX01/primary_doc.xml

If the Trustees / Transfer Agents have no verifiable records of who owns the underlying certificates, it becomes crystal clear that the servicers and trustees represent no one.

 

Bill Paatalo
Oregon Private Investigator – PSID#49411

BP Investigative Agency, LLC
P.O. Box 838
Absarokee, MT 59001
Office: (406) 328-4075

The Neil Garfield Show at 6pm EST: Contrived complexity from the usual suspects: MGIC master insurance pools

Thursdays LIVE! Click in to the The Neil Garfield Show

Or call in at (347) 850-1260, 6pm Eastern Thursdays

Tonight California attorney Charles Marshall hosts the show and is joined by Investigator Bill Paatalo.  Paatalo recently stumbled upon an insurance policy that was issued for loans in a trust, but discovered that the trust no longer existed due to a payoff of all loans within the trust years before by Mortgage Guarantee Master Policy (MGIC). However, that didn’t stop BNY Mellon “as Trustee” from filing a foreclosure complaint on behalf of the dissolved trust.

The insurance agreement is a “treasure trove” of insight as to the secret workings between the servicers (who are named as the “Insured”) and MGIC.

The Plaintiff not only ceased to exist due to a merger, but the trust itself was terminated with all loans paid off long before the filing of the complaint.

Bill Paatalo and California attorney Charles Marshall believe that MGIC issue is yet another example of contrived complexity by lenders/’trusts’/purported trustee’s and ‘beneficiaries’ in mortgage transactions, particularly when recording documents pursuant to taking properties to sale, or when subverting the credit bidding rules at sale.

It is likely that the insurance carrier is calling the shots with modifications and foreclosures because the policy states approval must be provided by the insurer.

Is this another sham wherein the instructions from the banks are filtered through yet another layer of complexity?  Homeowners should inquire if there is an insurance policy on the purported trust that claims to own their loan.  Radian and AIG also offer policies like MGIC.

 

Charles Marshall, Esq.

Law Offices of Charles T. Marshall

415 Laurel St., #405

San Diego, CA 92101

cmarshall@marshallestatelaw.com

Phone 619.807.2628

 

Investigator Bill Paatalo

BP Investigative Agency, LLC
P.O. Box 838

Absarokee, MT 59001
Office: (406) 328-4075

bill.bpia@gmail.com

http://www.bpinvestigativeagency.com

MAIN NUMBER: 202-838-NEIL (6345).

Get a Consult!

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule, leave message or make payments.

Our Services:  https://livinglies.wordpress.com/2016/04/11/what-can-you-do-for-me-an-overview-of-services-offered-by-neil-garfield/

Register for Consultation here: https://live.vcita.com/site/lendinglies

%d bloggers like this: