Nardolillo V. Chase – Northern District of California: Motion to Dismiss Denied

By J. Guggenheim/

Note: Our ongoing gratitude to Investigator Bill Paatalo of BP Investigative Agency for keeping us updated with significant developments in nationwide foreclosure defense cases.  Paatalo is the preeminent investigator regarding WaMu/JPMorgan Chase “merger” issues.

See Nordolillo v. JPMorgan Chase Nardolillo v. Chase

Analysis by Neil Garfield:  Although Nardolillo’s case has merit, unfortunately he may lose because he already alleged that the loan was sold to a specific securitized trust.  We already know the loans weren’t transferred to the trusts, so Nardolillo has already compromised his own case by making erroneous presumptions.

Without an amendment to his pleadings, he will be forced to prove the trust bought the loan which is impossible because the trust didn’t buy the loan and therefore there is no evidence to support the allegation.

The flip-side is that if Nordolillo had not identified who the loan was sold to, the court would have likely gone the other way on the motion to dismiss.

If he amends to not be specific on the “sale” of the loan, there is a risk that the court will dismiss the action.  The real problem really is that not only did the trust NOT buy the loan, but NOBODY did.

That is because the only movement of money that actually occurred in the real world was to fund loans originated by WAMU. Thus he is right that WAMU didn’t own it but he is citing the wrong reason. WAMU never owned the loan in the first place. Thus there could be no sale.

Chase relies on the complexity of its scheme to confuse and overwhelm the bench. This is the principal reason that I have been hammering at the idea of using a CPA as an expert witness because the numbers don’t lie. Banks lie, servicers lie, and lawyers lie; but in the end, the numbers on the general ledger as audited by one of the big auditing firms tell the real story. You will likely never find a single one of these loans on the balance sheet of any of the players pretending to foreclose.


Nardolillo v. JPMorgan Chase is scheduled for trial in April in California’s liberal North District Court.  This case includes illegal substitutions of trustees by Chase, if they were not the beneficiary per the Purchase and Assumption Agreement (PAA).  Nardolillo alleges wrongful foreclosure, violations of the California Homeowner’s Bill of Rights, and dual-tracking violations in regards to a pending loan modification.  Nardolillo is not the first to allege that JPMorgan Chase is playing an ownership shell-game (see Fox).

WaMu was taken under receivership by the FDIC in 2008 when it became insolvent.  JPMorgan Chase then entered into a Purchase and Assumption Agreement (PAA) with the FDIC to acquire “certain” WaMu assets.  Plaintiff Gary Nardolillo alleges his Note and Deed of Trust were not among the assets Chase acquired through the PAA and that they were “possibly” sold or securitized years earlier.

This is business as usual for JPMorgan Chase who typically has no note or assignment demonstrating ownership in regards to the WaMu loans it claimed to have acquired.  Therefore, without resorting to manufacturing the documents or having a ‘bank representative’ file a sworn affidavit they have personal knowledge of the loan (when they don’t), JPMorgan Chase simply relies on a substitute trustee to compensate for Chain of Assignment deficiencies.

On March 14, 2011, Chase claimed to be the beneficiary of the DOT and directed the California Reconveyance Corporation (CRC), as trustee, to record a Notice of Default against the subject property.  CRC recorded a Notice of Default, stating the amount due as of March 11, 2011, was $36,304.16.

On October 20, 2014, in a recorded “Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust,” Chase purported to act as “attorney in fact” for the FDIC and transferred all beneficial interest in Nardolillo’s DOT to itself.   Nardolillo alleges this was a void assignment because: (1) Nardolillo’s DOT was never among the assets received by the FDIC from WaMu and transferred to Chase; and (2) Chase was not authorized to serve as the attorney in fact for the FDIC at the time it executed and recorded the Corporate Assignment.

Chase then began its usual game of what Investigator Paatalo refers to “whack-a-mole” and on April 17, 2015, it recorded a Substitution of Trustee, substituting former-defendant Trustee Corps in place of CRC as trustee under the DOT. Nardolillo alleges that this substitution is also void.

Chase directed Trustee Corps to record a Notice of Trustee’s Sale against the Subject Property on July 7, 2016. Around July 22, 2016, Nardolillo submitted his first loan modification application to Chase, but the defendants have continued to notice trustee’s sale dates on the Property.  He claims that chase violated California Civil Code when it conducted the July 2016 Notice of Trustee’s Sale recorded, as Chase had no right to foreclose because Chase never acquired rights to the DOT and Note from WaMu.

Assuming these allegations are true, the Notice of Trustee’s Sale would not be “accurate and complete and supported by competent and reliable evidence.” Cal. City Code§ 2924.17/a).   Chase argues Nardolillo’s argument isn’t sufficiently supported by facts, but only by insufficient bare conclusions.  Nardolillo is at the mercy of Chase who likely doesn’t have the necessary proof but relies on the complicity of the bank to get away with fraud.  The relevant allegations in the Complaint are:

—Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that WaMu sold Plaintiff’s DOT and Note to a mortgage – backed securitized trust.
—Plaintiff’s securitization audit indicated Plaintiff ‘ s loan was possibly sold to the WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR12 trust – a real estate mortgage investment conduit (“REMIC”) registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).
—Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that his Note and DOT were not among the assets acquired by Chase through the PAA, having been sold and securitized to a trust pool a few years prior.

Chase relies on the PAA, that claims Chase acquired WaMu’s “assets” from the FDIC in 2008, as well as the recorded “Corporate Assignment,” showing that plaintiff’s DOT and Note were transferred to Chase by Chase (as the attorney in fact for the FDIC as receiver for WaMu).  Relying on JPMorgan Chase’s word is like believing Kevin Hart is a committed family man- despite the Vegas photos.

Chase claims these judicially noticeable documents and the absence of notices recorded by any other entity with respect to the Property establish that Chase “is of record with respect to the Property.”  Plaintiff has correctly objected to any attempt to take judicial notice of the facts contained in these public records as true. He argues that the “truth” of whether Chase was entitled to sign the Corporate Assignment and whether plaintiff’s Note and DOT were included with the scope of the PAA are contested and cannot be established through a request f0r judicial notice.  Neil Garfield writes about the perils of not objecting to judicial notice here.

Chase’s arguments are not well-taken on a motion to dismiss.  The PAA does not expressly cover plaintiff’s Note and DOT.  Chase fails to point to any portion of the PAA that demonstrates that WaMu-funded REMICs (like the one Nardolillo contends owns his Note and DOT) were “WaMu assets” transferred to Chase for servicing or for any other purpose.  The court noted that although Chase has been an entity causing notices to be recorded with respect to the Property, is significant, it does not by itself establish as an incontrovertible fact that Chase is “of interest” or otherwise entitled to enforce rights to the Note and DOT.

Investigator Bill Paatalo has proof that JPMorgan Chase did not purchase $615 billion in WaMu loans.  See article here:

Paatalo has long discussed the questionable use of using “Substitution of Trustees” in order to create the illusion of ownership and to further complicate the ownership issue in a court of law.  Paatalo discovered that WaMu entities have never been dissolved and still exist.  The loans did not go through the FDIC, therefore Chase executes assignments from the FDIC in order to substitute trustees.  Paatalo demonstrates that JPMorgan Chase did not purchase ownership of $615 billion in Washington Mutal loans in three simple steps.

Paatalo presents a “3-step Analysis” to show that “ownership” of at least $615,000,000,000.00 (over half a TRILLION Dollars!) of WaMu loans were not purchased by JPMorgan Chase from the FDIC.


The U.S. Senate Sub-Committee (Levin – Coburn Report) reveals in its findings of fact that WaMu sold and securitized at least $615B of residential mortgage loans through its subsidiaries “WaMu Asset Acceptance Corporation” and “Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corporation” who acted as “Depositors” in the securitization transactions.



Pg. 116 –

From 2000 to 2007, Washington Mutual and Long Beach securitized at least $77 billion in subprime and home equity loans. WaMu also sold or securitized at least $115 billion in Option ARM loans. Between 2000 and 2008, Washington Mutual sold over $500 billion in loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, accounting for more than a quarter of every dollar in loans WaMu originated.


Pg. 119 –

“WaMu Capital Corp. acted as an underwriter of securitization transactions generally involving Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp. or WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. Generally, one of the two entities would sell loans into a securitization trust in exchange for securities backed by the loans in question, and WaMu Capital Corp. would then underwrite the securities consistent with industry standards.


See: Page 2. – PAA – (click here: FDIC-Chase – PAA)

“Assets” means all assets of the Failed Bank purchased pursuant to Section 3.1. Assets owned by Subsidiaries of the Failed Bank are not “Assets” within the meaning of this definition.”


In the case of Fox v. JPMorgan Chase, a specific REMIC Trust is named in the action. To prevail on its argument that the loan was sold and transferred to the Trust, JPMorgan Chase and U.S. Bank, N.A. as Trustee, both admitted / “stipulated” that the loan contained both investor codes “AO1″ and “369” in the loan transfer history, which means the loan was sold by Washington Mutual Bank to the subsidiaries prior to those subsidiaries transferring the loan into the Trust. AND, it was stipulated that the loan was NOT PURCHASED FROM THE FDIC.

(Click here: Chase Stipulated Fact – AO1 – WMAAC)

Stipulated Facts:

“8. Investor Code AO1 in the Loan Transfer History File represents WaMu Asset Acceptance Corporation.”

“9. Investor Code 369 in the Loan Transfer History File represents Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corporation.”

“10.  JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. did not purchase the loan from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.”

In the Fox case, “JPMorgan Chase” and “U.S. Bank as Trustee,” have taken a position that universally applies to all $615B of these securitized loans.

Each one of these loan transactions will show either the investor code “AO1,” “369,” or both somewhere in the “Loan Transfer History” screenshots within the servicing system, and as such, the loans were not purchased from the FDIC.

To date, Chase has relied upon presumptions in order to maintain its position in thousands of foreclosure proceedings that: (1) it acquired the loans through the PAA, and (2) the assignments of beneficial-ownership interests to the loans unto itself is valid.

Please visit Bill Paatalos’s informative blog at  Paatalo has investigated and exposed the fraudulent WaMu/FDIC/JPMorgan Chase fraud and is one of the most talented foreclosure fraud investigators in the country.





Wall Street banks shifting “profits” from mortgage bonds into natural resources

Wall Street banks know all about leveraging. They need to bring back the huge quantity of money they stole from the U.S. economy that they have secreted around the world (without paying a dime in taxes). The strategy they adopted was to bring the money from the shadow banking sector into the real banking world by “investing” in natural resources. The reason for the choice is obvious — high demand for the raw materials, high liquidity in the marketplace for both the products and the futures and related contracts for “trading profits” (like the “trading profits they created with investor money in the mortgage bond market before any loans were made), and an opportunity for virtually unlimited “leverage” where they could control prices and bet against the very same investments they were selling to their customers.

The leverage comes from a primary investment in the warehousing and transport of raw materials and secondarily taking positions in the ownership of natural resources. This allows them to manipulate the cost of raw materials — like copper and aluminum (see articles below), manipulate the politics in our country so that infrastructure repairs and rebuilding is out off until there is a tragedy of a large collapsing bridge killing thousands, and manipulate the bidding process for natural resources (like the Iraq and Afghanistan wars) so that there is a level of panic that causes the nation to send ten times the price of rebuilding now. The natural resources market is basically the only game they can play because it is the only marketplace that is large enough to absorb trillions of dollars stolen from Americans and people all over the world in the securitization scam.

Just as securitization was an illusion, making the base investment (mortgage loans) non existent at the same moment they were created or acquired, so will be the exotic investment vehicles now being prepared for both institutional and ordinary investors that will cover the multiple sales of the same bundle of commodities. Here we go again! Another boom and bust.

Tue, Aug 13

CFTC subpoenas metal warehouse companies • The Commodity Futures Trading Commission has reportedly subpoenaed Goldman Sachs (GS), JPMorgan (JPM), Glencore Xstrata (GLCNF.PK) and their subsidiaries for documents relating to warehouses they operate for aluminum and other metals. • The agency has requested information dating back to January 2010; it also wants documents relevant to the companies’ relationships with the London Metals Exchange. • The CFTC’s investigation follows allegations that the activities of warehousing companies have artificially boosted the price of metals, particularly aluminum. • Earlier speculation said the CFTC had sent subpoenas to an unnamed metals warehousing firm.

Full Story:

Perils of Pooling

We hold these truths to be self evident: that Chase never acquired any loans from Washington Mutual and that Bank of America never acquired any loans from Countrywide.  A review of the merger documents approved by the FDIC reveals that neither Chase nor Bank of America wanted to assume any liabilities in connection with the lending operations of Washington Mutual or Countrywide, respectively. The loans were expressly left out of the agreement which is available for everyone to see on the FDIC website in the reading room.

With the exception of a few instances in which the court pointed out that Chase only acquired servicing rights and that Bank of America may not have acquired any rights, judges have been rubber-stamping foreclosures initiated by Bank of America (or entities controlled by Bank of America like Recontrust) under the assumption that Bank of America must be the owner of the Countrywide mortgages. The same is true  for judges who have been rubber-stamping foreclosures initiated by Chase under the assumption that Chase must be the owner of the Washington Mutual mortgages. After all, if they don’t own the mortgages then who does? The answer is that in nearly all cases either BofA nor Countrywide and neither Chase nor WAMU owned the loans and their financial statements prove it.

Not only have the judges been rubber-stamping the foreclosures and participating in a scheme that is correcting our title records nationwide, the entry of judgment against the borrower and for Bank of America or for Chase completes the theft of the investors money that was used for exorbitant fees, profits and bonuses and then finally for the funding of the origination or acquisition of loans. The fact that the REMIC trust was ignored in both form and content has also been the subject of the defective rulings from the bench.  Not only have the courts ruled against the borrowers and for the banks, they have even ruled against the presentation of evidence that would have shown that the investors were being stripped of their expected lien rights and then stripped again on their expected return of principal and interest, and then barred by collateral estoppel from ever bringing it up.

Since most of the foreclosures have emanated from Bank of America and Chase it is a fair assumption that most of the foreclosure sales were void because no valid bid was received in exchange for the deed. The property is still owned by the original homeowner In any case where a credit bid was submitted by Bank of America or Chase on any loan in which either Countrywide Mortgage or Washington Mutual was involved. I might add that the Federal Reserve in New York is completely aware of these facts and is steadfastly refusing to reveal the truth to the public or even to the homeowners whose homes were illegally and wrongfully foreclosed by Bank of America and Chase for a loan where both Bank of America and Chase and their chain of affiliates had been paid multiple times on a loan receivable account owned by the source of the funds, to wit: the investors who thought they were buying mortgage bonds from a funded legally organized REMIC trust.

CAVEAT:  The courts are mainly concerned with finality. In many states there may be a statute of limitations to challenge a void deed from an auction sale. Check with an attorney who is licensed in the jurisdiction in which your property is located before you take any action or make any decision.

It seems crazy to think that someone could apply for a loan and get the benefits of funding without ever being required to pay it back to the lender.  But that is exactly what is happening as a result of defective court decisions.  The lender consists of a group of investors including pension funds that are now underfunded as a result of the civil and possibly criminal theft of funds by Bank of America and Chase or the investment firms acquired by them.

Homeowners are being forced to pay Bank of America and Chase rather than the investors who actually advanced the funds. Bank of America and Chase actively interfere and Stonewall whenever a borrower or an investor seeks to peek under the hood to see what is in the box. There is nothing in the box. The deal was always between the investors and homeowners. The bank’s lied. They pretended that they were the lenders when in fact there were only the intermediaries. The result was that all the payments received from borrowers, government, the federal reserve, insurers, guarantors, co-obligors, and counterparties on credit  default swaps went to the accounts of Bank of America and Chase rather than to the investors.

 By holding back the money, Bank of America and Chase, just like other banks created the illusion of a default and since they had created the illusion of ownership of the default they took the money instead of handing it over to the investors. You read the lawsuits that have been filed by  investors against the investment banks that sold them worthless mortgage bonds issued by an empty asset pool you will see that they allege affirmatively that the notes and mortgages are unenforceable.

That makes it unanimous! Both the lender and the borrower agree that the documentation is defective and unenforceable. Both the lender and the borrower agree that the lender should get paid.  And both the lender and the borrower agree that the lender is entitled to be paid only once for the money advanced by the lender.  And both the lender and the borrower agree that the banks are holding trillions of dollars in money that should have been used to pay off the account receivable owned by the investors.

With the lender paid off or where the account receivable has been reduced by payments to the banks who were acting as agents of the investors but breaching their duties to the investors, the amount payable by the homeowner as a borrower would be correspondingly reduced or eliminated. In fact, under the requirements of the federal truth in lending act, the overpayment is due to the borrower for failure to disclose the true facts of the transaction. In fact, under federal law, treble damages, legal interest, attorneys fees and costs probably also apply.

Nardi Deposition Reveals All about JPM-WAMU Slick Transactions


I am going through the Nardi deposition a line by line. I have completed the first 50 pages. If you have a case where JPM is foreclosing even if it is doesn’t involve WAMU, you should read the whole thing. I have the link below. Below the link are my notes and comments on the first 50 pages of the deposition. IN the context of other things we know this is a picture of fraud in the making while at the same time keeping the people who are the boots on the ground actors unaware of the consequences of what they are doing.

Garfield Notes on Nardi deposition JP Morgan Chase, as successor to Washington Mutual v. Waisome, 5th Judicial Circuit, Florida Case NUmber 2009-CA-005717, May 9 2012

1.  No prior banking experience. No education in banking or finance. No academic degree. No direct knowledge as to any of the events, documents, or transactions relating to the subject loan because her scope of employment was to assist in litigation or settlement of contested cases. Worked at Citibank dealing with credit cards and assisted in programming.
2. Worked with PHH on loan originations. Line 21, Page 9, I was the originations or preserve rare. I worked with the borrowers on collecting documents, getting them prepared for eventual closing of their loan, working with underwriting and making sure that the documents they needed to push the loan package forward were provided. Basically kind of the air traffic controller of the loan origination’s part of the business.
3. Line 12 page 10 I was not a supervisor. I had a support staff but they were pooled into groups that basically support in five or 10 other loan officers. So I was supervised. We were in a pool.
4. Worked with Merrill Lynch as a series 7 and series 66 broker.
5. Worked at Washington Mutual starting in September 2007.
6. My duties were to work with deceased borrowers estates at Washington Mutual
7.   line11 page 16 I didn’t have anything to do with loss mitigation. I was focusing on establishing that line of communication verifying that these people have the authority to act on behalf of of the deceased.
8. RECORDS SYSTEMS CHANGE:  line 18  page 16 I was actually going back and kind of redoing some of the filing systems that they had an kind of getting that more modernized. And that probably took me through the first 1 1/2 years or thereabouts.
10. Worked with a guy named Vinnie and a lady named Laura.
11. Assigned different states. i was assigned Florida and some smaller states (line 20 page 24)
12. Line 5 page MSP: mortgage servicing platform. It’s a widely used system. In fact all of the major services I have ever worked for have used it. So Washington Mutual was using it. Chase was also using it so I had the benefit of that. So the training for that for me was kind of redundant.
13. LIne 6 page 27 (question was whether Fidelity LPS developed the software).  I am not an expert on everything at Fidelity. My understanding is that fidelity developed this software and licensed it to individual servicers. So that’s my understanding is that actually they own it. It’s their property. Where releasing it as a servicer.
14 line 3 page 28. IMAGE WEB: I believe it was called image web. Image web Wesley default software for any time you need to look up image documents, whether it be notes, mortgages, origination packages, applications. You know, whatever was deemed worthy of saving where necessary to save for servicing purposes.
15. line 13 page 28  a separate servicing system for the home-equity loans.  I think it was called ACLS.  And they had a customer service collection system called CACS  that was used for home equity collections.  those are example of systems they had that we would have used at Washington Mutual that weren’t used at the majors. The major system used being MSP.
16. LIne 21 Page 28 Outlook email was major server for communication within Chase.
17. Line 23, Page 28, MSP is really the central repository for all information related to a loan so most people work out of that anytime they’re coming in contact with, you know, servicing.
18. everyone has a unique identifying usually three digit code assigned to them and they have to set their own password.
19. I have the ability you know part of my duties were to document the things that I was doing. So yes I have the ability to enter data into certain areas. Not all areas can be manipulated. I could enter notes into the system. I could change stop code so that if I was dealing with alone that was in litigation and it needed to stop certain things like collection activities or foreclosure processing, I could put stops on the system. (line 13 Page 29)
20. Lin  se 9 page 31.   We had different client numbers that were assigned to different sets of loans. The Washington Mutual client was 156. The Chase client was like 465.
21. MAJOR PROJECT INTEGRATING CHASE AND WAMU LOANO PACKAGES: LINE 2 PAGE 33:  my understanding is that they drew resources from all areas of the business. I don’t think there was any one department that was involved in handling that transaction or that project.
22. Line 8 page 33: I don’t know if there was a specific person in charge of it. I can imagine based on my experience in some of the projects that I’ve seen in other places that there is probably a project manager and several business heads of business people that were running it but I wasn’t in charge I wasn’t part of the project specifically so I don’t really know.
23. LIne 6 page 39: CHASE LOANS VERSUS INVESTOR LOANS:    if you are looking for specific investor or owner information you would go into a screen called MAS1. And then there is a sub screen within that called INV1 which would tell you, if there is an investor, who it is. And if it’s Chase owned, it would say Chase owned.
24. line 17 page 40:  I believe that we keep records of these investor codes potentially outside the system. I’ve never accessed an investor list with an MSP, so it’s possible it’s there. I just don’t know.
25: NO NEED TO MEMORIZE THE USER ID: LINE 6 PAGE 41:  it’s not something you necessarily have to memorize because when you login using your password is going to tell you it’s going to memorialize everything. You don’t have to memorize it. I think mine was OY$.
26. IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTOR: line 17  page 41:   I believe there are also three digits for the investor codes. But when you go into MAS1 and INV1 it actually spells out the name of the investor,.    so if it’, for instance, a chase loan, it will say J.P. Morgan Chase. If it’s Bank of America, it will say Bank of America. It will spell out the name and the address of the investor or owner for you right there on the screen. So you don’t have to interpret a code it’s right there.
29. HANDLING OF FILES AND SHIPPING OF FILES. WHO IS AUTHORIZED. collateral file and credit file: line 8. page 47:  you referenced a collateral file. There is also a credit file. Sometimes you need stuff from the credit file and sometimes you don’t. The collateral file you know sometimes you need it sometimes you don’t. So depending on what you need, there is an electronic request for each one. You send it to the customer service folks. The credit file and there is certain restrictions as to who can actually order it. You have to have certain authorization. You can only send it certain places. You have to either send it to someone if you are sending it to someone within the company they have to have it’s a very short list within the company who can get it. Generally we ship it only to counsel when it needs to go out of custody and services. So you would include your identifier to show you have the authority to order it. You need to identify where it’s going so the firm it’s being shipped to, custody services, will accept that. Basically it’s an email transmission, and that works constantly. So they will go in, pull up the work order, have a person that’s designated to be able to enter the file room, go in and pull the file, and then ship it off to the firm was requesting it. I’m almost 100% certain that they use FedEx almost exclusively for the shipping.
30.  Inside counsel is ANITA Smith or Kendall Forster LINE 3 PAGE 50.
31. NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE OF THE PHYSICAL FILES. HEARSAY ON HEARSAY. LINE 10 PG 50. This would seem to indicate that all her testimony about the movement of the physical files is hearsay based upon computer entries by people she doesn’t know, or things she was told by counsel or someone else working for other departments, indicating multiple records custodians.

Truth Coming Home to Roost: JPM Knew the Loans Were Bad

In a statement shortly after he sued JPMorgan Chase, Mr. Schneiderman [Attorney general, New York state] said the lawsuit was a template “for future actions against issuers of residential mortgage-backed securities that defrauded investors and cost millions of Americans their homes.”


What’s the Next Step? Consult with Neil Garfield

For assistance with presenting a case for wrongful foreclosure or to challenge whoever is taking your money every month, please call 520-405-1688, customer service, who will put you in touch with an attorney in the states of Florida, Tennessee, Georgia, California, Ohio, and Nevada. (NOTE: Chapter 11 may be easier than you think).


Editor’s Comment and Analysis: It’s been a long pull to get the real information about the misbehavior of the mega banks and their officers. But Schneiderman, Attorney general of the State of New York, is drilling down to where this really needs to go. And others, tired of receiving hollow assurances from the mega banks are suing — with specific knowledge and proof that is largely unavailable to borrowers — a good reason to watch these suits carefully.

Both internal emails and interviews have revealed that they repeatedly were warned by outside analysts of the perils of the mortgage lending process. The officers of JPM chose to change the reports to make them look more appealing to investors who gave up the pension money of their pensioners in exchange for what turns out to be bogus mortgage bonds issued by a non-existent or unfunded entity that never touched a dime of the investors’ money and never received ownership or backing from real loans with real security instruments (mortgages and deeds of trust).

A lawsuit filed by Dexia, a Belgian-French bank is being closely watched with justified trepidation as the onion gets pealed away. The fact that the officers of JPM and other mega banks were getting reports from outside analysts and took the trouble to change the reports and change the make-up of the bogus mortgage bonds leads inevitably to a single conclusion — the acts were intentional, they were not reckless mistakes, they weren’t gambling. They were committing fraud and stealing the pension money of investors and getting ready to become the largest landowners in the country through illegal, fraudulent, wrongful foreclosure actions that should have been fixed when TARP was first proposed.

The Dexia lawsuit focuses on JPM, WAMU and Bear Stearns, acquired by JPM with government help. The failure to provide bailout relief to homeowners at the same time sent the economy into a downward spiral. Had the Federal reserve and US Treasury department even ordered a spot check as to what was really happening, the “difficult” decisions in 2008 would have been averted completely.

Receivership and breakdown of the large banks would have produced a far more beneficial result to the financial system, and is still, in my opinion, inevitable. Ireland is doing it with their major bank as announced yesterday and other countries have done the same thing. Instead of the chaos and trouble that the banks have policy makers afraid of creating, those countries are coming out of the recession with much stronger numbers and a great deal more confidence in the marketplace.

The practice note here is that lawyers should look at the blatant lies the banks told to regulators, law enforcement and even each other. The question is obvious — if the banks were willing to lie to the big boys, what makes you think that ANYTHING at ground level for borrowers was anything but lies?  They went to their biggest customers and lied in their faces. They certainly did the same in creating the illusion of a real estate closing at ground level.

Lawyers should question everything and believe nothing. Normal presumptions and assumptions do not apply. Keep your eye on the money, who paid whom, and when and getting the proof of payment and proof of loss. You will find that no money exchanged hands except when the investors put up money for the bonds that were supposed to be mortgage backed, and the money that was sent down the pipe via wire transfer to the closing agent under circumstances where the “lender” was not even permitted to touch the money, much less use it in their own name for funding.

The diversion of money away from the REMICs and the diversion of title away from the REMICs leaves each DOCUMENTED loan as non-existent, with the note evidence of a transaction in which no value exchanged hands, and the mortgage securing the obligations of the invalid note.

The diversion of the documents away from the flow of money leaves the borrower and lenders with a real loan that, except for the wire transfer receipts, that was undocumented and therefore not secured. Yet nearly all borrowers would grant the mortgage if fair market value and fair terms were used. Millions of foreclosures would have been thwarted by settlements, modifications and agreements had the investors been directly involved.

Instead the subservicers rejected hundreds of thousands of perfectly good proposals for modification that would have saved the home, mitigated the damages to investors, and left the bank liable to investors for the rest of the money they took that never made it into the money chain and never made it into the REMIC.

Add to this mixture the rigging of LIBOR and EuroBOR, the receipt of trillions in mitigating payments kept by the banks that should have been paid and credited to the investors, and it is easy to see, conceptually, how the amount demanded in nearly all foreclosure cases is wrong.

Discovery requests should include, in addition to third party insurance and CDS payments, the method used to compute new interest rates and whether they were using LIBOR ( most of them did) and what adjustments they have made resulting from the revelation that LIBOR was rigged — especially since it was the same mega banks that were rigging the baseline rate of interbank lending.

Once you are in the door, THEN you can do not only your own computations on resetting payments, but you can demand to see all the transactions so that the applied interest rate was used against the alleged principal. At that point you will know if a loan receivable account even exists and if so, who owns it — and a fair guess is that it is not now nor was it ever any of the parties who have “successfully” completed foreclosure, thus creating a corruption of title in the marketplace for real estate that has never happened before.

E-Mails Imply JPMorgan Knew Some Mortgage Deals Were Bad


When an outside analysis uncovered serious flaws with thousands of home loans, JPMorgan Chase executives found an easy fix.

Rather than disclosing the full extent of problems like fraudulent home appraisals and overextended borrowers, the bank adjusted the critical reviews, according to documents filed early Tuesday in federal court in Manhattan. As a result, the mortgages, which JPMorgan bundled into complex securities, appeared healthier, making the deals more appealing to investors.

The trove of internal e-mails and employee interviews, filed as part of a lawsuit by one of the investors in the securities, offers a fresh glimpse into Wall Street’s mortgage machine, which churned out billions of dollars of securities that later imploded. The documents reveal that JPMorgan, as well as two firms the bank acquired during the credit crisis, Washington Mutual and Bear Stearns, flouted quality controls and ignored problems, sometimes hiding them entirely, in a quest for profit.

The lawsuit, which was filed by Dexia, a Belgian-French bank, is being closely watched on Wall Street. After suffering significant losses, Dexia sued JPMorgan and its affiliates in 2012, claiming it had been duped into buying $1.6 billion of troubled mortgage-backed securities. The latest documents could provide a window into a $200 billion case that looms over the entire industry. In that lawsuit, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which oversees Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, has accused 17 banks of selling dubious mortgage securities to the two housing giants. At least 20 of the securities are also highlighted in the Dexia case, according to an analysis of court records.

In court filings, JPMorgan has strongly denied wrongdoing and is contesting both cases in federal court. The bank declined to comment.

Dexia’s lawsuit is part of a broad assault on Wall Street for its role in the 2008 financial crisis, as prosecutors, regulators and private investors take aim at mortgage-related securities. New York’s attorney general, Eric T. Schneiderman, sued JPMorgan last year over investments created by Bear Stearns between 2005 and 2007.

Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan’s chief executive, has criticized prosecutors for attacking JPMorgan because of what Bear Stearns did. Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in October, Mr. Dimon said the bank did the federal government “a favor” by rescuing the flailing firm in 2008.

The legal onslaught has been costly. In November, JPMorgan, the nation’s largest bank, agreed to pay $296.9 million to settle claims by the Securities and Exchange Commission that Bear Stearns had misled mortgage investors by hiding some delinquent loans. JPMorgan did not admit or deny wrongdoing.

“The true price tag for the ongoing costs of the litigation is terrifying,” said Christopher Whalen, a senior managing director at Tangent Capital Partners.

The Dexia lawsuit centers on complex securities created by JPMorgan, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual during the housing boom. As profits soared, the Wall Street firms scrambled to pump out more investments, even as questions emerged about their quality.

With a seemingly insatiable appetite, JPMorgan scooped up mortgages from lenders with troubled records, according to the court documents. In an internal “due diligence scorecard,” JPMorgan ranked large mortgage originators, assigning Washington Mutual and American Home Mortgage the lowest grade of “poor” for their documentation, the court filings show.

The loans were quickly sold to investors. Describing the investment assembly line, an executive at Bear Stearns told employees “we are a moving company not a storage company,” according to the court documents.

As they raced to produce mortgage-backed securities, Washington Mutual and Bear Stearns also scaled back their quality controls, the documents indicate.

In an initiative called Project Scarlett, Washington Mutual slashed its due diligence staff by 25 percent as part of an effort to bolster profit. Such steps “tore the heart out” of quality controls, according to a November 2007 e-mail from a Washington Mutual executive. Executives who pushed back endured “harassment” when they tried to “keep our discipline and controls in place,” the e-mail said.

Even when flaws were flagged, JPMorgan and the other firms sometimes overlooked the warnings.

JPMorgan routinely hired Clayton Holdings and other third-party firms to examine home loans before they were packed into investments. Combing through the mortgages, the firms searched for problems like borrowers who had vastly overstated their incomes or appraisals that inflated property values.

According to the court documents, an analysis for JPMorgan in September 2006 found that “nearly half of the sample pool” – or 214 loans – were “defective,” meaning they did not meet the underwriting standards. The borrowers’ incomes, the firms found, were dangerously low relative to the size of their mortgages. Another troubling report in 2006 discovered that thousands of borrowers had already fallen behind on their payments.

But JPMorgan at times dismissed the critical assessments or altered them, the documents show. Certain JPMorgan employees, including the bankers who assembled the mortgages and the due diligence managers, had the power to ignore or veto bad reviews.

In some instances, JPMorgan executives reduced the number of loans considered delinquent, the documents show. In others, the executives altered the assessments so that a smaller number of loans were considered “defective.”

In a 2007 e-mail, titled “Banking overrides,” a JPMorgan due diligence manager asks a banker: “How do you want to handle these loans?” At times, they whitewashed the findings, the documents indicate. In 2006, for example, a review of mortgages found that at least 1,154 loans were more than 30 days delinquent. The offering documents sent to investors showed only 25 loans as delinquent.

A person familiar with the bank’s portfolios said JPMorgan had reviewed the loans separately and determined that the number of delinquent loans was far less than the outside analysis had found.

At Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual, employees also had the power to sanitize bad assessments. Employees at Bear Stearns were told that they were responsible for “purging all of the older reports” that showed flaws, “leaving only the final reports,” according to the court documents.

Such actions were designed to bolster profit. In a deposition, a Washington Mutual employee said revealing loan defects would undermine the lucrative business, and that the bank would suffer “a couple-point hit in price.”

Ratings agencies also did not necessarily get a complete picture of the investments, according to the court filings. An assessment of the loans in one security revealed that 24 percent of the sample was “materially defective,” the filings show. After exercising override power, a JPMorgan employee sent a report in May 2006 to a ratings agency that showed only 5.3 percent of the mortgages were defective.

Such investments eventually collapsed, spreading losses across the financial system.

Dexia, which has been bailed out twice since the financial crisis, lost $774 million on mortgage-backed securities, according to court records.

Mr. Schneiderman, the New York attorney general, said that overall losses from flawed mortgage-backed securities from 2005 and 2007 were $22.5 billion.

In a statement shortly after he sued JPMorgan Chase, Mr. Schneiderman said the lawsuit was a template “for future actions against issuers of residential mortgage-backed securities that defrauded investors and cost millions of Americans their homes.”

Local Governments on Rampage Against Banks’ Manipulation of Credit Markets

Featured Products and Services by The Garfield Firm


LivingLies Membership – If you are not already a member, this is the time to do it, when things are changing.

For Customer Service call 1-520-405-1688

“When both government and the citizens start acting together, things are likely to change in a big way. There appears to be a unity of interests — the investors who thought they were buying bonds from a REMIC pool, the homeowners who thought they were buying a properly verified and underwritten loan from a pretender lender, and the local governments who were tricked into believing that their loans were viable and trustworthy based upon the gold standard of rate indexes. In many cases, the only reason for the municipal loan, was the illusion of growing demographics requiring greater infrastructure, instead of repairing the existing the infrastructure. As a result, the cities ended up with loans on unneeded products just like homeowners ended up with loans on houses that were always worth far less than the appraisal used.” — Neil F Garfield,

Editors Note: Hundreds of government agencies and local governments are on the rampage realizing that they were duped by Wall Street into buying into defective loan products. This puts them in the same class as homeowners who bought such loan products, investors who believed they were buying Mortgage Bonds to fund the loans, and dozens of other institutions who relied upon the lies told by the banks who were having a merry old time creating “trading profits” that were the direct result of stealing money and homes, and misleading the financial world on the status of the interest rates in the financial world. All loans tied to Libor (London Interbank Offered Rate), which was the gold standard,  are now in question as to whether the reset on those loans was true, correct or simply faked.

The repercussions of this will grow as the realization hits the victims of this gigantic fraud broadens into a general inquiry about most of the major practices in use — especially those in which claims of securitization were offered. It is now obvious that the deal proposed to pension funds and other investors was simply ignored by the banks who used the money to create faked trading profits, removing from the pool of investments money intended for funding loans that were properly originated and dutifully underwritten.

Cities, Counties, Homeowners and Investors are all victims of being tricked into loans that were simply unsustainable and were being manipulated to the advantage of the banks they trusted to act responsibly and who instead acted reprehensibly.

The ramifications for the mortgage and foreclosure markets could not be larger. If the banks were lying about the basics of the rate and the terms then what else did they do? As the Governor or of the Bank of England said, the business model of the banks appears to have been “lie More” rather than living up to the trust reposed in them by those who dealt with them as “customers.” Specifically, the evidence suggests that while the funding of the loan and the closing documents were coincidentally related in time, they specifically excluded any reference to each other, which means that the financial transaction as it actually occurred is undocumented and the document trail refers to financial transactions that did not involve money exchanging hands.

The natural conclusion created by the coincidence of the funding and the documents was to conclude that the two were related. But the actual instructions and wire transfers tell another story. This debunks the myth of securitization and more particularly the mortgage lien. How can the mortgage apply to a transaction described in the note that never took place and where the terms of the loan were different than what was expected by the creditors (investors, like pension and other managed funds) in the mortgage bond. The parties are different too. The wires funding the transaction are devoid of any reference to the supposed lender in the closing documents presented to borrowers. Thus you have different parties and different terms — one in the money trail, which was undocumented, and the other in the document trail which refers to transactions in which no money exchanged hands.

When the municipalities like Baltimore start digging they are going to find that manipulation of Libor was only one of several issues about which the Banks lied.

Rate Scandal Stirs Scramble for Damages


As unemployment climbed and tax revenue fell, the city of Baltimore laid off employees and cut services in the midst of the financial crisis. Its leaders now say the city’s troubles were aggravated by bankers’ manipulation of a key interest rate linked to hundreds of millions of dollars the city had borrowed.

Baltimore has been leading a battle in Manhattan federal court against the banks that determine the interest rate, the London interbank offered rate, or Libor, which serves as a benchmark for global borrowing and stands at the center of the latest banking scandal. Now cities, states and municipal agencies nationwide, including Massachusetts, Nassau County on Long Island, and California’s public pension system, are looking at whether they suffered similar losses and are weighing legal action.

Dozens of lawsuits filed by municipalities, pension funds and hedge funds have been consolidated into a few related cases against more than a dozen banks that are involved in setting Libor each day, including Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Deutsche Bank and Barclays. Last month, Barclays admitted to regulators that it tried to manipulate Libor before and during the financial crisis in 2008, and paid $450 million to settle the charges. It said other banks were doing the same, but none of them have been accused of wrongdoing. Libor, a measure of how much banks must pay to borrow money from one another in the short term, is set through a daily poll of the banks.

The rate influences what consumers, businesses and investors pay on a wide range of financial contracts, as varied as mortgages and interest rate swaps. Barclays has said it and other banks understated the rate during the financial crisis to make themselves look healthier to the public, rather than to make more money from clients. As regulators and lawmakers in Washington and Europe assess the depth of the Libor abuse and the failure to address it, economists and analysts are already predicting it could be one of the most expensive scandals to hit Wall Street since the financial crisis.

Governments and other investors may face many hurdles in proving damages. But Darrell Duffie, a professor of finance at Stanford, said he expected that their lawsuits alone could lead to the banks’ paying out tens of billions of dollars, echoing numbers from a recent report by analysts at Nomura Equity Research.

American municipalities have been among the first to claim losses from the supposed rate-rigging, because many of them borrow money through investment vehicles that directly derive their value from Libor. Peter Shapiro, who advises Baltimore and other cities on their use of these investments, said that “about 75 percent of major cities have contracts linked to this.”

If the banks submitted artificially low Libor rates during the financial crisis in 2008, as Barclays has admitted, it would have led cities and states to receive smaller payments from financial contracts they had entered with their banks, Mr. Shapiro said.

“Unambiguously, state and local government agencies lost money because of the manipulation of Libor,” said Mr. Shapiro, who is managing director of the Swap Financial Group and is not involved in any of the lawsuits. “The number is likely to be very, very big.”

The banks have declined to comment on the lawsuits, but their lawyers have asked for the cases to be dismissed in court filings, pointing to the many unusual factors that influenced Libor during the crisis.

The efforts to calculate potential losses are complicated by the fact that Libor is used to determine the cost of thousands of financial products around the globe each day. If Libor was artificially pushed down on a particular day, it would help people involved in some types of contracts and hurt people involved in others.

Securities lawyers say the lawsuits will not be easy to win because the investors will first have to prove that the banks successfully pushed down Libor for an extended period during the crisis, and then will have to demonstrate that it was down on the day when the bank calculated particular payments. In addition, investors may have to prove that the specific bank from which they were receiving their payment was involved in the manipulation. Before it even reaches the point of proving such subtleties, however, the banks could be compelled to settle the cases.

One of the major complaints was filed by several traders and hedge funds that entered into futures contracts that are traded through the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and that pay out based on Libor. These contracts were a popular way to protect against spikes in interest rates, but they would not have paid off as expected if Libor had been artificially lowered.

A 2010 study cited in the suit — conducted by professors at the University of California, Los Angeles and the University of Minnesota — indicated that Libor was significantly lower than it should have been throughout 2008 and was particularly skewed around the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.

A separate complaint filed in 2010 by the investment firm Charles Schwab asserts that some of its mutual funds, including popular ones like the Schwab Total Bond Market Fund, lost money on similar investments.

The complaints being voiced by municipalities are mostly related to their use of a popular financial contract known as an interest rate swap. States and cities generally enter into these swaps with specific banks so that they can borrow money in the bond market. They pay bondholders based on a floating interest rate — like an adjustable-rate mortgage — but end up paying their bankers a fixed rate through a swap. If Libor is artificially lowered, the municipality is stuck paying the same fixed rate, but it receives a smaller variable payment from its bank.

Even before the current controversy, some municipal activists have said that banks took advantage of the financial inexperience of municipal officials to sell them billions of dollars of interest rate swaps. Experts in municipal finance say that because of the particular way that cities and states borrow money, they are especially liable to lose out on their swaps if Libor drops.

Mr. Shapiro, who helps cities, states and companies negotiate these contracts, said that if a city had interest rate swaps on bonds worth $1 billion and Libor was artificially pushed down by 0.30 percent, which is what the lawsuits contend, that city would have lost $3 million a year. The lawsuit claims the manipulation occurred over three years. Barclays’ settlement with regulators did not specify how much the banks’ actions may have moved Libor.

In Nassau County, the comptroller, George Maragos, said in a statement that according to his own calculations, Libor manipulation may have cost the county $13 million on swaps related to $600 million of outstanding bonds.

A Massachusetts state official who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of potential future legal actions, said the state was calculating its potential losses.

“We are deeply concerned and we are carefully analyzing all of our options,” the official said.

Anne Simpson, a portfolio manager at the California Public Employees’ Retirement System — the nation’s largest pension fund — said that the fund’s officials “are sifting through the impact, but there certainly is an impact.”

In Baltimore, the city had Libor-based interest rate swaps on about $550 million of bonds, according to the city’s financial report from 2008, the central year discussed in the lawsuit. The city’s lawyers have declined to specify what they think Baltimore’s losses were.

The city solicitor, George Nilson, said that the rate manipulation claims meant that the city lost out on money when it needed it the most.

“The injury we suffered during the time we suffered it hurt more because we were challenged budgetarily,” Mr. Nilson said. “Every dollar we lost due to illegal conduct was a dollar we couldn’t pay to keep open recreation centers or to pay police officers.”





Simon Johnson on Business Model of Lie More

Featured Products and Services by The Garfield Firm


LivingLies Membership – If you are not already a member, this is the time to do it, when things are changing.

For Customer Service call 1-520-405-1688

Editor’s Comment:  

Anyone who is curious why I named this blog LivingLies will have all their questions answered by this well-articulated article by Simon Johnson, Chief economist of the World Bank, author of 13 Bankers, and the main writer for http://www.baseline Johnson is first among the world of economists who instantly knew the severity of the culture of lying and deception at the TBTF banks. He is joined in these views by the Financial Times, normally rabidly pro-bank and no less than the Governor of the Bank of England who apparently coined the phrase “Lie More” to replace what was the only index that mattered in the world of finance and bond trading.

The consequences of this culture of lying will be laid bare in the weeks and months and years to come. But as Johnson points out, the days are over when anyone trusts a bank or bank statement. Representations of bank officials once considered as good as gold or what used to be called good as Libor, are now going to be subject of scrutiny and will no doubt reveal a pattern of deceit even deeper than thes we already know about the mortgage meltdown and the trading scam resulting from intentionally manipulating Libor — the gold standard of all indexes.

Lie-More As A Business Model

By Simon Johnson

On Monday, Bob Diamond – the CEO of Barclays, one of the largest banks in the world – was supposedly the indispensable man, with his supporters claiming he was the only person who could see that global megabank through a growing scandal.  On Tuesday morning Mr. Diamond resigned and the stock market barely blinked – in fact, Barclays’ stock was up 0.3 percent.  As Charles de Gaulle supposedly remarked, “the cemeteries are full of indispensable men.”

Mr. Diamond’s fall was spectacular and complete.  It was also entirely appropriate.

Dennis Kelleher of Better Markets – a financial reform advocacy group – summarized the situation nicely in an interview with the BBC World Service on Tuesday.  The controversy that brought down Mr. Diamond had to do with deliberate and now acknowledged deception by Barclays’ staff with regard to the data they reported for Libor – the London Interbank Offered Rate (with the abbreviation pronounced Lie-Bore).  Mr. Kelleher was blunt: the issue in question is “Lie More” not Libor.  (See also this post on his blog, making the point that this impacts credit transactions with a face value of at least $800 trillion.)

Mr. Kelleher’s words may seem harsh, but they are exactly in line with the recently articulated editorial position of the Financial Times (FT) – not a publication that is generally hostile to the banking sector.  In a scathing editorial last weekend (“Shaming the banks into better ways,” June 28th), the typically nuanced FT editorial writers blasted behavior at Barclays and nailed the broader issue in what it called “a long-running confidence trick”:

“The Barclays affair may lack the spice of some recent banking scandals, involving as it does the rather dry “crime” of misreporting interest rates.  But few have shone such an unsparing light on the rotten heart of the financial system.”

The editorial was exactly right with regard to the cultural problem – within that Barclays it had become acceptable or perhaps even encouraged to provide false information.  It underemphasized, however, the importance of incentives in creating that culture.  The employees of Barclays were doing what they were paid to do – and the latest indications from the company are that none of their bonuses will now be “clawed back”.

Martin Wolf, senior economics columnist at the FT and formerly a member of the UK’s Independent Banking Commission, sees to the core issue:

“banks, as presently constituted and managed, cannot be trusted to perform any publicly important function, against the perceived interests of their staff. Today’s banks represent the incarnation of profit-seeking behaviour taken to its logical limits, in which the only question asked by senior staff is not what is their duty or their responsibility, but what can they get away with.”

This matters because, “Trust is not an optional extra in banking, it is, as the salience of the word “credit” to this industry implies, of the essence.”

As the FT editorial put it, “The bankers involved have betrayed an important public trust – that of keeping an accurate public record of the key market rates that are used to value contracts worth trillions of dollars”.

In the words of Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of England, “the idea that my word is my Libor is dead.”  Translation: No one will believe large banks again when their executives claim they could have borrowed at a particular interest rate – we will need to see actual transaction data, i.e., what they actually paid.  Presumably there should be similar skepticism about other claims made by global megabanks, including whenever they plead that this or that financial reform – limiting their ability to take excessive risk and impose inordinate costs on society – will bring the economy to its knees.  It is all special pleading of one or another, mostly intended to rip off customers or taxpayers or, ideally perhaps, both.

Mr. Kelleher has the economics exactly right.  Global megabanks have an incentive to deceive customers, including both individuals and nonfinancial corporations.  Their size confers both market power and the political power needed to conceal the extent to which they are engage in economic fraud.  The lack of transparency in derivatives markets provides them with an opportunity to cheat, but the abuses are much wider – as the Libor scandal demonstrates.

The rip-off is not just for retail investors; chief financial officers of major corporations who should be up in arms.  Boards of directors and shareholders of companies that buy services from big banks should be asking much harder questions about all kinds of derivatives transactions – and who exactly is served by the terms of such agreements.

As Mr. Kelleher puts it on his blog,

“They like to call themselves “banks,” but they aren’t banks in any traditional sense. They are global behemoths that are not just too-big-to-fail, but also too-big-to-regulate and too-big-to-manage. Take JP Morgan Chase for example. It has a $2.35 trillion balance sheet, more than 270,000 employees worldwide, thousands of legal entities, 554 subsidiaries and, as proved by the recent trading losses in London, a CEO, CFO and management team that has no idea what is going on in their own bank.”

“Let’s hope for the sake of the global financial system, the global economy and taxpayers worldwide that Mr. Diamond’s resignation is the first of many. What is needed is a clean sweep of the executive offices of these too-big-to-fail banks, which are still being governed by the same business model as before the crisis: do whatever they can get away with to get the biggest paychecks as possible. (Remember, CEO Diamond paid himself 20 million pounds last year and was the UK banking leader insisting that everyone stop picking on the banks.)

Lie-more is just the latest example of why that all has to change and the sooner the better”





%d bloggers like this: