JPM Chase CEO Jamie Dimon shares his concern for the “average American”.

JPM Chase CEO Jamie Morgan said today that, “we would have to get our act together, do what we’re supposed to do to the average American

Do TO the average American??

What, like foreclose on homes JPM Chase can’t demonstrate it owns except through the production of fabricated documents?

During today’s earnings call discussing JPM’s Q2 beat, which however masked another sharp drop in the company’s trading revenue, Dimon – unloaded on everything that’s holding U.S. businesses back.  

“It’s almost an embarrassment be an American citizen traveling around the world and listening to the stupid shit we have to deal with in this country and at one point we have to get our act together. We won’t do what were supposed to for the average American.”

He continued: “since the Great Recession, which is now 8 years old, we’ve been growing at 1.5 to 2 percent in spite of stupidity and political gridlock, because the American business sector is powerful and strong. What I’m saying is that it would be much stronger growth if there were more intelligent decisions and less gridlock.”

Dimon’s outburst was prompted by a Wall Street analyst who asked if clients were beginning to worry about D.C. dysfunction and a lack of progress. Dimon countered by saying that the economy has grown despite years of bad policy, and that it would continue to grow regardless of the US political climate.

In an earlier call, Dimon said the media should focus on the major issues the nation faces rather than the vagaries of the firm’s Wall Street trading businesses: “the USA has to start to focus on policy which is good for all Americans and that is regulation, tax, education, we have to get those things done.”

Dimon has become a vocal critic of the US economic and social situation, devoting an entire section of his April annual letter to the problems in the US, saying “Something is Wrong’ with America” and offering several ideas of what needs to be fixed.  Dimon should start by addressing the issue that the Mega Banks should not be above the law and .

Of course, this being Jamie, he took advantage of the shocking moment to tell analysts and journalists to focus on the “bigger picture” instead of the decline in the company’s sales and trading results:

“Why you guys don’t write about it every day is completely beyond me. And, like, who cares about fixed income trading in the last two weeks of June? I mean seriously.”

Shareholders maybe?

The JPM CEO said “gridlock in Washington isn’t likely to harm U.S. growth rates because they are already muted by bad policy.”  JPM Chase is behind the largest financial crime ever executed and has taken no responsibility while knowing he should be in prison for the crimes that have destroyed America’s working classes.

 

* * *  

The full transcript of the exchange in question below, courtesy of FactSet:

Q: That’s great thank you if I could follow up at the bigger picture question, Jamie you’ve been correct me if I’m wrong pretty vocal about believing the underpinnings of the economy are healthy and strong and not buying into the full secular stagnation argument. But at what point does political dysfunction and political paralysis really start to dent that confidence. And because you’ve also indicated we do need structural reform to lift trend growth whether it’s infrastructure whatever it is, can you just comment on that. And I guess as an adjunct to that, what are your conversations with clients like and is there a risk that is materializing that clients are also starting to become more frustrated with the lack of progress politically?

A: I would look at it the other way around since the great recession which is now eight years old we’ve been growing at 1.5% to 2% despite the stupidity and political gridlock. Because the American business sector is powerful and strong and is going to grow regardless if they want to feed their kids and want to buy home they want to do things the same as American businesses. What I’m saying is it would be much stronger growth had we made intelligent decisions and that gridlock. And thank you for pointing it out because I’m going to be a broken record until this gets done we are unable to build bridges unable to build airports not graduating.

I was just in France in Argentina Israel Ireland we met with the Prime Minister of India and China. It’s amazing to me that every single one of those countries understands that practical policies to promote business growth is good for the average citizens of those countries for jobs and wages and somehow this great American free enterprise system we no longer get it.

My view is corporate taxation is critical to that. By the way regarding capital brings overseas which is why the $2 trillion overseas benefiting all these other countries don’t like that so if we don’t get our act together we can still grow. It’s just unfortunate but it’s hurting us: it’s hurting the body politic, it’s hurting the average American that we don’t have these right policies. So no in spite of gridlock we will grow at 1 % or 2%.

I don’t buy the argument that we are relegated to this effort we are not this administration can make breakthroughs in taxes and infrastructure ready for reform we have become one of the most bureaucratic confusing litigious societies on the planet. It’s almost an embarrassment be an American citizen traveling around the world and listening to the stupid shit we have to deal with in this country and at one point we have to get our act together. We won’t do what were supposed to for the average American and unfortunately people write about this like corporations is not corporations competitive taxes are important for business and business growth which is important to jobs in wage growth and we should be making that along to every single one of you every time you talk to a client.

The Neil Garfield Radio Show at 6pm Eastern: JPMorgan Chase operates a Racketeering Enterprise according to Plaintiffs

The Neil Garfield Show LIVE today at 6 pm Eastern/3 pm Pacific.  Join us!

Thursdays LIVE! Click in to the The Neil Garfield Show

Or call in at (347) 850-1260, 6pm Eastern Thursdays

For a copy of the LIST OF LOANS involved in the RICO lawsuit Click the following link: First Fidelity loans purchased from Chase

For a copy of this case click here: RICO Complaint – Chase

JPMorgan Chase has been accused of creating a “racketeering enterprise” whose purpose was to evade legal duties owed to borrowers, regulators and Plaintiffs, among others, to appropriately service federally regulated mortgage loans.  Basically, JPMorgan Chase cannot provide the necessary documentation to the Plaintiff’s regarding the loans they purchased, while borrowers whose loans were sold to JPMorgan Chase cannot obtain proof regarding the ownership of their loans (likely because all documentation was intentionally destroyed). The loans are void without the proper documentation (notes, reconveyances and assignments).   It is noteworthy, that when JPMorgan Chase went to foreclose on the “loans” with no legitimate documentation,  they would use entities like Nationwide Title Clearing to create false title and paperwork necessary to foreclose or to attach to a proof of claim in bankruptcy.

This blockbuster lawsuit illuminates the fact that JPMorgan Chase was selling thousands of loans it didn’t own including loans it had previously sold to other MBS trusts!  It is alleged that Chase transferred these defective “loans” in order to avoid non-reimbursable advances and expenses.

S&A Capital Mortgage Partners, Mortgage Resolution Servicing and 1st Fidelity Loan Servicing are suing JPMorgan Chase in the Southern District of New York District court for failure to service loans in a manner consistent with its legal obligations under: RESPA, TILA, FTC violations, the FDCPA, The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Housing Act; and other applicable state and federal usury, consumer credit protection and privacy, predatory and abusive lending laws (collectively “the Acts”).  It is likely that this is not an isolated incident, but JPMorgan Chase’s normal operational standard.

The Plaintiffs complain that JPMC, rather than comply with the costly and time consuming legal obligations it faced under the Acts, the Defendants warehoused loans in a database of charged-off loans known as RCV1 and intentionally and recklessly sold these liabilities to unaware buyers such as the Plaintiffs.

To accomplish the transfer of these obligations Defendants prevented Plaintiff’s from conducting normal due diligence, failure to provide information, and changing terms of transactions after consummation; as well as failure to transfer mortgages to them. Because the Plaintiff’s did not receive the information about the loans purchased, the Defendants tortuously interfered with the Plantiff’s relationships with the borrowers including illegally sending borrowers debt forgiveness letters and releasing liens.   These actions not only resulted in specific damage to said lien’s value, but caused Plaintiffs reputational harm with borrowers, loan sellers, investors, lenders and regulators.

In reality both investors and borrowers should unite and sue JPMorgan Chase for Fraud and Fraudulent Inducement, Tortious Interference with Business Relations, conversion, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel and additional relief.

Highlights from the case include these bombshells accusing JPMorgan Chase of:

(iv) Knowingly breached every representation they made in the MLPA, including failing to legally transfer 3,529 closed-end 1st lien mortgages worth $156,324,399.24 to the Plaintiffs, and to provide Plaintiffs with the information required by both RESPA and the MMLSA so that Plaintiffs could legally service said loans.

(v) Took numerous actions post-facto that tortiously interfered with Plaintiffs’ relationships with borrowers including illegally sending borrowers debt forgiveness letters and releasing liens.

RCV1 Evades Regulatory Standards and Servicing Requirements

  1. Defendants routinely and illicitly sought to avoid costly and time-consuming servicing of federally related mortgage loans. Since 2000, Defendants maintained loans on various mortgage servicing Systems of Records (“SOR”) which are required to meet servicing standards and regulatory mandates. However, Defendants installed RCV1, an off-the-books system of records to conduct illicit practices outside the realm of regulation or auditing. Defendants’ scheme involves flagging defaulted and problem federally related loans on the legitimate SOR and installing a subsequent process to then identify and transfer the loan records from the legitimate SOR to RCV1. The process could be disguised as a reporting process within the legitimate SOR and the data then loaded to the RCV1 repository on an ongoing basis undetected by federal regulators.
  2. Defendants inactivated federally related mortgage loans from their various SORs such as from the Mortgage Servicing Platform (“MSP”) and Vendor Lending System (“VLS”).

 

  1. RCV1’s design and functionality does not meet any servicing standards or requirements under applicable federal, state, and local laws pertaining to mortgage servicing or consumer protection. Instead, the practices implemented by Defendants on the RCV1 population are focused on debt collection.

 

  1. Defendants seek to maximize revenue through a scheme of flagging, inactivating, and then illicitly housing charged-off problematic residential mortgage loans in the vacuum of RCV1, improperly converting these problematic residential mortgage loans into purely debt collection cases that are akin to bad credit card debt, and recklessly disregarding virtually all servicing obligations in the process. In order to maximize revenue, Defendants used unscrupulous collection methods on homeowners utilizing third-party collection agencies and deceptive sales tactics on unsuspecting note sale investors, all the while applying for governmental credits and feigning compliance with regulatory standards.

 

  1. In short, the RCV1 is where mortgage loans and associated borrowers are intentionally mishandled in such a manner that compliance with any regulatory requirements is impossible. In derogation of the RESPA, which requires mortgage servicers to correct account errors and disclose account information when a borrower sends a written request for information, the information for loans in RCV1 remains uncorrected and is sent as an inventory list from one collection agency to another, progressively resulting in further degradation of the loan information. In dereliction of various regulations related to loan servicing, loans once in RCV1 are not verified individually and the identity of the true owner of the note per the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) is often concealed. Regulatory controls regarding grace periods, crediting funds properly, charging correct amounts are not followed.

 

  1. More specifically, a borrower sending a qualified written request under Section 6 of RESPA concerning the servicing of his/her loan or request for correction under 12 U.S.C. §2605(e), 12 CFR §1024.35 could not obtain resolution because RCV1 is a repository for housing debt rather than a platform for housing and servicing federally related loans. RCV1 contains no functionalities for accounting nor escrow management in contravention of §10 of RESPA, Regulation X, 12 CFR §1024.34.

 

In contravention of 12 CFR §1024.39, Chase failed to inform Borrowers whose loans were flagged, inactivated, and housed in RCV1, about the availability of loss mitigation options, and in contravention of 12 CFR §1024.40. Chase also failed to make available to each Borrower personnel assigned to him/her to apprise the Borrower of the actions the Borrower must take, status of any loss mitigation application, circumstances under which property would be referred to foreclosure, or applicable loss mitigation deadlines in careless disregard of any of the loss mitigation procedures under Reg X 12 CFR § 1024.41.

 

  1. Unbeknownst to Plaintiffs and regulatory agencies, Chase has systematically used RCV1 to park flagged loans inactivated in the MSP, VLS, and other customary SORs to (1) eschew Regulatory requirements while publicly assuring compliance, (2) request credits and insurance on the charge-offs., (3) continue collection, and (4) sell-off these problematic loans to unsuspecting investors to maximize profit/side-step liability, all with the end of maximizing profit.

 

Specifics of Defendants’ RICO Scheme and Conduct:

  1. Since at least 2000, Defendants evaded their legal obligations and liabilities with respect to the proper servicing of federally related mortgages, causing Plaintiffs damage through Defendants’ misconduct from their scheme to violate:
  • The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA);
  • The Truth in Lending Act (TILA);
  • The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC);
  • The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA);
  • The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank);
  • The Equal Credit Opportunity Act; and
  • The Fair Housing Act.
  1. After Plaintiffs acquired mortgage loans from Defendants, during the period 2011 through at least 2016, Defendants released thousands of liens related to RCV1 loans, including RCV1 loans Defendants no longer owned, to avoid detection of non-compliance with the Lender Settlements. These lien releases caused harm to the Plaintiffs and to numerous other note sale investors.

 

  1. Similarly, in September 2008, Chase Bank entered into an agreement with the FDIC as receiver for WAMU-Henderson. Chase Bank made a number of representations in its agreement with the FDIC, including that Chase Bank and its subsidiaries were in compliance with all applicable federal, state and local laws. However, at the time of execution and delivery of the agreement, Chase owned thousands of loans with respect to which, through its improper servicing and other misconduct relating to the RCV1, it was in violation of many federal and state laws. These circumstances created a further motive for Chase Bank to participate in the scheme to transfer thousands of noncompliant loans to Plaintiffs and others.

 

  1. Plaintiff MRS purchased loans from Chase pursuant to the MLPA that were actually Chase’s most problematic loans and mostly housed in the RCV1 repository. In March, 2009, bare notes and deeds, without the promised required loan files documenting servicing and borrower information, were simply shipped to Plaintiffs as the “loan files”. Plaintiffs also received loans for which no notes, deeds or loan files were provided at all. Nevertheless, Defendants kept promising that the complete loan files were forthcoming, with no intent of ever providing them. Without the necessary documentation, it was difficult or impossible for Plaintiffs to service and collect on the loans. And despite herculean efforts, most often Plaintiffs could not locate the necessary information to service and collect on the loans.

 

  1. Defendants’ plan to entice an existing and approved, but unsuspecting note sale buyer to purchase these toxic loans is in plain view in various recently produced email exchanges discussing Defendant’s fraudulent scheme to dump non-serviced loans with inadequate documentation on Plaintiffs from October 2008 through February 2009.

 

  1. As early as 2008, Defendants’ knew the public was becoming more aware of its the scope of its improper actions. Ultimately, in 2012, public pressure prompted the federal government and many states to bring a complaint against JPMorgan and Chase Bank, as well as other banks responsible for fraudulent and unfair mortgage practices that cost consumers, the federal government, and the states tens of billions of dollars. The complaint alleged that JPMorgan and Chase Bank, as well as other financial institutions, engaged in improper practices related to mortgage origination, mortgage servicing, and foreclosures, including, but not limited to, irresponsible and inadequate oversight of the banks’ quality control standards. Unfortunately, the complaint failed to note, and the government appeared unaware of, the Defendants’ deeper institutional directives designed to hide their improprieties (such as the establishment of the RCV1 and its true purpose).

 

  1. 48. At all applicable times, Defendants had been continuing to utilize its RCV1 database.

 

  1. However, as in 2008, the loans housed in the RCV1 repository presented a huge reputational risk and legal liability as the loans housed in RCV1 were not being treated as federally related mortgage loans, were not in compliance, were no longer being serviced as such, but were being collected upon.

 

  1. By 2012, the RCV1 database contained hundreds of thousands of federally related mortgage loans, which had been inactivated in regular systems of records and whose accounts were no longer tracked pursuant to regulatory requirements, including escrow accounting.

 

  1. Other knowing participants in the conspiracy include third party title clearing agencies, such as Nationwide Title Clearing Company (NTC), Pierson Patterson, and LCS Financial Services, who were directed by Defendants to prepare and then file fraudulent lien releases and other documents affecting interests in property. Either these entities were hired to verify liens and successively failed to properly validate the liens before creating documents and lien releases containing false information, or these entities were directed by Chase to create the documents with the information provided by Defendants. In either case, these title clearing agencies which recorded fraudulent releases of liens and related documents in the public record, had independent and separate duty from Defendants to file, under various state laws, all relevant documents only after a good faith proper validation of the liens. Instead these entities deliberately violated their duty of care by knowingly or recklessly filing false lien releases and false documents on properties not owned by Defendants.

 

  1. In many states, the act of creating these documents is considered the unauthorized practice of law. In Florida, where NTC is organized, there is a small exception for title companies who are only permitted to prepare documents and perform other necessary acts affecting the legal title of property where the property in question is to be insured, to fulfill a condition for issuance of a title policy or title insurance commitment by the Insurer or if a separate charge was made for such services apart from the insurance premium of the Insurer. Plaintiffs have not ascertained whether Nationwide Title or any other agencies created documents for Chase as a necessary incident to Chase’s purchase of title insurance in Florida.

 

  1. Chase used Real Time Resolutions, GC Services, and Five Lakes Agency, among other collection agencies, to maximize its own back door revenues on loans that were problematic and had been inactivated/“charged off” and thereby were invisible to regulatory agencies.

 

  1. At all times, Defendants directed the collection of revenue on problematic federal mortgage loans, placing them in succession at third party collection agencies. Those third party collection agencies included:

 

  1. The third-party collection agencies had a duty to verify whether the debts were owned by Chase, offer pre-foreclosure loss mitigation, offer Borrowers foreclosure alternatives, and comply with any of HUD’s quality control directives and knowingly or recklessly failed to do so. The third-party collectors knew that the debts they were collecting at Defendants’ directions were mortgage loans. They also knew they did not have the mechanisms to provide any regulatory servicing. Nonetheless, the third-party collection agencies continued collection on behalf of Chase for RCV1 loans. The collection agencies continued to collect without oversight or verification and did in fact continue collecting on debt on behalf of Defendants, despite the mortgage loans being owned by the Schneider entities. The ongoing collection gave Chase continued windfalls.

 

  1. A September 30, 2014 document shows that as late as September 30, 2014, Defendants had charged-off and ported 699,541 loans into RCV1.

 

  1. Unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, Chase was selling non-compliant and thus no longer “federally related mortgage loans” to Plaintiff which Chase had ported and inactivated within their regulated systems of records but had copied over to a separate data repository solely for the purpose of collecting without servicing.

 

 

  1. Plaintiff MRS was not privy to Defendants’ internal communications of October 30, 2008, which clarify that Chase knew that the loans it was intending to off load onto the Plaintiff were not on the primary system of record and were being provided from the un-serviced repository called RCV1. The information in RCV1 was not complete because it was not a regulated system of record. As indicated by Chase’s communications, Chase purposefully cut and pasted select information where it could from other systems of records to the information in RCV1. Defendants’ emails discuss data from the FORTRACS application, the acronym for Foreclosure Tracking System, which is an automated, loan default tracking application that also handles the loss mitigation, foreclosure processing, bankruptcy monitoring, and whose data would have originally come from a primary system of record. Rather than a normal and customary data tape, Chase was providing a Frankenstein of a data tape, stitched together from a patchwork of questionable information.

 

  1. Despite its representation and warranty that Chase “is the owner of the Mortgage Loans and has full right to transfer the Mortgage Loans,” a significant portion of the loans listed on Exhibit A were not directly owned by Chase.

 

  1. Upon information and belief, some of the loans sold to MRS were RMBS trust loans which Chase was servicing. Chase had transferred these to MRS in order to avoid non-reimbursable advances and expenses. The unlawful transfer of these loans to MRS as part of the portfolio of loans sold under the MLPA aided the Defendants in concealing Regulatory non-compliance and fraud while increasing the liabilities of MRS.

 

  1. Chase committed, inter alia, the following violations of law with respect to the loans sold to MRS: a. Chase transferred the servicing of the mortgage loans to and from multiple unlicensed and unregulated debt collection agencies which lacked the mortgage servicing platforms to account for or service the borrowers’ loan with any accuracy or integrity.

Investigator Bill Paatalo of the BP Investigative Agency points out that allegations in this case support accusations in other lawsuits against JPMorgan Chase including that:

  1. Chase knowingly provided collection agencies with false and misleading information about the borrowers.
  2. Chase failed to provide proper record keeping for escrow accounts.
  3. Chase stripped loan files of most origination documentation, including federal disclosures and good faith estimates, thus putting MRS in a positionwhere it was unable to respond to borrower or regulatory inquiries.
  4. Chase failed to provide any accurate borrower payment histories for any of the loans in theMLPA.
  5. Chase knowingly executed assignments of mortgage to MRS for mortgage loans that Defendants knew had been foreclosed and sold to third parties.
  6. Chase circumvented its own operating procedures and written policies in connection with servicing federally-related mortgage loans by removing the loans from its primary record-keeping platform and creating an entry in its RCV1 repository. This had the effect of denying the borrowers their rights concerning federally related mortgages yet allowed Chase to retain the lien and the benefit of the security interest,
  7. Chase included on Exhibit A loans that it had previously sold to third parties and loans that it had never owned.
  8. Chase knowingly and deliberately changed the loan numbers of numerous valuable loans sold to MRS after the MLPA had been fully executed and in force. This allowed Chase to accept payments from borrowers whose loans had been sold to MRS without its own records disclosing the wrongful acceptance of such payments.
  9. Chase’s failure to provide the assignments of the notes and mortgages was not an act of negligence. As events unfolded, it became clear that Chase failed to provide the assignments of the notes and mortgages because it wanted, in selective instances, to continue to treat the sold loans as its own property.
  10. Chase converted payments from borrowers whose loans it had sold

At what point does the Federal Government take action against these fraudulent practices?  It is likely that ALL major banks are participating in the exact same racketeering enterprises so obvious at JPMorgan Chase.

Bill Paatalo, Private Investigator:
BP Investigative Agency, LLC
P.O. Box 838
Absarokee, MT 59001
Office: (406) 328-4075
Attorney Charles Marshall, Esq.
Law Office of Charles T. Marshall
415 Laurel St., #405
San Diego, CA 92101

 

 

Big US Banks Make Laughable Excuses for Preserving Failed Universal Bank Model

In today’s lead story at the Financial Times, Big US banks defy calls that they should be broken up, American megabanks make clear that they don’t think much of the financial savvy of investors or the business press. In quarterly earning calls, bank analysts were pressing executives on the news reports that former Goldman exec, now director of the National Economic Council Gary Cohn told senators last week told a group of senators that he was in favor of Glass-Steagall break-up-the-banks style legislation.

Our comments:

Wake me up when this gets serious. Cohn made it clear that he supported a breakup bill. While Trump has also said he wanted to revive Glass-Steagall, he didn’t say that very often on the campaign trail and there are many things he did say often and pretty consistently, like questioning why the US is carrying so much of the cost of NATO, he’s either reversed himself or is now backing a weak-tea version that his base regards as a sellout, such as Trump’s promises about NAFTA. Plus any Glass-Steagall type bill gets passed only over rabid anti-regulation House Financial Services committee chairman Jeb Hensarling’s dead body.

Don’t buy Jamie Dimon’s Brooklyn Bridge. Big complicated banks are not good for investors, no matter how much banks put their hands on their hearts and try to convince you otherwise. Here was the argument, per the pink paper:

The biggest banks in America are defying calls to break themselves up, arguing that the benefits of size and diversity were on display during a very mixed set of first-quarter results.

At JPMorgan Chase, finance chief Marianne Lake said on Thursday that the bank’s universal model was a “source of strength” for the broader economy, as she unveiled a 20 per cent drop in quarterly profits from consumer banking.

In the investment-banking part of the business, however, profits were up 64 per cent from a bleak period a year ago, boosted by a surge in bond trading and plenty of sales of debt and equity by big companies.

Anyone with proper finance training can tell you this is nonsense. Investors should be making portfolio diversification choices, not corporate execs asserting “synergy” on their behalf. Investors love earnings streams that are not much or better yet negatively correlated with the stock market; that’s one of the reasons they were willing to pay hedgies their inflated management and carry fees. Hedge funds promised returns that didn’t synch with stock market averages. When that proved to be less and less true and the results weren’t so hot generally, investors started beating a major retreat from the strategy.

If banks have all sorts of interesting return profiles hidden away in their various business lines, it would be much better in terms of the overall returns for investors owning those stocks to break them up.1

However, big complicated banks are good for securities analysts, since the complexity gives them more to do and thus creates the appearance that they are adding value to investors. So don’t expect any critical scrutiny of this bank PR from them.

The idea that bigger banks are better is a flat-out canard that we’ve debunked regularly since the inception of this site. Suffice it to say that every study ever done of US banks shows that they have a slightly negative cost curve once a certain asset size threshold is passed. Translation: bigger banks are actually have higher expenses per dollar of bank assets than smaller banks.

Now you might say, “But what about those bank mergers where they fire lots of people! Doesn’t that prove bank consolidation saves costs?”

No. The cost curve issue means the banks that were combined could have gotten those expenses lowered all on their own, and maybe some more. However, mergers provide an excuse to do what managements normally are too nice or too lazy to do, which is get ruthless about headcount.

Finally, the one real synergy is one that is dangerous to the public: the use of bank deposits to fund derivatives. Yes, Virginia, a whole lot of derivatives are booked in bank depositaries. For instance, to a bit of outcry, in 2011, Bank of America moved derivatives from Merrill Lynch into Bank of America NA. And why was that? The banking subsidiary had a better credit rating, meaning lower costs, because that’s where the deposits sat. As we wrote at the time:

Even though I’ve expressed my doubts as to whether Dodd Frank resolutions will work, dumping derivatives into depositaries pretty much guarantees a Dodd Frank resolution will fail. Remember the effect of the 2005 bankruptcy law revisions: derivatives counterparties are first in line, they get to grab assets first and leave everyone else to scramble for crumbs. So this move amounts to a direct transfer from derivatives counterparties of Merrill to the taxpayer, via the FDIC, which would have to make depositors whole after derivatives counterparties grabbed collateral. It’s well nigh impossible to have an orderly wind down in this scenario. You have a derivatives counterparty land grab and an abrupt insolvency. Lehman failed over a weekend after JP Morgan grabbed collateral.

But it’s even worse than that. During the savings & loan crisis, the FDIC did not have enough in deposit insurance receipts to pay for the Resolution Trust Corporation wind-down vehicle. It had to get more funding from Congress. This move paves the way for another TARP-style shakedown of taxpayers, this time to save depositors. No Congressman would dare vote against that.

And in case you think I’m exaggerating, the FDIC objected to the move, but the Fed took the position that it would “give relief” to the bank holding company. Bank of America took the position it has the authority to make this move, and since JP Morgan then had 99% of the notional value of its $79 trillion of derivatives booked in its depositary, JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, there was ample precedent. 2

And as we’ve also written regularly, over the counter derivatives are the biggest source of interconnected among too-big-too-fail banks. So getting derivatives out of depositaries would shrink the derivatives market by making them more costly and reduce systemic risk.

Keep your eye on the ball of the real reason for bankers wanting ginormous banks: executive pay. Bank CEO and C-suite pay is a function of bank size and complexity. Simpler, smaller banks mean much less egregiously paid top brass.

Thus bear in mind the incentives for banks to bulk up: The bank that buys another bank gets to pay everyone at the top more, and the execs of the gobbled-up bank get huge consolation prizes. And all sorts of other people are feeding at the trough too: merger & acquisition professionals, lawyers, accountants, and all sorts of consultants and integration specialists. Our reader Clive will probably tell you the folks that have it the worst who still stay on the payroll are the people in IT.

Fortunately, even without all understanding the sordid details, the great unwashed public understands that overly large banks are hard to unwind and will therefore always be propped up, and separately exercise too much political power. But whether popular support will ever become important to Trump is very much in doubt.

____
1 Absent, of course, breakup costs, but don’t expect banks to give you an honest idea about that if the threat starts looking more serious.

2 Yes, most of these are plain vanilla swaps. But still, no subsidy of this sort is warranted. Taxpayers should not be backstopping capital markets activities.

http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2017/04/big-us-banks-make-laughable-excuses-for-preserving-failed-universal-bank-model.html

Chase-WAMU Letter Reveals”Expungement” and “Assignments” of Alleged Mortgages ” Not on the Books and Records of WAMU”

There is an old saying on Wall Street that “Bulls make money, Bears make money but Pigs never do.” The obvious circumstances of Chase claiming ownership to nonexistent loan portfolios contained within WAMU coupled with the admission in this letter to the FDIC, shows just how arrogant Chase felt when they informed the FDIC that they wanted to get paid by the FDIC for expunging documents and fabricating other instruments for “loans” that were not on the books and records of WAMU at the time of their purchase and sale agreement wherein Chase acquired the WAMU estate.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-
see Letter from Chase to FDIC: chase-letter-to-fdic-2014
*
Hat tip to Bill Paatalo who reminded me of this letter that surfaced in the dispute over FDIC indemnification of Chase for the takeover of WAMU operations. Chase expressly admits to defects in the chain of title and erroneous mortgage documentation.
*
It has been central to the defense of foreclosures based upon alleged “loans” originated by Washington Mutual (WAMU) that Chase never acquired any loans. It is obvious from the the transaction where Chase agreed to pay around $2 Billion to the estate but received more than that in a tax refund due to the WAMU estate. So the consideration was zero.
*
Yet Chase has persistently asserted claims of ownership and direct or indirect authority to foreclose on loans that were not in the books and records of WAMU at the time of the FDIC sale to Chase.
Along with several others, I have stated the fact that Chase (1) acquired no loans (2) because they were not in the WAMU portfolio and that (3) a check of the WAMU books and records in the bankruptcy court will not show the loans that Chase says it acquired from WAMU. If WAMU didn’t own them then Chase could not have acquired them from WAMU.
*
In order to perpetuate this farce we have alleged that Chase was directly involved in the fabrication and forgery of documents to create the illusion of loans that didn’t exist on WAMU books and records and schedules in the receivership and schedules in bankruptcy.
*
Even a non-lawyer can see the problem for Chase. The letter in the link below clearly shows the lawyers asserting a claim for expenses in expunging records (i.e., destroying them) and fabricating other records which obviously leads to the issue of forging since the document itself was knowingly fabricated at the expense of Chase.
*
Somehow Chase came to the conclusion that having paid for the destruction of documents and having paid for fabricating documents, they were now entitled to call themselves owner of the “Loan portfolio” which according to the schedules never existed.
*
They admit to fabricating documents to create the illusion of a chain of title. Now they want payment from the FDIC to cover the expense of fabrication and forgery. Perhaps more importantly they admit “errors in mortgage documentation occurring prior to September 25,2008.”
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Email from Bill Paatalo:
Neil,
Have you seen this letter? The collusion between JPMC and the FDIC could not be any more transparent.
Excerpts from letter in italics:

The additional matters giving rise to JPMC’s indemnity rights relate to costs incurred in connection with mortgages held by WMB prior to September 25,2008. These costs have resulted from aspects of-and circumstances related to- WMB mortgages that were not reflected on the books and records of WMB as of September 25, 2008, and include:

[HERE IS A DIRECT ADMISSION THAT THERE IS A SCHEDULE OF LOANS “NOT REFLECTED ON THE BOOKS AND RECORDS OF WMB.” IF NO SCHEDULE EXISTS SHOWING WHAT WAS “ON THE BOOKS AND RECORDS,” THEN WE SHOULD NOW INQUIRE AS TO THE SCHEDULE SHOWING THOSE LOANS NOT REFLECTED ON THE BOOKS AND RECORDS.]

(a) Costs incurred by JPMC associated with individual assignments of WMB mortgages. Where JPMC has initiated foreclosures on properties associated with mortgages that were held by WMB prior to its Receivership, JPMC has performed individual assignments of the associated mortgages/deeds of trust and allonges to comply with a recent appellate-level court decision in Michigan so as avoid potential additional expense and/or liability. In so doing, JPMC has incurred additional recording and legal fees, Limited Power of Attorney costs, as well as quantifiable costs associated with increased staffing to address these issues.

[THIS IS A DIRECT ADMISSION THAT ASSIGNMENTS AND ALLONGES ARE BEING EXECUTED BY JPMC (AS BENEFICIARIES AND MORTGAGEES) FOR WMB LOANS THAT WERE “NOT REFLECTED ON THE BOOKS AND RECORDS OF WMB.”]

(c) Costs incurred by JPMC to expunge records associated with WMB mortgages as a result of errors in mortgage documentation occurring prior to September 25,2008, including erroneously recorded satisfactions of mortgages and associated legal fees and disbursements.

[“EXPUNGING RECORDS ASSOCIATED WITH WMB MORTGAGES AS A RESULT OF ERRORS IN MORTGAGE DOCUMENTATION?” THIS IS A DIRECT ADMISSION THE JPMC HAS DESTROYED RECORDS RELATED TO WMB MORTGAGE FILES.]

(d) Costs incurred by JPMC to correct various defects in the chains of title for WMB mortgages occurring prior to September 25, 2008, including recording and legal services fees.

[WHAT “CHAINS OF TITLE?” JPMC TAKES THE POSITION THAT THESE LOANS WERE NEVER SOLD BY WMB. THIS IS A DIRECT ADMISSION THAT JPMC IS ATTEMPTING TO CORRECT DEFECTS IN THE CHAINS OF TITLE FOR WMB LOANS THAT WERE NOT REFLECTED ON THE BOOKS AND RECORDS OF WMB. THESE “CORRECTIONS” UNIVERSALLY INVOLVE ASSIGNMENTS OF BENEFICIAL INTERESTS FROM THE FDIC, AND/OR BY VIRTUE OF THE PAA.]

At the time of WMB’ s closure, the above liabilities were not reflected on its books and records.

Bill Paatalo
Oregon Private Investigator – PSID#49411

BP Investigative Agency, LLC
P.O. Box 838
Absarokee, MT 59001
Office: (406) 328-4075

Educating the Judge

The assumption that the Judge already knows the facts and the law is what drives lawyers into defeat. The Judge is not required to know anything, and is actually prohibited from taking an active role in favor of one party or the other.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

I recently had the occasion to assist as consultant on a case in a non judicial state. The Judge was clearly struggling with giving the homeowner due process but still not able to connect the dots. So I proposed that a preliminary statement be submitted in answer to the demurrer that was filed.

Plaintiff concedes the obvious — that when money was received by him or on behalf of him, a liability arose (the debt). But as stated in Yvanova, that debt arose by operation of law from the receipt of funds from a particular identified source. And the debt is not owed to the world at large but only to the party who advanced the funds.

The debt exists without anything in writing. In fact, there was nothing in writing creating a loan contract between the funding source and the Plaintiff, as alleged in the complaint. Further there is a complete absence of any allegation or evidence, despite years of requesting same in formal requests and informal requests, in which any of the parties in the chain ever paid one cent for the origination or acquisition of the alleged loan that they alleged was sold successively.

Ordinarily the debt would merge into a promissory note in which Plaintiff was the maker and the payee was the aforesaid funding source. But the funding source was never mentioned in the note or mortgage, which now contains the signature of Plaintiff obtained by fraud in the execution, to wit: Plaintiff signed said documents based upon the representation that the payee on the note (and the beneficiary under the deed of trust) was the funding source.

The debt owed to the funding source was thus not merged into the note because the funding source and the payee on the note were two completely separate and distinct entities. Hence the transfer of the note was the transfer of paper that was worthless and which ceased status of negotiable instrument when the Defendants asserted a default in performance under the note that had been fraudulently obtained. Hence no entity can assert the status of “holder” or “holder in due course” inasmuch as such terms arise solely from the state adoption of statutes from the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 3, governing negotiable instruments.

JPMC was the underwriter, Master servicer and agent for trusts that appear to be legally nonexistent and in any event completely controlled by JPMC Nonetheless control over all the events related to the debt, note and mortgage lies in the hands of JPMC.

JPMC is referred to as lender in Plaintiff’s complaint, although the funding actually came from institutional investors and passed through JPMC as an intermediary conduit. JPMC initiated the transfer of funds from accounts in which commingled funds from institutional investors from multiple trusts had been deposited.

The assumption that any Trust or other special purpose vehicle ever funded the origination of a loan, or even purchased it for value is a fiction. The only valid purchase would have been from those institutional investors. There being no such purchase asserted nor in existence, the paper instruments upon which the Defendants rely are merely obfuscations of the truth. And the reason they seek foreclosure is that the forced sale of the property would be the first legally valid document in their entire chain.

If securitization actually occurred, then one of two things would have occurred:
  1. The Trust or other special purpose vehicle would have funded the origination, thus eliminating the need for endorsements and assignments. [The Trust would have been the payee on the note and the mortgagee on the mortgage]. OR
  2. A bona fide lender would have received actual money for the sale of the debt, note and mortgage. Both the lender or the purchaser would have a record of the payment.
The reason I say that securitization is virtually nonexistent and the reason why Adam Levitin calls it “Securitization fail” is that neither of those things happened in the vast majority of so-called loans. I even object to the using the word “loan” because I find it misleading. A scheme that relies on stolen money and fraudulent documentation should not be given the title “lending.” This takes nothing away from the fact that the debt exists. But in nearly all cases, the debt is unliquidated and unsecured.
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