Bartram: The Missing Links

Why did the Plaintiff lose in its “standard foreclosure”?

The decision on acceleration is essentially this: If the banks do it, it doesn’t count.

While Bartram didn’t turn out the way we want, there are two paths that nobody is talking about — logistics and res judicata.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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The Florida Supreme Court decision in Bartram reinforces the absurd — that after losing in trial court, the pretender lender can sue over and over again for “new defaults.” The court has re-written the alleged “loan contract” to mean that a loss in court means that their acceleration of the entire loan becomes de-accelerated, meaning that acceleration is merely an option hanging in the wind that doesn’t really mean anything. The decision might have consequences when the same logic is applied to other actions taken pursuant to contract. The decision on acceleration is essentially this: If the banks do it, it doesn’t count.
 *
But two things remain outstanding, one of which the court mentioned in its opinion. Why did the Plaintiff lose in its “standard foreclosure”? The issues that were litigated as to the money and/or documentary trail have been litigated and are subject to res judicata. The Plaintiff, if it is the same Plaintiff, is barred from relitigating them.
 *
If Plaintiff failed to prove ownership of the loan and was using fabricated void assignments and endorsements, the lifting of the statute of limitations should not help them in attempting to bring future litigation. Many other such issues were undoubtedly raised in the original case. The Plaintiff would be forced to argue that while the issues were raised, they were not actually litigated and a judgment was not entered based upon those issues.
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The Florida Supremes took away the Statute of Limitations, up to a point (see below) but gave us the right remedy — res judicata. Even if a new Plaintiff appears, the questions remain as to how the alleged loan papers got to them remain open, as well as whether the paper represented any actual loan contract absent an actual lender.
 *
And then there are the logistics that I don’t think were considered in its decision. According to the Bartram decision the act of acceleration vanishes if the Plaintiff loses. The statute of limitations does apply for past due payments that are more than 5 years old. That means, starting with the date of the lawsuit (not the demand), you count back 5 years and all payments due before that are barred by the SOL.
 *
So if a Plaintiff loses the foreclosure, it can bring the action again based upon missed payments that were due within the SOL period. Of course if the Defendant won because the Plaintiff had no right or authority to collect on the DEBT, the action should be barred by res judicata. But putting that issue aside, there are other problems.
 *
“Servicing” of a designated “loan account” is actually done by multiple IT platforms. The one used for foreclosure comes out of LPS/Black Knight in Jacksonville, Florida. This is the entity that  fabricates documents and business records for foreclosure. It is not the the actual system used for servicing that deals in reality with the alleged borrower and accepts payments and posts them. It is incomplete. This system intentionally does not have all the documents and all the “business records” relating to the loan. For example there is no document or report that shows who was and probably still is receiving payments as though the loan were performing perfectly.
 *
The decision on when and if to foreclose is always performed by LPS/Black Knight in order to prevent multiple servicers, trustees, banks and “lenders” from suing on the same loan, which has happened in the past. LPS assigns the loan to a specific party who is then named by Plaintiff. And LPS creates all the fabricated paperwork to make it look like that party is the right Plaintiff and that the business records produced by LPS can be presented as the business records of the party whose name was rented for the purpose of foreclosure. It is LPS documents that are produced in court, not the records of the named Plaintiff.
 *
So here is a sample simple scenario that will illustrate the logistical problem created by the Florida Supremes: LPS issues a notice of default letter naming the claimant as XYZ, as trustee for XYZ series 2006-19B Pass Through Trust Certificates. Previously XYZ lost the foreclosure action by failing to prove that it had any relationship with the loan. The Notice of Default and right to reinstate issued by LPS on behalf of XYZ must be for payment that was within the SOL. This action of course waives the payments, fees etc that are barred by the SOL. It also assumes that the date of the letter AND THE LAWSUIT will be within the SOL period. So for example, if the last payment was on December 1, 2006 and the letter refers to a missed payment starting with January 1, 2012, the letter is proper. But if suit is not commenced until January 2, 2017, the letter is defective and the lawsuit is barred by the SOL. Further the doctrine of res judicata bars any cause of action that was litigated previously.
 *
All of this leads to a court determination of what issues were previously raised, when they were raised and whether the Final Judgment in favor of the homeowner means anything.

Bank Media Blitz: End of Foreclosure Era: FALSE

The false pronouncements that the mortgage crisis is over have led many attorneys and homeowners to give up on winning cases.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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For years the banks having been gradually ramping up a PR campaign that carries the message: the foreclosure crisis is over. “Institutions” like Black Knight (formerly known as the infamous Lender Processing Services —LPS) have been issuing statements that foreclosures are essentially over. The newest round of these false pronouncements is that foreclosures  have sunk to a 9 year low.

The truth is more nuanced and “counter-intuitive” as Reynaldo Reyes, VP of Deutsch Bank “asset management” said many years ago. What the banks have done (using LPS/Black Knight) is play Wackamo with the states and counties. They ramp up foreclosures to an all time high and then switch to another county. Then the report is that the county with the all time high is now declining — because the banks have moved on to another county or state.

After the decline, they come back again and ramp it back up, sometimes stopping short of another all time high.

The facts are that there have been some 9 million foreclosures since the mortgage crisis began and there will be at least another 6 million foreclosures under cover of what is being reported as a crisis that is over. There are hundreds of thousands of foreclosures that were put on hold in cases where the homeowner put up a fight. Some of them are over ten years old — and courts, rather than dismissing them for lack of prosecution or adequate prosecution have (a) let them continue and (b) blamed the homeowner for the delays. Those cases are also coming to a head now and the banks are starting to show losses in court that were never reported before because they were only pursuing cases that were uncontested.

The truth is that the banks were playing the odds. The number of homeowners who put up a fight is only around 4-6%. By putting the contested foreclosures on hold, the banks were able to get millions of fraudulent foreclosures completed at a rate of 100%. Out of the contested ones, they still have the advantage much there record of success is much lower and getting lower every day as courts wake up to the fact that the banks are not being truthful in court nor with borrowers.

The soft underbelly is that the banks were not truthful with investors, from whom they essentially stole the money that was advanced for the purchase of mortgage backed securities that were issued by empty trusts.

PRACTICE HINT: There are three basic classifications of foreclosures into which every foreclosure falls.

  1. Foreclosures without “issues.”
  2. Foreclosures with factual issues
  3. Foreclosures with procedural issues.

The first two can be won and should be won 100% of the time (speaking of loans in which multiple “transfers” and claims of securitization were made).  The third one can be more challenging because either the pro se litigant or an attorney made admissions or already missed deadlines or otherwise failed to raise and press appropriate defenses.

The result of winning is an involuntary or voluntary dismissal when you win, but then you have the statute of limitations to deal with when they come back and sue again on more fraudulent paperwork. Attorney fees are generally awarded as long as you included the demand in the filings for the homeowner.

By foreclosures without issues I mean an apparent “default:” that the homeowner did stop making payments before the delinquency or default letter. These cases can only be won by good trial practice: timely proper objections, watching what evidence comes in and well-planned cross examination (which means good trial preparation). If you do the work your chances of winning at trial level or appeal, if necessary are very good.

By foreclosures with factual issues I mean situations in which the “servicer” created the illusion of a default by negligently or intentionally posting payments to the wrong ledger. This includes lump sum payments for reinstatement, insurance and other matters. The “borrower” never defaulted even if the note and mortgage were valid and even if the assignments were valid. The result is dismissal usually without prejudice. But if you also show that they were lying about the transfer to the trust or other foreclosing party, the case could be dismissed with prejudice and even with sanctions.

By foreclosures with procedural issues I mean situations in which procedural errors are present that require leniency of the court to correct them in order to properly defend. This usually occurs when pro se (aka pro per) litigants attempt to represent themselves because they think they have found some magic bullet. 95% of such cases are lost thus skewing the overall percentage of wins and losses for homeowners who put up a fight.

No case falls 100% into any specific category but each case can be generally categorized using the above analysis.

In all cases the homeowners’ attorney should make every effort to destroy the case asserted by the foreclosing party through vigorous and timely objections and brutal cross examination. Depending upon the rulings on objections and motions to strike testimony or documentary evidence, the defense should rest if there are no factual issues to present. This is especially true in cases without issues. If you don’t have the defense of payment or that the demand for reinstatement was inaccurate, there is nothing to present by the homeowner except for attempts at prejudicial comments about the lawyers and the servicers etc.

In a recent (August, 2016) case I had “without issues”, Patrick Giunta and I surprised the opposition by resting at the conclusion of the bank’s case. In nonjudicial states this is not so easy to do procedurally although it is possible in isolated instances. By resting at the conclusion of the bank’s case in a judicial foreclosure, the judge is forced to consider whether the evidence on the record supports a judgment for the plaintiff. Some judges will rule for the bank by the seat of their pants.

But by using objections vigorously, we had preserved multiple issues on appeal — namely we had excluded many pieces of evidence that were vital to the Plaintiff’s case. We were fortunate to have a judge that was serious about his job of being a judge. Like a jury would do, the judge took the case, the filings and the evidence into Chambers and read every page. He concluded that there were fatally defective elements and missing elements in the Plaintiff’s case and announced judgment for the homeowner.

In the final analysis the issue is always tacitly or explicitly legal and procedural standing. And one thing to keep in mind is that trial judges are not entirely persuaded by legal argument. But they ARE persuaded by facts admitted into evidence and facts excluded from evidence.

On a final note, I want remind practitioners that the admission of an objectionable document into evidence does two things: (1) it raises an issue for appeal and (2) it opens the door to challenge the probity of the evidence admitted. Once a document is admitted into evidence, it is in — in its entirety and for all purposes and for all parties.

For example when the PSA is admitted into evidence, make sure you have examined it and raise issues on cross examination as to whether it was signed, whether the exhibits were complete etc. Of course the main exhibit is the Mortgage Loan Schedule (MLS) which never contained real loans even where the PSA was complete and in many cases has no actual MLS exhibit, thus defeating the assertion that the Trust ever acquired any loan much less the loan of your client.

Lorraine Brown To Be Set Free

What we have here is what I dubbed in 2008 “A holographic image of an empty paper bag.”

The farce of securitization continues every day. In the savings and loan crisis of the 1980’s more than 800 bankers were jailed. This time only one person was jailed and she is about to be set free. Despite the revelations of illegal and fraudulent practices by banks acting in multiple roles as REMIC Trusts, Trustees, Master Servicers, and attorneys in fact, despite the fact that the money for loans was converted by those banks and covered up with a trail of paper that was garbage, despite the wholesale gutting of investors and homeowners alike, this appears to be the end of criminal prosecution even as the fraud continues.

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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see http://www.vice.com/read/the-only-person-jailed-for-the-foreclosure-crisis-will-soon-go-free

The only thing they continue to get wrong is the presumption that the bank conduct was the result of negligence. There was no negligence. All the acts were the components of a carefully constructed criminal enterprise. And that is why 9 lawyers who were tasked with writing the documents for “securitization” quit. They refused to take part in what they called a criminal enterprise.

The truth is they rented the name of Linda Green to be used on tens of thousands of documents in order to distance the perpetrators from the actual fraud. This practice of “rent-a-name” is mirrored in the role of “Trustees” for “REMIC Trusts” that never conducted business, “Master Servicers”, “Subservicers” and others.

In a case I won last week with Patrick Giunta, a state court judge laid out the discrepancies and absence of any connection between the “evidence” and the myriad of companies meant to complicate the relationships such that piercing through the veil of fraud would be nearly impossible. But a very persistent Judge did it anyway — after painstakingly going through the documents and other evidence, while we waited nearly 2 hours for his decision.

Watch for my article on this when the case has been completed. Spoiler alert: Look carefully at the PSA on exhibit “A” and think about what was required to tie in the “MLS” (Mortgage Loan Schedule) with the PSA. The robo-witness was at best mistaken when he testified that the MLS, bearing no markings of any kind as to where it came from, was Exhibit “A” to the PSA “Trust Instrument.”And the presentation of the MLS was in direct conflict with what was written on “Exhibit “A”. What we have here is what I dubbed in 2008 “A holographic image of an empty paper bag.”

Here are some excerpts from the VICE article:

Brown was CEO of DocX, the third-party document-processing company that engineered the production of some 2 million fictitious mortgage assignments, often forged by people whose name didn’t match their signature, as a recent VICE investigation documented. These assignments were used as evidence in foreclosure cases nationwide beginning in the mid 2000s, leading to an untold number of people being ejected from their houses. Some 9 million Americans have surrendered their homes to banks since 2006, according to the Wall Street Journal, and the case that netted Lorraine Brown added to the evidence pile suggesting much of that misery was based on fraud.

Linda Green, a former shipping clerk for an auto-parts store, signed as the vice president of at least 20 other financial institutions, according to records compiled by Lynn Szymoniak, a whistleblower who wrote the fraud complaint that triggered the Jacksonville FBI investigation. But Green’s signatures all featured different styles of handwriting, because various people in the office wrote her signature on DocX mortgage assignments. According to a 60 Minutes profile from 2011, Green was selected to be the authorized bank officer because she had an easy-to-spell name.

Federal officials in Jacksonville believed that not only DocX, but their clients—the mortgage companies seeking false evidence—committed fraud by lacking a clear chain of title on millions of homes. And their superiors at FBI headquarters saw potential in the case, according to the FOIA documents. “If evidence collected shows intent to defraud investors by the real estate trusts, this matter has the potential to be a top ten Corporate Fraud case,” read one reply from the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division that authorized additional resources to the Jacksonville office.

 

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Reminder: President of DOCX Pled Guilty to Fabricating and Forging Documents

WE HAVE REVAMPED OUR SERVICE OFFERINGS TO MEET THE REQUESTS OF LAWYERS AND HOMEOWNERS. This is not an offer for legal representation. In order to make it easier to serve you and get better results please take a moment to fill out our FREE registration form https://fs20.formsite.com/ngarfield/form271773666/index.html?1453992450583 
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THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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Article by Lynn Symoniak

On November 20, 2012, Lorraine O’Reilly Brown, the former president of mortgage-document mill, DocX, LLC, a subsidiary of Lender Processing Services, pleaded guilty in federal court in Jacksonville, Florida to conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud.  DocX produced over one million mortgage assignments.  These assignments were used in foreclosures across the country. Brown admitted that she knew that these assignments were being prepared to use in foreclosures.

In tens of thousands of cases, these fraudulent documents were used by mortgage-backed trusts to show that the trust acquired a mortgage.  The information on these assignments was false – the trusts did not acquire the mortgages on the date set forth on these DocX Assignments.

Signatures were forged, notarizations were wrongly added to create an appearance of authenticity.  Job titles were falsely claimed.

Which trusts used these phony DocX-prepared mortgage assignments?  The trusts that used these Mortgage Assignments to foreclose include those listed below, with the name of the trustee following the name of the trust.

ABFC TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

ABFC 2004-OPT4 (Wells Fargo Bank)

ABFC 2005-OPT1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

ABFC 2005-HE1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

ABFC 2006-HE1 (U.S. Bank)

ABFC 2006-OPT1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

ABFC 2006-OPT2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

ABFC 2006-OPT3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

 

ACE SECURITIES CORP. HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST & TRUSTEES

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2004-OP1 (HSBC Bank)

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2006-NC1 (HSBC Bank)

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2006-OP1 (HSBC Bank)

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2006-OP2 (HSBC Bank)

Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2007-HE5 (HSBC Bank)

 

AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE ASSETS TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

AHM Assets Trust, 2005-1 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2005-2 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2006-1 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2006-2 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2006-3 (Citibank Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2006-4 (Citibank Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2006-5 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2006-6 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2007-1 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2007-2 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2007-3 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2007-4 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2007-5 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Assets Trust, 2007-6 (Deutsche Bank)

 

AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE INVESTMENT TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

AHM Investment Trust, 2004-2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2004-3 (Citibank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2004-4 (Bank of NY)

AHM Investment Trust, 2005-1 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2005-2 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2005-3 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2005-4 (U.S. Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2006-1 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2006-2 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2006-3 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2007-1 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2007-2 (Deutsche Bank)

AHM Investment Trust, 2007-SD1 (Deutsche Bank)

 

AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE SECURITIES TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-5 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-8 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-AR1 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-R3 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-R7 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-R9 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R1 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R2 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R3 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R4 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R5 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R6 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R7 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R8 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R9 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R10 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-R11 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust ARSI 2006-M3 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-R1 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-R2 (Deutsche Bank)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-R7 (Deutsche Bank)

 

ARGENT SECURITIES INC. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Argent Securities, Inc. 2003-W3 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2003-W6 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2004-W10 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2004-W11 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2005-W1 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2005-W2 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2005-W3 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2005-W4 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2005-W5 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-M1 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-M2 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-W1 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-W2 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-W3 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-W4 (Deutsche Bank)

Argent Securities, Inc. 2006-W5 (Deutsche Bank)

 

ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES CORP. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

AB Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-HE6 (Wells Fargo Bank)

AB Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-HE3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

AB Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-HE5 (U.S. Bank)

AB Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series OOMC 2005-HE6 (Wells Fargo Bank)

AB Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series OOMC 2006-HE3 (U.S. Bank)

AB Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series OOMC 2006-HE5 (U.S. Bank)

 

BANC OF AMERICA FUNDING CORP. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Banc of America Funding Corp. Mort. PT Certs., 2008-1 (U.S. Bank)

 

BEAR STEARNS AB SECURITIES I TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Bear Stearns AB Securities I Trust 2006-AC3 (U.S. Bank)

 

CARRINGTON MORTGAGE LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT2 (Deutsche Bank)

Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-OPT1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

 

CITIGROUP MORTGAGE LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-OPT1 (Wells Fargo)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT3 (Deutsche Bank)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT4 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-AMC1 (Deutsche Bank)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-HE2 (U.S. Bank)

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-SHL1 (HSBC Bank)

 

DEUTSCHE ALT-A SECURITIES MORT. LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mort. Loan Trust, 2006-AR6 (HSBC Bank)

Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mort. Loan Trust, 2007-1(HSBC Bank)

 

DEUTSCHE ALT-B SECURITIES MORT. LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mort. Loan Trust, 2006-AB2 (HSBC Bank)

Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mort. Loan Trust, 2006-AB3 (HSBC Bank)

Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mort. Loan Trust, 2006-AB4 (HSBC Bank)

Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mort. Loan Trust, 2007-AB1 (HSBC Bank)

 

GSAA HOME EQUITY TRUST & TRUSTEES

GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-6 (U.S. Bank)

GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-9 (U.S. Bank)

GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-10 (Deutsche Bank)

GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-11 (Deutsche Bank)

 

GSAMP TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

GSAMP 2004-OPT (Deutsche Bank)

 

GSR NORTGAGE LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR1 (U.S. Bank)

GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-OA1 (Deutsche Bank)

 

HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-7 (Deutsche Bank)

Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-14 (Deutsche Bank)

Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-2 (Deutsche Bank)

Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-5 (Deutsche Bank)

 

HSI ASSET SECURITIZATION CORP. “OPT” TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2005-OPT1 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2006-OPT1 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2006-OPT2 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2006-OPT3 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2006-OPT4 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2007-HE1 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Securitization Corp., 2007-OPT1 (Deutsche Bank)

HSI Asset Loan Obligation Trust, 2007-AR1 (Deutsche Bank)

 

IXIS TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

IXIS Real Estate Capital Trust 2006-HE1 (Deutsche Bank)

 

JP MORGAN ACQUISITION CORP. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

JP Morgan Acquisition Corp. 2005-OPT1 (U.S. Bank)

JP Morgan Acquisition Corp. 2005-OPT2 (U.S. Bank)

 

LUMINENT MORTGAGE TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Luminent Mortgage Trust 2006-7 (HSBC Bank)

 

MASTR ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGES TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2006-OA1 (U.S. Bank)

MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2007-1 (U.S. Bank)

 

MASTR ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2006-2 (Bank of New York)

 

MASTR ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

MASTR Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2003-OPT2 (Wells Fargo)

MASTR Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2004-OPT2 (Wells Fargo)

MASTR Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2005-OPT1 (Wells Fargo)

 

MERRILL LYNCH MORT. INVESTORS TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Merrill Lynch Mort. Investors Trust, 2004-OPT1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Merrill Lynch Mort. Investors Trust, 2006-OPT1 (U.S. Bank)

 

MORGAN STANLEY ABS CAPITAL I, INC. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Morgan Stanley ABC Capital I, Inc. Trust 2004-OP1 (Deutsche Bank)

Morgan Stanley ABC Capital I, Inc. Trust 2005-HE1 (Deutsche Bank)

Morgan Stanley ABC Capital I, Inc. Trust 2005-HE2 (Deutsche Bank)

Morgan Stanley ABC Capital I, Inc. Trust 2007-NC3 (Deutsche Bank)

 

NOMURA HOME EQUITY TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Nomura Home Equity Loan 2005-HE1 (HSBC Bank)

 

NOVASTAR MORTGAGE FUNDING TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Novastar Mortgage Funding Trust 2007-2 (Deutsche Bank)

 

OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2003-1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2003-2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2003-3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2003-4 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2004-1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2004-2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2004-3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2005-1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2005-2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2005-3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2005-4 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2006-1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2006-2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2006-3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-4 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-5 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-6 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-CP1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-FXD1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-FXD2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust, 2007-HL1 (HSBC Bank)

 

QUEST TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Quest Trust 2006-X1 (Deutsche Bank)

 

SAXON ASSET TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2005-2 (Deutsche Bank Americas)

 

SECURITIZED ASSET-BACKED RECEIVABLES, LLC TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

Securitized AB Receivables, LLC 2004-OP1 (Wells Fargo)

Securitized AB Receivables, LLC 2004-OP2 (Wells Fargo)

Securitized AB Receivables, LLC 2005-OP2 (Wells Fargo)

Securitized AB Receivables, LLC 2006-OP1 (Wells Fargo)

 

SECURITIZED ASSET INVESTMENT LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Securitized Asset Investment Loan Trust 2004-4

 

SG MORTGAGE SECURITIES TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-OPT1 (HSBC Bank)

SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-OPT2 (HSBC Bank)

SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-OPT2 (HSBC Bank)

 

SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN “OPT” TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2005-OPT1 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2005-OPT2 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2005-OPT3 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2005-OPT4 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2006-OPT1 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2006-OPT2 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2006-OPT3 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2006-OPT4 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2006-OPT5 (Deutsche Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2007-OPT1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2007-OPT2 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2007-OPT3 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2007-OPT4 (Wells Fargo Bank)

Soundview Home Loan Trust, 2007-OPT5 (Wells Fargo Bank)

 

STRUCTURED ASSET INVESTMENT LOAN TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-BC9 (Bank of America)

Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2004-11 (Bank of America)

Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-3 (U.S. Bank)

 

STRUCTURED ASSET MORTGAGE INVESTMENTS II , INC. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Structured Asset Mort. Investments II, Inc. 2006-AR5 (JP Morgan Chase)

 

STRUCTURED ASSET SECURITIES CORP. TRUSTS & TRUSTEES

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2003-BC10 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2003-BC11 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2004-3 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2005-OPT1 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2005-SC1 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2006-BC2 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2006-BC6 (U.S. Bank)

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2006-OPT1 (Wells Fargo Bank)

 

Missouri AG Sells Out to LPS

LPS has settled with Missouri for non-prosecution. The Missouri AG agreed to accept the assertion of LPS that it had no idea that all the criminal behavior was ever happening. They are soooooo sorry that they are paying $2 million to the state as a charitable contribution. Think I’m joking? read the article. This is an outrage and should be stopped and the AG should be kicked out of office.

Agreement Not to Prosecute Docx, LLC and Assurance of Voluntary Compliance

FireDogLake: How the Corruption of the Land Title System is NOT Being Fixed

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“You’re talking about massive, massive fraud. And this is what the state Attorneys General and the federal regulators gave up, in exchange for their non-investigatory investigation.”

The Real Foreclosure Fraud Story: Corruption of the Land Title System

By: David Dayen

George Zornick carries a rebuttal from Eric Schneiderman’s team on yesterday’s damaging expose of the securitization fraud working group. Here’s what it has to say:

• There are 50 staffers “across the country” working on the RMBS working group (the official title).
• DoJ has asked for $55 million for additional staffing.
• The five co-chairs of the working group meet formally weekly, and talk daily.
• There are no headquarters for the working group, but that’s because it’s spread across the country.
• There is no executive director.
• Activists still think the staffing level is too low.

If any of this looks familiar, it’s because it’s EXACTLY what Reuters and I reported a week ago. In other words, it was unnecessary. And it doesn’t contradict what the New York Daily News op-ed said yesterday, either. Like that op-ed, this confirms that there is no executive director and no headquarters for the working group, which sounds more like a central processing space for investigations that could have happened independently, at least at this point.

Meanwhile, if you want actual news, you can go to this very good story at MSNBC, revealing the truth that nobody wants to talk about: the inconvenient detail that the land title and property rights system that has served this country well for over 300 years has been irreparably broken by this gang of thieves at the leading banks.

In a quiet office in downtown Charlotte, N.C., dozens of Wells Fargo’s foreclosure foot soldiers sit in cubicles cranking out documents the bank relies on to seize its share of the thousands of homes lost to foreclosure every week […]

The Wells Fargo worker, who first contacted msnbc.com via email in late January, told of a wide range of concerns about the foreclosure documents she processes. Some families apparently were denied loan modifications after only cursory interviews, she said. Other borrowers applying for help sent comprehensive personal financial documents to a fax machine that she discovered had been unattended for weeks. Others landed in foreclosure after owing interest payments of as little as $1.18 a day, according to documents she said she reviewed.

“There was one file where they weren’t even past due and they were in foreclosure status,” the loan processor said. “They’re pushing these files and pushing these files….”

Five years into the worst housing collapse since the Great Depression, the foreclosure pipeline that is removing tens of thousands of families from their homes every month rests on a legal process that has been badly compromised by errors, misrepresentation and outright fraud, according to consumer attorneys, state attorneys general, federal investigators and state and federal judges.

I must confess that I don’t throw this in everyone’s face nearly enough. What is being described in this article is the product of a completely broken system. The low-level grunts are being forced to sign off on a quota of loan files every day, and push the paper through the pipeline. Veracity, or even knowledge of the underlying data in the files, is irrelevant. This is precisely what got us into this mess in the first place, and it’s still happening. And these grunts, making $30,000 a year, are given titles like “Vice President of Loan Documentation” to sign off on affidavits attesting to the loan files. That’s basically robo-signing. It’s still happening.

Check out this part about LPS:

Like many mortgage servicers, Wells Fargo relies on a company called Lender Processing Services to assemble some of the information used to foreclose on properties.

With each file they prepare, the bank’s document processors must swear “personal knowledge” the information in each affidavit was properly collected and is accurate and complete.

But they have no way of making good on that promise because they are not able to check whether LPS properly collected and processed the data, according to the document processor.

“We’re basically copying and pasting” information from the LPS system, she said. “It’s data entry. We just input (on the affidavit) what’s on that system. And that’s it. We don’t go back through system and look.”

You’re talking about massive, massive fraud. And this is what the state Attorneys General and the federal regulators gave up, in exchange for their non-investigatory investigation.

This story is familiar here, but not necessarily to the MSNBC.com audience. I applaud them for putting this long piece together that synthesizes a lot of the information that’s been out there for years. This is the real scandal here, a corrupted residential housing market that actually cannot be put back together.

 

Citi’s Parsons Blames Glass-Steagall Repeal for Crisis

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Editor’s Comment: So here we have one of the guys that was part of the team that overturned Glass-Steagal saying that their success led to the failure of our financial system. But then he says it is too late to change what we have done. It is not too late and if we are ever going to correct the financial system and hence the economy, we need to fix what we have done — separate the banks back into investment banks that take risks and commercial banks that are supposed to minimize risks. Instead we have a system where there is a virtually unlimited supply of other people’s money in the form of deposits and taxpayer bailouts that is the engine for leading what is left of the financial system into another ditch, this one deeper and worse.

Think about it. The banks are reporting record profits while the rest of us are experiencing record problems. That means that the banks are reporting gargantuan profits trading paper based upon economies that are in a nose-dive. How is that possible. We have less commerce (buying and selling) and more money being made by banks trading paper to each other. Or is this simply money laundering — bringing back and repatriating the money they stole in the mortgage meltdown and paying little or no tax?

Parsons Blames Glass-Steagall Repeal for Crisis

By Kim Chipman and Christine Harper 

Richard Parsons, speaking two days after ending his 16-year tenure on the board of Citigroup Inc. (C) and a predecessor, said the financial crisis was partly caused by a regulatory change that permitted the company’s creation.

The 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall law that separated banks from investment banks and insurers made the business more complicated, Parsons said yesterday at a Rockefeller Foundation event in Washington. He served as chairman of Citigroup, the third-biggest U.S. bank by assets, from 2009 until handing off the role to Michael O’Neill at the April 17 annual meeting.

A Citigroup Inc. Citibank. Photographer: Dado Galdieri/Bloomberg

April 20 (Bloomberg) — Bloomberg’s Erik Schatzker and Stephanie Ruhle report that Richard Parsons, speaking two days after ending his 16-year tenure on the board of Citigroup Inc. and a predecessor, said the financial crisis was partly caused by a regulatory change that permitted the company’s creation. They speak on Bloomberg Television’s “Inside Track.” (Source: Bloomberg)

“To some extent what we saw in the 2007, 2008 crash was the result of the throwing off of Glass-Steagall,” Parsons, 64, said during a question-and-answer session. “Have we gotten our arms around it yet? I don’t think so because the financial- services sector moves so fast.”

The 1998 merger of Citicorp and Sanford I. Weill’s Travelers Group Inc. depended on the U.S. government overturning the portion of the Depression-era act that required banks to be separate from capital-markets businesses like Travelers’ Salomon Smith Barney Holdings Inc. Parsons, who was president of Time Warner Inc. (TWX) at the time, had been a member of the Citicorp board before joining the board of the newly created Citigroup.

“Why didn’t he do something about it when he had a chance to?” Mike Mayo, an analyst at CLSA in New York who rates Citigroup shares “underperform,” said in a phone interview. “He’s a couple days out the door and he’s publicly criticizing the ability to manage the company.”

‘Dynamic World’

Unlike John S. Reed, the former Citicorp CEO who said in 2009 that he regretted working to overturn Glass-Steagall, Parsons said he didn’t think that the barriers can be rebuilt.

“We are going to have to figure out how to manage in this new and dynamic world because there are good and sufficient business reasons for putting these things together,” Parsons said. “It’s just that the ability to manage what we have built isn’t up to our capacity to do it yet.”

Parsons didn’t refer to Citigroup specifically during his comments and Shannon Bell, a spokeswoman for the bank in New York, declined to comment. Mayo said Parsons’ comments show he views the New York-based bank as “too big to manage.”

“This gives more support to the new chairman to take more radical action,” said Mayo, whose book “Exile on Wall Street” was critical of Parsons and the management of banks including Citigroup. “Citigroup needs to be reduced in size whether that’s breaking up or additional asset sales or whatever it takes.”

‘Separate Houses’

Parsons said in a phone interview after the event that it was difficult to find executives who could run retail banks and investment banks in the U.S. because the two businesses had been separated by Glass-Steagall for about 60 years.

“One of the things we faced when we tried to find new leadership for Citi, there wasn’t anybody who had deep employment experience in both sides of what theretofore had been separate houses,” he said. Chief Executive Officer Vikram Pandit is trying to change that, Parsons said. “I think if you ask Vikram he’d say probably his biggest challenge long-term is developing the management.”

Banks are growing because corporations and other clients want them to, and management must meet the challenge, he said.

U.S. Bailout

“People have a sort of a notion that ‘well, we can decide that’s too big to manage,’” he said. “But it got that way because there was a market need and institutions find and follow the needs of the marketplace. So what we have to do is we have to learn how to improve our ability to manage it and manage it more effectively.”

Citigroup, which took the most government aid of any U.S. bank during the financial crisis, has lost 86 percent of its value in the past four years, twice as much as the 24-company KBW Bank Index. (BKX) Most shareholders voted this week against the bank’s compensation plan, which awarded Pandit about $15 million in total pay for 2011, when the shares fell 44 percent.

Shareholders’ views shouldn’t be “given the same level of weight” as those of the board and management, Parsons said. Companies “shouldn’t make the mistake of putting them in the driver’s seat.”

To contact the reporters on this story: Kim Chipman in Washington at kchipman@bloomberg.net; Christine Harper in New York at charper@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Colleen McElroy at cmcelroy@bloomberg.net; David Scheer at dscheer@bloomberg.net.

 

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