Miuse of Lift Stay Order Causes Chaos in State and Federal Courts

I have noticed on many occasions that the bankruptcy court judges are adding to the orders some language of finding that the movant is the owner of the loan. The court lacks jurisdiction to consider those issues and that is the reason why the act of lifting the stay is a ministerial act based upon a preliminary finding that the movant has some colorable right to proceed.

It is nothing more than an order of remand outside the administrative side of the bankruptcy following which the debtor ought to be able to file either an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy action, a federal civil action with the Federal District Civil Court or the state court of competent jurisdiction.

But when filed outside the adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court, the debtor is often met with the argument that the matter has already been litigated and that therefore the debtor should be barred from “re-litigating” the issue under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, or the common law doctrines of collateral estoppel or res judicata.

Frequently uninformed Judges accept this argument as true. While it is true that good research and writing of memorandums might suffice I have suggested to attorneys that they attack the source — the bankruptcy Judge in the administrative proceedings in which the bankruptcy is being processed.

Based upon this I have advised several attorney who have asked for my research and opinion, that the court be advised that the lift stay order is going to be misused and that the court lacks jurisdiction to do anything other than grant or deny the motion to lift stay. But many Judges are adding language that implies that the matter has been litigated, which causes unending procedural problems for the homeowners.

If you lose, you ought to ask the Judge to insert language in the order that the order may not be construed as a findings of fact based upon an adversary hearing in which evidence was presented on the merits of the intended foreclosure or the the debtor’s defenses.

The problem you are addressing is that if the lift stay order is entered, it is often construed by state courts as being conclusive as to the issue of the ownership of the loan, the legal ability of the forecloser to submit a credit bid, and your potential defenses.

This is particularly true where Judges gratuitously add, at the urging of the would-be forecloser that the forecloser is the owner of the loan. Since the burden of proof required at a motion to lift stay hearing is merely whether there exists some “colorable” right to proceed, it is not a hearing in which due process  has been afforded the debtor as to the merits of the supposed creditor’s claim nor the defenses of the debtor, where the burden of proof is at least a preponderance of the evidence.

So I often suggest that counsel for the debtor specifically request that if the Judge is inclined to grant the lift stay order, that the Judge also recite the fact that this order should not be construed as barring the defenses or claims of the debtor under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, res judicata or collateral estoppel, which is something for the state court to decide.

Whether you are filing or speaking or both, the wording should go something like this (check with licensed counsel as to form and content):

1. The debtor denies that the party seeking relief from stay is a creditor of the bankruptcy estate or an authorized representative of any creditor. In fact, the moving party refuses to provide the identity of the creditor who could submit a credit bid in lieu of cash at auction and refuses to provide either the debtor or this court with any evidence from the Master Servicer which has access to the loan receivable account that contains all of the receipts and disbursements relative to this loan and the pool it is alleged to be the owner of the loan.
2. Debtor also denies that a perfected lien exists in which this moving party or any other party can foreclose.
3. Debtor denies the default, since the subservicer and other parties continued to make payments to the creditor’s loan or bond receivable account after the alleged declaration of default and notice of sale. Hence even if this court were to decide that the “colorable” claim threshold had been met, the order entered should not be subject to claims by this movant that a default exists or that it is the the actual owner of a loan receivable account in which the balance is deficient or payments have not been made to the creditor.
4. In fact, based upon public records, it is apparent that a mortgage bond was issued in lieu of an account or loan receivable and that the account was or should be credited with payments received by insurance, credit default swaps and other contractual arrangements with the subservicer and master Servicer in which the creditor was paid or credited with those payments that expressly waived subrogation and which did not involve an assignment or purchase of the loan.
5. Based upon the facts thus far discovered by debtor and the lack of evidence offered by the the party seeking the right to foreclose, debtor specifically denies that she ever entered into a financial transaction with this party or any of its predecessors. Debtor admits that she has had many loans or credit with many parties as is evident from the schedules filed in this bankruptcy, but none of those included this party moving to lift stay or any predecessors.
6. If the court were to enter an order based upon the “colorable” interest doctrine, Debtor respectfully requests that this party or any successors be barred from using this order as a matter that had had already been litigated and that debtor be permitted to assert claims and defenses in the state court, as these would-be foreclosers have claimed when the debtor brings actions for Temporary restraining Orders and other claims.
7. Debtor denies the the note is evidence of any loan owed by debtor to this movant or any of its predecessors and denies therefore that the Deed of Trust constitutes a perfected lien against the subject property and further denies that the power of sale contained in the Deed of Trust can be exercised —particularly without an adversary proceeding in which evidence is presented with proper foundation through testimony of competent witnesses that the debtor can cross examine.
8. In fact, upon information and belief, the wire transfer instructions received by a closing agent specifically exclude this movant and any predecessors in interest or asserted interest regarding the loan origination documents, that were not and never were supported by consideration nor were any “assignments” or sales of the loan ever supported by consideration in which value or money exchanged hands. Debtor denies that the named payee was the lender or source of funds for any loan and therefore could not neither be the beneficiary under the deed of trust nor have any nominee as beneficiary under the deed of trust.
9. This is being brought to the court’s attention at a late date because the information about the origination of the loan only recently came into the hands of the debtor.
10. Debtor denies the validity and authenticity of any documents proffered by the supposed creditor to whom no money is owed and who lacks any right, justification or excuse to bring any collection or foreclosure proceeding since it neither funded nor purchased the loan.
11. Even in a motion to lift say, the burden is upon the movant to bring forward some competent evidence in which the foundation for any documents being used to support the motion are supported by the testimony of a witness that is competent to testify — on personal knowledge of the all of the receivable instead of the partial accounting from the subservicer upon which the the movant and the trustee on the deed of trust rely. Debtor denies that such a witness exists because the facts upon which such a witness would be required to testify also do not exist.
12. Debtor intends to bring an adversary action against this movant for wrongful foreclosure, abuse of process and slander of title, amongst other causes of action. If the court denies the motion to lift stay, debtor shall file the adversary action in the in this Court. If the Court grants the motion to lift stay, debtor shall file the proceeding in state court. Debtor requests that her meritorious claims not be barred by misuse of civil procedure and misuse of the rules of evidence and common law doctrines based upon a hearing whose burden of proof is less than “probable cause” in criminal actions.

If the BKR judge disagrees, then statistics would indicate that a LATERAL appeal to the District Court judge would have a much higher likelihood (50%) of success than an appeal to the BAP (15%) or Circuit Court of Appeal (15%).

Mass Supremes Declare Note and Mortgage Must Be Owned by Same Party

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We disagree that § 14 is unambiguous. The section is one in a set of provisions governing mortgage foreclosures by sale, and that set in turn is one component of a chapter of the General Laws devoted generally to the topic of foreclosure and redemption of mortgages. The term “mortgagee” appears in several of these statutes, and its use reflects a legislative understanding or assumption that the “mortgagee” referred to also is the holder of the mortgage note.

Editor’s Analysis:  Hat tip to stopforeclosurefraud.com. And a special hat tip to Fr. Emmanuel Lemelson, who is a Greek orthodox Priest, and author of the article below. I add the editorial comments of the blog site because they are exactly on point.

First, let’s note that the Court tried to limit the effect of its ruling to future foreclosure actions and possibly those already in process. But the attempt fails because of their acknowledgment that foreclosure is not a single event but rather a process in which several elements must be present to conclude the matter. That process includes:

  1. Declaring a default and demanding a payment that is plainly wrong after taking into account the financial transactions of the Master Servicer and thus the one true creditor. As a fraud upon the court, this opens the door to going back retroactively and attacking the notice.
  2. Commencing foreclosure proceedings. Just because you are allowed to initiate a foreclosure by court order (Motion to Lift Stay) or appellate decision, doesn’t make you a creditor who can submit a credit bid at auction.his is the Achilles heal of the 5 million preceding foreclosures and all of the ones planned for the future.
  3. The court clearly states that the statutes and case law allowing the initiation of foreclosure proceedings are restricted by other statutes and legislative assumptions. The requirement of holding both the note and mortgage as owner is phrased in terms of redemption; but the logic also applies to the credit bid submitted in lieu of a cash bid at the sham auction of the property.
  4. A credit bid by definition can only be submitted and accepted if it comes from the secured creditor in the transaction that originated the paperwork giving rise to all the false claims of securitization and assignments. Thus a bid received by a party other than the secured creditor listed on the paperwork is no bid at all. We call that lack of consideration. hence the auctioneer had no choice but to ignore the “credit bid” and move on to cash bids, which is why I tell people to go to their auctions and make a bid. They should also register an objection in writing that the auction is unauthorized and fraudulent, and deny the debt, obligation, note, mortgage, default etc. If there was no cash bid, then the property is still owned by the homeowner, the deed in foreclosure should be set aside, and this new decision might apply to renewal of foreclosure proceedings.
  5. In Bankruptcy the Motion to Lift stay need only be supported by some colorable right to proceed in foreclosure. From now on unless the party can establish that it has possession and ownership of the note, they have no right to get relief from automatic stay because they have no right to submit a credit bid.
  6. The reference to redemption raises interesting issues. While the court waffled and more or less came down on the side of the banks as to prior completed foreclosures, there is still an attack left standing under the old law and the new law. How can you redeem, modify mediate or even litigate where the true creditor’s identity is being intentionally withheld from the borrower and the court? The right of redemption thus becomes a doorway to reopen the title question. If accompanied by valid causes of action for fraudulent and predatory lending, slander of title etc. the redemption price cold be reduced to zero or less — giving the homeowner both the title and possession of his home plus a monetary award.
  7. If the auction was conducted improperly and the deed issued without consideration then it follows that the eviction must be overturned as well.
  8. Hence, CAVEAT EMPTOR to those looking for bargain homes where the home is alleged to be owned as REO property or the property is being subjected to a short sale where the “prior” fraudulent mortgage is paid off to a stranger to the transaction who issues an invalid release and satisfaction.
  9. The main point is that Massachusetts foreclosures are now likely to come to a dead stop, which will have rippling effect throughout the world of mortgages, foreclosure and finance. This in turn will reveal that the assets carried on the books of the mega banks are fictitious. As those facts are revealed, BOA and Citi, as well as other banks are going to take another brutal hit on their credit ratings — enough to finish off BOA and Citi and maybe one or two others.

Watch later for our article on warnings to those purchasing US properties investment or retirement. You might well be the victim of another scam perpetrated by Wall Street.

Henrietta Eaton and the Boston Foreclosure Party

By Fr. Emmanuel Lemelson

To read entire article go to:

Henrietta Eaton and the Boston Foreclosure Party


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GAME OVER? VEAL CASE VINDICATES EVERY POINT REPORTED ON LIVINGLIES

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NO MERIT TO FORECLOSURE ACTIONS, PAST PRESENT OR FUTURE UNLESS THE REAL CREDITOR IS PRESENT.

BURDEN OF PROOF SHIFTS TO PRETENDERS

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  1. “IN THIS CASE, ONE COMPONENT OF PRUDENTIAL STANDING IS PARTICULARLY APPLICABLE. IT IS THE DOCTRINE THAT A PLAINTIFF MUST ASSERT ITS OWN LEGAL RIGHTS AND MAY NOT ASSERT THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF OTHERS. SPRINT, 554 U.S. AT 589; WARTH, 422 AT 499; OREGON V LEGAL SERVS. CORP, 552 F. 3D 965, 971 (9TH CIR., 2009).

  2. “Civil Rule 17(a)(1) starts simply: “An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest… The modern function  of the rule… is simply to protect the defendant against a subsequent action by the party actually entitled to recover, and to insure generally that the Judgement will have its proper effect as res judicata.”

  3. “The party asserting it has standing bears the burden of proof to establish standing. Sumers v Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009)

  4. “Real party in interest analysis requires a determination of the applicable substantive law, since it is that law which defines and specifies the wrong, those aggrieved, and the redress they may receive. 6A Federal practice and Procedure sec 1543 at 480-481

ILLUSION OF SECURITIZATION IS FALLING APART

COLLATERAL BENEFIT TO HOMEOWNER

RESULTING FROM DEFECTS IN PRETENDER LENDER CASE

IS NOT A REASON TO RULE AGAINST THE HOMEOWNER-BORROWER

In a decision filed June 10, 2011 — one year after oral argument — the BAP carefully analyzed the position of the borrower and the alleged creditor and came up with nothing to support the allegations that there was a creditor in the room. Standing being a jurisdictional issue wiped out AHMSI and Wells Fargo.

This one is for publication, which means it is controlling precedent for all bankruptcy Judges in the Ninth Circuit. In a nutshells, the claim of “holder” is not enough, even for a motion to lift stay where the burden is extremely light. Thanks to a growing number of bankruptcy lawyers who understand these issues and thanks to their skill in presenting it, Bankruptcy Judges are realizing two things (1) lifting the stay is misused by the movant by creating the appearance that the merits of the case have already been heard and decided and therefore are engraved in stone under the doctrine of collateral estoppel and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and (2) nipping abuse of process in the bud is the proper way for the courts to handle the pretender lenders.

It is very clear that this represents a sea change in the judicial attitude toward the pretender lenders. The documents don’t add up. So if anyone wants to come in to a court alleging that they can foreclose on the property or collect on the debt, they need to have real evidence which means live witnesses testifying under oath that they have personal knowledge and can authenticate the documents and other evidence proffered by the pretenders. These people don’t exist.

The bottom line is that there is no claim, an objection to the proof of claim will obviously be upheld in view of this ruling, and the homeowner is going to get their home free and clear of any encumbrances or debts unless the real creditor shows up — which is unlikely since the investors are busy suing the investment banks that sold them the bogus mortgage bonds.

LAWYERS ARE SHARPENING UP THEIR PENCILS GETTING READY TO FILE MOTIONS FOR REHEARING AND RECONSIDERATION IN AND OUT OF BANKRUPTCY COURT.

QUOTES FROM THE CASE:

“We hold that that a party has standing to seek relief from stay if it has a property interest in, or is entitled to enforce or pursue remedies related thereto, teh secured obligation that forms the basis of its motion.”

“We hold that a party has standing to prosecute a proof of claim involving a negotiable promissory note secured by real property if, under applicable law, it is a “person entitled to enforce the note” as defined by the Uniform Commercial Code.”

“The Dorchuck letter is just that; a letter, and nothing more. Mr. Dorchuck does not declare that his statements are made under penalty of perjury, nor does the document bear any other traditional elements of admissible evidence.”

“No basis was laid for authenticating or otherwise admitting the Dorchuck letter into evidence at any of the hearings in this matter.”

“Wells Fargo presented no evidence as to who possessed the note and no evidence regarding any property interest it held in the Note.”

“the purported assignment from Option One to Wells Fargo does not contain language affecting the assignment of the note. While the Note is referred to, that reference serves only to identify the mortgage. Moreover, the record is devoid of any indorsement of the Note from Option One to Wells Fargo. As a consequence, even had the second assignment been considered as evidence, it would not have provided any proof of the transfer of the note to Wells Fargo. At most, it would have been proof that only the mortgage, and all associated rights arising from it, had been assigned.”

“given the carve out of the Note at the beginning… the relative pronouns “therein”, “thereto” and thereon” more naturally refer back to the obligations contained in the mortgage, such as the the obligation to insure the property, and not to an external obligation such as the Note…. Although the clauses might be sufficiently vague to permit parol evidence to clarify their intended meaning, no such evidence was offered or requested.”
“STANDING  is a threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.”

“Prudential standing ” ’embodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.'” Spring, 554 U.S. at 289 (quoting Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 11); County of Kern F. 3d at 845.

“IN THIS CASE, ONE COMPONENT OF PRUDENTIAL STANDING IS PARTICULARLY APPLICABLE. IT IS THE DOCTRINE THAT A PLAINTIFF MUST ASSERT ITS OWN LEGAL RIGHTS AND MAY NOT ASSERT THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF OTHERS. SPRINT, 554 U.S. AT 589; WARTH, 422 AT 499; OREGON V LEGAL SERVS. CORP, 552 F. 3D 965, 971 (9TH CIR., 2009).

“Civil Rule 17(a)(1) starts simply: “An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest… The modern function  of the rule… is simply to protect the defendant against a subsequent action by the party actually entitled to recover, and to insure generally that the Judgement will have its proper effect as res judicata.”

“The party asserting it has standing bears the burden of proof to establish standing. Sumers v Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009)

“Real party in interest analysis requires a determination of the applicable substantive law, since it is that law which defines and specifies the wrong, those aggrieved, and the redress they may receive. 6A Federal practice and Procedure sec 1543 at 480-481

9th Circuit BAP: HSBC, ASC Not Real Party In Interest, No Standing, MERS Has No Interest

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The collateral benefit MUST go solely to the homeowner. If the creditor chooses not to exercise any right or intention to collect, it is not a license for ANYONE to come in as a third party and make the claim.

“If you don’t want it, we’ll take it” is not a cause of action. Pretender lenders are not entitled to collect on the claim of the real creditor under any theory.

RON RYAN, ESQ. USES LIVINGLIES MATERIAL AND OVERTURNS BANKRUPTCY COURT DECISION

Interesting that the Judges on the panel had previously tossed out expert testimony from me and otherwise ruled against the theories and facts reported on this blog. Now, sitting on an appellate review panel, the same Judges decided that Judge Hollowell should be reversed, but like other favorable decisions, announced that their decision should not be used as binding legal precedent. In other words, they are creeping toward our conclusions, accepting them gradually with a toe in the water to see what happens. The primary new event is that these Judges are no longer giving lip service to the “free house” political argument that was previously made and accepted by pretender lenders. Things are changing! Hold on tight, this ride is not over yet.

Despite the acknowledgment by the Bankruptcy Chapter 13 Petitioner that ASC had a secured claim, the appellate panel said that relying on the Petition is not enough. As we have said repeatedly here on these pages, many lawyers suggest that the Petition be filed such that these issues don’t even arise, thus bolstering at the administrative level in Bankruptcy or the Trial level in civil litigation the argument that the borrower already admitted that this was a secured liquidated claim. The truth is, in my opinion, and in the opinion of many other lawyers and Judges, that the claims being presented in nonjudicial (which is the subject of this Fontes case) and judicial proceedings are neither secured nor liquidated.

Whether you look at the Herrera case, reported earlier, or any of the recent cases we have reported in the last week, you will see very clearly that the courts no longer have the automatic knee jerk prejudice to rule against the homeowner. A bad mortgage is a bad mortgage. The securitizers created these table funded loans with undisclosed lenders and messed up almost everything that was a clerical task. If the end result runs negative to the foreclosers, too bad, they never showed they had any loss anyway (because in fact they had no loss).

The real party in interest is the investor-lender who has chosen NOT to enforce against the homeowner because they don’t want any part of the multitude of affirmative defenses and counterclaims for fraud, predatory lending, statutory violations etc. Instead, they are suing the investment banks who sold them “mortgage bonds” without the mortgages.

The collateral benefit MUST go solely to the homeowner. If the creditor chooses not to exercise any right or intention to collect, it is not a license for ANYONE to come in as a third party and make the claim. “If you don’t want it, we’ll take it” is not a cause of action.

Pretender lenders are not entitled to collect on the claim of the real creditor under any theory.

QUOTES FROM THE CASE:

“Under sec 362(d) only a “party in interest” may seek relief from the operation of the automatic stay from the bankruptcy court.”

In Weisband “the court concluded that MERS did not have constitutional standing and, if MERS did not have constitutional standing, its assignee could not satisfy the requirements of constitutional standing either. Id. see also Wilhelm, 407 B.R. at 404 (discussing validity of MERS’s assignments related tot he note). We do not perceive a different result is warranted…”

“it is axiomatic that HSBC must show that it has both constitutional standing and prudential, or party in interest, standing to bring the motion for relief from stay. Satisfying one standing requirements and not the other is insufficient. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982)”

“The only manner in which HSBC links itself to ASC in the record is through its repeated assertions (e.s.) without any reference to any evidence that ASC was its “Servicer.” No further details were given [Editor’s note: nor are further details EVER given, thus the importance of this statement in the case]. Does HSBC mean that ASC was its agent at thet ime fo the debtors’ filing? Or, does HSBC mean it somehow became the sucessor in interest to ASC? The record does not support either theory.”

“The record contains no servicing agreement between ASC and HSBC indicating that ASC was HSBC’s agent, and ASC’s proof of claim did not state it was acting as the agent for HSBC.”

“… the only inference to be drawn from the record is that ASC was acting as the servicer for some other party than HSBC when debtors filed their petition.” [Editor’s Note: The court recognized the shell game and put a stop to it]

US TRUSTEES ATTACKING PRETENDER LENDER STANDING IN MLS

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In his experience, Mr. Shaev said: “The attorneys who represent the banks invariably state that they will get the collateral file for us and prove that the banks had possession of the documents at the appropriate time. But then when we review the file it doesn’t show that at all.”

“The Central Question rising to the surface and now unavoidable is whether a party claiming to be a secured creditor would prevail if there was a normal adversary hearing on the merits where the normal rules of evidence apply” — Neil F Garfield

EDITOR’S NOTE:  In bankruptcy courts across the country, pretender lenders have been able to rely upon an unwritten code wherein a motion to lift stay (MLS) filed by a secured creditor would be unopposed by the trustee. The pretender lender would not only be free to continue with judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure and sale, they would also have the appearance of a court order  apparently confirming their right to foreclose.

When I first broached the subject with various US trustees around the country in 2007 and 2008 they were extremely skeptical. I proposed a business model to them which would provide the protection to the debtor that was intended by the Constitution and the statutes governing the substance of bankruptcy petitions.  I showed them that the US trustee, the attorney for the US trustee, the creditors, and the attorney for the debtor would all be able to share in a larger estate and thus earned more fees than was currently the case where a home was in foreclosure.

It was my opinion then and it is my opinion now that not only do the pretender lenders lack standing to pursue a foreclosure, but that there does not appear to be any credible party in the securitization chain who would possess such standing. It was my opinion that the participants in the securitization scheme had hopelessly obscured the obligation and split the obligation from the note and mortgage as well as splitting the note from the mortgage.

Thus while the obligation clearly exists, subject to offsets and counterclaims, there is no law or legal theory under which the obligation was in fact secured. The US trustees in bankruptcy were not only skeptical, they were actually opposed to my plan because they did not want to be part of any procedure by which a borrower abused the judicial process in order to gain a windfall or undue advantage.

In a major change of policy, US trustees in bankruptcy court are now challenging the standing and viability of the claims made by the pretender lenders. The premise was that if a lawyer came to bankruptcy court claiming to represent a lender that was secured by a mortgage on the property it was presumed that the representation to the court was true. As we have seen in various news reports there are good reasons to question whether the attorney represents anyone, whether any of the parties to whom the attorney refers is an actual creditor, and whether the claim is secured by a mortgage on the home.

The wrongful foreclosure damage actions are giving pause to everyone involved in the closing of these deals and in the processing of the “foreclosures.” Invariably, the old trustee on a deed of trust is substituted with one with whom the pretender lender has an ‘arrangement” concerning going forward, regardless of the obstacles.

The employment of  intermediaries used to obscure the fraud in the sale of the bogus mortgage bonds and the bogus mortgage loans are the business model for the employment of intermediaries used to obscure the fraud on the court in foreclosures.

These intermediaries — originators, brokers, title agents, escrow agents, appraisers, trustees, and foreclosure companies are all in the cross hairs of lawyers across the country who are suing for individual or class action relief. Any party moving forward at this point can be held to the “knew or should have known” status required for a fraudulent foreclosure or slander of title action. If it is negligence, there might be insurance coverage. If it is viewed as an intentional act of fraud, the insurer for errors and omissions might decline coverage for even the defense of the action.

The megabanks have intentionally and in so many words set up various “bankruptcy remote” vehicles that are intended to insulate them from liability in case this thing explodes in their faces. They wish to protect their claim of plausible deniability and point the finger at the actual people who got the hands dirty — as the recent closing of  David Stern’s office in Florida demonstrates. These remote vehicles are submitting credit bids at auction which are by all accounts not only illegal, but void.

Any issuance of a title document reflecting a “credit bid” is essentially a “wild deed,” — i.e., one that can and would be ignored by a title examiner. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that nearly all REO property is still legally owned by the homeowners who believe their home was foreclosed and sold.

The central question that is gradually rising to the surface is simply whether or not a party claiming to be a creditor could sustain its burden of proof in a normal evidentiary hearing. The presumptions that were used before the securitization of residential mortgage loans made sense when the transaction lacked the complexity and duplicity inherent in the scheme of securitization as it was practiced by Wall Street. It is now apparent to many judges, many lawyers, many people in the media, many homeowners, and now US trustees in bankruptcy, that the old presumptions do not apply.

In plain language, the parties claiming to be creditors are not creditors, because the bankruptcy estate does not owe them any money. The same is true in federal and state civil court. The mega banks took advantage of their appearance of propriety and the old presumptions and made the judicial system of vehicle for fraudulent conveyances. The resulting chaos in the chain of title, claims under title insurance, and the inability to obtain a satisfaction of mortgage from a party that is authorized to execute it is the major challenge confronting the legal system.

This has thrust an enormous burden on the offices of the  property appraiser and County recorder across the country. 66 million transactions involving “wild deeds” are now in the chains of title in tens of millions of homes.

The resolution to this crisis is obvious even if it is odious. It has happened in the past that title records have been corrupted beyond repair. It becomes necessary to push a figurative “reset” button with a window of opportunity for those affected to present their claims in a manner required by the court and the legislature of each state. It is in this process that the homeowners will receive an opportunity to obtain some relief while the investors who advanced the funds for the loans recover as much as possible.

LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL

November 27, 2010

Don’t Just Tell Us. Show Us That You Can Foreclose.

SYSTEMIC CHANGE NEEDED

By GRETCHEN MORGENSON

NY TIMES

AFTER examining their foreclosure practices for flaws in mortgage documentation and other procedures, many of the nation’s largest banks have resumed — or will soon resume — trying to evict defaulted borrowers.

JPMorgan Chase, for example, told investors this month that it had extensively reviewed its foreclosure controls, trained personnel in the unit and started new procedures to ensure that all legal requirements would be met when it moves to seize a property in default.

“If we find any foreclosures in error, we will fix them,” JPMorgan Chase said.

But while banks may have booted a few robo-signers and tightened up some lax procedures, one question at the heart of the foreclosure mess refuses to go away: whether institutions trying to take back a property can prove they even have the right to foreclose at all.

Some in the industry believe that questions about this issue — known as “legal standing” — are trivial. They say it’s just a gambit by borrowers’ lawyers to throw sand in the foreclosure machine. Nine times out of 10, bankers say, the right institutions are foreclosing on the right borrowers.

Maybe so. But the United States Trustee Program, the unit of the Justice Department charged with overseeing the integrity of the nation’s bankruptcy courts, is taking a different view. The unit is stepping up its scrutiny of the veracity of banks’ claims against borrowers, and its approach is evident in two cases in federal bankruptcy court in Atlanta.

In both cases, Donald F. Walton, the United States trustee for the region, has intervened, filing motions contending that the banks trying to foreclose have not shown they have the right to do so.

The matters involve borrowers operating under Chapter 13 bankruptcy plans overseen by the court in the Northern District of Georgia. In both cases, the banks have filed motions with the bankruptcy court to remove the automatic foreclosure stay that results when a court confirms a debtor’s Chapter 13 repayment plan. If the stay is removed, the banks can foreclose.

In one case, the borrower had her Chapter 13 plan confirmed by the court early last month. About two weeks later, Wells Fargo asked the court for relief from the stay so that it could foreclose.

Responding on Nov. 16, Mr. Walton asked the court to deny the bank’s request because it had failed to produce any facts showing that it was entitled to foreclose — either as the holder of the underlying note or as the agent for the holder.

The other case involves a couple who had their Chapter 13 plan confirmed by the court in March 2009. A month ago, Chase Home Finance, a unit of JPMorgan Chase, asked the court for relief from the automatic stay so that it could start foreclosure proceedings.

Again, Mr. Walton objected, asking the court to deny the request on the same grounds as argued in the Wells Fargo matter — in this case, that Chase hadn’t proved that it controlled the note on the property.

Jane Limprecht, a spokeswoman for the trustee program, confirmed that it was ratcheting up its scrutiny on banks’ foreclosure practices.

“The United States Trustee Program is engaged in an enhanced review of mortgage servicer filings in bankruptcy cases to help ensure the accuracy of the claim to repayment,” she said. She declined to comment on specific filings.

A Chase spokesman said the bank is the holder of the note in the Georgia case, giving it standing to file the motion.

A spokeswoman for Wells Fargo said that in its case, it is the trustee of a mortgage security that contains the loan, not the servicer. In its capacity as the trustee for mortgage loans serviced by others, it says it expects those servicers to abide by all required laws, processes and procedures.

Howard D. Rothbloom, a lawyer in Atlanta who represents borrowers in bankruptcy, welcomed the actions by Mr. Walton and said he believes they show a sea change in the United States trustee’s thinking on the foreclosure mess.

“Until now, what we had was homeowners complaining about a lack of due process,” Mr. Rothbloom said. “Now you have the federal government complaining about the abuse of the judicial process. That’s really what was missing before.”

The judges overseeing these matters have not yet ruled on the banks’ or the trustee’s requests. And Wells Fargo and Chase may indeed be able to persuade the trustee that their filings were proper.

But the trustee’s intervention in these matters indicates that it wants banks to show the courts that they have the right to foreclose, rather than simply telling them they do. That had been the custom, after all. Now, Mr. Walton’s motions may serve as a warning to banks that they need to be better prepared if they want to foreclose on a borrower.

“For years, the trustee would always take the creditors’ side,” Mr. Rothbloom said. “My strong opinion is the U.S. trustee’s perspective is that they exist to stop borrowers from cheating banks. Perhaps they are coming to the realization that banks can also cheat borrowers.”

FEDERAL trustees in other parts of the country have also intervened in borrower cases, but many of these actions have been related to questionable foreclosure fees or to dubious legal or documentation practices. The shift to a broader focus on the issue of standing suggests that the courts may no longer accept at face value the banks’ arguments that they have the right to foreclose or represent the institution that does.

David Shaev, a lawyer in New York who works with troubled borrowers, says the United States trustee there has also intervened in one of his cases, taking up the issue of a bank’s right to foreclose.

In his experience, Mr. Shaev said: “The attorneys who represent the banks invariably state that they will get the collateral file for us and prove that the banks had possession of the documents at the appropriate time. But then when we review the file it doesn’t show that at all.”

As many large banks renew their foreclosure efforts, Mr. Rothbloom says he hopes that the United States trustee will bring about a comprehensive change in bank practices.

“I’ve gotten resolutions for clients in individual cases, but I’m just a flea on the tail of an elephant,” he said. “Resolutions of individual cases don’t bring about systemic change.”

And systemic change is precisely what’s needed.

BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE: NAME ONLY THE ORIGINATING LENDER OF RECORD

submitted by Brian Davies

EDITOR’S NOTE: By naming only the originating lender of record — that is, the only instrument in the title record as per the county recording office, you immediately shift the burden onto any pretender lender to explain what they are doing in court. If you look down into the records in the link below you’ll see Davies objection and some excellent points he raises. My opinion is that the property value is unknown and unencumbered by a mortgage, if you know about the securitization path. Combine that with our loan specific title review, you get a value to put in if you want to, and then name only the originating lender as a creditor under unsecured claims because the mortgage was split from the note and note was split from the obligation. The MERS assignment is icing on the cake.

It’s my opinion that if you show the home as encumbered by the mortgage it is an admission of the validity of the encumbrance. That is an admission of a “fact” that is probably false. Why would you do that? In my opinion, generally speaking, NONE of these securitized “mortgages” are secured, NONE of the obligations are properly or legally described in the note and NONE of them are properly secured with a perfected lien in favor of an actual creditor. The security instrument is an “incident” to the note. But the note neither names the actual creditor nor discloses the true facts of the deal. The note is contrary to the Good Faith Estimate in that respect as well (a TILA violation).

So the obligation that arose when the borrower took the money is NOT described in the note, at least not completely. That means that the note, which is normally presumed to be evidence of the obligation, is not a complete description of the obligation and in fact is not even correct insofar as it identifies the creditor or lender. The note also does not contain the terms of the mortgage bond given to the lender (investor).

The mortgage bond received by the lender (investor) contains terms and parties that are not included in the note. Neither the bond nor the note are complete descriptions of the obligation.

Thus neither the note nor the bond can be accepted into evidence as the complete statement of the obligation. Even together they fail to show the actual path that the money traveled and they provide the context and conditions under which the note or mortgage could be accepted by the pool —- conditions that were in nearly ALL cases unfulfilled. There can be no proper accounting of the amount due nor a determination of whether there is  an actual default (failure of the CREDITOR to receive payment, not merely the the failure of the borrower to make a payment which might not be due).

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY BY ONEWEST. A PARTY NOT EVEN MENTIONED IN THE CHAPTER 7 FILING. HOWEVER, MOVANT ONEWEST COMES INTO THE COURT WITH 1) NO STANDING, 2) FALSIFIED AFFIDAVITS 3) DISCOLORED NOTES NOT COPIES OF THE ORIGINALS 4) SIGNED AFFIDAVITS BY BRIAN BARNHILL THAT ARE INACCURATE 5) DEED OF TRUST THAT IS FAULTY AND NOT PERFECTED 6) A SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF THE DEED OF TRUST WHICH TRIES TO CORRECT SECURITY INTEREST AND TITLE ISSUES.. DEBTOR ASKS FOR SANCTIONS. READ THE ENTIRETY AS IT IS LISTED AS UNSECURED DEBT, ONLY ORIGINATOR IS LISTED

http://www.scribd.com/doc/39002836/ONEWEST-HAS-NO-STANDING-MOTION-FOR-RELIEF-FROM-STAY-WITH-OBJECTIONS

They will get caught

WEISBAND Case No. 4:09-bk-05175-EWH. BKR Tucson Judge HOLLOWELL Denies MLS for Lack of Standing

GMAC has failed to demonstrate that it is the holder of the Note because, while it was in possession of the Note at the evidentiary hearing, it failed to demonstrate that the Note is properly payable to GMAC

Once the securities have been sold, the SPV is not actively involved.

IN RE WEISBAND

In re: BARRY WEISBAND, Chapter 13, Debtor.

Case No. 4:09-bk-05175-EWH.

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Arizona.

March 29, 2010.

Barry Weisband, Tucson, AZ, Ronald Ryan, Ronald Ryan, P.C., Tucson, AZ, Attorney for Debtor.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

EILEEN W. HOLLOWELL, Bankruptcy Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

The debtor, Barry Weisband (“Debtor”), has challenged the standing of creditor, GMAC Mortgage, LLC (“GMAC”), to seek stay relief on his residence. After reviewing the documents provided by GMAC and conducting an evidentiary hearing, the court concludes that GMAC, the alleged servicer of the Debtor’s home loan, lacks standing to seek stay relief. The reasons for this conclusion are explained in the balance of this decision.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Creation of Debtor’s Note And Asserted Subsequent Transfers

On or about October 6, 2006, the Debtor executed and delivered to GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. (“GreenPoint”) an adjustable rate promissory note in the principal sum of $540,000 (“Note”) secured by a Deed of Trust (“DOT”) on real property located at 5424 East Placita Apan, Tucson, Arizona 85718 (“Property”).

On a separate piece of paper, GreenPoint endorsed the Note to GMAC (“Endorsement”). The Endorsement is undated. The DOT was signed by the Debtor on October 9, 2006, and recorded on October 13, 2006. The DOT lists GreenPoint as the lender, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as the beneficiary of the DOT “solely as nominee for [GreenPoint], its successors and assigns.”

Approximately five months before the creation of the Note and DOT, on April 10, 2006, GreenPoint entered into a Flow Interim Servicing Agreement (“FISA”) (Exhibit D)[ 1 ] with Lehman Capital, a division of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (collectively “Lehman”), pursuant to which Lehman agreed to purchase conventional, residential, fixed and adjustable rate first and second lien mortgage loans from GreenPoint. Under the FISA, GreenPoint agreed to service the mortgage loans it sold to Lehman. According to GMAC, GreenPoint transferred the Note and DOT to Lehman under the FISA.

On November 1, 2006, Lehman entered into a Mortgage Loan Sale and Assignment Agreement (“MLSAA”) with Structured Asset Securities Corporation (“SASC”) (Exhibit E). Under that agreement, Lehman transferred a number of the mortgage loans it acquired under the FISA to SASC. GMAC claims that the Note was one of the mortgage loans transferred to SASC. SASC created a trust to hold the transferred mortgages — GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Trust (“Trust”). The MLSAA also transferred the right to receive principal and interest payments under the transferred mortgage loans from Lehman to the Trust.

Also, on November 1, 2006, SASC entered into a Trust Agreement (Exhibit F) with Aurora Loan Services (“Aurora”) as the master servicer, and U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”) as the trustee. A Reconstituted Servicing Agreement (Exhibit G) was executed the same day, which provided that GreenPoint would continue to service the mortgages transferred to the Trust under the MLSAA, but that the Trust could change servicers at any time. Also, according to GMAC, on November 1, 2006, GMAC, Lehman, and Aurora entered into a Securitization Servicing Agreement (“SSA”) (Exhibit H), pursuant to which GMAC would service the loans transferred to the Trust. GMAC claims that under the SSA it is the current servicer of the Note and DOT.

Thus, according to GMAC, as of November 1, 2006, the Note and DOT had been transferred to the Trust, with SASC as the Trustor, U.S. Bank as the Trustee, Aurora as the master servicer, and GMAC as the sub-servicer. GreenPoint went out of business in 2007. According to GMAC, it remains the sub-servicer of the Note, and that is its only financial interest in the Note and DOT. (Transcript Nov. 10, 2009, pp. 44, 47, 75.)

B. Bankruptcy Events

As of March 1, 2009, the Debtor was in default of his obligations under the Note. Debtor filed his petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on March 19, 2009. On May 16, 2009, GMAC filed a proof of claim (“POC”), which attached the Note and DOT. The Endorsement from GreenPoint to GMAC was not attached to GMAC’s proof of claim. On May 12, 2009, MERS, as nominee for GreenPoint, assigned its interest in the DOT to GMAC (“MERS Assignment”). The MERS Assignment was recorded on July 16, 2009.

GMAC filed a Motion for Relief from Stay (“Motion”) on May 29, 2009, on the grounds that the Debtor had no equity in the Property and the Property was not necessary for an effective reorganization. The Motion also requested adequate protection payments to protect GMAC’s alleged interest in the Property. GMAC attached the Note with the Endorsement and DOT as exhibits to the Motion.

The Debtor filed a response challenging GMAC’s standing to seek relief from stay. After various discovery disputes, GMAC sent a letter dated September 17, 2009, to the Debtor which purported to explain the various transfers of the Note and the DOT. (Docket #90). The letter explained that GreenPoint transferred the “subject loan” to Lehman under the FISA, that Lehman sold the “subject loan” to SASC under the MLSAA, that SASC, Aurora Loan Services, and U.S. National Bank entered into a trust agreement, which created the Trust and made Aurora the master servicer for the “subject loan,” and, that GMAC was the servicer of the “subject loan” under the SSA. According to GMAC, its status as servicer, along with the Endorsement of the Note to GMAC and the assignment of the DOT from MERS to GMAC, demonstrated that it had standing to bring the Motion.

On November 10, 2009, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Motion. GMAC offered the original Note at the hearing and admitted into evidence a copy of the Note, DOT, copies of the FISA, MLSAA, Trust Agreement, the Reconstituted Servicing Agreement and the SSA. However, GMAC did not offer any documents demonstrating how the Note and DOT were conveyed by GreenPoint to the FISA. No document was offered demonstrating how the Note and DOT were conveyed from the FISA to the MLSAA or from the MLSAA into the Trust. Schedule A-1 of the MLSAA, where the transferred mortgages presumably would have been listed, only has the words “Intentionally Omitted” on it, and Schedule A-2 has the word “None.” (Exhibit F, pp. 19-20). Similarly, there is no evidence that the Note and DOT are subject to the SSA. Exhibit A to the SSA, titled “Mortgage Loan Schedule,” is blank. At the conclusion of the hearing, this Court ordered the Debtor to begin making adequate protection payments commencing on December 1, 2009 to the Chapter 13 Trustee. The Court further ordered GMAC and the Debtor to negotiate the amount of the adequate protection payments. When the parties were unable to reach agreement, the Court set the amount of the monthly payments at $1,000.

III. ISSUE

Does GMAC have standing to bring the Motion?

IV. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a) and 157(b)(2)(G).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Introduction

Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of collection and enforcement actions. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The purpose of the automatic stay is to provide debtors with “protection against hungry creditors” and to assure creditors that the debtor’s other creditors are not “racing to various courthouses to pursue independent remedies to drain the debtor’s assets.” In re Tippett,Dean v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 72 F.3d 754, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also In re Johnston, 321 B.R. 262, 2737-4 (D. Ariz. 2005). Despite the broad protection the stay affords, it is not without limits. 542 F.3d 684, 689-90 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Section 362(d) allows the court, upon request of a “party in interest,” to grant relief from the stay, “such as terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). The court may grant relief “for cause, including the lack of adequate protection.” Id. The court may also grant relief from the stay with respect to specific property of the estate if the debtor lacks equity in the property and the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).

Any party affected by the stay should be entitled to seek relief. 3 COLLIER’S ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.07[2] (Henry Somers & Alan Resnick, eds. 15th ed., rev. 2009); Matter of Brown Transp. Truckload, Inc., 118 B.R. 889, 893 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990); In re Vieland, 41 B.R. 134, 138 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)). Relief from stay hearings are limited in scope — the validity of underlying claims is not litigated. In re Johnson, 756 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1985). As one court has noted, “[s]tay relief hearings do not involve a full adjudication on the merits of claims, defenses or counterclaims, but simply a determination as to whether a creditor has a colorable claim.” In re Emrich, 2009 WL 3816174, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009).

Nevertheless, in order to establish a colorable claim, a movant for relief from stay bears the burden of proof that it has standing to bring the motion. In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 400 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009). The issue of standing involves both “constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Constitutional standing concerns whether the plaintiff’s personal stake in the lawsuit is sufficient to have a “case or controversy” to which the federal judicial power may extend under Article III. Id.; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992); Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Ass’n v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 219 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2000).

Additionally, the “prudential doctrine of standing has come to encompass several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.'” Pershing Park Villas, 219 F.3d at 899. Such limits are the prohibition on third-party standing and the requirement that suits be maintained by the real party in interest. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 498-99; Gilmartin v. City of Tucson, 2006 WL 5917165, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2006). Thus, prudential standing requires the plaintiff to assert its own claims rather than the claims of another. The requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 17, made applicable in stay relief motions by Rule 9014, “generally falls within the prudential standing doctrine.” In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. at 398.

B. GMAC’s Standing

GMAC advances three different arguments in support of its claim to be a “party in interest” with standing to seek relief from stay. First, GMAC asserts it has standing because the Note was endorsed to GMAC and GMAC has physical possession of the Note. Second, GMAC asserts that by virtue of the MERS Assignment, it is a beneficiary of the DOT and entitled to enforce and foreclose the DOT under Arizona law. Third, GMAC asserts it has standing because it is the servicer of the Note. The court addresses each of GMAC’s claims in turn.

1. GMAC Has Not Demonstrated That It Is A Holder Of The Note

If GMAC is the holder of the Note, GMAC would be a party injured by the Debtor’s failure to pay it, thereby satisfying the constitutional standing requirement. GMAC would also be the real party in interest under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 because under ARIZ. REV. STAT. (“A.R.S.’) § 47-3301, the holder of a note has the right to enforce it.[ 2 ] However, as discussed below, GMAC did not prove it is the holder of the Note.

Under Arizona law, a holder is defined as “the person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession.” A.R.S. § 47-1201(B)(21)(a).[ 3 ] GMAC has failed to demonstrate that it is the holder of the Note because, while it was in possession of the Note at the evidentiary hearing, it failed to demonstrate that the Note is properly payable to GMAC. A special endorsement to GMAC was admitted into evidence with the Note. However, for the Endorsement to constitute part of the Note, it must be on “a paper affixed to the instrument.” A.R.S. § 47-3204; see also In re Nash, 49 B.R. 254, 261 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985). Here, the evidence did not demonstrate that the Endorsement was affixed to the Note. The Endorsement is on a separate sheet of paper; there was no evidence that it was stapled or otherwise attached to the rest of the Note. Furthermore, when GMAC filed its proof of claim, the Endorsement was not included, which is a further indication that the allonge containing the Endorsement was not affixed to the Note.[ 4 ]

In Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 853 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1988), the plaintiffs executed promissory notes which, after a series of transfers, came into the defendant’s possession. At issue was whether the defendant was the rightful owner of the notes. The court held that the defendant was not entitled to holder in due course status because the endorsements failed to meet the UCC’s fixation requirement. Id. at 168-69. The court relied on UCC section 3-202(2) [A.R.S. § 47-3204]: “An indorsement must be written by or on behalf of the holder and on the instrument or on a paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof.” Id. at 165. Since the endorsement page, indicating that the defendant was the holder of the note, was not attached to the note, the court found that the note had not been properly negotiated. Id. at 166-67. Thus, ownership of the note never transferred to the defendant. Applying that principle to the facts here, GMAC did not become a holder of the Note due to the improperly affixed special endorsement.

While the bankruptcy court in In re Nash, 49 B.R. 254 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985) found that holder in due course status existed even though an allonge was not properly affixed to an instrument, the court based its determination on the clear intention that the note assignment be physically attached because: (1) the assignment was signed and notarized the same day as the trust deed; (2) the assignment specifically referenced the escrow number; (3) the assignment identified the original note holder; and (4) the assignment recited that the note was to be attached to the assignment. Id. at 261.

In this case, however, there is no proof that the allonge containing the special endorsement from GreenPoint to GMAC was executed at or near the time the Note was executed. Furthermore, the Endorsement does not have any identifying numbers on it, such as an account number or an escrow number, nor does it reference the Note in any way. There is simply no indication that the allonge was appropriately affixed to the Note, in contradiction with the mandates of A.R.S. § 47-3204. Thus, there is no basis in this case to depart from the general rule that an endorsement on an allonge must be affixed to the instrument to be valid.

GMAC cannot overcome the problems with the unaffixed Endorsement by its physical possession of the Note because the Note was not endorsed in blank and, even if it was, the problem of the unaffixed endorsement would remain.[ 5 ] As a result, because GMAC failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the Endorsement was proper, it has failed to demonstrate that it is the holder of the Note.

2. The MERS Assignment Of The DOT Did Not Provide GMAC With Standing

GMAC argues that it has standing to bring the Motion as the assignee of MERS.[ 6 ] In this case, MERS is named in the DOT as a beneficiary, solely as the “nominee” of GreenPoint, holding only “legal title” to the interests granted to GreenPoint under the DOT. A number of cases have held that such language confers no economic benefit on MERS. See, e.g., In re Sheridan, 2009 WL 631355, *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009); In re Mitchell, 2009 WL 1044368, *3-4 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009); In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359, 367 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009). As noted by the Sheridan court, MERS “collect[s] no money from [d]ebtors under the [n]ote, nor will it realize the value of the [p]roperty through foreclosure of the [d]eed of [t]rust in the event the [n]ote is not paid.” 2009 WL 631355 at *4.

Because MERS has no financial interest in the Note, it will suffer no injury if the Note is not paid and will realize no benefit if the DOT is foreclosed. Accordingly, MERS cannot satisfy the requirements of constitutional standing. GMAC, as MERS’ assignee of the DOT, “stands in the shoes” of the assignor, taking only those rights and remedies the assignor would have had. Hunnicutt Constr., Inc. v. Stewart Title & Trust of Tucson, Trust No. 3496, 187 Ariz. 301, 304 (Ct. App. 1996) citing Van Waters & Rogers v. Interchange Res., Inc., 14 Ariz. App. 414, 417 (1971); In re Boyajian, 367 B.R. 138, 145 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). Because GMAC is MERS’ assignee, it cannot satisfy the requirements of constitutional standing either.[ 7 ]

3. GMAC Does Not Have Standing As The Servicer Of The Note

(a) Servicer’s Right To Collect Fees For Securitized Mortgages

Securitization of residential mortgages is “the process of aggregating a large number of notes secured by deeds of trust in what is called a mortgage pool, and then selling security interests in that pool of mortgages.” Kurt Eggert, Held Up In Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 536 (2002). The process begins with a borrower negotiating with a mortgage broker for the terms of the loan. Then, the mortgage broker either originates the loan in its own name or in the name of another entity, which presumably provides the money for the loan. Almost immediately, the broker transfers the loan to the funding entity. “This lender quickly sells the loan to a different financial entity, which pools the loan together with a host of other loans in a mortgage pool.” Id. at 538.

The assignee then transfers the mortgages in the pool to another entity, which in turn transfers the loans to a special purpose vehicle (“SPV”,) whose sole role is to hold the pool of mortgages. Id. at 539. “The transfer to the special purpose trust must constitute a true sale, so that the party transferring the assets reduces its potential liability on the loans and exchanges the fairly illiquid loans for much more liquid cash.” Id. at 542. Next, the SPV issues securities which the assignee sells to investors. Id. at 539.

Once the securities have been sold, the SPV is not actively involved. It “does not directly collect payments from the homeowners whose notes and deeds of trust are held by the SPV.” Id. at 544. Rather, servicers collect the principal and interest payments on behalf of the SPV. Id. Fees are associated with the servicing of loans in the pool. Therefore, GMAC would have constitutional standing if it is the servicer for the Note and DOT because it would suffer concrete injury by not being able to collect its servicing fees.[ 8 ]In re O’Kelley, 420 B.R. 18, 23 (D. Haw. 2009) . In this case, however, the evidence does not demonstrate that the Note and DOT were transferred to the Trust, and, without that evidence, there is no demonstration that GMAC is the servicer of the Note.

(b) There Is Insufficient Evidence That The Note Was Sold To Lehman And Became Part Of The Trust

When the Debtor executed the Note and DOT, GreenPoint was the original holder of the Note and the economic beneficiary of the DOT. GreenPoint, allegedly, transferred the Note to Lehman pursuant to the FISA. However, the term “mortgage loans” is not defined in the FISA and GMAC’s documents regarding the securitization of the Note and DOT provide no evidence of actual transfers of the Note and DOT to either the FISA or the Trust. Because such transfers must be “true sales,” they must be properly documented to be effective. Thus, to use an overused term, GMAC has failed “to connect the dots” to demonstrate that the Note and DOT were securitized. Accordingly, it is immaterial that GMAC is the servicer for the Trust.

C. Debtor’s Other Arguments

1. Securities Investors Are Not The Only Individuals Who Can Satisfy Standing Requirements When Dealing With A 362 Motion on a “Securitized” Mortgage

The Debtor argues that, in an asset securitization scheme, only the securities investors have standing to seek stay relief because they are the only parties with a financial interest in the securitized notes. However, because the Debtor executed the Note and received consideration (which he used to purchase the house), the contract is enforceable regardless of who provided the funding. In other words, the fact that the funds for a borrower’s loan are supplied by someone other than the loan originator, does not invalidate the loan or restrict enforcement of the loan contract to the parties who funded the loan. A number of cases and treatises recognize that consideration for a contract, including a promissory note, can be provided by a third party. See, e.g., DCM Ltd. P’ship v. Wang, 555 F. Supp. 2d 808, 817 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Buffalo County v. Richards, 212 Neb. 826, 828-29 (Neb. 1982); 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:20 (Richard A. Lord, 4th ed. 2009); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(4) (2009).

Notes are regularly assigned and the assignment does not change the nature of the contract. The assignee merely steps into the shoes of the assignor. In re Boyajian, 367 B.R. 138, 145 (9th Cir. BAP 2007); In re Trejos, 374 B.R. 210, 215 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). No additional consideration is required, as opposed to a novation which creates a new obligation. Id. at 216-17 citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 280, cmt. e. Therefore, the Debtor’s argument that the Note is unenforceable because the funder of the Note was not the payee fails. The Note is still valid and can be enforced by the party who has the right to enforce it under applicable Arizona law.

2. Proof Of A Note’s Entire Chain Of Ownership Is Not Necessary For Stay Relief

A movant for stay relief need only present evidence sufficient to present a colorable claim — not every piece of evidence that would be required to prove the right to foreclose under a state law judicial foreclosure proceeding is necessary. In re Emrich, 2009 WL 3816174, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009). Accordingly, not every movant for relief from stay has to provide a complete chain of a note’s assignment to obtain relief.

Arizona’s deed of trust statute does not require a beneficiary of a deed of trust to produce the underlying note (or its chain of assignment) in order to conduct a Trustee’s Sale. Blau v. Am.’s Serv. Co., 2009 WL 3174823, at *6 (D. Ariz. 2009); Mansour v. Cal-W. Reconveyance Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 2009); Diessner v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1187 (D. Ariz. 2009). It would make no sense to require a creditor to demonstrate more to obtain stay relief than it needs to demonstrate under state law to conduct a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure. Moreover, if a note is endorsed in blank, it is enforceable as a bearer instrument. See In re Hill, 2009 WL 1956174, at *2 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009). Therefore, this Court declines to impose a blanket requirement that all movants must offer proof of a note’s entire chain of assignments to have standing to seek relief although there may be circumstances where, in order to establish standing, the movant will have to do so.

3. The Movant Has Not Violated Rule 9011

The Debtor argues that GMAC “violated Rule 7011” by presenting insufficient and misleading evidence. Given that there is no Rule 7011, the Court assumes that the Debtor was actually referring to Bankruptcy Rule 9011. Rule 9011 allows a court to impose sanctions for filing a frivolous suit. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(c); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). As noted at the evidentiary hearing, the Court did not find that GMAC filed its motion for relief stay in bad faith, nor does this Court believe GMAC filed its motion thinking it did not have proper evidentiary support. There are numerous, often conflicting, decisions on the issues of “real party in interest” and constitutional standing, and what evidence must be presented by a servicer seeking stay relief. The record in this case does not support imposition of 9011 sanctions.

VI. CONCLUSION

GMAC has not demonstrated that it has constitutional or prudential standing or is the real party in interest entitled to prosecute a motion for relief from stay.

Accordingly, its motion is DENIED without prejudice.

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