RESCISSION: It’s time for another slap on the wrist for state and federal judges.

50 years ago Congress decided to slap punitive measures on lenders who ignore or attempt to go around (table-funded loans) existing laws on required disclosures — instead of creating a super agency that would review every loan closing before it could be consummated. So it made the punishment so severe that only the stupidest lenders would attempt to violate Federal law. That worked for a while — until the era of securitization fail. (Adam Levitin’s term for illusion under the cloak of false securitization).

Draconian consequences happen when the “lender” violates these laws. They lose the loan, the debt (or part of it), their paper is worthless and the disgorgement of all money ever paid by borrower or received by anyone arising out of the origination of the loan.

But Judges have resisted following the law, leaving the “lenders” with the bounty of ill-gotten gains and no punishment because judges refuse to do it —even after they received a slap on their wrists by the unanimous SCOTUS decision in Jesinoski. Now they will be getting another slap — and it might not be just on the wrists, considering the sarcasm with which Scalia penned the Jesinoski opinion.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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TILA rescission is mainly a procedural statute under 15 USC §1635. Like Scalia said in the Jesinoski case it specifically states WHEN things happen. It also makes clear, just as the unanimous court in Jesinoski made clear that no further action was required — especially the incorrect decisions in thousands of cases where the judge said that the rescission under TILA is NOT effective until the borrower files a lawsuit. What is clear from the statute and the regulations and the SCOTUS decision is that rescission is effective on the date of notice, which is the date of mailing if the borrower uses US Mail.

There are several defenses that might seem likely to succeed but those defenses (1) must be filed by a creditor (the note and mortgage are void instruments the moment that rescission notice is sent) (2) hence the grounds for objection are not “defenses” but rather potential grounds to vacate a lawful instrument that has already taken effect. Whether the right to have sent the notice had expired, or whether the right to rescind the putative loan is not well-grounded because of other restrictions (e.g. purchase money mortgage) are all POTENTIAL grounds to vacate the rescission — as long as the suit to vacate the rescission is brought by a party with legal standing.

A party does not have legal standing if their only claim to standing is that they once held a note and mortgage that are now void. {NOTE: No party has ever filed an action to vacate the rescission because (1) they have chosen to ignore the rescission for more than 20 days and thus subject to the defense of statute of limitations to their petition to vacate and (2) they would be required to state the rescission was effective in order to get relief and (3) there is a very high probability that there is no formal creditor that was secured by the mortgage encumbrance of record. The latter point about no formal creditor would also mean that the apparent challenge to the rescission based upon the “purchase money mortgage” “exception” would fail.}

The premise to this discussion is that the so-called originator was not the source of funds. This in my opinion means that there never was consummation — despite all appearances to the contrary.

The borrower was induced to sign a note and mortgage settlement statements and acknowledgement of disclosures and right to rescind under the false premise that the originator was the lender, as stated on the note and mortgage.

The resulting execution of documents thus produced the following results: (1) the putative borrower has signed the “closing documents” and (2) the originator neither signs those documents nor lends any money. This results in an executory contract without consideration which means an unenforceable partially completed documentary trail that creates the illusion of a normal residential loan closing.

TILA Rescission is effective at the time that the borrowers notify any one of the players who represent themselves as being servicer, lender, assignee or holder. The effect of rescission is to cancel the loan contract and that in turn makes the note and mortgage void, not voidable. That the note and mortgage become void is expressly set forth in the authorized regulations (Reg Z) promulgated by the Federal Reserve and now the Consumer Financial Protection Board (CFPB). There is no lawsuit that is required or even possible for the putative borrower to file — i.e., there is no present controversy because the loan “contract” to the extent it exists has already been canceled and the note and mortgage have already been rendered void.

FDUTPA:”Per Se” Violations of Deceptive or Unfair trade Practices Under Federal or State Law

a per se violation of TILA or any other Federal or State law makes the act also per se violations of the FTC act, (and the applicable little FTC acts passed in various states). Florida is used here as an example. 

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Anyone who has done even the most cursory research knows that a pattern of behavior in which the name of the creditor or lender is withheld is a “per se” predatory loan. While Judges don’t care whether the borrower knows the actual lender, clearly Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court and the executive branch DO care ( and so their state counterparts); the courts are required to follow the law not create it by inaction or action contrary to the express wording of statutes. As we have discussed this will be shortly revealed as the rescission cases go back to SCOTUS which has already ruled unanimously that there is nothing wrong with the rescission statute, it clearly states the procedures and nothing unconstitutional about its process or effect.
 
Pretender lenders are rushing as many cases to forced sale through foreclosure because their days are numbered in which they can continue to do so. One reason is that their violations of Federal and State statutes prohibiting unfair trade practices are violations per se and another is that their violations are still prosecutable even if they are not on some list somewhere in some statute or group of cases interpreting deceptive trade and lending practices. 
 
For along time, it has been known, accepted and understood that withholding the name of the actual lender as a matter of practice makes each such loan and each such practice “predatory per se” under Reg Z of the Federal truth in Lending Act. The purpose of this article is to suggest that a per se violation of TILA or any other Federal or State law makes the act also per se violations of the FTC act, (and the applicable little FTC acts passed in various states). Florida is used here as an example. 
 
While the recognition that the alleged loan transaction was by definition unto itself predatory, there has been no attempt or agreement to arrive at any consequences that should befall the “ pretender lender” violator because TILA has enforcement provisions and self executing punishment like TILA rescission but it does not specifically provide an easy route to assessing substantial damages by way of disgorgement, which probably cannot be barred by the defense of the statute of limitations. 
 
If a loan is predatory per se under Reg Z as a table funded loan then it is hard to imagine how that act of “lending” would not also be a per se violation of the FTCA and, in Florida, the FDUTPA 501.204 et seq. A table funded loan by definition withholds the identity of the true lender. Table funded loans were not only part of the pattern and practice of creating illusions they called “loans” but became industry standard.
 
 It is neither an exaggeration nor over-reaching to say that table funded loans that were predatory per se became industry practice from around 2001 through the present. In other words it became industry standard to violate the Federal Truth in Lending Act, the FTC Act, and the state versions of the FTC act (in Florida §501.204 et seq). As we have seen with construction defect lawsuits starting back in the 1970’s, the fact that it became custom and practice to violate the the local building codes does not in any way raise a valid defense to violating those codes. 
 
This would fall under the Florida FDUTPA category of “Per Se by Description. “ It doesn’t matter whether the judge “feels” that some bank or “lender” or “servicer” might be hurt. That question has been decided by the Federal legislative branch, the Federal Executive Branch and the Federal Judicial branch as enunciated by the highest court in the land. Under the powers vested in the Federal government laws were passed in which the Federal government pre-empted or restricted state action in circumstances where ordinary consumers were fooled by deceptive practices. And the test is whether the least sophisticated and most gullible consumer was tricked and hurt by the trick. The same line of thought applies to state laws like the little FTC act in Florida.
 
Once the violation becomes a per se violation, the question is not whether there is injury but rather how much should be awarded to the consumer as a punishment to the violator and as a means to settle the score with the consumer. This calls for disgorgement which is not considered to be “damages” since it is described as merely preventing the violator from keeping ill-gotten gains. Attorneys fees and court costs are almost always provided by the Federal and state FTC statutes. The violations under the FDCPA may be barred by the expiration of a statute of limitations but the per se violations of the of the FDCPA and its equivalent state statutes probably is a trigger for declaring the FDCPA violation a per se violation which in turn triggers the rest of the applicable statutes for disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. 
 
Per Se by Description
The reference in §501.203(3)(a) and (c) to FDUTPA violations based on FTC or FDUTPA rules, or “[a]ny law, statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance” can further be interpreted as a formal acknowledgment of violations of a second type of per se violation which occurs when a rule, statute, or ordinance is violated, and the rule, statute, or other ordinance expressly describes unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable conduct, without necessarily referring expressly to FDUTPA.
 
Rules Adopted by the FTC
Pursuant to the FTC act, the FTC has adopted rules which describe unfair or deceptive acts in several contexts, and which appear in 16 C.F.R. ch. 1, subch. D, entitled “Trade Regulation Rules.” Some of the more well known of these include the FTC rules governing door-to-door sales,16 franchises,17 holders in due course,18 negative option sales plans,19 funeral industry practices,20 and mail or telephone order sales.21 According to the definition of “violation of this part,” in §501.203(3)(a) a violation of FDUTPA can occur when federal administrative rules promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission pursuant to the FTC act are violated. Along these lines, the 11th Circuit has confirmed that §501.203(3)(a) of FDUTPA creates a private cause of action for violation of an FTC rule even though none exists under federal law.22
 
[Whether  or not the facts alleged by the consumer are sufficient for rescission, damages remain available under the FTC act and little FTC acts in various states. The damages extend up to and including all money paid by the debtor. And according to recent case law following a long prior tradition, the statute of limitations does not apply to petitioners for disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.  16 CFR 433 — Preservation of consumer claims and defenses, unfair or deceptive acts or practices]

120510advisoryopinionholderrule

Much of the material for this article has been inspired by the following article:
Florida Bar Journal May, 2002, Volume LXXVI, No. 5 Page 62 by Mark S. Fistos. “Per Se Violations of Florida Deceptive and Unfair Practices Act §501.204(1)”
Relevant passages quoted:
 
FDUTPA broadly declares in §501.204(1) that “[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce” are unlawful. By design, FDUTPA does not contain a definition or “laundry list” of just which acts can be “deceptive,” “unfair,” or “unconscionable.” No specific rule or regulation is required to find conduct unfair or deceptive under the statute.1
 
There is, however, an entire body of state and federal rules, ordinances, and statutes which serves to identify specific acts that constitute automatic violations of FDUTPA’s broad proscription in §501.204(1). These rules, ordinances, and statutes, if violated, constitute “per se” violations of FDUTPA, and could automatically expose parties to actual damages, injunctions, and civil penalties up to $15,000 per violation. An assessment of potential per se FDUTPA violations, therefore, should play a part in any commercial law practice, and is imperative for any lawyer bringing or defending against a claim for deceptive or unfair trade practices.
 
Approaches to FDUTPA Liability
There are two basic approaches to analyzing FDUTPA liability: one is to determine whether an act or practice in trade or commerce violates broadly worded standards relating to unfairness, deception, unconscionable acts or practices, or unfair methods of competition; a second is to assess whether conduct in trade or commerce constitutes a per se violation.2
FDUTPA tracks the broad language of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC act)3and declares “[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce” to be unlawful. Subsection 501.204(2) of FDUTPA in turn provides that “due consideration and great weight” be given interpretations by federal courts and the Federal Trade Commission of what constitutes unfairness and deception.
 
Based on FTC interpretations and federal case law dating from the 1960s, Florida courts have adopted and applied in various contexts a broadly worded standard of unfairness under which a practice is unfair, “if it offends public policy and is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.”4

Categories of Per Se Violations

The rules, regulations, ordinances, and statutes referenced in the above-quoted §501.203(3) refer to sources which may serve as a basis for a per se FDUTPA violation. These sources can be broken down into three categories:
1) Per se violations whereby a statute, ordinance, or rule expressly refers to FDUTPA and provides a violation thereof to be a violation of FDUTPA; [per se by reference]
2) Per se violations whereby a statute, ordinance, or rule expressly describes deceptive, unconscionable, or unfair conduct without referring expressly to FDUTPA and when violated constitutes a per se violation of FDUTPA; [per se by description] and
3) Per se violations whereby a court, in the absence of any such reference or description, construes a statute, ordinance, or rule to be a per se violation of FDUTPA.
 
Examples from Footnotes: Fla. Stat. §§210.185(5) (cigarette distribution), 320.03(1) (DHSMV agents), 320.27(2) (vehicle dealer licensing), 624.125(2) (service agreements), 681.111 (lemon law), 501.97(2) (location advertising), 400.464(4)(b) (home health agencies), 400.93(6)(b) (home medical equipment providers), 483.305(3) (multiphasic health testing centers), 496.416 (charitable contributions), 501.160(3) (price gouging), 501.0579 (weight loss centers), 501.34 (aftermarket crash parts), 509.511 (campground memberships), 559.934 (sellers of travel), 624.129(4) (location and recovery services), 817.62(3)(c) (credit card factoring);Code of Ordinances, City of Ft. Walton Beach, Florida §23-145(a) (title loans).

Problems with Lehman and Aurora

Lehman had nothing to do with the loan even at the beginning when the loan was funded, it acted as a conduit for investor funds that were being misappropriated, the loan was “sold” or “transferred” to a REMIC Trust, and the assets of Lehman were put into a bankruptcy estate as a matter of law.

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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I keep receiving the same question from multiple sources about the loans “originated” by Lehman, MERS involvement, and Aurora. Here is my short answer:
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Yes it means that technically the mortgage and note went in two different directions. BUT in nearly all courts of law the Judge overlooks this problem despite clear law to the contrary in Florida Statutes adopting the UCC.

The stamped endorsement at closing indicates that the loan was pre-sold to Lehman in an Assignment and Assumption Agreement (AAA)— which is basically a contract that violates public policy. It violates public policy because it withholds the name of the lender — a basic disclosure contained in the Truth in Lending Act in order to make certain that the borrower knows with whom he is expected to do business.

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Choice of lender is one of the fundamental requirements of TILA. For the past 20 years virtually everyone in the “lending chain” violated this basic principal of public policy and law. That includes originators, MERS, mortgage brokers, closing agents (to the extent they were actually aware of the switch), Trusts, Trustees, Master Servicers (were in most cases the underwriter of the nonexistent “Trust”) et al.
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The AAA also requires withholding the name of the conduit (Lehman). This means it was a table funded loan on steroids. That is ruled as a matter of law to be “predatory per se” by Reg Z.  It allows Lehman, as a conduit, to immediately receive “ownership” of the note and mortgage (or its designated nominee/agent MERS).
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Lehman was using funds from investors to fund the loan — a direct violation of (a) what they told investors, who thought their money was going into a trust for management and (b) what they told the court, was that they were the lender. In other words the funding of the loan is the point in time when Lehman converted (stole) the funds of the investors.

Knowing Lehman practices at the time, it is virtually certain that the loan was immediately subject to CLAIMS of securitization. The hidden problem is that the claims from the REMIC Trust were not true. The trust having never been funded, never purchased the loan.

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The second hidden problem is that the Lehman bankruptcy would have put the loan into the bankruptcy estate. So regardless of whether the loan was already “sold” into the secondary market for securitization or “transferred” to a REMIC trust or it was in fact owned by Lehman after the bankruptcy, there can be no valid document or instrument executed by Lehman after that time (either the date of “closing” or the date of bankruptcy, 2008).

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The reason is simple — Lehman had nothing to do with the loan even at the beginning when the loan was funded, it acted as a conduit for investor funds that were being misappropriated, the loan was “sold” or “transferred” to a REMIC Trust, and the assets of Lehman were put into a bankruptcy estate as a matter of law.

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The problems are further compounded by the fact that the “servicer” (Aurora) now claims alternatively that it is either the owner or servicer of the loan or both. Aurora was basically a controlled entity of Lehman.

It is impossible to fund a trust that claims the loan because that “reporting” process was controlled by Lehman and then Aurora.

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So they could say whatever they wanted to MERS and to the world. At one time there probably was a trust named as owner of the loan but that data has long since been erased unless it can be recovered from the MERS archives.

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Now we have an emerging further complicating issue. Fannie claims it owns the loan, also a claim that is untrue like all the other claims. Fannie is not a lender. Fannie acts a guarantor or Master trustee of REMIC Trusts. It generally uses the mortgage bonds issued by the REMIC trust to “purchase” the loans. But those bonds were worthless because the Trust never received the proceeds of sale of the mortgage bonds to investors. Thus it had no ability to purchase loan because it had no money, business or other assets.

But in 2008-2009 the government funded the cash purchase of the loans by Fannie and Freddie while the Federal Reserve outright paid cash for the mortgage bonds, which they purchased from the banks.

The problem with that scenario is that the banks did not own the loans and did not own the bonds. Yet the banks were the “sellers.” So my conclusion is that the emergence of Fannie is just one more layer of confusion being added to an already convoluted scheme and the Judge will be looking for a way to “simplify” it thus raising the danger that the Judge will ignore the parts of the chain that are clearly broken.

Bottom Line: it was the investors funds that were used to fund loans — but only part of the investors funds went to loans. The rest went into the pocket of the underwriter (investment bank) as was recorded either as fees or “trading profits” from a trading desk that was performing nonexistent sales to nonexistent trusts of nonexistent loan contracts.

The essential legal problem is this: the investors involuntarily made loans without representation at closing. Hence no loan contract was ever formed to protect them. The parties in between were all acting as though the loan contract existed and reflected the intent of both the borrower and the “lender” investors.

The solution is for investors to fire the intermediaries and create their own and then approach the borrowers who in most cases would be happy to execute a real mortgage and note. This would fix the amount of damages to be recovered from the investment bankers. And it would stop the hemorrhaging of value from what should be (but isn’t) a secured asset. And of course it would end the foreclosure nightmare where those intermediaries are stealing both the debt and the property of others with whom thye have no contract.

GET A CONSULT!

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, MAKE A DONATION, leave message or make payments.

 

“Lost” Note Found and Linda Green Assignments

Virtually none of the nonjudicial or judicial foreclosures can be won by banks without use of legal presumptions that lead the court to assume facts that are plainly untrue.

The bottom line is that the rules of evidence require proof of the transaction chain with no right to rely on legal presumptions. The banks can’t do that. Press hard on this issue and experience shows that at the very least a good settlement is in the offing and even a perfectly good judgment for the homeowner would be rendered.

The bottom line to keep your eye on the ball is that the Trust doesn’t own the note and never did; the same thing applies to nearly all bogus “beneficiaries” and “mortgagees.”

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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We have all known that the banks, servicers and trustees have been fabricated, back-dating and forging documents. And they continue to do it because they are getting away with it. In all but a few cases Judges uphold bank objections to reveal the transaction chain in which money is actually exchanged.
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So banks are winning cases based upon legal presumptions stemming from the facial “validity” of the documents. By admitting fabricated documents into evidence and applying, without proper objection, legal presumptions that remove the obligation to actually prove their case, the banks win.
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Homeowners are defenseless because even though they and their attorneys know this is a farce, they have no way to prove it except by access to the only entities that actually have records in which the absence of a real transaction that ever took place — including both the origination of the alleged loan and the presumed acquisition of the loan. .
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But there are several circumstances in which one can argue that the legal presumptions should not be applied and in the absence of the required proof, the party seeking foreclosure can be showed to lack standing. Take for example the lost note, later abandoned and the robo-signed assignment executed by a known robo-signer, which is also later abandoned.
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The lost note is intended to be straight forward — a pleading that says the note was lost, that due diligence has been performed, that the present claimant owns or holds the original note and that the note has not been otherwise negotiated.  It is a lie of course. They never had the note because ti was destroyed intentionally. But they also don’t want to be subject to discovery or requirements of proof as to the chain of possession and the chain of transactions that would prove that the present holder actually owns or holds the note.
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So the tactic employed is to “withdraw” the count stating that the note is lost. And there is where the opportunity for the homeowner comes into play. If they have admitted losing the note, they are admitting that the chain might be broken. By simply withdrawing the lost note count without explanation they have failed to explain how it was found, where it was found and why it was lost.
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In other words the possibility that the note has already been negotiated is still present and the possibility exists that the “original” note is not an original but rather a mechanical reproduction — which leaves the question of the banks either admitting they destroyed it (and explaining that in pleadings, proof at trial or both) or admitting that they cannot produce admissible evidence that they actually own the debt, loan, note or mortgage.
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This possibility is raised to a probability once you establish at least “probable cause” to believe that the foreclosing party is relying upon the utterance of false or fraudulent documentation, at which point they are stripped or should be stripped of the benefits of a legal presumptions that the documents upon which they are relying are true.
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Even if they can come up with the actual original “original” note, they have already put on record that they lost it. Now they withdraw Count I without any amendment to the complaint explaining what happened to the note with no certification of possession and no documents attached to the complaint showing endorsement or assignment at the time of the filing of the lawsuit except that the Linda Green “assignment” was supplied and later abandoned after all the publicity about her which is now in the records I have sent to you.

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So you have 2 “abandonments”: the allegation that the note was lost and the assignment executed by a robo-signer. The banks cover this deficiency by still more paper  — in which the banks file a “corrective” assignment that might withstand scrutiny in place of the original fabricated and forged assignment.
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They want the court to assume that since it is merely a “corrective” assignment that it relates back to the original assignment. But there is no legal presumption that covers that. So if they want to relate the assignment produced AFTER suit was filed with the bogus assignment dated BEFORE the lawsuit was filed then they should be required under the rules of evidence to show and when the assignment really related back to the time they of the transaction in which ownership and rights to enforce were transferred.
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The burden is on the banks to show they had standing before suit was filed or foreclosure was initiated. If they can’t prove by testimony and evidence of proof of payment that they had a transaction in which the loan, debt, note or mortgage was acquired by purchase and sale BEFORE the action was commenced, then they are stuck with their “Corrective” assignment which is obviously filed AFTER the foreclosure suit or forced sale was initiated. ( I need not explore here what they mean by :corrective” other than to say that naming it as a “corrective assignment” doesn’t make it relate back to the prior one.)
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So the only operative assignment is a “corrective” assignment that was filed AFTER the lawsuit was filed. We have no explanation of the chain of possession and there should be no presumptions about the chain of possession since it was their own pleadings that raised the issue.

The only way they reconcile this is by proving that they had an actual transaction resulting in the assignment (the equivalent of a bill of sale) BEFORE the lawsuit. But they have no records listed on their exhibit list showing that they intend to show they actually purchased the loan, debt, note or mortgage before suit was filed. The reason is simple — there was no such transaction. But this time they are not entitled to presumptions since the use of Linda Green’s signature (or some other robo-signor) that was clearly robo-signed has been abandoned and the trustworthiness of the documents are clearly in doubt.

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Under Florida Rules of Evidence on presumptions the proponent must now actually prove an actual transaction without benefit of the legal presumption where the document is at least dubious and does not scream out trustworthiness.

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This could be argued to the Judge as a simple burden of proof problem. The banks must prove their case. The banks have a history in this case of using a fabricated, forged document that they have tacitly admitted by their abandonment of the Linda Green assignment. Therefore they still have a possible case but they must prove the facts of the origination of the loan and the transfers of the loan without benefit of presumptions that those transactions actually took place.

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So you have two problems here that go against the Bank — the failure to explain chain of custody of the lost note and the failure to have an assignment before suit is filed.On both issues there is plenty of case law that says the banks lose in that scenario. But failure to object and I might add failure to educate the judge as to your theory of the case could be fatal.

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So I am suggesting to most lawyers who are not already doing that they file a pretrial memorandum outlining the issues for trial and why you think the court’s ruling’s on evidence should favor of the borrower. There is no real prejudice if the transactions actually took place.

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The only prejudice is that they need to spend a few more minutes showing that the bank, trustee, servicer or whoever paid for the acquisition fo the note and perhaps that the originator actually paid to fund the loan for which the originator is given credit on the note and mortgage.

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If the originator did not fund the loan, that would obviously explain the absence of an actual transaction in which the originator received consideration for the transfer of the loan papers improperly naming the originator as the lender. And it would explain the large fees paid to originator to engage in this pretense despite the Reg Z definition of table funded loans as “predatory per se.”

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Rescission enforcement actions are the next really big thing

For more information on rescission, our rescission package or any other topic, please call 954-495-9867 nor 520-405-1688.
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Rescission enforcement actions are the next really big thing. Its effect is to immediately unencumber the property from any claims of lien or mortgage and any claim on the note which is void and must be returned marked “cancelled”. If the parties collecting or enforcing the loans really have a right to do so they may demonstrate that in court by filing a lawsuit to set aside the rescission based upon any factual grounds they wish to raise, applying the rules of the TILA statutory scheme for rescission. But if they don’t do that within 20 days they waive their defenses. AND if they don’t comply with TILA by returning the canceled note, filing a satisfaction of mortgage and returning all money paid by borrower, then they are barred from making even an unsecured claim for “damages.”
The action to enforce rescission would essentially consist of an allegation that the notice was sent, it has been more than 20 days since the notice was sent, and therefore the parties claiming to be creditors owe (1) return of canceled note, (2) filing a satisfaction of mortgage and (3) return of all money paid by borrower since the inception of the alleged loan contract. We will refuse to get into an argument about whether the rescission should have been sent. THAT is something that the parties would have had to allege in a lawsuit against the borrower(s) to set the rescission aside.

According to TILA, Reg Z and the US Supreme Court (Jesinowski decision) the rescission IS effective (by operation of law) the moment it is put in US Mail. The borrower does not have to be right to send it. THAT issue is left to the banks and servicers to allege in a lawsuit to vacate the rescission. And they must do so within 20 days. All issues that are confusing everyone — statute of limitations, purchase money first mortgage, etc. are questions of fact that need to be raised by the other side. They cannot do so after 20 days. We would move to strike those defenses when raised in our lawsuit to enforce rescission.

There are dozens of lawyers across the country that agree with my interpretation of the TILA rescission statutes and who are filing these rescission enforcement actions. In some cases, Ocwen has agreed that the rescission is effective and even agreed that the original payee was not the lender. That is an interesting juxtaposition of theories. Because if there was no funding by the payee on the note (“lender”) then there is no loan contract. If there is no loan contract, there is nothing to rescind. But the rescission under TILA might still apply as to the note and mortgage and the right to obtain disgorgement of money paid by borrower might be partially blocked by the standard statute of limitations governing contract disputes or the statute regarding tort actions.

It sounds weird, I know. But the fact is that Congress specifically decided that the act of the borrower in sending a notice of rescission cancels the loan and Reg Z (Federal Reserve) says that by operation of law that means the note and mortgage become void as of the date of mailing of the notice of rescission. Void means void, not voidable. It means that the the note and mortgage no longer exist and that is final. So even if the “lender” tries to bring a lawsuit to set aside the rescission they would need to establish standing presumably without the note and mortgage which can no longer be used because they are void. Standing could only be established by alleging that the pleading party is suffering actual damages — which is not really possible if they never paid anything for the loan and even if they did, is also not possible since they still could bring a claim against the borrower (unsecured) for the money that is due as the balance of the loan.

Congress specifically provided this method so that the old “lender” could not block the ability of the borrower to get another loan from a different (and presumably real) lender which would have first priority and would enable the borrower to either pay the old lender or not (if the old lender had not complied with TILA as to its duties in the event of rescission).

It was the specific intent to prevent the old “lender” from stonewalling and thus trap the borrower into a deal he or she didn’t want. And THAT is why the rule is that the note and mortgage are VOID by operation of law regardless of whether or not the “lender” returns the cancels note, satisfies the mortgage or pays the money to disgorge all funds paid by borrower starting with the origination fees, cost of closing and all interest and principal paid up to the date of the rescission.

NOTE: THE RESCISSION IS PROBABLY VOID IF THERE IS NO LOAN CONTRACT LEFT IN EXISTENCE WHEN THE NOTICE IS SENT. IF THERE IS NO CONTRACT THEN THERE IS NOTHING TO RESCIND. THUS I CONCLUDE THAT IF THE SALE HAS OCCURRED, THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE DON’T EXIST ANYMORE AND RESCISSION MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE. IF JUDGMENT HAS BEEN ENTERED, THE ISSUE IS LESS CLEAR BECAUSE THE RIGHT TO REDEEM STILL EXISTS.

NOTE: THIS IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION ON ANY SPECIFIC CASE. READERS SHOULD CONSULT WITH A QUALIFIED ATTORNEY WHO IS LICENSED IN THEIR JURISDICTION.

Statute of LImitations Running on Bank Officers Who Perpetrated Mortage Crisis

For more information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

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see http://www.courant.com/opinion/letters/hc-go-after-mortgage-fraud-perps-20150427-story.html

It appears that the statute of limitations might be running out this year on any claim against the officers of the banks that created the fraudulent securitization process. Eric Holder, outgoing Attorney general, made an unusual comment a few months back where he said that private suits should be brought against such officers. The obvious question is why didn’t he bring further action against these individuals and the only possible answer I can think of is that it was because of an agreement not to prosecute while these officers and their banks “cooperated” in resolving the mortgage crisis and the downturn of the US economy.

People keep asking me what the essential elements of the fraud were and how homeowners can use it. That question involves a degree of complexity that is not easily addressed here but I will try to do so in a few articles.

The first point of reference is that the investment banks sold mortgage backed securities to investors under numerous false premises. The broker dealers sold shares or interests in REMIC Trusts that existed only on paper and were registered nowhere. This opened up the possibility for the unthinkable: an IPO (initial public offering) of securities of an “entity” that would not complain if they never received the proceeds of the sale. And in fact, as I have been advised by accountants and other people who were privy to the inner workings of the Securitization fail (See Adam Levitin) the money from the offering was never turned over to the Trustee of the “Trust” which only existed on paper by virtue of words written by the broker dealers themselves. They created a non existent entity that had no business and sold securities issued by that entity without turning over the proceeds of sale to the entity whose securities had been sold. It was the perfect plan.

Normally if a broker dealer sold securities in an IPO the management and shareholders would have been screaming “fraud” as soon as they learned their “company” was not receiving the proceeds of sale. Here in the case of REMIC Trusts, there was no management because the Trustee had no duties and was prohibited from pretending that it did have any duties. And here in the case of REMIC Trusts, there were no shareholders to complain because they were contractually bound (they thought) to not interfere with or even ask questions about the workings of the Trust. And of course when Clinton signed the law back in 1998 these securities were deregulated and redefined as private contracts and NOT securities, so the SEC couldn’t get involved either.

It was the perfect hoax. brokers and dealers got to sell these “non-securities” and keep the proceeds themselves and even register ownership of interests in the Trust in the name of the same broker dealer who sold it to pension funds and other investors. Back in 2007-2008 the banks were claiming that there were no trusts involved because they knew that was true. But then they got more brazen, especially when they realized that this was an admission of fraud and theft from investors.

Now we have hundreds of thousands of foreclosures in which a REMIC Trust is named as the foreclosing party when it never operated even for a second. It never had any money, it never received any income and it never had any expenses. So it stands to reason that none of the loans claimed to be owned by the Trusts could ever have been purchased by entities that had no assets, no money, no management, and no operations. We have made a big deal about the cutoff date for entry of a particular loan into the loan pool owned by the trust. But the real facts are that there was no loan pool except on paper in self-serving fabricated documents created by the broker dealers.

Investors thought they were giving money to fund a Trust. The Trust was never funded. So the money from investors was used in any way the broker dealer wanted. The investors thought they were getting an ownership interest in a valid note and mortgage. They never got that because their “Trust” did not acquire the loans. But their money was used, in part, to fund loans that were put on a fast track automated underwriting platform so nobody in the position of underwriter could be disciplined or jailed for writing loans that were too rigged to succeed. Then the broker dealers, knowing that the mortgage bonds were worthless bet that the value of the bonds would decrease, which of course was a foregone conclusion. And the bonds and the underlying loans were insured in the name of the broker dealer so the investors are left standing out in the wind with nothing to show for their investment — an interest in a worthless unfunded trust, and no direct claim for the repayment of loans that were funded with their money.

The reason why the foreclosing parties need a foreclosure sale is to create the appearance that the original loan was a valid loan contract (it wasn’t because no consideration actually flowed from the “lender” to the “borrower” and because the loan was table funded, which as a pattern is described in Reg Z as “predatory per se”). By getting foreclosures in the name of the Trust they have a Judge’s stamp of approval that the Trust was either the lender or the successor to the lender and that makes it difficult for anyone to say otherwise. And THAT is why TILA was passed with the rescission option.

So through a series of conduits and sham entities, the Wall Street investment banks lied to the investors and lied to the borrowers about who was in the deal and who was making money off the deal and how much. They lied to the investors, lied to the public, lied to regulatory agencies and lied to borrowers about the quality of the loan products they were selling which could not succeed and in which the broker dealers had a direct interest in making sure that the loans did not succeed. That was the whole reason why the Truth In Lending Act and Reg Z came into existence back in the 1960’s. Holder’s comments are a clue to what private lawyers should do and how much money there is in these cases against the leaders of the those investment banks. Both borrowers and lawyers should be taking a close look at how they get even for the fraud perpetrated upon the American consumer and the American taxpayer.

It is obvious that someone had to be making a lot of money in order to spend hundreds of millions of dollars advertising and promoting 2% loans. There is no profit there unless someone is stealing the money and tricking borrowers into signing loan papers that instantly clouded their title and created two potential liabilities — one to the payee on the note who never had any economic interest in the deal and one to the investors whose money was used to fund the loan. Most investors still don’t realize what happened to their money and many are still getting payments as though the Trust was real — but they are not getting payments or reports from the REMIC Trust.

And most borrowers don’t realize that their identity was stolen, that their loan was cloned, and that each version of their loan that was sold netted another 100% profit to the investment banks, who also sold the bonds to the Federal Reserve after they had already sold the same bonds to investors. Thus the investment banks screwed the investors, screwed the borrowers and screwed the taxpayers while their plan resulted in a cataclysmic failure of the economies around the world. Investors mostly don’t realize that they are never going to see the money they were promised and that the banks are keeping the investors’ money as if it belonged to the bank. Most investors also don’t realize that the investment banks were their servant and that all that money the bank made really belongs to the investor, thus zeroing out the liability of the borrower but creating an enormous profit to the investors. Most borrowers don’t realize that they certainly don’t owe money to any of the foreclosing parties, but that they might have some remote liability to the clueless investors whose money was used to fund this circus.

TILA (NON-JUDICIAL AND JUDICIAL) Rescission Gets Clearer in Most Respects

For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

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It is becoming crystal clear that with help from a competent attorney the options under the TILA rescission process are (a) different from common law rescission and (b) very effective against “lenders” who can no longer hide behind “presumptions”. LIKE THE PRESUMPTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN STRICTLY APPLIED AGAINST HOMEOWNERS, BUT WHICH ARE REBUTTABLE, TILA RESCISSION IS STRICTLY APPLIED AGAINST “LENDERS.” Just as presumptions force the borrower to take the burden of proof on basic facts in the pretender lender’s case, TILA rescission forces the “lender” to take the burden of proof in the borrower’s loan, establishing that there was no basis for rescission. This article covers the law regarding those legal presumptions AND the effects and mechanics of a TILA rescission.

Amongst the things that are clear now is the plain fact that rescission is a private statutory remedy requiring only a letter to give notice of exercising the TILA right of rescission. If a homeowner wants to file suit to enforce the rescission, there is a one year statute of limitations to collect damages or get any requiring the “lender” to comply. But the effective date of rescission remains the same even if the one year statute has passed. In plain language that means that by operation of law you don’t have a mortgage encumbrance on your property if more than 20 days has passed since the rescission was effective (the day you dropped it in a mailbox).

But if you are looking to recover the financial damages provided by TILA (disgorgement of payments etc.) then you need to file suit within one year of the rescission. If you want to clear title with a quiet title action my opinion is that the one year statute of limitations does not apply — because the act provides that the mortgage and note are void by operation of law. Thus the title issue is cleared as of the date of rescission. As argued by the ACLU and as stated by a unanimous Supreme Court the rescission is effective upon notice. There is no requirement of notice AND a lawsuit. So the suit to clear or quiet title is merely based on removing the mortgage from your chain of title because it is (and has been) void since the day of rescission.

I cannot emphasize enough the importance or reading the ACLU brief below. Too many judges and lawyers have become confused over the various provisions of TILA. A lawsuit based upon rescission to to enforce the rights due to the borrower because the rescission is already effective. The lawsuit is NOT the exercise of the right of TILA rescission. The letter declaring the rescission is the exercise of the right of TILA rescission. This is far different from common law rescission.

FOR REBUTTING PRESUMPTIONS See Franklin Decision

FOR ADMISSIONS REGARDING FABRICATION OF DOCUMENTS THUS REBUTTING PRESUMPTIONS See Wells Fargo Foreclosure_attorney_procedure_manual-1

FOR THOROUGH ANALYSIS AND HISTORY OF TILA RESCISSION SEE jesinoski_v._countrywide_home_loans_aclu_amicus_brief

And see this explanation which is almost entirely accurate —

Read this excerpt from the CFPB Amicus Brief (Rosenfeld v. HSBC):
” If the court finds the consumer was entitled to rescind, it will order the procedures specified by 1635 and Reg. Z, or modify them as the case requires…Accordingly, if the court finds the consumer rescinded the transaction because she properly exercised a valid right to rescind under 1635, the lender must be ordered [by the court] to honor the rescission, even if the underlying right to rescind has expired.”
 
I needn’t go further…this is the CFPB talking…and they are the sole authority to promulgate the rules of rescission by Congress. They (the lender) must act within 20 days, regardless of the consumer’s perception of whether or not the rescission is timely. It would be up to a court to determine the exercise of the right…but the lender must be ordered by the court to follow the rules of rescission under TILA and the attendant time frames contemplated therein.
The rescission process is private, leaving the consumer and lender to working out the logistics of a given rescission.” McKenna, 475 F.3d at 421; accord Belini, 412 F.3d at 25. Otherwise, to leave the creditors in charge of determining timing, the creditors would no doubt stonewall until the time ran after receipt of the notice of rescission. Thus, even valid rescissions would result in creditors claiming that the time to file suit had run out and the statute is then moot. Congress recognized that TILA rescission is necessarily effected by notice and any subsequent litigation must be accomplished within restrictions set against the creditors…not the consumers. This is non-judicial action at its finest. Just like the non-judicial act of foreclosure (in such forums). 
Consummation is a question of fact that would be determined after the creditor performed its required obligations under 1635 (b)…unless suit is brought within 20 days of the notice of rescission…as is required.
“Everyone is a genius, but if one passes judgment on a fish trying to climb a tree, and then continues to tell him that he is stupid, the fish, and everyone else, will believe that, even though his genius has never been discovered.” Albert Einstein.
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