Confused? Beware of Scams

One of the fundamental cancers growing out of the “Securitization” craze is that it opened the door to financial scams of increasing diversity. The article below demonstrates one of those scams. None of this would be possible if it were not for the fact that “securitization” was and continues to be a scam as to residential loans starting in the late 1990’s.

Basic rule for all “deals”: if you don’t fully understand it or have someone who does understand it, don’t do it. With 50 years of experience on Wall Street, in business and practicing law (41 years) I can sniff out a scam in minutes.

Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

I provide advice and consent to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key elements of a scam. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM. A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.

PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORMWITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.

Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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LOOK BEFORE YOU LEAP!

see – More REMIC Scams Emerging – Fla. Office of financial Regulation Starts Investigation

This scam was only possible because nobody understands “Securitization.” Even fewer people understand what “REMIC” means. This scam told people that the IRS would pay refunds to them to pay off their residential mortgage loans. The money was to be derived from a REMIC Trust.

Because REMIC Trusts rarely exist, the perpetrators of this nonsense were able to use that fact to convince people that this REMIC did exist. All the criminals had to do was copy the PSA from some other scam masquerading as a REMIC Trust and Presto! they could say they had a trust. The “REMIC” designation was simply added for flavor, as though the entity actually was formed and funded and acquired residential mortgages with money derived from mostly institutional investors.

Securitization comes in three main flavors:

  1. Securitization as a concept
  2. Securitization documents as they are written
  3. Securitization in practice in real life.

In the real world those three flavors should all be the same, but they are not. real life practice is inconsistent with the written documents and the concept of securitization. Instead of spreading risk the investment banks are concentrating it. That’s why the 2008 hiccup turned into a landslide. The only people making money off of alleged
“loans” are the investment banks acting as intermediaries between the investors and borrowers.

There is nothing wrong with securitization as a concept. There is everything wrong with securitization as it has been written into thousands of false REMIC documents supposedly creating a REMIC Trust. And in practice it was wide open for “moral hazard” — i.e., outright theft.

The reason that virtually all “documents” are fabricated in foreclosures is that the actual path of investment ran off a completely different track than the one portrayed in court. But using false documents has now been institutionalized, paving the way for the proliferation of financial scams against people who were already scammed.

I offer the following guide: if the word “REMIC” is used, the real facts are almost always certain to reveal a scam, whether you are in foreclosure proceedings or dealing with some “rescue operation”.

IN ALL CASES HIRE AN INDEPENDENT FINANCIAL AND /OR LEGAL ADVISER BEFORE YOU SPEND MONEY THAT YOU WILL NEVER SEE AGAIN.

Terms of Art: Assignment or Endorsement?

Lawyers, judges and homeowners are using different terms interchangeably thus muddying up the argument or ruling. An assignment refers to a mortgage whereas an   endorsement (“indorsement” in legalese) refers to a note. The rules regarding enforcement of a mortgage are different than the enforcement of a note.

Let us help you plan your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult

PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORMWITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.

Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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I want to point out the difference between assignment and endorsement. Because judges often defer to bank lawyers to explain the law, there is some confusion there. Often the point is that there was no valid purported assignment of the mortgage and there was no valid endorsement of the note. The argument has great significance particularly in view of the use of sham conduints at the initial “closing,” where the disclosed “ledner” is a misrepresentation, thus preventing the doctrine of merger in which the debt is merged with the note.
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By law, notes are not assigned. They are endorsed if a transfer occurs. Like a check the endorsement must be on the face of the instrument (like the back of the check), or if there is no room because of prior endorsements then an allonge must be permanently affixed to the note containing the endorsement. A separate paper is not an allonge, by definition.
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Keep in mind that the note is not the debt and the debt is not the note. The note can be (a) evidence of the debt or (b) merged with the debt (to prevent double liability only if the payee on the note is the same as the lender. The only exception to this is if the payee was acting as a disclosed agent for the lender. The debt exists regardless of whether there is paperwork. The note might exist but it might be invalid depending upon whether it memorializes a real transaction between the parties on the note.
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In practice in the typical “closing” the borrower signs the note and mortgage before he receives the alleged loan. Neither one should be released, much less recorded, by the closing agent unless and until the borrower receives the funds or money is actually paid on the borrower’s behalf by the Payee on the note. When it comes to purported transfer of these residential “loans,” low level employees are not given powers over tens of millions of dollars worth of loans in banking custom and practice.
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The biggest point I wish to make here is that the assignor and assignee of a mortgage must exist legally and actually. Similarly the endorser and endorsee of a note must exist. An apparently valid assignment or endorsement to a party who did not purchase the debt can result in two things: (a) the assignment of mortgage is not valid because it failed to transfer the debt and/or (b) the failure of the assignment to transfer the debt may be fairly construed as failing to place the subject loan in trust. Without the trust owning the debt (as evidenced by a real transaction in which the debt was purchased from a party who owned the debt), the trust does not exist as to the subject loan nor does it exist at all if that was the practice with respect to all alleged loans for which there was a transfer on paper that did not memorialize real life events.
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Three endorsements:
Dated special endorsement to a particular party. This will be treated a presumptively valid. But the presumption can be rebutted — if the endorser (“indorser” in legalese) did not own the note or otherwise have the right to act as agent for a party who did own the note. This is the point of our TERA — to expose the fact that the paper is self generated and self serving and fabricated by revealing the one simple fact that the party who executed the endorsement was an actual or fictitious individual who was probably a robo-signor on behalf of an entity that did not own the note nor have the power to assign.
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Undated special endorsement to a particular party. If it is undated, it is probably fabricated because custom and practice in the industry does not treat mortgage loans the same as they treat checks. When dealing with high ticket items a special endorsement that is dated would (a) ordinarily accompany an assignment of mortgage (often abandoned by the foreclosing party) and (b) MUST be accompanied by acquisition for value — i.e., purchase of the debt. Ordinarily there would also be correspondence and written agreements concerning the sale of the note and mortgage. Those are issues for discovery.
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Dated or undated blank endorsement — bearer paper. As stated above, big ticket items usually are not generally transferred by blank endorsements, assuming the paper is actually “negotiable.” Hence if it is bearer paper (no person identified as the endorsee) this is likely a fabricated, backdated document, if it is dated, or just a blanket self serving document that consists of a misrepresentation to the court. Note that most provisions in a PSA (Pooling and Servicing Agreement, also referred to as the “trust instrument”) state specifically that (a) the “trust” is organized to be a REMIC vehicle which means there is a 90 day window in which they can acquire loans (the cutoff period) and (b) the assignments must be in recordable form and (c) the endorsements must be valid. Otherwise, the apparent transfer cannot be accepted by the Trust under REMIC rules (see Internal Revenue Code 26 U.S. Code § 860D – REMIC defined), under the powers of the Trustee (virtually nonexistent in most REMIC Trusts), and under New York Law which almost always invoked as the  State in which the Trust is organized. New York Law states that any act that contravenes the powers expressed in the Trust instrument are void, not voidable. So a transfer after the cutoff date is void, as it would ruin the REMIC status under the IRC and violate the specific provisions of the Trust designed to invoke the REMIC rules.

Financial Industry Caught with Its Hand in the Cookie Jar

Like the infamous NINJA loans, the REMICs ought to be dubbed NEITs — nonexistent inactive trusts.

The idea of switching lenders without permission of the borrower has been accepted for centuries. But the idea of switching borrowers without permission of the “lender” had never been accepted until the era of false claims of securitization.

This is just one example of how securitization, in practice, has gone far off the rails. It is significant to students of securitization because it demonstrates how the debt, note and mortgage have been separated with each being a commodity to sell to multiple buyers.

Let us help you analyze your case: 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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see https://asreport.americanbanker.com/news/new-risk-for-loan-investors-lending-to-a-different-company

Leveraged loan investors are now concerned about whether they are funding a loan to one entity and then “by succession” ending up with another borrower with a different credit profile, reputation, etc. You can’t make this stuff up. This is only possible because the debt has been separated from the promissory note — the same way the debt, note and mortgage were treated as entirely separate commodities in the “securitization” of residential mortgage debt. The lack of connection between the paper and the debt has allowed borrowers to sell or transfer their position as borrower to another borrower leaving the “lender” holding a debt from a new borrower. This sounds crazy but it is nevertheless true. [I am NOT suggesting that individual homeowners try this. It won’t work]

Keep in mind that most certificates issued by investment bankers purportedly from nonexistent inactive trusts (call them NEITs instead of REMICs) contain an express provision that states in clear unequivocal language that the holder of the certificate has no right, title or interest to the underlying notes and mortgages. This in effect creates a category of defrauded investors using much the same logic as the use of MERS in which MERS expressly disclaims and right, title or interest in the money (i.e., the debt), or the mortgages that reregistered by third party “members.”

Of course those of us who understand this cloud of smoke and mirrors know that the securitization was never real. The single transaction rule used in tax cases establishes conclusively that the only real parties in interest are the investors and the borrowers. Everyone else is simply an intermediary with no more interest in any transaction than your depository bank has when you write a check on your account. The bank can’t assert ownership of the TV you just paid for. But if you separate the maker of the check from the seller of the goods so that neither knows of the existence of the other then the intermediary is free to make whatever false claims it seeks to make.

In the world of fake securitization or as Adam Levitin has coined it, “Securitization Fail”, the successors did not pay for the debt but did get the paper (note and mortgage or deed of trust). All the real monetary transactions took place outside the orbit of the falsely identified REMIC “Trust.” The debt, by law and custom, has always been considered to arise between Party A and Party B where one of them is the borrower and the other is the one who put the money into the hands of the borrower acting for its own account — or for a disclosed third party lender. In most cases the creditor in that transaction is not named as the lender on the promissory note. Hence the age-old “merger doctrine” does not apply.

This practice allows the sale and resale of the same loan multiple times to multiple parties. This practice is also designed to allow the underwriter to issue investors a promise to pay (the “certificate” from a nonexistent inactive trust entity) that conveys no interest in the underlying mortgages and notes that supposedly are being acquired.

It’s true that equitable and perhaps legal rights to the paper (i.e., ownership) have attached to the paper. But the paper has been severed from the debt. Courts have inappropriately ignored this fact and stuck with the presumption that the paper is the same as the debt. But that would only be true if the named payee or mortgagee (or beneficiary on a Deed of Trust) were one and the same. In the real world, they are not the same. Thus we parties who don’t own the debt foreclosing on houses because the real parties in interest have no idea how to identify the real parties in interest.

While the UCC addresses situations like this Courts have routinely ignored statutory law and simply applied their own “common sense” to a nearly incomprehensible situation. The result is that the courts apply legal presumptions of facts that are wrong.

PRACTICE NOTE: In order to be able to litigate properly one must understand the basics of fake securitization. Without understanding the difference between real world transactions and paper instruments discovery and trial narrative become corrupted and the homeowner loses. But if you keep searching for things that ought to exist but don’t — thus undercutting the foundation for testimony at deposition or trial — then your chances of winning rise geometrically. The fact is, as I said in many interviews and on this blog as far back as 2007, they don’t have the goods — all they have is an illusion — a holographic image of an empty paper bag.

DEUTSCH BANK Memo Reveals Documents and Policies Ripe for Discovery

This completely corroborates what I have been saying for years along with a chorus of lawyers and pro se litigants across the county. It simply is not true that the attorney represents the trust or the trustee. 

This “Advisory” shows that there are documents that are rarely in the limelight and that clarify claims of securitization in practice. Note that the memorandum cited below comes from Deutsch Bank National Trust Company, as trustee and Deutsch Bank Trust Company Americas, as trustee.

These names are often NOT used when foreclosure actions are initiated where the name of the alleged REMIC Trustee is Deutsch Bank. It is important to note that neither of the two trust entities actually have been entrusted with any loans on behalf of any trust. Their name is used, for a fee, as windows dressing.

In this memo, Deutsch is attempting to limit its liability beyond the absence of any duties or trustee powers whose absence is revealed by reading the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) which is the alleged Trust instrument.

Let us help you plan your discovery requests: 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Hat tip to Bill Paatalo

See Deutsche Bank Memorandum – July 2008

I have previously published and commented on parts of this memorandum. This is an expansion on my comments. This “advisory” obviously intends to bring alleged servicers back in line because it states in the introductory paragraph that the Trustee respectfully requests that all servicers review the First Servicing Memorandum and adhere to the practices it describes.”

None of this would have been necessary if the servicers were conforming to the directions and restrictions contained in the First Servicing Memorandum. We all know now that they were not conforming to anything or accepting instruction from anyone other than the alleged “Master Servicers” for NEITs (nonexistent  inactive trusts).

In discovery, one should ask for any servicer memoranda that exist including but not limited to the Memorandum to Securitization Loan Servicers dated August 30, 2007 a/k/a the First Servicer Memorandum, and all subsequent correspondence or written directions to servicers including but not limited to this “Advisory Concerning Servicing Issues Affecting Securitized Housing Assets.

Note also the oblique reference to the fact that the cut-off date actually means something.  It states that “typically” the REMICs (actually NEITs) take ownership of loans at the time the securitization trusts are formed. Thus discovery would include questions as to whether or not that occurred and if not, when did transfer of ownership occur and with what parties. Also one would ask for correspondence and agreements attendant to the alleged “transaction” in which the Trust allegedly purchased the loans with trust money that came from the proceeds of sales of certificates to investors. If the Trust did not pay value for the loans then it did not acquire the debt. It only acquired the paper instruments that are used as evidence of the debt.

Perhaps most importantly, the memo comes down hard on the use of powers of attorney, which are a favorite medium through which lawyers for the foreclosing parties typically try to patch obvious gaps in the chain of ownership or custody of the loan documents.

Then the memo provides foreclosure defense attorneys with the opportunity to attack the foundation laid for testimony and exhibits from robo-witnesses. It states that all parties must “Understand the mechanics of of relevant securitization transactions and related custodial practices in sufficient details to address such questions in a timely and accurate manner.” As any foreclosure defense lawyer will tell you, the robo-witness knows nothing about “the mechanics of of relevant securitization transactions and related custodial practices.” [The problem is that most borrowers and foreclosure defense lawyers don’t know either].

The inability of the robo-witness to describe the specific securitization practices in real life as it pertains to the subject loan gives rise to a cogent attack on the foundation for the rest of his testimony. With proper objections, perhaps motions in limine, and cross examination, this could lead to a defensive motion to strike the witnesses testimony and exhibits for lack of foundation. The following quote takes this out of the realm of theory and argument and into simple fact:

Servicers must ensure that loss mitigation personnel and professionals engaged by servicers, including legal counsel retained by servicers, understand the mechanics of relevant securitization transactions and related custodial practices in sufficient details to address such questions in a timely and accurate manner. In particular, servicing professionals [including “loss mitigation”] must become sufficiently familiar with the terms of the relevant securitization documents for each Trust for which they act to explain, and where necessary, prove those terms and resulting ownership interests to courts and government agencies.”

Note the assumption that lawyers are hired by servicers and not the Trustee or the Trust. Thus the servicers hire counsel and then order that foreclosure be brought in the name of the alleged trust. But if there is no trust or no acquisition of the debt, or authorization (remember powers of attorneys are not sufficient), the servicer is without legal authority to do anything, much less collect money from homeowners or bring foreclosure actions.

Paragraph (2) of the this “advisory” also gives guidance and foundation for what various people, especially attorneys, can say about who they represent and how.

“The Trustee believes that all persons retained by the servicer should specifically role or capacity in which they are acting. … One would be less accurate… if he or she claimed to be … attorney for the Trustee. A more accurate statement [attorney for servicer] acting for [Deutsch] as trustee of the Trust.”

This completely corroborates what I have been saying for years along with a chorus of lawyers and pro se litigants across the county. It simply is not true that the attorney represents the trust or the trustee.

 

Foreclosures spike 18%

“Fake news” is now the dominant form of spreading disinformation in our marketplace. The banks are in control of media outlets — some created by the banks — that keep spewing out false data about the foreclosure crisis being over. It isn’t true. It never was true. We still have millions more to go and that doesn’t include the new “delinquencies” that will hit the shores as the race continues to move money through false claims of securitization.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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see http://www.dsnews.com/headline/02-22-2017/delinquency-rate-shows-improvement

While most of the banking sector is claiming that the mortgage mess is over, the data shows that we (a) never hit any bottom and (b) that foreclosures are beginning to spike again.

The threat to the economy and market indices is a clear and present danger to our national economy and to the geographical areas that have yet to be decimated by declarations of default, foreclosure filings by strangers, and the wholesale sweep of once vibrant neighborhoods.

As we have seen many times in our history, Wall Street is one big selling machine. And the players on Wall Street will continue to sell anything that they convince others to buy regardless of quality and certainly regardless of social cost. Despite the lessons that could have been learned from the 2008 crash, the banks continue to retain ill-gotten gains siphoned out of the American economy and continue to pursue more ill-gotten gains.

The goal was and continues to be foreclosure because once the foreclosure judgment is signed there is a presumption of validity to everything that preceded the foreclosure judgment or sale. In fact, though, in nearly all cases where the “owner” is portrayed as a REMIC Trust, the trust was never used in any capacity except for invoking the name of the trust, whether it existed or not and whether or not the trust ever had any business or assets. The trust was cover for global theft.

Black Knight reports that there are now 2.8 million delinquent loans.  What they do not report is that they continue the same behavior as before (when they were known as LPS), to wit: creating fake data, fake documents and fake signatures using mechanical arms and an IT platform that performs the work required while keeping the client banks safely hidden from view.

As money continues to flood the marketplace, housing prices are once again climbing far above value. Value has historically been calculated, for more than 100 years, as the relationship between housing costs and median income. While TILA creates a duty of the lender to assure that its loan products are affordable, the only way the banks make the big money is by making sure that the loans go into default. And the only way the banks can create a veil of legitimacy over their illegal scheme of false securitization claims is to foreclose — because it is the only legal outcome that protects them from lawsuits and enforcement actions.

In the current market deregulation of the banks will have little meaning — just as regulating them will mean nothing if we forbear enforcement actions. With the Court system presuming that the transactions originated were actually loans between the payee on the note and the homeowner and with legislators at every level heavily influenced or bought by the banks the burden of righting the ship falls on the victims of foreclosure — the homeowners and the investors. And since the investors have no appetite for attacking the TBTF banks, that leaves the homeowners who have scant resources to mount a credible attack on the banks — except through mass joinder actions that have been stained by insult.

Can you really call it a loan when the money came from a thief?

The banks were not taking risks. They were making risks and profiting from them. Or another way of looking at it is that with their superior knowledge they were neither taking nor making risks; instead they were creating the illusion of risk when the outcome was virtually certain.

Securitization as practiced by Wall Street and residential “mortgage” loans is not just a void assignment. It is a void loan and an enterprise based completely on steering all “loans” into failure and foreclosure.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Perhaps this summary might help some people understand why bad loans were the object of lending instead of good loans. The end result in the process was always to steer everyone into foreclosure.

Don’t use logic and don’t trust anything the banks put on paper. Start with a blank slate — it’s the only way to even start understanding what is happening and what is continuing to happen. The following is what you must keep in mind and returning to for -rereading as you plow through the bank representations. I use names for example only — it’s all the same, with some variations, throughout the 13 banks that were at the center of all this.

  1. The strategic object of the bank plan was to make everyone remote from liability while at the same time being part of multiple transactions — some real and some fictitious. Remote from liability means that the entity won’t be held accountable for its own actions or the actions of other entities that were all part of the scheme.
  2. The goal was simple: take other people’s money and re-characterize it as the banks’ money.
  3. Merrill Lynch approaches institutional investors like pension funds, which are called “stable managed funds.” They have special requirements to undertake the lowest possible risk in every investment. Getting such institutional investors to buy is a signal to the rest of the market that the securities purchased by the stable managed funds must be safe or they wouldn’t have done it.
  4. Merrill Lynch creates a proprietary entity that is neither a subsidiary nor an affiliate because it doesn’t really exist. It is called a REMIC Trust and is portrayed in the prospectus as though it was an independent entity that is under management by a reputable bank acting as Trustee. In order to give the appearance of independence Merrill Lynch hires US Bank to act as Trustee. The Trust is not registered anywhere because it is a common law trust which is only recognized by the laws of the State of New York. US Bank receives a monthly fee for NOT saying that it has no trust duties, and allowing the use of its name in foreclosures.
  5. Merrill Lynch issues a prospectus from the so-called REMIC entity offering the sale of “certificates” to investors who will receive a hybrid “security” that is partly a bond in which interest is due from the Trust to the investor and partly equity (like common stock) in which the owners of the certificates are said to have undivided interests in the assets of the Trust, of which there are none.
  6. The prospectus is a summary of how the securitization will work but it is not subject to SEC regulations because in 1998 an amendment to the securities laws exempted “pass-through” entities from securities regulations is they were backed by mortgage bonds.
  7. Attached to the prospectus is a mortgage loan schedule (MLS). But the body of the prospectus (which few people read) discloses that the MLS is not real and is offered by way of example.
  8. Attached for due diligence review is a copy of the Trust instrument that created the REMIC Trust. It is also called a Pooling and Servicing Agreement to give the illusion that a pool of loans is owned by the Trust and administered by the Trustee, the Master Servicer and other entities who are described as performing different roles.
  9. The PSA does not grant or describe any duties, responsibilities to be performed by US Bank as trustee. Actual control over the Trust assets, if they ever existed, is exercised by the Master Servicer, Merrill Lynch acting through subservicers like Ocwen.
  10. Merrill Lynch procures a triple AAA rating from Moody’s Rating Service, as quasi public entity that grades various securities according to risk assessment. This provides “assurance” to investors that the the REMIC Trust underwritten by Merrill Lynch and sold by a Merrill Lynch affiliate must be safe because Moody’s has always been a reliable rating agency and it is controlled by Federal regulation.
  11. Those institutional investors who actually performed due diligence did not buy the securities.
  12. Most institutional investors were like cattle simply going along with the crowd. And they advanced money for the purported “purchase” of the certificates “issued” by the “REMIC Trust.”
  13. Part of the ratings and part of the investment decision was based upon the fact that the REMIC Trusts would be purchasing loans that had already been seasoned and established as high grade. This was a lie.
  14. For all practical purposes, no REMIC Trust ever bought any loan; and even where the appearance of a purchase was fabricated through documents reflecting a transaction that never occurred, the “purchased” loans were the result of “loan closings” which only happened days before or were fulfilling Agreements in which all such loans were pre-sold — i.e., as early as before even an application for loan had been submitted.
  15. The normal practice required under the securities regulation is that when a company or entity offers securities for sale, the net proceeds of sale go to the issuing entity. This is thought to be axiomatically true on Wall Street. No entity would offer securities that made the entity indebted or owned by others unless they were getting the proceeds of sale of the “securities.”
  16. Merrill Lynch gets the money, sometimes through conduits, that represent proceeds of the sale of the REMIC Trust certificates.
  17. Merrill Lynch does not turn over the proceeds of sale to US Bank as trustee for the Trust. Vague language contained in the PSA reveals that there was an intention to divert or convert the money received from investors to a “dark pool” controlled by Merrill Lynch and not controlled by US Bank or anyone else on behalf of the REMIC Trust.
  18. Merrill Lynch embarks on a nationwide and even world wide sales push to sell complex loan products to homeowners seeking financing. Most of the sales, nearly all, were directed at the loans most likely to fail. This was because Merrill Lynch could create the appearance of compliance with the prospectus and the PSA with respect to the quality of the loan.
  19. More importantly by providing investors with 5% return on their money, Merrill Lynch could lend out 50% of the invested money at 10% and still give the investors the 5% they were expecting (unless the loan did NOT go to foreclosure, in which case the entire balance would be due). The balance due, if any, was taken from the dark pool controlled by Merrill Lynch and consisting entirely of money invested by the institutional investors.
  20. Hence the banks were not taking risks. They were making risks and profiting from them. Or another way of looking at it is that with their superior knowledge they were neither taking nor making risks; instead they were creating the illusion of risk when the outcome was virtually certain.
  21. The use of the name “US Bank, as Trustee” keeps does NOT directly subject US Bank to any liability, knowledge, intention, or anything else, as it was and remains a passive rent-a-name operation in which no loans are ever administered in trust because none were purchased by the Trust, which never got the proceeds of sale of securities and was therefore devoid of any assets or business activity at any time.
  22. The only way for the banks to put a seal of legitimacy on what they were doing — stealing money — was by getting official documents from the court systems approving a foreclosure. Hence every effort was made to push all loans to foreclosure under cover of an illusory modification program in which they occasionally granted real modifications that would qualify as a “workout,” which before the false claims fo securitization of loans, was the industry standard norm.
  23. Thus the foreclosure became extraordinarily important to complete the bank plan. By getting a real facially valid court order or forced sale of the property, the loan could be “legitimately” written off as a failed loan.
  24. The Judgment or Order signed by the Judge and the Clerk deed upon sale at foreclosure auction became a document that (1) was presumptively valid and (b) therefore ratified all the preceding illegal acts.
  25. Thus the worse the loan, the less Merrill Lynch had to lend. The difference between the investment and the amount loaned was sometimes as much as three times the principal due in high risk loans that were covered up and mixed in with what appeared to be conforming loans.
  26. Then Merrill Lynch entered into “private agreements” for sale of the same loans to multiple parties under the guise of a risk management vehicles etc. This accounts for why the notional value of the shadow banking market sky-rocketed to 1 quadrillion dollars when all the fiat money in the world was around $70 trillion — or 7% of the monstrous bubble created in shadow banking. And that is why central banks had no choice but to print money — because all the real money had been siphoned out the economy and into the pockets of the banks and their bankers.
  27. TARP was passed to cover the banks  for their losses due to loan defaults. It quickly became apparent that the banks had no losses from loan defaults because they were never using their own money to originate loans, although they had the ability to make it look like that.
  28. Then TARP was changed to cover the banks for their losses in mortgage bonds and the derivative markets. It quickly became apparent that the banks were not buying mortgage bonds, they were selling them, so they had no such losses there either.
  29. Then TARP was changed again to cover losses from toxic investment vehicles, which would be a reference to what I have described above.
  30. And then to top it off, the Banks convinced our central bankers at the Federal Reserve that they would freeze up credit all over the world unless they received even more money which would allow them to make more loans and ease credit. So the FED purchased mortgage bonds from the non-owning banks to the tune of around $3 Trillion thus far — on top of all the other ill-gotten gains amounting roughly to around 50% of all loans ever originated over the last 20 years.
  31. The claim of losses by the banks was false in all the forms that was represented. There was no easing of credit. And banks have been allowed to conduct foreclosures on loans that violated nearly all lending standards especially including lying about who the creditor is in order to keep everyone “remote” from liability for selling loan products whose central attribute was failure.
  32. Since the certificates issued in the name of the so-called REMIC Trusts were not in fact backed by mortgage loans (EVER) the certificates, the issuers, the underwriters, the master servicers, the trustees et al are NOT qualified for exemption under the 1998 law. The SEC is either asleep on this or has been instructed by three successive presidents to leave the banks alone, which accounts for the failure to jail any of the bankers that essentially committed treason by attacking the economic foundation of our society.

MERS/GMAC Note and Mortgage Discharged

If only all courts would entertain the possibility that everything presented to them should be the subject of intense scrutiny, 90%+ of all foreclosures would have been eliminated. Imagine what the country would look like today if the mortgages and fraudulent foreclosures failed.

The Banks say that if the mortgages failed they all would go bust and that there is nothing to backstop the financial system. The rest of us say that illegal mortgage lending and foreclosures was too high a price to pay for a dubious theory of national security.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

I received the email quoted below from David Belanger who, like many others has proven beyond any reasonable doubt that persistence pays off. (BOLD IS EMPHASIS SUPPLIED BY EDITOR)

Besides the obvious the big takeaway for me was what I have been advocating since 2007 — if any company in in the alleged chain of “creditors” has gone out of business, there probably is a bankruptcy involved or an FDIC receivership. Those records are available for inspection. And what those records will show is that the the bankrupt or insolvent entity did not own the debt that arose when you signed documents for the benefit of parties other than the source of funding. It will also show that the bankrupt or insolvent entity did not own the note or mortgage either.

This is instructional for virtually all parties “involved” in a foreclosure but particularly clear in the cases of OneWest, whose entire business plan depended upon fraudulent foreclosures, and Chase Bank who bet heavily on getting away with it and they have, so far. BUT looking at the bankruptcy and receivership filings of IndyMac and WAMU respectively the nature of the fraud was obvious and born out of pure arrogance and apparently a correct perception of invincibility.

All such bankruptcy proceedings and receivership require schedules of assets right down to the last nickle in bankruptcy. Belanger simply looked at the schedule, knowing he never took the loan, and found without surprise that the bankrupt entity never claimed ownership of the debt, note or mortgage.

The big message here though is not just for those who are being pursued in collection for loans they never asked for nor received. The message here is to look at those schedules to see if your debt, note or mortgage is listed. Lying on those forms is a federal felony punishable by jail. Those forms are the closest you are ever going to get to the truth. Odds are your loan is nowhere to be found — even if you did get a loan.

And the second takeaway is the nonexistence of the “trust.” In most cases it never existed. Your “REMIC Trust” was almost certainly formed under the laws of the State of New York or Delaware that permit common law trusts (i.e., trusts that don’t need to be registered with the state in order to exist). BUT uniform trust laws adopted in virtually all states require for the trust to be considered a “person” it needs to have these elements — (1) trustor (2) trustee (3) trust instrument (PSA) and (4) a “thing” (res in Latin) that is committed to the trust by someone who owns the thing. It is the last element that is wholly absent from nearly all REMIC “Trusts.”

And now, David Belanger’s email:

JUST WANTED TO TELL YOU ALL SOMETHING,  THAT I JUST GOT DONE , FROM MERSCORP!  ON OUR PROPERTY THERE WAS A 2d MORTGAGE ON IT, IT WAS A LINE OF CREDIT THAT WE DID NOT DO, AND WE DID REPORT IT TO THE RIGHT AUTHORITY’S, BACK IN 2006/2007. NOW THE COMPANY WAS GMAC MORTGAGE CORP.

OVER THE YRS, FROM 2006 TILL NOW, IT REMAINED ON PROPERTY, UNTIL JUST LAST WEEK, WHEN I DEMANDED THAT MERS DISCHARGE IT.  AND AFTER THEY FOUND OUT IT WAS NEVER ASSIGNED OUT OF MERS, THEY HAD TO DISCHARGE IT. BECAUSE GMAC MORTGAGE IS DEAD.  NOW THIS GO TO WHAT WE ALL HAVE SAID HERE.

ANY ASSIGNMENT THAT HAS NOT BEEN DONE, OR RECORDED AT REGISTRY OF DEEDS, OUT OF MERS, AND THE MORTGAGE COMPANY IS A DEAD MORTGAGE COMPANY. THEN MERS WILL DISCHARGE IT . I HAVE A COPY OF THE DISCHARGE IN HAND.

AM STILL FIGHTING, BECAUSE OF THIS NEWS,  I HAVE ASK MY ATTORNEY TO NO AVAIL TO DO A QWR ON THE COMPANY THAT RECORDED AN ASSIGNMENT IN 2012, EVEN THOUGH GMAC MORTGAGE CORP WAS IN BK AND AFTER GOING THROUGH ALL BK RECORDS OF EACH ENTITY, THAT HAD TO FILE ALL ASSET OF THERE COMPANY, AND FOUND THAT NO ONE IN GMAC HAD THE MORTGAGE AND NOTE, 3 MONTHS PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENT BEING PUT ON MY RECORD.
https://www.kccllc.net/rescap/document/1212020120703000000000033

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW …
http://www.kccllc.net
Southern District of New York, New York In re: GMAC Mortgage, LLC UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT Case No. 12-12032 (MG) B6 Summary (Official Form 6 – Summary) (12/07)

THIS IS AGAIN THE REASON, THIS FRAUD TRUST  DOES NOT EXIST, AND I DO HAVE ALL SECRETARY OF STATES, INCLUDING ALL STATING THAT  THIS FRAUD TRUST IN FACT HAS NEVER
BEEN REGISTERED IN ANY STATE. LET ALONG THE STATE OF DELAWARE, THE STATE THEY SAY IT IS REGISTERED IN.  THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID NO. AND HAS NEVER BEEN A LEGAL OPERATING TRUST, EVER. SIGNED AND NOTARIZED BY THE SECRETARY. THE FRAUD TRUST NAME IS AS FOLLOWS.
GMACM MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2006-J1,

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