Distilling the 20 Points of TILA Rescission: 9th Circuit Allows “Claim” for Rescission Under WA Statute of Limitations

I have distilled the legal points and procedure of TILA Rescission down to their essentials and specifics as you can see below. In the case presented the 9th Circuit ruled in favor of the homeowner but in so doing continued to violate the law of the land enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States and Congress.

Yes the homeowner should win but no, the homeowner should not be treated as having any burden of proof as to effectiveness of the TILA Rescission because the TILA Rescission statute is a self-executing statute that is effective by operation of law. It is not and never was a claim.

Astonishing. The 9th Circuit is drilling down on the premise that TILA Rescission is a claim rather than a self executing statutory event. This decision, favorable to the homeowner, not only engraves the “claim” theory in concrete, it applies a 6 year statute of limitations in Washington State.

The fact that the statute says the rescission is effective “by operation of law” is once again ignored. This may cause the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) to finally accept certiorari in cases involving TILA Rescission and to once again (See Jesinoski v Countrywide 135 S. Ct. 790, 792 (2015) scold all the lower courts for their excess in reading into the statute what is either not there at all or which is in direct contradiction to what the TILA rescission statute says. 15 U.S.C. §1635(f).

The message from SCOTUS should be clear: Just because you don’t like the result doesn’t mean you can reinvent the statute to say what you think it should have said. Both the trial court and the 9th Circuit were massively wrong, and eventually that will be made clear — but not until considerably more damage is done to American homeowners, the real estate market, our society, and the financial system generally. If you really want to see a correction to bad bank behavior this is the tool.

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Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult or check us out on www.lendinglies.com. Order a PDR BASIC to have us review and comment on your notice of TILA Rescission or similar document.
I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM.
A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.
PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.
Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345 or 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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see 9th cir hoang v bank of america 17-35993

Had they accepted the simple wording of the statute and the wording of the SCOTUS decision in Jesinoski, the decision of the 9th Circuit would have been on target. As it is, they have muddied the waters even further.

They continue to regard TILA Rescission as a claim, thus applying the statute of limitations and avoiding the distasteful issues (for the courts) that would be raised by recognizing what SCOTUS and the TILA Rescission statute have already said: the TILA Rescission statute is procedural.

Upon sending the required notice the claim of the creditor is changed from the note and mortgage to a claim under the statute. The note and mortgage vanish just like the debt vanishes and when the note is executed (assuming the Payee is the same party to whom the debt is owed). The purpose both the TILA Rescission statute and the merger doctrine is to to bar two claims on the same debt.

The problem that the courts have manufactured is based upon the premise of “I don’t’ like that statute.” But if the statute is to be changed it MUST be done ONLY by Congress. SCOTUS (Jesinoski) has already pronounced the TILA Rescission statute clear and unambiguous permitting no interpretation based upon any perceived “ambiguity.” The courts hands are legally tied but they continue to operate in derogation of the statute and SCOTUS.

Here is the ONLY correct application of the statute — according to 15 USC §1635 and SCOTUS in Jesinoski v Countrywide 135 S. Ct. 790, 792 (2015):

  1. Upon sending a clear notice of a desire or intent to cancel the loan contract, and either its actual or presumed receipt (i.e. US Mail) by the owner of the debt or the owner’s authorized representative (or agent with apparent authority) the loan contract is canceled “by operation of law”.
  2. This renders the note and mortgage void. There is no “but”.
  3. The statute substitutes a different creditor claim for what was the note and mortgage, to wit:  a statutory obligation to pay the debt after the owner complies with three conditions: (a) payment of money to the borrower (b) cancellation of note and sending it to borrower and (c) satisfaction of mortgage filed in the county records.
  4. The three duties are conditions precedent to demanding tender of property or money to pay off the debt.
  5. The fact that the three duties MAY be subject to an enforcement action by the borrower does nothing to change the effect of the cancelation of the loan contract by notice of TILA Rescission.
  6. There is no claim for enforcement of the three duties if the TILA statute of limitations has run.
  7. There is no claim for TILA Rescission. Either it was mailed or it wasn’t. There is no case or prima facie case except in enforcement of the three duties.
  8. There is no lawsuit required or even applicable to demand a court declare that the Rescission was effective. It is already effective simply by mailing. It already happened by operation of law. All decisions by all courts to the contrary are wrong. SCOTUS already said that.
  9. If the owner of the debt fails to either sue to vacate the rescission and/or follow the statutory duties, the statute of limitations under TILA is running and they may lose their right to demand payment of the debt completely. Once the TILA SOL runs out the right to collect the debt is dead after TILA Rescission.
  10. If the borrower fails to sue to enforce the three creditor duties, he/she is gambling on the TILA SOL cutting off the debt. The same statute of limitations cuts off the right of the borrower to sue based upon TILA claims.
  11. If the borrower does sue to enforce the three statutory Rescission duties the ONLY thing he/she should be claiming is that the statutory duties exist by virtue of 15 USC §1735 and that the Defendants failed to comply. Such an action could be after the SOL has run out seeking a declaration that the debt is dead (depending upon how SOL is treated).
  12. Neither the borrower nor the owner of the debt can reverse the effect of the TILA Rescission law. It is effective by operation of law and self-executing.
  13. Whether the notice is sent within 3 years or outside of the 3 years could be grounds to vacate the rescission which was already effective by operation of law. But that creditor lawsuit must be brought within the 20 days due for compliance with the three statutory duties. Minutes of the congressional discussion on this statute are quite clear — there should be no possibility at all for the presumed creditor to stonewall the borrower. SCOTUS said as much in Jesinoski, when it declared that no further action is required from the borrower other than the sending of the notice.
  14. The notice of rescission is facially valid if it declares the intention or desire to cancel the loan contract. There are dozens of cases saying exactly that. But it might be facially invalid if it expressly states that the contract it seeks to eliminate is outside of the three year limitation of “Consummation” (otherwise the 3 year limitation requires parole or extrinsic facts and requires finding of facts). This admission on the face of the instrument used to declare TILA Rescission MIGHT enable the presumed creditor to ignore it and ask the court to ignore it, at their own peril.
  15. If the creditor’s claim is that the rescission should be vacated (especially if it is recorded) or ignored because of the three year limitation or for any other reason, that is a lawsuit or an affirmative defense requiring allegation and proof of facts that are parole or extrinsic to the fact of the notice of TILA Rescission.
  16. There is no statute of limitation on anything that is effective by operation of law. It is an event, not a claim. Hence notice of TILA Rescission cannot be subject to interpretation as a claim and therefore cannot be subject to any statute of limitations.
  17. Thus all claims upon which courts took action or are taking action or will take any action based upon a loan contract that was canceled are VOID and completely undermine judicial standing and jurisdiction of the court. Subject matter jurisdiction is absent because the loan contract no longer exists. The creditor may either sue to revoke the rescission and cancel the instrument of rescission if recorded or make a claim based upon the statutory debt created by 15 USC §1635.
  18. The ONLY thing that could make void “sales” (of title to real property) final is Adverse Possession which typically takes around 20 years to establish. Check state statutes. The elements of adverse possession include but are not limited to continuous, open, notorious, peaceful, hostile (to actual owner), actual, visible, exclusive, and adverse. This is the “reset” that I forecasted 12 years ago. State legislatures are being lobbied to make such sales final even though they are legally void.
  19. All attorneys for the financial industry are in agreement with this analysis. The industry rejects the analysis because they correctly believe that they can persuade judges to act and rule opposite to the express provisions of the statute. So far they are right — except for the the  Supreme Court of the United States who is the sole source of a final definition of the law in this country.
  20. Anyone who seeks a change from the the current statute or the Supreme Court decision must do so through efforts to have Congress change the law.  If the rule of law is to prevail, the above procedural analysis must be followed in every instance.

SCOTUS Oral Argument Illuminates the Main Question in Foreclosures: What are the roles of the parties?

Two days ago in the case of Obudskey v McCarthy and Holthus LLP the  Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) heard oral argument on issues relating to the application of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA).

The argument for including the law firm pursuing foreclosure was presented by DANIEL L. GEYSER, Esq. in a case that started in Texas.

In the course of reading the oral argument and comments by the court it is clear that everyone is struggling with defining the roles of each of the players in foreclosure.  The fact that such a struggle exists is a testament to the credibility of arguments raised by homeowners that claimants are misrepresenting their roles and capacity to pursue foreclosure or at least on dubious ground for claiming any rights in relation to the subject debt. While the SCOTUS ruling could go any number of ways, the fact that they took the case for review combined with the content of the oral argument, shows that the roles of all the parties who line up to pursue foreclosure are obscured.

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Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult or check us out on www.lendinglies.com.
I provide advice and consultation to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key required elements of a scam — in and out of court. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM.
A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.
PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORM WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.
Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345 or 954-451-1230. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
==========================

see scotus oral argument on fdcpa 17-1307_apl1

Hat tip to Charles Cox

Claims under the FDCPA are very interesting because in order to determine of the party that is acting is a debt collector you must first determine if they are a creditor and then determine whether their activities fall within the FDCPA. By alleging they are a debt collector you are implicitly stating that they are not a creditor — i.e. an owner of the debt seeking to collect it.

This opens discovery on the issue of who owns the debt and wether the party demanding payment is representing the owner of the debt . We know they are not representing the owner of the debt (there probably is no “owner of the debt”) and they are not owners of the debt — unless a presumption is made that possession of the original note raises the presumption of transfer of the debt.

That in turn raises the question of whether the note was delivered by someone who owned the debt.

And THAT is at the heart of the game for the banks. They lead foreclosure defense counsel, homeowners and the courts into believing that the existence of the chain of paper is sufficient to raise a virtually irrebuttable presumption that what is written in the chain of paper is true. It is not true. So the entire tsunami of foreclosures was based upon the premise of the banks that it is true because they say it is true.

This is accepted by courts because they automatically accept representations of bank counsel as credible —- and automatically reject assertions of foreclosure defense counsel —- as either not credible or just technical ways to either delay the inevitable (which is a prejudgment) or get out of a legitimate debt (making the frequently erroneous assumption that the debt is legitimate) without regard to whether it is owed to the claimant who is named in the foreclosure proceedings — or whether the claimant has a legal relationship (privity) with the owner of the debt.

Rescission Article for the Banks

Hat tip to anonymous tipster

I have previously posted articles written by lawyers who researched and analyzed the TILA rescission statute 15 U.S.C. §1635 et seq. The bottom line is that they all have come to the same conclusions that I have after 12 years of study. The latest one brought to my attention was written probably before January, 2015, when the Jesinoski decision was published by the United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS).

The interesting thing about this article, written for in-house counsel for lenders, is that it obviously predates the Jesinoski decision (January, 2015) by SCOTUS. The thrust of the article is that borrowers must bring a lawsuit to effectuate TILA rescission within 3 years. The law of the land is that borrowers do NOT need to file suit to effectuate rescission and that to do so would be redundant because TILA Rescission is effective on delivery “by operation of law.”

Despite thousands of court decisions based upon that exact premise, the U.S. Supreme Court reached the obvious conclusion that such a view conflicts with the wording of the statute that says the rescission is effective, by operation of law, on the date of delivery or mailing. In effect SCOTUS reversed thousands of decisions by trial courts, appellate courts and even State Supreme Courts.

So the interesting point is that once you read the whole article you must read it again and exclude or remove the notion that there is some burden, rule or law that requires the homeowner to bring it to court and that the burden of going to court and applying for relief from the TILA rescission is squarely on the creditor, and must be exercised within 20 days; any ability of the “lender” to stonewall or extend the 20 day period would enable the foreclosing party to block the ability of the borrower to obtain alternative financing to pay back the principal. The session notes for the legislation make it very clear that Congress was removing all possible tools for the banks to “stonewall” the TILA rescission.

You must remember that the banks were instrumental in drafting TILA back in the 1960’s. There is no surprise here. Faced with two potential methods of policing the banks Congress chose the one advocated by the banks — a provision handing the control over the loan contract completely and entirely to the borrower. The results were draconian to be sure, but they were intended to be draconian because Congress did not want to establish a new federal agency to review all loan contracts.

So once you read the article for a second time you will come to the same conclusion that I did in 2008 — that the attorneys for the banks agree with my statements and analysis 100%. But what these attorneys don’t know is that their clients have no way of introducing a party with standing to challenge the TILA rescission. Hence the advice of filing a motion in court to establish rescission procedure is falling on deaf ears.

And the second thing these attorneys for the banks don’t understand is that TILA rescission is a risk factor to the issuance of “certificates” by an alleged trust. It’s a risk factor that was never publicized. And when the borrower is successful, by operation of law, in sending a notice of rescission it is game over — nobody except the owner of the debt can possibly bring the challenge to the TILA rescission. There MIGHT be some wiggle room as to whether the 3 year limitation is a statute of repose (barring equitable tolling) or a statute of limitations.

But either way, applying the express wording of the TILA Rescission statute, any challenge to a notice of rescission must be made by a party with legal standing within 20 days of the date on which the rescission became effective. Standing after any notice of TILA rescission cannot rely on ownership or possession of the note or mortgage. They were rendered void by sending the notice.

A claim may not be based upon void documents. There simply is no subject matter jurisdiction where, after notice of rescission has been delivered, the claims against the borrower for repayment of the debt are based upon the void (by operation of law) note and mortgage.

See Locke Lord TILARescission-Perdew

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Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

I provide advice and consent to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key elements of a scam. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM. A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.

PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORMWITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.

Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345 or 954-451-1230. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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Statute of Limitations on TILA Rescission: How long does the debt survive after notice of TLA rescission?

The simple answer is that the debt, or the claim on the debt, ends 20 days after notice of rescission. Otherwise the statute 15 U.S.C. §1635 and SCOTUS would have had no meaning when it says that the rescission is effective by operation of law at the time the notice is delivered. It provides a  very short window for “lender’s” compliance.

In reality, I have referred to a one year limitation because the courts are trying to mitigate the punitive intent of the TILA rescission statute. 15 U.S.C. §1640(e) basically leans toward a one year limitation for borrower’s claims against “lenders” based upon disclosure which is what TILA rescission is all about.

The borrower has every right to force compliance and get a court order requiring (a) return of canceled note (b) filing a release and satisfaction of the encumbrance and (c) payment of money to the borrower — but they have no such right after one year has expired starting with the date of the notice or date of delivery.

Employing analysis based upon the goose and the gander, it would follow that the one year limitation would also apply to “lenders” seeking payment from the borrower based upon the statutory requirement that the borrower pays the debt.

If this analysis was adopted as doctrine it would create a window of opportunity for a lender in violation of the three statutory duties under TILA rescission to cure the violation and bring the claim for repayment. This interpretation would be contrary to the wording and intent of the TILA rescission statute — as it would cloud the purpose of the statute — to enable borrowers to get out of the deal they are in and seek a new deal instead. Nobody would lend to the borrower if there was a risk that they might still owe money to a prior lender, even though the law makes the debt unsecured. Nonetheless it is entirely possible that the courts will invent such a doctrine. 

Let us help you plan for trial and draft your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

I provide advice and consent to many people and lawyers so they can spot the key elements of a scam. If you have a deal you want skimmed for red flags order the Consult and fill out the REGISTRATION FORM. A few hundred dollars well spent is worth a lifetime of financial ruin.

PLEASE FILL OUT AND SUBMIT OUR FREE REGISTRATION FORMWITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION. OUR PRIVACY POLICY IS THAT WE DON’T USE THE FORM EXCEPT TO SPEAK WITH YOU OR PERFORM WORK FOR YOU. THE INFORMATION ON THE FORMS ARE NOT SOLD NOR LICENSED IN ANY MANNER, SHAPE OR FORM. NO EXCEPTIONS.

Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

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Any borrower claim based upon a remedy in the TILA statutes has a one year limitation. In TILA rescission, the claim for the debt arises not from the note and mortgage which are void, but from 15 USC §1635. The statute replaces the contract. The “lender” has a claim to collect the debt under that statute. But they must first comply with their three statutory duties before they can demand and then enforce collection of the debt. The debt can be satisfied by tendering title to the home. But a part of the debt is easily satisfied by the payment to the borrower from the Lender.

The confusion arises from the fact that statutory rescission is different from common law rescission. Common law rescission puts tendering payment on the debt first, whereas statutory rescission puts payment of the debt last.
In TILA Rescission, while there is no express limitation provision as to the ability of the lender to collect on the debt, they can never collect the debt unless, within 20 days, they have complied with the three duties set forth in the statutory scheme for statutory rescission. After that they are barred from enforcing the debt. It is intended to be punitive to encourage “lenders” to comply with disclosure requirements.
Theoretically then, they can never collect the debt because they never comply with the three duties that are condition precedent to seeking payment on the debt. So academically speaking the “lender” is barred after 20 days. But realistically the language of the statute leans heavily to one year for claims arising from TILA and that includes rescission although the statute doesn’t say that expressly.
So I have taken the position that they are barred after 20 days from ever expressing a claim on the debt or, if one wants to “interpret” the statute (against the advice of SCOTUS in Jesinoski) the limitation would be one year from the date of rescission or from the last day that “lender” compliance was due. That interpretation would mean, though, that the “lender” had complied with its duties under statutory rescission 15 U.S.C. § 1635.
Lastly there is another academic thread that would state that there is no limitation on the right of the lender to collect the debt as long as they complied with the statute even if it was outside of the 20 day period. This conclusion seems unlikely as it would change the wording in 15 U.S.C. §1635 and render lender’s compliance practically irrelevant. It would insert language into the statute that would mean that the rescission was not effective when mailed and there was nothing the borrower could do about that.

RESCISSION: Reviewing Wells Fargo v Frazee, NJ App.

At what point does a final decision of SCOTUS actually mean anything? When confronted with TILA rescission, virtually all lower courts, state and federal, have taken up legislating from the bench, essentially over-ruling the Supreme Court of the United States (literally legally impossible).

Agree or disagree — everyone has that right. But to obey or not obey a SCOTUS decision attacks the foundation of our democratic and judicial institutions and makes the U.S. Constitution into a optional guide to the universe of disputes, delegating the real power to lower courts and removing the power and finality of SCOTUS as delineated in our Constitution.

Opinions like the one reviewed in this article are thus both irrelevant and irreverent — unless we amend or abandon our Constitution as the highest law of the land.

see Wells Fargo v Frazee

This case is just another example of a judicial tantrum defying the ultimate authority of SCOTUS. Unless the Supreme Court itself reverses the Jesinoski decision, it is quite obvious what the next SCOTUS decision is likely to be on the issue of TILA (Truth in Lending Act) rescission 15 USC §1635. Here is what I expect and hope for:

  1. Any court entering a decision or opinion after a notice of notice of TILA Rescission has been delivered must vacate such orders and must dismiss any pending foreclosure.
  2. Failure to dismiss the foreclosure is acting ultra vires — outside their authority.
  3. Dismissal of foreclosure is mandatory inasmuch as notice of TILA rescission removes the operative documents — note and mortgage — from consideration, rendering them void, by operation of law.
  4. As to all prior decisions, judgments and orders that ignored TILA rescission, all such decisions are void, the title consequences of which are left to state legislatures to decide, so long as the Federal Statute is obeyed and the law does not nullify the effect of delivery of a notice of TILA rescission.
  5. Any claims to vacate the effect of the TILA Rescission must be brought within one year from date of delivery.
  6. Neither tender nor a lawsuit is required for TILA rescission to become effective. An Aggrieved party with standing has adequate remedies at law to vacate a notice of TILA rescission, that must be raised as a new claim for relief from TILA rescission  based upon the pleading that the homeowner was wrong in sending the notice.
  7. TILA Rescission is an event, not a claim that a trial or appellate court can grant or deny. The legislature (Congress) has already granted the remedy. As stated in the Jesinoski SCOTUS decision, the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, thus barring interpretation by a court. That is the difference between the rule of law vs. the rule of man.
  8. The Courts may neither overrule legislative action nor overrule a decision from the U.S. Supreme Court. Legislative action may not be overruled by a court unless there are clear violations of constitutional provisions and restrictions.

It’s possible that we will see the above menu in more than one decision from SCOTUS. The essential focus is going to be this: The rule, as stated repeatedly over decades by SCOTUS in admonishments to lower trial and appellate courts is that if it isn’t broken you can’t “fix” it to suit your personal views. 

Now we turn to the unlawful, ultra vires decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey, appellate division in Frazee (See link above).

The Court starts its analysis on page 6.

The opinion of the court is that Wells Fargo had standing because of its possession of the note and mortgage. But the note and mortgage are and were void at the time of this decision. So there is no standing to enforce except by the actual creditor, i.e., the owner of the debt.

This court recognized a potential “issue” (invented by the court, in opposition to the final decision that no court has any authority to interpret the TILA rescission statute). So it creates its own quagmire and falls deeper and deeper into trouble.

The panel obviously recognized that there could be no standing for Wells Fargo unless the TILA rescission could somehow be ignored without a claim to vacate the rescission from a party who owned the debt where the claim was that the rescission was unwarranted because all necessary disclosures had been made.

Diving right in this appellate court immediately misquotes and totally ignores the 2015 Jesinoski decision. It is only by mangling both the statute and the SCOTUS decision that this court can arrive at its predetermined destination. It intentionally misstates the law and effect of Jesinoski. If TILA Rescission was not effective without tender, there would be no TILA rescission.

The whole purpose and methodology of the statutory procedure was to first void the loan contract, second void the encumbrance by operation of law, third void the note, thus allowing the borrower to obtain refinancing from another institution. The key points of the Truth in Lending Act were (1) make certain the borrower knew who he/she was dealing with and (2) make certain the borrower had a fighting chance of understanding the enormously complex loan products being sold, dating back to the 1960’s when TILA was first passed.

In order to be certain these two disclosures were made, Congress had a choice. They could either greatly enlarge an existing agency to enforce these goals, laws and rules, or they could create a new administrative agency. Neither of those choices were remotely acceptable by most legislators. So they agreed on a plan that would force the banks to comply with TILA with consequences so horrendous that no bank in their right mind would transgress.

Enter TILA Rescission. By putting enormous power in the hands of borrowers that shifted the entire burden of pleading and proof to the banks it was thought that banks would comply. The statute provides for an order of things (a statutory scheme not unlike nonjudicial foreclosure) after notice of rescission is delivered. Like nonjudicial foreclosures it is a form of extrajudicial relief for homeowners who believe they were not protected at closing.

Within 20 days they must either comply or seek relief from a court of competent jurisdiction. The statute was designed to completely bar stonewalling. But like any law, if nobody enforces it, the statute does not enforce compliance with the two main goals of disclosure requirements — the identity of the lender and the breakdown of the main characteristics of the proposed loan.

Failing to seek relief puts them in violation of the statute, and enables a borrower to sue to enforce the three statutory duties under TILA rescission: return of the cancelled note, release of encumbrance and return of moneys paid by the borrower. If the borrower does not bring such suit within 1 year he/she loses the right to enforce compliance with those three duties.

THIS DOES NOT CHANGE THE EFFECT OF RESCISSION. THE MORTGAGE AND NOTE ARE STILL VOID BY OPERATION OF LAW.

If the bank does not comply with the three statutory TILA duties the bank has no right to demand tender or any relief. If the banks fails to comply within the same one year, they lose the right to demand the money under any scenario. The court goes off the tracks when it states

“nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion . . .would override TILA’s tender requirement”. Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 3d 956, 962 (D. Minn. 2016), aff’d, Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 16- 3385, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 4974 (8th Cir. Feb. 28, 2018).

 

That statement on its face is true. But ignores the content of TILA’s tender requirement. It only arises AFTER the “lender” fulfills the three statutory duties.

That is what Congress wrote. That is what they meant. And that was the substitute for an unwieldy bureaucracy.

The court confirms the content of the statute but repeats the tender “error” when it says

With regard to an alleged TILA violation, it is not enough to seek rescission and stop paying the mortgage to gain ownership of the home outright. Defendants argue they own the home outright because Wells Fargo failed to respond to the rescission notice within twenty days. Although failure to respond to a rescission notice within twenty days would constitute another TILA violation, TILA also explicitly states that if a “creditor does not take possession of the property within 20 days after tender by the obligor, ownership of the property vests in the obligor without obligation on his [or her] part to pay for it.” 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (emphasis added).

The problem here is the term “own the home outright.” That’s another way of repeating the myth about the “free house.” More importantly it is contradicting the express wording and purpose of the statute — to force banks to comply with TILA disclosure requirements. The ultra vires interpretation of this court, like so many others, gives the banks a way out without ever being penalized for their lack of proper disclosure.

NOTE: THIS DOES NOT CREATE A FREE HOUSE. If the parties seeking foreclosures were not creditors, the actual creditor can still bring an action for legal and equitable relief. But in order to do so, they would need to show that the parties seeking relief were not in any way authorized to do so by the real creditor.

But the court nevertheless faults the homeowner for not tendering even though tender was not due.

 

The erroneous nature of the court’s decision becomes crystal clear when it says

Additionally, Jesinoski did not overturn Third Circuit precedent that “a notice of rescission is not effective if the obligor lacks either the intention or the ability to perform, i.e., repay the loan.” Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707

F.3d 255, 265 n.7 (3d Cir. 2013). Jesinoski also did not take away a court’s discretion to modify the rescission procedures. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (stating that the rescission “procedures prescribed by this subsection shall apply except when otherwise ordered by a court”) (emphasis added); see also 12 C.F.R. 226.23(d)(4) (stating that the rescission “procedures outlined in paragraphs (d)(2) and (3) of [§ 226.23] may be modified by court order”) (emphasis added).

It is quoting yet another court who has put blinders on and is disregarding the intentionally punitive aspect of TILA rescission. In most cases the homeowner cannot perform unless the “lender” gives up the note and mortgage and returns money paid under the canceled loan contract. The homeowner can ONLY perform if the deck is cleared for them to get a new loan from a new lender and to apply the proceeds of disgorgement required by the statute.

And to add insult to injury the court is putting yet another constraint on the borrower that TILA does not mention, to wit: the intention of the borrower to perform (tender). Forget the logistics of “intention” which is ridiculous — any such requirement places TILA rescission in the position of a claim instead of the event that the statute says has occurred by operation of law at the moment of delivery of the note of rescission. In direct contradiction to the TILA rescission statute (and SCOTUS in Jesinoski), this requires the borrower to submit to a trial before the rescission is effective.

The bottom line is that it appears that all courts are only interested in treating rescission under common law in which the rescission would only be effective upon a court order after a trial. The fact that the TILA Rescission statute clearly and unquivocably says otherwise won’t stop them, because they have prejudged the case as presenting a choice to the courts that can only be made by the legislature — who pays the price for violation of disclosure requirements under the Truth in Lending Act.

 

Rescission Precision Goes to U.S. Supreme Court Petition for Mandamus

10 years ago, seeing where the foreclosure wave was going and watching court cases, I said on these pages that the only solution to these foreclosures is Mandamus. First to stop judges from applying legal PRESUMPTIONS and second to stop judges from ignoring TILA rescission. Now someone has done it and others might follow suit, if you pardon the pun. Lawyers were not well versed in mandamus and pro se litigants had never heard of it. So for the most part everyone has been screaming and yelling about injustice, fabrication, forgery and perjury.

Ironically it is Dan Junk, pro se, who has done the best legal writing on the issue of TILA Rescission and has chosen, in my opinion, the best route to getting the Supreme Court to issue an order prohibiting judges from disregarding TILA Rescission and requiring judges to follow the law in 15 U.S.C. §1635. The irony is doubled because of Dan’s last name (Junk) and the fact that the securitization scheme arose partly out of the junk bond craze 30 years ago. Except of course that back then Wall Street pirates WERE sent to prison.

SCOTUS has the option of taking any case they want to review. They did take the Jesinoski v Countrywide case from which this Petition for Mandamus arises. And once they take it for review, they can still deny the writ leaving decisions on rescissions in limbo and creating case precedent where Judges have the option of disregarding the law as written in a statute in virtually any kind of case.

This one was filed, as I understand it, last Friday. It may or may not be considered timely. The reason I am publishing the Petition for the Writ of Mandamus is  that it attacks exactly on point what is happening in the courts — namely, “denying” the existence and effect of TILA rescission even after it has taken effect as a nonjudicial remedy.

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see

Junk SCOTUS Petition for Writ of Mandamus on TILA RESCISSION

Hiding in Plain Sight_ Jesinoski and the Consumer_s Right of Resc

Jesinoski decision

Dan Junk attended one of my first seminars back in the days when I was co-presenting with Brad Keiser. In litigation for around 9 years, he has followed this blog (and many others) and fought off the “inevitable” foreclosure as long as he could in Ohio. Besides clear evidence of substantive defenses Dan had sent a notice of rescission within the 3 years stated in the TILA Rescission statute.

Like thousands of judges across the country in State and Federal courts, the timely and effective rescission was ignored simply because the judges didn’t like the result. The ultimate decision was against him because the courts continue to allow legal presumptions to apply even though they create “alternate facts” in conflict with reality.

Blind justice supposedly requires courts to apply the law, as written by the Federal and State legislatures. The answer for Dan was not in some attempted appeal but rather to seek a sweeping ruling from the Supreme Court of the United States that specifically requires all judges, whoever situated, to follow the TILA Rescission law. There is adequate evidence to show that this is of great public importance inasmuch as virtually all judges are committing the same “error” to wit: not taking TILA rescission literally or seriously.

We’ll see what happens. But in the meanwhile do give a careful read of the Brief Dan filed. This could be a moment where everything changes.

Writ of Certiorari to SCOTUS: Transfers to Trusts Are Void, not Voidable

In observance of the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, my office will be closed Wednesday, September 23. The following article was scheduled in advance:

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See Anh N. Tran, et al. v. Bank of New York SCOTUS Certiorari_SRCH

READ THE ENTIRE BRIEF SLOWLY AND STUDY IT.

I think we have another case here where the pen of Justice Scalia (if they grant the writ and hear the case) will be dripping with sarcasm , just like we saw in Jesinoski. The New York Law says that the “transfer” to the REMIC Trust is void if it violates the terms of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement. The problem for the banks is that they MUST rely on the PSA in order to give standing to their trustee and servicer. If the trust does not have the loan, then the trustee has no authority over the loan and neither does the servicer. SO the Banks are trying to use the PSA and then Bar the borrower from inquiring as to its terms and provisions.

This isn’t an academic exercise. The Trusts are now known to have existed only on paper and not even registered in any state or anywhere else. They never had a bank account, they never received the money from the offering and sale of the trust’s certificates, they never had any money, they never had any liabilities, they never had any assets, and they they were never operated as a business in any sense of the word. Thus the Trust COULD NOT have acquired the loans because it never had the money to do so. And the paper transfers to the trust, all of which occurred in reality far beyond the date of the cutoff period would be void and mean nothing.

This is not a problem caused by the borrowers. It is a problem intentionally created by the banks so that behind curtains they could take or steal the money of investors, covering their tracks by making it appear that there was a transaction when there was none. The fundamental question presented to the courts is whether we are going to allow nonexistent parties to exercise rights in court with respect to nonexistent transactions.

The courts, once again, read into a perfectly clear and unambiguous statute and converted the word “void” to “voidable.” This is an impermissible “interpretation” of statute because it changes the law rather than clarifying it.

I recommend the brief because it appears to be complete, and it is the best (better than mine) brief on the subject of why the trusts do not have “prudential standing” which is a jurisdictional threshold question. It is clear to me that an entity created only on paper and never used for business activity, except for the purpose of foreclosure on a loan it does not own, is not an entity that should be given any right to appear in court.

One thing is clear: this brief should be used by all attorneys drafting memorandums of law on the subject of “Borrowers cannot invoke the provisions of the PSA because they are not third party beneficiaries.” If they were not third party beneficiaries then what assurance would the borrowers or the investors have that the certificate holders would receive the money promised to them? What assurance would the borrower have that a manufactured default would be declared despite the fact that the real creditors have been paid, or that a manufactured default would arise simply because the servicer and trustee refused to pay the creditors?

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