Rescission Summary As I see It

If you read my blog for the last 3 weeks or so you should get a good idea of where I am coming from on this. If you still have questions or need assistance call me at 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688. The basic thrust of my argument is that

  1. BOTH Congress and US Supreme Court agree that there is nothing left for the borrower to do other than dropping notice of rescission in the mail. It is EFFECTIVE BY OPERATION OF LAW at the point of mailing. The whole point is that you don’t need to be or have a lawyer in order to cancel the loan contract, the note and the mortgage (deed of trust) with the same force as if a Judge ordered it. No lawsuit, no proof is required from the borrower. No tender is required as it would be in common law rescission. The money for payoff of the old debt is presumed to come from a new lender that approves a 1st Mortgage loan without fear that they will lose their priority position.
  2. Lender(s) must comply within 20 days — return canceled note, satisfy mortgage, and return money to borrower.
  3. Lenders MUST file a lawsuit challenging the rescission within 20 days or their defenses are waived. Any other interpretation would make the rescission contingent, which is the opposite of what TILA and Scalia say is the case.
  4. Therefore a lawsuit by borrower to enforce the rescission need only prove mailing.
  5. Any attempt to bring up statute of limitations or other defenses are barred by 20 day window.
  6. The clear reason for this unusual statutory scheme is to allow borrower to cancel the old transaction and replace with a new loan. This can only happen if the rescission is ABSOLUTE. It can be declared void or irregular or barred or anything else ONLY within the 20 day window. If the 20 day window was not final (like counting the days for filing notice of appeal appeal, motion for re-hearing, etc.) then no new lender or bank would fund a loan that could be later knocked out of first priority position in the chain of title because the rescission was found to be faulty in some way. This is the opposite of what TILA and Scalia say.
  7. The content of the rescission notice should be short — I hereby cancel/rescind the loan referenced above. You merely reference the loan number, recording information etc. at which point the note and mortgage become VOID by operation of law.
  8. BY OPERATION OF LAW means that the only way it can be avoided is by getting a court order.
  9. If any court were to allow “defense” in a rescission enforcement action AFTER the 20 day window the goal of allowing the borrower to get another loan to pay off the old lender(s) would be impossible.
  10. Hence the ONLY possible logical conclusion is that they MUST file the action within 20 days or lose the opportunity to challenge the rescission. And any possible defenses are waived if not filed during that period of time. That action by the “lender” or “creditor” must be an equitable action to set aside the rescission, which is already “effective” by operation of law.

The worst case scenario would be that rescission is the most effective discovery tool available. If the lender(s) file the 20 day action they would need to establish their positions as creditors WITHOUT the note and mortgage (which are ALREADY VOID). This would require proof of payment and proof of economic interest and proof of ownership and balance. Any failure to plead these things would fail to establish standing. The attempt to use the note and mortgage as proof or the basis of pleading should be dismissed easily. The note and mortgage are void by operation of law by the time the bank or servicer files its action.

In all probability the only parties who actually have an interest in the debt are clueless investors who by contract have waived their right to enforce or participate in the collection process. The problem THEY have is they gave their money to a securities broker. They can neither show nor even allege that they know what happened to their money after they gave it to the broker.

The important thing about TILA Rescission is that it is a virtual certainty that the borrower will be required to file an enforcement action. In that action they should not allow themselves to get sucked into an argument over whether the rescission was correct, fair, barred by limitations or anything else, all of which should have been raised within the 20 day window. AND that recognition is the reason why we have been inundated to prepare pre-litigation packages, analysis and reports to assist lawyers in filing actions to enforce rescissions, whether filed today or ten years ago.

Caveat: I have no doubt that attempts will be made to change the law. The Supreme Court has made changing the law impossible by a ruling from the bench, That means state legislatures and Congress are going to be under intense pressure to change this law or the effect of it. But as it stands now, I don’t think any other analysis covers all the bases like the one expressed here.

Rescission Letter is Equivalent to Court Order Under TILA

For further information or assistance please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688.

We are starting a new pilot offering for those who are close readers of the blog. Call one of the numbers above and ask about our package of services relating to rescission either with respect to rescission letters previously sent or rescission letters that are being considered by borrowers. This is not an offer of legal services or legal representation. Nothing we provide — templates, analyses or memorandums — should be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from an attorney licensed in the jurisdiction in which your property is located.

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I am hearing reports that Judges are entering rulings based upon the “note holder” and other spurious premises in connection with the application of the rescission rules under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). It is obvious that the Judges still don’t get it or don’t want to, both of which are perfectly understandable because the rules under TILA are VERY different from the the rules governing common law rescission.
Any ruling predicated on the note or mortgage after rescission is wrong unless it recognizes that there is no note or mortgage anymore. They became void by operation of law (i.e., the same as if a court order was entered) the moment the notice of rescission was dropped in the mail. The issue of when or whether the rescission is effective is OVER by operation of law. It’s done. Stick a fork in it.
There is no burden of proof for the borrower to make the rescission effective. And if the Borrower does sue to enforce compliance with TILA that is an enforcement action, the same as one would seek to enforce a judgment or order that has already been entered. At that point, unless the servicer or bank had filed a lawsuit challenging the rescission as a creditor (because the note and mortgage no longer exist) WITHIN THE 20 DAY WINDOW measured from the date of notice, the creditor has no right or standing to challenge the rescission itself or whether it should be considered effective.
ATTORNEY PRACTICE HINT: I think it is very important to say something to the effect “Judge, I understand your thinking on this and hundreds, perhaps thousands of judges agreed with you — until the US Supreme Court said otherwise a few weeks ago. This is not common law rescission. The note and mortgage cease to exist when the notice of rescission is dropped in the mail.”
The only way for an alleged lender or creditor to prevent an enforcement order being entered against them is to file a lawsuit contesting the notice of rescission within 20 days of the notice and to ask for an injunction. But in order to do that they would have to say that they are in fact the creditor — i.e., prove the actual debt due without the note and without the mortgage — because the note and mortgage ceased to exist by operation of law.
When that borrower drops the notice into a mailbox it is the same thing as a Judge entering an order. There is nothing left for the borrower to do and nothing left that the borrower can do to make the rescission effective. Most courts held that the borrower had to file a lawsuit or tender payment or both before the notice of rescission could be effective.
The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in Jesinowski was that all those judges were wrong. And of course this court lacks jurisdiction or authority under the US Constitution to countermand a Supreme Court decision. There is no requirement of a lawsuit —the rescission is effective upon notice and notice is effective when it is dropped into a mailbox. There is no requirement of tender either.
The borrower may be obligated on the debt (after deductions for unpaid amounts from the creditor) but ONLY AFTER the creditor has complied with the three elements of mandatory compliance — return of the canceled note, satisfaction of the mortgage in the county records, and return of all money paid by borrower starting with the origination of the loan and continuing up to the date of rescission. Assuming a creditor has complied with TILA and now wishes to collect on the debt, THEN the creditor steps forward alleges the debt by showing proof of payment, not self-serving documents like assignments and endorsements. And if the creditor proves the debt, the debt is unsecured.
The purpose of TILA rescission was intentionally to provide consumers with a quick easy remedy that didn’t require a lawyer to cancel the loan. The Supreme Court ruling is that the statute means what it says. And the statute  says that the note and mortgage are immediately nullified by operation of law (same as a court order) when dropped in the mailbox.
And the reason for that is the whole reason behind the Truth in Lending Act — to level the playing field between tricky sophisticated banks and unsophisticated borrowers who didn’t and don’t receive the information they needed to choose lenders or make a decision about which loan they would choose to take from which lender.
It was recognized by the framers of this law that in order for the old lender to get paid (assuming they could prove the debt without the note or the mortgage which no longer exist) the existing note (even if still held by anyone) and the existing mortgage of record (even if recorded in the county records) MUST be void in order for the borrower to get a new loan to pay off the old debt. Otherwise it would be impossible fro the borrower to go out and get a substitute loan. 
And since it was obvious that the banks would ordinarily stonewall the rescission if they had the chance, Congress gave them no chance to stonewall. And that is why they made it such that the rescission becomes legally effective, voiding the note and mortgage the moment it is dropped into a mailbox.
The only way out for the banks is (1) after full compliance with the requirements of TILA (return of note, satisfaction of mortgage and disgorgement of all money received and paid in connection with the loan) to either ask for payment of the debt (once they prove it) or (2) to file an action in Court within 20 days of the notice alleging that they are the creditor (but they can’t rely on the now nonexistent note and mortgage) and alleging that the rescission should be set aside.
The lawsuit by the bank is akin to a motion to set aside judgment. That is where Judges are making errors and continuing to issue rulings that are wrong. The rescission is already effective if it was sent. There is NOTHING left for the borrower to do to make that rescission effective. Hence even if the lender wants to challenge whether the rescission was sent, they would have to do so in their own lawsuit brought within the 20 day window.
Comments invited.

TILA (NON-JUDICIAL AND JUDICIAL) Rescission Gets Clearer in Most Respects

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It is becoming crystal clear that with help from a competent attorney the options under the TILA rescission process are (a) different from common law rescission and (b) very effective against “lenders” who can no longer hide behind “presumptions”. LIKE THE PRESUMPTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN STRICTLY APPLIED AGAINST HOMEOWNERS, BUT WHICH ARE REBUTTABLE, TILA RESCISSION IS STRICTLY APPLIED AGAINST “LENDERS.” Just as presumptions force the borrower to take the burden of proof on basic facts in the pretender lender’s case, TILA rescission forces the “lender” to take the burden of proof in the borrower’s loan, establishing that there was no basis for rescission. This article covers the law regarding those legal presumptions AND the effects and mechanics of a TILA rescission.

Amongst the things that are clear now is the plain fact that rescission is a private statutory remedy requiring only a letter to give notice of exercising the TILA right of rescission. If a homeowner wants to file suit to enforce the rescission, there is a one year statute of limitations to collect damages or get any requiring the “lender” to comply. But the effective date of rescission remains the same even if the one year statute has passed. In plain language that means that by operation of law you don’t have a mortgage encumbrance on your property if more than 20 days has passed since the rescission was effective (the day you dropped it in a mailbox).

But if you are looking to recover the financial damages provided by TILA (disgorgement of payments etc.) then you need to file suit within one year of the rescission. If you want to clear title with a quiet title action my opinion is that the one year statute of limitations does not apply — because the act provides that the mortgage and note are void by operation of law. Thus the title issue is cleared as of the date of rescission. As argued by the ACLU and as stated by a unanimous Supreme Court the rescission is effective upon notice. There is no requirement of notice AND a lawsuit. So the suit to clear or quiet title is merely based on removing the mortgage from your chain of title because it is (and has been) void since the day of rescission.

I cannot emphasize enough the importance or reading the ACLU brief below. Too many judges and lawyers have become confused over the various provisions of TILA. A lawsuit based upon rescission to to enforce the rights due to the borrower because the rescission is already effective. The lawsuit is NOT the exercise of the right of TILA rescission. The letter declaring the rescission is the exercise of the right of TILA rescission. This is far different from common law rescission.

FOR REBUTTING PRESUMPTIONS See Franklin Decision

FOR ADMISSIONS REGARDING FABRICATION OF DOCUMENTS THUS REBUTTING PRESUMPTIONS See Wells Fargo Foreclosure_attorney_procedure_manual-1

FOR THOROUGH ANALYSIS AND HISTORY OF TILA RESCISSION SEE jesinoski_v._countrywide_home_loans_aclu_amicus_brief

And see this explanation which is almost entirely accurate —

Read this excerpt from the CFPB Amicus Brief (Rosenfeld v. HSBC):
” If the court finds the consumer was entitled to rescind, it will order the procedures specified by 1635 and Reg. Z, or modify them as the case requires…Accordingly, if the court finds the consumer rescinded the transaction because she properly exercised a valid right to rescind under 1635, the lender must be ordered [by the court] to honor the rescission, even if the underlying right to rescind has expired.”
 
I needn’t go further…this is the CFPB talking…and they are the sole authority to promulgate the rules of rescission by Congress. They (the lender) must act within 20 days, regardless of the consumer’s perception of whether or not the rescission is timely. It would be up to a court to determine the exercise of the right…but the lender must be ordered by the court to follow the rules of rescission under TILA and the attendant time frames contemplated therein.
The rescission process is private, leaving the consumer and lender to working out the logistics of a given rescission.” McKenna, 475 F.3d at 421; accord Belini, 412 F.3d at 25. Otherwise, to leave the creditors in charge of determining timing, the creditors would no doubt stonewall until the time ran after receipt of the notice of rescission. Thus, even valid rescissions would result in creditors claiming that the time to file suit had run out and the statute is then moot. Congress recognized that TILA rescission is necessarily effected by notice and any subsequent litigation must be accomplished within restrictions set against the creditors…not the consumers. This is non-judicial action at its finest. Just like the non-judicial act of foreclosure (in such forums). 
Consummation is a question of fact that would be determined after the creditor performed its required obligations under 1635 (b)…unless suit is brought within 20 days of the notice of rescission…as is required.
“Everyone is a genius, but if one passes judgment on a fish trying to climb a tree, and then continues to tell him that he is stupid, the fish, and everyone else, will believe that, even though his genius has never been discovered.” Albert Einstein.

Rescission: Equitable Tolling Extends Statute of Limitations

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Important Message: This blog should NEVER be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from an attorney licensed in the jurisdiction in which your property is located.

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see http://openjurist.org/784/f2d/910/king-v-state-of-california-d-m

The most popular question I get here on the blog and on my radio show is what happens when the three year statute has run? The answers are many. First is the question of whether it ever started running. If the transaction was not actually consummated with anyone in the chain of parties claiming rights to collect or enforce the loan it would be my opinion that the three day right of rescission has not begun to run. That would be a remedy to an event in which the note and mortgage (or deed of trust) has been signed and delivered but the loan was never funded by the originator any creditor in the chain of “ownership.” The benefit of the three day rescission is that you don’t need a reason to do it. But in order to do that you need to be careful that you are not stating that there was a closing because that would be consummation and therefore the right to rescind unconditionally ran three days after that “Closing.”

Second is the three year statute of limitations. The same reasoning applies.  But it also raises the question of non-disclosure and withholding information. The rather obvious delays in prosecuting foreclosures on alleged “defaults” are clearly a Bank strategy for letting the 3 year statute run out and then claim the homeowner cannot rescind because the closing was more than 3 years ago. That is where the doctrine of equitable tolling comes into play. A party who violates TILA and fails to disclose material facts and continues to hide them from the borrower should not be permitted to benefit from continuing the violation beyond the apparent statute of limitations. People keep asking why the banks wait so long to prosecute foreclosures. The answer is that it is because they have no right to do so and they are running out the apparent statute of limitations on rescission and TILA disclosure actions.

Third is a procedural issue. According to TILA the “lender” who receives such a notice of rescission is (1) obligated to send it to the “real” lender and (2) must file a declaratory action against the borrower within 20 days in order to avoid the rescission. If they don’t file the 20 day action, they waive the objections they could have raised. So far I have not heard of one case in which such an action has been filed. I think the reason for that is that nobody can file an action in which they establish standing. Such a party would be obliged to allege that they are the “lender” or “creditor” as defined by TILA. That means they either loaned the money or bought the loan for “valuable consideration” just like it says in Article 9 of the UCC. Then they would have to prove that allegation before any burden shifted to the borrower to answer or file affirmative defenses against the action filed by this putative “lender.”

CAVEAT: The doctrine of equitable tolling is remedial as is the statute, but it is fairly strictly construed. I’m am quite confident that the best we will get from the courts is that the 3 day and 3 year rules and other limitations in TILA starts running the moment you knew or should have known the facts that had been withheld from you at “closing.” The fact that you are not a lawyer and did not realize the significance of this will not allow you to delay the start of the statute running after the date of discovery of the facts, whether you understood them or not.  But this is a two-edged sword. The current practice of objecting to any QWR, DVL or discovery question without answering the truth about the claimed chain of ownership or servicers on the loan corroborates the borrowers allegation that the parties are continuing to withhold this information. So a well-framed TILA defense might serve as the basis for enforcing your rights of discovery and rights to answers on your Qualified Written Request or Debt Validation Letter.

Additional Caveat: The doctrine of equitable tolling has been applied with respect to the one year statute of limitations on TILA disclosures but it remains open as to whether it would be otherwise applied. From the 9th Circuit —

“Section 1640(e) provides that “[a]ny action under this section may be brought within one year from the date of the occurrance of the violation.” We have not yet determined when a violation occurs so as to commence the one-year statutory period. See Katz v. Bank of California, 640 F.2d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860, 102 S.Ct. 314, 70 L.Ed.2d 157 (1981). Three theories have been used by other circuits to determine when the statutory period commences: (1) when the credit contract is executed; (2) when the disclosures are actually made (a “continuing violation” theory); (3) when the contract is executed, subject to the doctrines of equitable tolling and fraudulent concealment (limitations period runs from the date on which the borrower discovers or should reasonably have discovered the violation). See Postow v. OBA Federal S & L Ass’n, 627 F.2d 1370, 1379 (D.C.Cir.1980) (adopting “continuing violation” theory in some situations); Wachtel v. West, 476 F.2d 1062, 1066-67 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874, 94 S.Ct. 161, 38 L.Ed.2d 114 (1973) (rejecting “continuing violation” theory, statutory period commences upon execution of loan contract); Stevens v. Rock Springs National Bank, 497 F.2d 307, 310 (10th Cir.1974) (rejecting “continuing violation” theory); Jones v. TransOhio Savings Ass’n., 747 F.2d 1037, 1043 (6th Cir.1984) (applying equitable tolling and fraudulent concealment).”

Hats off to James Macklin who sent me this email:

Hang on to your hats fella’s…in Sargis’ ruling … back in 2012…he confirms the equitable tolling principles of TILA as I had argued…just saw this again while reviewing…to wit:
“The Ninth Circuit applies equitable tolling to TILA’s … statute of limitations (King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 1986).
“Equitable Tolling is applied to effectuate the congressional intent of TILA.”, Id.
Courts have construed TILA as a remedial statute, interpreting it liberally for the consumer.” (Id. Citing Riggs v. Gov’t Emps. Fin. Corp., 623 F.2d 68, 70-71 (9th Cir. 1980).
 Specifically the 9th Circuit held: “[T]he limitations period in section 1640(e) runs from the date of consummation of the transaction but that the doctrine of equitable tolling may, in appropriate circumstances, suspend the limitations period until the borrower discovers or had the reasonable to discover the fraud or non-disclosures that form the basis of the TILA action.” 
Gentlemen…I give you proof positive that the statute tolls and the fact that the term “consummation” is also subject to broad interpretation as we know…the loan could not have consummated if what we allege is found to be true… However, the non-disclosures language used by the 9th Circuit gives rise to possible myriad rescissions upon discovery of those non-disclosures…
James L. Macklin, Managing Director
Secure Document Research(Paralegal Services/Legal Project Management)

Reverse Redlining: Targeting the Poor and the Unsophisticated for High Risk Mortgages

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see https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/aclumfy_mortgage_report.pdf

At this point it is clear that the banks actually targeted people of color and other demographics where the likelihood of “default” on a loan was extraordinarily high. The ACLU in its latest report on the mortgage crisis proves this to any remaining doubters. This report also shows that these disadvantaged groups are the least likely to get a modification or other settlement or assistance of the various mortgage issues that we all know now were pandemic throughout the period of 1996-present.

But what they are missing is an answer to the REAL question: Why would anyone target a demographic where “defaults” could be claimed in much higher proportion to the history in the general population? Why did they want the loans to fail, because “failure” of the loan was a basic assumption to anyone who understands the various iterations of highly complex and sophisticated loan products — a number which climbed from 5 in the 1970’s to 450 in 2008. Imagine that 450 different loan options offered to the poor, the people who don’t speak or understand English very well and the people who are poor enough that eventually when payments reset they will not pay and they won’t be able to fight for their house. The tragedy here, let me remind everyone, is that most of these were refinancing of existing home ownership — that’s right, most of the homes were in the family for generations.

The Banks targeted homes where the home values were low. Then they drove the prices up to many items the actual value by filling the bathtub with money and selling “payments” instead of principal or interest rate. They offered teaser payments that the homeowner could afford — but which changed to a monthly payment that was higher (sometimes a multiple) than the entire household income. Somehow the Banks have convinced courts to think that the disclosures were sufficient. They were not. And in my opinion if the courts would scrutinize these so-called loans the way they did before securitization none of the loans would survive any fair interpretation of disclosures required under Federal laws (TILA) and state laws, including common law.

Banks do economic analysis every day employing thousands of analysts. Those analysts knew that the prices were being driven above the value of the property, knew that the endgame was the drop of prices to resume relationship with values, and thus knew — because they rigged the game — that if they bet the mortgages would fail, they would make a lot of money. The trick was to lose somebody else’s money not their own. and that is what they did.

If the ACLU wants to do something that produces actual results, they should analyze the economics of the alleged securitization of these loans. What they will find is a note that cannot be enforced and a mortgage that was void from the start. They will find fraud with aggravating circumstances. the banks needed really “bad” loans in order to accomplish their goals. By using investor funds instead of their own, they could claim ownership of the loans when they reported their assets and liabilities to regulatory authorities; but they would assign the losses to investors, borrowers, insurers, guarantors, FDIC loss sharing, and credit default swap counterparties and take the proceeds for themselves — even though they had no losses.

The ACLU should bring actions on behalf of the demographics hit hardest by this Ponzi scheme. They should state the obvious — that the true source of funds had no idea how their money was being used, the banks that did know were intentionally creating bloated loan documents based upon fraudulent appraisals, and the real creditors were deprived of any protection for their investment while the borrowers were signing documents that recited fraudulent information as to the identity of the lender and the real cost of the loan.

The attack on enforceability of the mortgages is easiest simply because it is now fairly easy to show unclean hands. Where a loan is statutorily defined as “predatory per se” it is hard to argue for the banks that it isn’t subject to “unclean hands per se” and therefore cannot be enforced because it is against public policy.

In a court where rules of equity are applied, there is no enforcement of a deal that was, from the start, violation of Federal and State law, was “predatory per se” (Regulation Z) and was part of a fraudulent scheme. This scheme only works for the banks if the loan is secured by a mortgage on the property. That mortgage is mostly unenforceable and probably void, ab initio. True creditors can prove they lost money on the deal have an opportunity to sue and collect on money due them — (1)  from the borrower up to perhaps the amount that should have been the principal, and (2) from the banks for the rest of the money that was skimmed off the top. The amount skimmed in many cases especially in the disadvantaged demographics, was frequently more than the loan itself.

Do you know where your loan payments are going? Bet you Don’t!

For further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

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Submitted from a person who is an anonymous source but who works deep inside an organization where the raw data is available and just to be clear —- I told you so:

Bonding experience

Subject: Bonding experience

Sorry for the title line, low hanging fruit……Anyway, I thought you both will find this of interest.) From the Citibank Trustee website you both have access to per my prior e-mail (or anyone, it is public….) you will find below the listing of the original principal balance of the loans in the various traunches for the WAMU-HE-2 Trust. The balances below are from the PSA on page 8; they track almost identically to the balances as of the funds 1st reporting date on the Citibank website (I have attached below from May 2007); Directly above the May 2007 balances is the current January 2015 balances. Notice anything strange? All principal balances are lower or gone, and reduced by half in the largest traunch (1-A). How can this be you ask?  Did that many loans default and have the homes liquidated and proceeds applied to the loans? OR,  did insurance payments, credit default swaps, TARP money, or buy backs on the loans by Chase (as likely forced by the investors who have that right for non-conforming loans) pay off the loan balances that are now gone? The answer is likely a bit of all the above.

Not to bore you with the details, but if you look at the January 2015 certificate holder statement on Page 5 you will see detail on who lost what, other pages break out reasons for reductions (yes, some of this is due to repurchase, Chase? maybe, unknown). The M-Series traunches appear to have been wiped out completely, which tracks to PSA which shows 1-A-II A’s get distributions 4th (AFTER credit default swaps and derivative holders mind you, who may be from entirely different funds! Like that, your loan payment is not even going to the fund that claims to hold it 1st, 2nd, or 3rd time around), losses last, Hence if you are M-series you are screwed.

So why does this matter in a typical homeowner foreclosure? As XXX and I pointed out to judges too lazy to want to dive into this, if your loan is in Traunch 1-IIA, which report no principal loss (any losses?) the fund has a hard time claiming standing if the certificate holders of your loan suffered no loss. Due to commingling of funds, and cross defaults, when peoples loan payments are distributed to the Servicer (Chase), it puts your payment in the loan pool, and it is likely used to pay someone else’s loan payment (ditto with foreclosure proceeds, if your loan was in M Traunch, a 100% loss was realized years ago, your proceeds go to make someone else’s loan payment). This was never disclosed to the homeowner at loan signing, your payment goes to another, your home is cross collateralized, your home may be covered by a pool level insurance policy, credit default swaps, your payment does not go to whom you bargained it would (TILA, RESPA, REG Z violations anyone?). If your loan was repurchased, the fund is not even the correct foreclosing party anymore, and if servicer advances and credit default swaps cover your loan payments (from swap holders in other funds!!) you are not even in default nor has the fund suffered a claimed loss. You can see what a mess this is, and why Chase and other “Servicers” don’t want to open the books on what happens to the Trust funds money to anyone. Investors in current lawsuits have to sue their own Trustee’s (like Citigroup) to try to get to the “real” books, sound crazy, it’s happening….  since Chase and the fund never legally held my loan due to multiple forgeries and botched assignments, they in essence committed theft through conversion of my loan payments when I made them, because they never held the legal right to accept payments from me.Like I said, this happens thousands of times daily to thousands of homeowners, and no one, not the government, regulators, judiciary, and especially the banks, want to discuss this mess. LOL, if this all gives you a headache, it should! Same process is now happening on credit cards and auto loans, anything they can securitize…..

see http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-24/justice-department-probing-auto-loan-securitization-yates-says
 

REMIC 3
As provided  herein, the Trustee shall  make an election  to treat the segregated  pool of assets consisting of the REMIC 2 Regular Interests as a REMIC for federal income tax purposes, and such segregated pool of assets shall be designated as “REMIC 3.”  The Class R-3 Interest represents  the  sole  class  of  “residual  interests”  in  REMIC  3  for  purposes   of  the  REMIC Provisions.The following  table sets forth (or describes)  the Class  designation,  Pass-Through  Rate and Original Class Certificate Principal Balance for each Class of Certificates that represents one or more of the “regular interests” in REMIC 3 and each class of uncertificated  “regular  interests” inREMIC 3:

Class designation Original Class Certificate Principal Balance Pass-Through

Rate

Assumed Final

Maturity Date1

1-A $             491,550,000.00 Variable May25, 2047
II-AI $              357,425,000.00 Variable2 May25, 2047
II-A2 $              125,322,000.00 Variable2 May25, 2047
II-A3 $              199,414,000.00 Variable2 May25, 2047
II-A4 $              117,955,000.00 Variable2 May 25,2047
M-1 $                50,997,000.00 Variable2 May25, 2047
M-2 $                44,623,000.00 Variable2 May25,  2047
M-3 $                27,092,000.00 Variable2 May25, 2047
M-4

M-5

M-6

$                23,905,000.00

$                23, I 08,000.00

$                21,514,000.00

Variable2

Variable2

Variable2

May25, 2047

May25, 2047

May25,  2047

M-7 $                20,718,000.00 Variable2 May25,  2047
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$                59,762,058.04

Variables

Variable2

May25, 2047

May25, 2047

Class P Interest $                            100.00 N/A4 May25,  2047

Two Different Worlds — Note and Mortgage

Further information please call 954-495-9867 or 520-405-1688

No radio show tonight because of birthday celebration — I’m 68 and still doing this

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The enforcement of promissory notes lies within the context of the marketplace for currency and currency equivalents. The enforcement of mortgages on real property lies within the the context of the marketplace for real estate transactions. While certainty is the aim of public policy in those two markets, the rules are different and should not be ignored.

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see http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Committees_Materials/PEBUCC/PEB_Report_111411.pdf

This article is not a substitute for getting advice from an attorney licensed to practice in the jurisdiction in which your property is or was located.

Back in 2008 I had some correspondence and telephone conversations with an attorney in Chicago, Robert Wutscher when I was writing about the reality of the way in which banks were doing  what they called “securitization of mortgages.” Of course then they were denying that there were any trusts, denying that any transfers occurred and were suing in the name of the originator or MERS or anyone but the party who actually had their money used in loan transactions.  It wasn’t done the right way because the obvious intent was to play a shell game in which the banks would emerge as the apparent principal party in interest under the illusion created by certain presumptions attendant to being the “holder” of a note. For each question I asked him he replied that Aurora in that case was the “holder.” No matter what the question was, he replied “we’re the holder.” I still have the letter he sent which also ignored the rescission from the homeowner whose case I was inquiring about for this blog.

He was right that the banks would be able to bend the law on rescission at the level of the trial courts because Judges just didn’t like TILA rescission. I knew that in the end he would lose on that proposition eventually and he did when Justice Scalia, in a terse opinion, simply told us that Judges and Justices were wrong in all those trial court decisions and even appellate court decisions that applied common law theories to modify the language of the Federal Law (TILA) on rescission. And now bank lawyers are facing the potential consequences of receiving notices of TILA rescission where the bank simply ignored them instead of preserving the rights of the “lender” by filing a declaratory action within 20 days of the rescission. By operation of law, the note and mortgage were nullified, ab initio. Which means that any further activity based upon the note and mortgage was void. And THAT means that the foreclosures were void.

Is discussing the issue of the “holder” with lawyers and even doing a tour of seminars I found that the confusion that was apparent for lay people was also apparent in lawyers. They looked at the transaction and the rights to enforce as one single instrument that everyone called “the mortgage.” They looked at me like I had three heads when I said, no, there are three parts to every one of these illusory transactions and the banks fail outright on two of them.

The three parts are the debt, the note and the mortgage. The debt arises when the borrower receives money. The presumption is that it is a loan and that the borrower owes the money back. it isn’t a gift. There should be no “free house” discussion here because we are talking about money, not what was done with the money. Only a purchase money mortgage loan involves the house and TILA recognizes that. Some of the rules are different for those loans. But most of the loans were not purchase money mortgages in that they were either refinancing, or combined loans of 1st mortgage plus HELOC. In fact it appears that ultimately nearly all the outstanding loans fall into the category of refinancing or the combined loan and HELOC (Home Equity Line of Credit that exactly matches the total loan requirements of the transaction (including the purchase of the home).

The debt arises by operation of law in favor of the party who loaned the money. The banks diverged from the obvious and well-established practice of the lender being the same party as the party named on the note as payee and on the mortgage as mortgagee (or beneficiary under a Deed of Trust). The banks did this through a process known as “Table Funded Loans” in which the real lender is concealed from the borrower. And they did this through agreements frequently called “Assignment and Assumption” Agreements, which by contract called for both parties (the originator and the aggregator to violate the laws governing disclosure (TILA and frequently state law) which means by definition that the contract called for an illegal act that is by definition a contract in contravention of public policy.

A loan contract is created by operation of law in which the borrower is obligated to pay back the loan to the source of the funds with or without a written instrument. If the loan contract (comprised of offer, acceptance and consideration) does not exist, then there is nothing to enforce at law although it is possible to still force the borrower to repay the money to the actual source of funds through a suit in equity — mainly unjust enrichment. The banks, through their lawyers, argue that the Federal disclosure requirements should be ignored. I think it is pretty clear that Justice Scalia and a unanimous United States Supreme Court think that argument stinks. It is the bank’s argument that should be ignored, not the law.

Congress passed TILA specifically to protect consumers of financial products (loans) from the overly burdensome and overly complex nature of loan documents. This argument about what is important and what isn’t has already been addressed in Congress and signed into law against the banks’ position that it doesn’t matter whether they really follow the law and disclose all the parties involved in the transaction, the true identity of the lender, the compensation of all the parties that made money as a result of the origination of the loan transaction. Regulation Z states that a pattern of behavior (more than 5) in which loans are table funded (disclosure of real lender withheld from borrower) is PREDATORY PER SE.

If it is predatory per se then there are remedies available to the borrower which potentially include treble damages, attorneys fees etc. Equally important if not more so is that a transaction, whether illusory or real, that is predatory per se, is therefore against public policy and the party seeking to enforce an otherwise enforceable document cannot do so because of the doctrine of unclean hands. In fact, if the transaction is predatory per se, it is dirty hands per se. And this is where Judges get stuck and so do many lawyers. The outcome of that unavoidable analysis is, they say, a free house. And their remedy is to give the party with unclean hands a free house (because they paid nothing for the origination or acquisition of the loan). I think the Supreme Court will not look kindly upon this “legislating from the bench.” And I think the Court has already signaled its intent to hold everyone to the strict construction of TILA and Regulation Z.

So there are two reason the debt can’t be enforced the way the banks want. (1) There is no loan contract because the source of the money and the borrower never agreed to anything and neither one knew about the other. (2) the mortgage cannot be enforced because it is an action in equity and the shell game of parties tossing the paperwork around all have unclean hands. And there is a third reason as well — while the note might be enforceable based merely on an endorsement, the mortgage is not enforceable unless the enforcer paid for it (Article 9, UCC).

And THAT is where the confusion really starts — which bank lawyers depend on every time they go to court. Bank lawyers add to the confusion by using the tired phrase of “the note follows the mortgage and the mortgage follows the note.” At one time this was a completely true presumption backed up by real facts. But now the banks are asking the courts to apply the presumption even when the courts actually know that the facts presumed by the legal presumption are untrue.

Notes and mortgages exist in two different marketplaces or different worlds, if you like. Public policy insists that notes that are intended to be negotiable remain negotiable and raise certain presumptions. The holder of a note might very well be able to sue and win a judgment ON THE NOTE. And the judgment holder might be able to record a judgment lien and foreclose on it subject to homestead exemptions.

But it isn’t as simple as the banks make it out to be.

If someone pays for the note in good faith and without knowledge of the borrower’s defenses when the note is not in default, THAT holder can enforce the note against the signor or maker of the note regardless of lack of consideration or anything else unless there is a provable defense of fraud and perhaps conspiracy. But any other holder steps into the shoes of the original lender. And if there was no consummated loan contract between the payee on the note and the borrower because the payee never loaned any money to the borrower, then the holder might have standing to sue but they don’t have the evidence to win the suit. The borrower still owes the money to whoever was the source, but the “holder” of the note doesn’t get a judgment. There is a difference between standing to sue and a prima facie case needed to win. Otherwise everyone would get one of those mechanical forging machines and sign the name of someone with money and sue them on a note they never signed. Or they would promise to loan money, get the signed note and then not complete the loan contract by making the loan.

So public policy demands that there be reasonable certainty in the negotiation of unqualified promises to pay. BUT public policy expressed in the UCC Article 9 says that if you want to enforce a mortgage you must not only have some indication that it was transferred to you, you must also have paid valuable consideration for the mortgage.

Without proof of payment, there is no prima facie case for enforcement of the mortgage, but it does curiously remain on the chain of title of the property (public records) unless nullified by the fact that the mortgage was executed as collateral for the note which was NOT a true representation of the loan contract based upon the real debt that arose by operation of law. The public policy is preserve the integrity of public records in the real estate marketplace. That is the only way to have reasonable certainty of title and encumbrances.

Forfeiture, an equitable remedy, must be done with clean hands based upon a real interest in the alleged default — not just a pile of paper that grows each year as banks try to convert an assignment of mortgage into a substitute for consideration.

Hence being the “holder” might mean you have the right to sue on the note but without being a holder in due course or otherwise paying fro the mortgage, there is no automatic basis for enforcing the mortgage in favor of a party with no economic interest in the mortgage.

see also http://knowltonlaw.com/james-knowlton-blog/ucc-article-3-and-mortgage-backed-securities.html

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