How Do We Know That the Name of the Trustee was Rented?

The practice of paying a fee to a “service provider” to conceal the real nature of a transaction and the real parties in interest has been at the center of all Wall Street schemes that are at variance from conventional loan products.

Virtually all parties who appear in the chain of title or possession in securitization schemes are parties who rent their name to lend credence to the illusion of the loan transaction, loan transfers and foreclosures.

The truth is simply that the debt is never purchased and sold in such circumstances. But paper is created to create the illusion that “the loan” has been purchased and sold. It wasn’t. This illusion is created by simply using the names of the biggest banks in the world.

See Rent-A-Name popular amongst banks

So Payday lenders, the bottom feeders of an already corrupt lending industry, are renting the names of Native American tribes in order to escape rules and laws that apply to lending in general and Payday lenders in particular. They do it because the tribes might be exempt from certain Federal laws and rules. This enables them to charge higher and higher “interest rates” that are in fact gouging American consumers. So the tribal name or jurisdiction is invoked and the lenders pretend that they are not the real parties in interest. More pretender lenders.

This is what happens when we don’t enforce the existing laws and rules in the first place for fear of angering or collapsing the major banks. The prevailing view is that collapsing the TBTF banks — i.e., putting them out of business — is a bad thing no matter how badly they behave.

In the case of REMIC Trusts, big name banks have a tacit and express agreement (which should be pursued in discovery) in which they each will allow their names to be used or rented for a fee. This cross pollination of names, makes it appear that the giant banks are in fact the injured parties in foreclosures. I can say with 100% certainty this is not the case where claims of securitization are involved.

Banks have been quick to point out when faced with judgments for costs, fees or sanctions that they are NOT the foreclosing party and that their name only appears as “Trustee” of a self-proclaimed REMIC Trust. The “party” is the REMIC Trust itself, they say. But when you peek under the hood, the named Trust is just that — only a name. There is no trust and there have been no transactions in which the nonexistent trust’s name has been involved wherein loans have been purchased — or in which anything has been purchased.

Logic dictates and data confirms that the reason for this lack of transactional data is that there were no such transactions. Logic further dictates that the only possible conclusion is that the “investor money” was never entrusted to the falsely named big bank, as trustee and therefore could not have been entrusted to the REMIC Trust. Hence a key element of any valid trust is missing — the active management by a named trustee of assets that were entrusted tot he trustee on behalf of beneficiaries.

So there is no trust and there is court jurisdiction to grant relief in the name of a nonexistent trust. Reading the so-called trust instrument (Pooling and Servicing Agreement) also reveals the absence of trustor/settlor. So not only is the putative trust empty, it also lacks a trustor and trustee. Further inquiry into the PSA and the indenture for the the fake RMBS certificates reveals that the investors are not beneficiaries of a trust because even if the trust existed, the indenture disclaim such an interest in compliance with the buried description in the PSA.

So there is no trust, no trustee, no trustor, and no beneficiary. The investors’ only interest is in the form of a constructive trust, shared with other investors who may or may not be in the same “pool”. The opportunity for commingling money from thousands of investors in multiple pools is just too good for the bank to pass up.

Thus the laws and rules governing the highly complex lending marketplace require only an illusion of compliance instead of the real thing. Court administrators justified their “rocket dockets” by judicial economy and expediency, requiring the courts to hire more judges and personnel. But that is only true if the foreclosure were real. Some courts have required that the original note must be filed with the court upon suit and others require an affidavit describing possession and ownership of the so-called loan documents. Some affidavits must be executed by the lawyers seeking foreclosure on behalf of their clients.

My question is if the trust does not exist except in the minds of certain financiers and there are no trust assets and no active management of them (obviously) then how truthful is it for any lawyer  to execute documents for filing in court on behalf of a client that the lawyer knows or should know does not exist?

 

DEUTSCH BANK Memo Reveals Documents and Policies Ripe for Discovery

This completely corroborates what I have been saying for years along with a chorus of lawyers and pro se litigants across the county. It simply is not true that the attorney represents the trust or the trustee. 

This “Advisory” shows that there are documents that are rarely in the limelight and that clarify claims of securitization in practice. Note that the memorandum cited below comes from Deutsch Bank National Trust Company, as trustee and Deutsch Bank Trust Company Americas, as trustee.

These names are often NOT used when foreclosure actions are initiated where the name of the alleged REMIC Trustee is Deutsch Bank. It is important to note that neither of the two trust entities actually have been entrusted with any loans on behalf of any trust. Their name is used, for a fee, as windows dressing.

In this memo, Deutsch is attempting to limit its liability beyond the absence of any duties or trustee powers whose absence is revealed by reading the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) which is the alleged Trust instrument.

Let us help you plan your discovery requests: 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Hat tip to Bill Paatalo

See Deutsche Bank Memorandum – July 2008

I have previously published and commented on parts of this memorandum. This is an expansion on my comments. This “advisory” obviously intends to bring alleged servicers back in line because it states in the introductory paragraph that the Trustee respectfully requests that all servicers review the First Servicing Memorandum and adhere to the practices it describes.”

None of this would have been necessary if the servicers were conforming to the directions and restrictions contained in the First Servicing Memorandum. We all know now that they were not conforming to anything or accepting instruction from anyone other than the alleged “Master Servicers” for NEITs (nonexistent  inactive trusts).

In discovery, one should ask for any servicer memoranda that exist including but not limited to the Memorandum to Securitization Loan Servicers dated August 30, 2007 a/k/a the First Servicer Memorandum, and all subsequent correspondence or written directions to servicers including but not limited to this “Advisory Concerning Servicing Issues Affecting Securitized Housing Assets.

Note also the oblique reference to the fact that the cut-off date actually means something.  It states that “typically” the REMICs (actually NEITs) take ownership of loans at the time the securitization trusts are formed. Thus discovery would include questions as to whether or not that occurred and if not, when did transfer of ownership occur and with what parties. Also one would ask for correspondence and agreements attendant to the alleged “transaction” in which the Trust allegedly purchased the loans with trust money that came from the proceeds of sales of certificates to investors. If the Trust did not pay value for the loans then it did not acquire the debt. It only acquired the paper instruments that are used as evidence of the debt.

Perhaps most importantly, the memo comes down hard on the use of powers of attorney, which are a favorite medium through which lawyers for the foreclosing parties typically try to patch obvious gaps in the chain of ownership or custody of the loan documents.

Then the memo provides foreclosure defense attorneys with the opportunity to attack the foundation laid for testimony and exhibits from robo-witnesses. It states that all parties must “Understand the mechanics of of relevant securitization transactions and related custodial practices in sufficient details to address such questions in a timely and accurate manner.” As any foreclosure defense lawyer will tell you, the robo-witness knows nothing about “the mechanics of of relevant securitization transactions and related custodial practices.” [The problem is that most borrowers and foreclosure defense lawyers don’t know either].

The inability of the robo-witness to describe the specific securitization practices in real life as it pertains to the subject loan gives rise to a cogent attack on the foundation for the rest of his testimony. With proper objections, perhaps motions in limine, and cross examination, this could lead to a defensive motion to strike the witnesses testimony and exhibits for lack of foundation. The following quote takes this out of the realm of theory and argument and into simple fact:

Servicers must ensure that loss mitigation personnel and professionals engaged by servicers, including legal counsel retained by servicers, understand the mechanics of relevant securitization transactions and related custodial practices in sufficient details to address such questions in a timely and accurate manner. In particular, servicing professionals [including “loss mitigation”] must become sufficiently familiar with the terms of the relevant securitization documents for each Trust for which they act to explain, and where necessary, prove those terms and resulting ownership interests to courts and government agencies.”

Note the assumption that lawyers are hired by servicers and not the Trustee or the Trust. Thus the servicers hire counsel and then order that foreclosure be brought in the name of the alleged trust. But if there is no trust or no acquisition of the debt, or authorization (remember powers of attorneys are not sufficient), the servicer is without legal authority to do anything, much less collect money from homeowners or bring foreclosure actions.

Paragraph (2) of the this “advisory” also gives guidance and foundation for what various people, especially attorneys, can say about who they represent and how.

“The Trustee believes that all persons retained by the servicer should specifically role or capacity in which they are acting. … One would be less accurate… if he or she claimed to be … attorney for the Trustee. A more accurate statement [attorney for servicer] acting for [Deutsch] as trustee of the Trust.”

This completely corroborates what I have been saying for years along with a chorus of lawyers and pro se litigants across the county. It simply is not true that the attorney represents the trust or the trustee.

 

Trustee v Active Trustee US Bank Fails to show or even attempt to show it is an active trustee

CASE DISMISSED,WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. US BANK DECLINED TO AMEND. CASE DISMISSED.

Even where there is a clerk’s default “The burden is on the plaintiff to establish its entitlement to recovery.” Bravado Int’l, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 189.

Here is an example of how lawyers purport to represent US Bank when in fact they are creating the illusion that they represent a trust and in reality they are representing a subservicer who is receiving orders from a master servicer of a nonexistent trust. As Trustee of the nonexistent trust USB had no active role in the nonexistent trust. As the inactive Trustee for a nonexistent Trust, no right, title or interest in the debts of homeowners were within any scope of authority of any servicer, subservicer or master servicer. Each foreclosure is a farce based upon assumptions and presumptions that are exactly opposite to the truth.

Given the opportunity to amend the complaint, lawyers for USB chose not to amend — because they could not plead nor prove the required elements of an active trustee. Because of that USB lacked standing to bring the action except as agent for an active trust or on behalf of the trust beneficiaries. But where the certificates show that the certificate holders do NOT have any interest in a mortgage or note (true in about 70% of all cases), then they too lack of standing. And if the Trust is not an active Trust owning the debt, note or mortgage then it too lacks standing.

Let us draft your motions and do the research necessary to draw the attention of the court to the fraud taking place under their noses. 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Hat tip Bill Paatalo

see Memorandum and Order – USBank Trust NA as Trustee for LSF9 MPT v Monroe

See Judgment – USB Trust for LSF9 v Monroe –

While this case discusses diversity and other issues concerning US Bank “as trustee” the reasoning and ruling clearly expose the truth about pleading irregularities by attorneys who purport to represent US Bank or a REMIC Trust.

A debt is an asset to anyone who owns it. Industry practice requires that for transfer of ownership, there must be an agreement or other document providing warranty of title, confirmation of the existence and ownership of the debt and proof of authority of the person executing the document. Go into any bank and try to borrow money using a note as collateral. The bank will require, at a minimum, that the debt be confirmed (usually by the purported debtor) and that each party in the chain show proof of purchase.

Without consideration, the assignment of mortgage or endorsement of the note is just a piece of paper.

When there is an assertion of ownership of the loan, what the banks and so-called servicers are actually saying is that they own the paper (note and mortgage) not the debt. In the past this was a distinction without a difference. In the era of patently f false claims of securitization, the debt was split off from the paper. The owner of the debt were without knowledge that their money was not under Trust management nor that their money was being used to originate or acquire loans without their knowledge.

The securitization sting is accomplished because the owners of the debt (the investors who sourced the funds) are unaware of the fact that the certificate they are holding is merely a promise to pay from a nonexistent trust that never was utilized to acquire the debts and whose ownership of the paper is strictly temporary in order to foreclose.

The failure to make that distinction between the real debt and the fake paper is the principal reason why so many people lose their homes to interlopers who have no interest in the loan but who profit from the sale of the home because a judgment was entered in favor of them allowing them to conduct a foreclosure sale. 

This case also sets forth universally accepted legal doctrine even where there is a clerk’s default entered against the homeowner. The Judge cannot enter a judgment for an alleged debt without proving the debt — even if the homeowner doesn’t show up.

“When a default is entered, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the well- pleaded factual allegations in the complaint pertaining to liability.” Bravado Int’l Grp. Merch. Servs., Inc. v. Ninna, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 2d 177, 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992)). “While a default judgment constitutes an admission of liability, the quantum of damages remains to be established by proof unless the amount is liquidated or susceptible of mathematical computation.” Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 1974); accord, e.g., Bravado Int’l, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 190. “[E]ven upon default, a court may not rubber-stamp the non-defaulting party’s damages calculation, but rather must ensure that there is a basis for the damages that are sought.” United States v. Hill, No. 12-CV-1413, 2013 WL 474535, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2013)

“The burden is on the plaintiff to establish its entitlement to recovery.” Bravado Int’l, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 189.

 

Can you really call it a loan when the money came from a thief?

The banks were not taking risks. They were making risks and profiting from them. Or another way of looking at it is that with their superior knowledge they were neither taking nor making risks; instead they were creating the illusion of risk when the outcome was virtually certain.

Securitization as practiced by Wall Street and residential “mortgage” loans is not just a void assignment. It is a void loan and an enterprise based completely on steering all “loans” into failure and foreclosure.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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Perhaps this summary might help some people understand why bad loans were the object of lending instead of good loans. The end result in the process was always to steer everyone into foreclosure.

Don’t use logic and don’t trust anything the banks put on paper. Start with a blank slate — it’s the only way to even start understanding what is happening and what is continuing to happen. The following is what you must keep in mind and returning to for -rereading as you plow through the bank representations. I use names for example only — it’s all the same, with some variations, throughout the 13 banks that were at the center of all this.

  1. The strategic object of the bank plan was to make everyone remote from liability while at the same time being part of multiple transactions — some real and some fictitious. Remote from liability means that the entity won’t be held accountable for its own actions or the actions of other entities that were all part of the scheme.
  2. The goal was simple: take other people’s money and re-characterize it as the banks’ money.
  3. Merrill Lynch approaches institutional investors like pension funds, which are called “stable managed funds.” They have special requirements to undertake the lowest possible risk in every investment. Getting such institutional investors to buy is a signal to the rest of the market that the securities purchased by the stable managed funds must be safe or they wouldn’t have done it.
  4. Merrill Lynch creates a proprietary entity that is neither a subsidiary nor an affiliate because it doesn’t really exist. It is called a REMIC Trust and is portrayed in the prospectus as though it was an independent entity that is under management by a reputable bank acting as Trustee. In order to give the appearance of independence Merrill Lynch hires US Bank to act as Trustee. The Trust is not registered anywhere because it is a common law trust which is only recognized by the laws of the State of New York. US Bank receives a monthly fee for NOT saying that it has no trust duties, and allowing the use of its name in foreclosures.
  5. Merrill Lynch issues a prospectus from the so-called REMIC entity offering the sale of “certificates” to investors who will receive a hybrid “security” that is partly a bond in which interest is due from the Trust to the investor and partly equity (like common stock) in which the owners of the certificates are said to have undivided interests in the assets of the Trust, of which there are none.
  6. The prospectus is a summary of how the securitization will work but it is not subject to SEC regulations because in 1998 an amendment to the securities laws exempted “pass-through” entities from securities regulations is they were backed by mortgage bonds.
  7. Attached to the prospectus is a mortgage loan schedule (MLS). But the body of the prospectus (which few people read) discloses that the MLS is not real and is offered by way of example.
  8. Attached for due diligence review is a copy of the Trust instrument that created the REMIC Trust. It is also called a Pooling and Servicing Agreement to give the illusion that a pool of loans is owned by the Trust and administered by the Trustee, the Master Servicer and other entities who are described as performing different roles.
  9. The PSA does not grant or describe any duties, responsibilities to be performed by US Bank as trustee. Actual control over the Trust assets, if they ever existed, is exercised by the Master Servicer, Merrill Lynch acting through subservicers like Ocwen.
  10. Merrill Lynch procures a triple AAA rating from Moody’s Rating Service, as quasi public entity that grades various securities according to risk assessment. This provides “assurance” to investors that the the REMIC Trust underwritten by Merrill Lynch and sold by a Merrill Lynch affiliate must be safe because Moody’s has always been a reliable rating agency and it is controlled by Federal regulation.
  11. Those institutional investors who actually performed due diligence did not buy the securities.
  12. Most institutional investors were like cattle simply going along with the crowd. And they advanced money for the purported “purchase” of the certificates “issued” by the “REMIC Trust.”
  13. Part of the ratings and part of the investment decision was based upon the fact that the REMIC Trusts would be purchasing loans that had already been seasoned and established as high grade. This was a lie.
  14. For all practical purposes, no REMIC Trust ever bought any loan; and even where the appearance of a purchase was fabricated through documents reflecting a transaction that never occurred, the “purchased” loans were the result of “loan closings” which only happened days before or were fulfilling Agreements in which all such loans were pre-sold — i.e., as early as before even an application for loan had been submitted.
  15. The normal practice required under the securities regulation is that when a company or entity offers securities for sale, the net proceeds of sale go to the issuing entity. This is thought to be axiomatically true on Wall Street. No entity would offer securities that made the entity indebted or owned by others unless they were getting the proceeds of sale of the “securities.”
  16. Merrill Lynch gets the money, sometimes through conduits, that represent proceeds of the sale of the REMIC Trust certificates.
  17. Merrill Lynch does not turn over the proceeds of sale to US Bank as trustee for the Trust. Vague language contained in the PSA reveals that there was an intention to divert or convert the money received from investors to a “dark pool” controlled by Merrill Lynch and not controlled by US Bank or anyone else on behalf of the REMIC Trust.
  18. Merrill Lynch embarks on a nationwide and even world wide sales push to sell complex loan products to homeowners seeking financing. Most of the sales, nearly all, were directed at the loans most likely to fail. This was because Merrill Lynch could create the appearance of compliance with the prospectus and the PSA with respect to the quality of the loan.
  19. More importantly by providing investors with 5% return on their money, Merrill Lynch could lend out 50% of the invested money at 10% and still give the investors the 5% they were expecting (unless the loan did NOT go to foreclosure, in which case the entire balance would be due). The balance due, if any, was taken from the dark pool controlled by Merrill Lynch and consisting entirely of money invested by the institutional investors.
  20. Hence the banks were not taking risks. They were making risks and profiting from them. Or another way of looking at it is that with their superior knowledge they were neither taking nor making risks; instead they were creating the illusion of risk when the outcome was virtually certain.
  21. The use of the name “US Bank, as Trustee” keeps does NOT directly subject US Bank to any liability, knowledge, intention, or anything else, as it was and remains a passive rent-a-name operation in which no loans are ever administered in trust because none were purchased by the Trust, which never got the proceeds of sale of securities and was therefore devoid of any assets or business activity at any time.
  22. The only way for the banks to put a seal of legitimacy on what they were doing — stealing money — was by getting official documents from the court systems approving a foreclosure. Hence every effort was made to push all loans to foreclosure under cover of an illusory modification program in which they occasionally granted real modifications that would qualify as a “workout,” which before the false claims fo securitization of loans, was the industry standard norm.
  23. Thus the foreclosure became extraordinarily important to complete the bank plan. By getting a real facially valid court order or forced sale of the property, the loan could be “legitimately” written off as a failed loan.
  24. The Judgment or Order signed by the Judge and the Clerk deed upon sale at foreclosure auction became a document that (1) was presumptively valid and (b) therefore ratified all the preceding illegal acts.
  25. Thus the worse the loan, the less Merrill Lynch had to lend. The difference between the investment and the amount loaned was sometimes as much as three times the principal due in high risk loans that were covered up and mixed in with what appeared to be conforming loans.
  26. Then Merrill Lynch entered into “private agreements” for sale of the same loans to multiple parties under the guise of a risk management vehicles etc. This accounts for why the notional value of the shadow banking market sky-rocketed to 1 quadrillion dollars when all the fiat money in the world was around $70 trillion — or 7% of the monstrous bubble created in shadow banking. And that is why central banks had no choice but to print money — because all the real money had been siphoned out the economy and into the pockets of the banks and their bankers.
  27. TARP was passed to cover the banks  for their losses due to loan defaults. It quickly became apparent that the banks had no losses from loan defaults because they were never using their own money to originate loans, although they had the ability to make it look like that.
  28. Then TARP was changed to cover the banks for their losses in mortgage bonds and the derivative markets. It quickly became apparent that the banks were not buying mortgage bonds, they were selling them, so they had no such losses there either.
  29. Then TARP was changed again to cover losses from toxic investment vehicles, which would be a reference to what I have described above.
  30. And then to top it off, the Banks convinced our central bankers at the Federal Reserve that they would freeze up credit all over the world unless they received even more money which would allow them to make more loans and ease credit. So the FED purchased mortgage bonds from the non-owning banks to the tune of around $3 Trillion thus far — on top of all the other ill-gotten gains amounting roughly to around 50% of all loans ever originated over the last 20 years.
  31. The claim of losses by the banks was false in all the forms that was represented. There was no easing of credit. And banks have been allowed to conduct foreclosures on loans that violated nearly all lending standards especially including lying about who the creditor is in order to keep everyone “remote” from liability for selling loan products whose central attribute was failure.
  32. Since the certificates issued in the name of the so-called REMIC Trusts were not in fact backed by mortgage loans (EVER) the certificates, the issuers, the underwriters, the master servicers, the trustees et al are NOT qualified for exemption under the 1998 law. The SEC is either asleep on this or has been instructed by three successive presidents to leave the banks alone, which accounts for the failure to jail any of the bankers that essentially committed treason by attacking the economic foundation of our society.

Servicers Using US Bank as Shield From Liability in Fraudulent Foreclosures

The conclusion is that US Bank “as trustee” is a sham entity. it does not exist.

The marketplace is flooded with false representations about the role of US Bank. This becomes abundantly clear when you are made privy to decisions made wherein sanctions were levied against US Bank. It underscores the basic premise that there is no formal loan, and hence that there is no creditor and there is no borrower — a very accurate but  counter-intuitive conclusion.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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On U.S. Bank I have always had a problem with describing them as a national bank in this context.

While it IS a national bank, it specifically disclaims that it is acting on its own behalf and states that it appears strictly as Trustee for a putative trust. As such it is neither acting as an investment bank nor a commercial bank processing deposits or withdrawals. It COULD perform those services if US Bank received borrower payments on putative loans. But it doesn’t perform those tasks since the records produced in court are ALWAYS those of a third party who claims rights to “service” particular loans including the subject loan.

Further, upon information and belief, US Bank has no knowledge or involvement in the invocation of the name “US Bank.” It uniformly refuses to sign off on any settlement or modification of loans and uniformly avoids sending any employee or officer to any court proceeding involving foreclosure of residential putative loans where it is described as “trustee” of a “trust”.

In addition US Bank has no duties that it is required to perform and no duties that are required by any document or instrument, save the consent to use its name in foreclosure cases. The absence of any duties to perform as Trustee is equivalent to the absence of a Trustee — a basic requirement in the creation of a valid trust.

And the absence of any duties as Trustee is evidence of the absence of any res, another basic requirement for the creation of a trust.

The use of the name “US Bank” is an attempt at “layering” or “laddering” as it is defined in the financial industry, to create a shield from liability on the part of self-proclaimed “servicers” whose authority is entirely dependent upon (1) the existence of a valid trust and (2) the presence of a real trustee.

Thus US Bank is not performing nor required to perform any trustee duties; and the putative trust never entered into any transaction in which the Trust paid for assets. Nor have any third parties contributed assets (owned by such third parties) to the res of the Trust.

Hence the sub rosa third party using the name of US Bank as a shield while the sub rosa third party pursued claims for its own benefit and not the benefit of any trust nor any beneficiaries of the putative trust nor any third party investors. Thus neither the named Trustee (or the named trust) nor the “servicer” had any right, justification or excuse to claim any rights arising out of the receipt of funds or the obligation to repay those funds by the putative borrower.

 

MERS/GMAC Note and Mortgage Discharged

If only all courts would entertain the possibility that everything presented to them should be the subject of intense scrutiny, 90%+ of all foreclosures would have been eliminated. Imagine what the country would look like today if the mortgages and fraudulent foreclosures failed.

The Banks say that if the mortgages failed they all would go bust and that there is nothing to backstop the financial system. The rest of us say that illegal mortgage lending and foreclosures was too high a price to pay for a dubious theory of national security.

Get a consult! 202-838-6345

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments.
 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
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I received the email quoted below from David Belanger who, like many others has proven beyond any reasonable doubt that persistence pays off. (BOLD IS EMPHASIS SUPPLIED BY EDITOR)

Besides the obvious the big takeaway for me was what I have been advocating since 2007 — if any company in in the alleged chain of “creditors” has gone out of business, there probably is a bankruptcy involved or an FDIC receivership. Those records are available for inspection. And what those records will show is that the the bankrupt or insolvent entity did not own the debt that arose when you signed documents for the benefit of parties other than the source of funding. It will also show that the bankrupt or insolvent entity did not own the note or mortgage either.

This is instructional for virtually all parties “involved” in a foreclosure but particularly clear in the cases of OneWest, whose entire business plan depended upon fraudulent foreclosures, and Chase Bank who bet heavily on getting away with it and they have, so far. BUT looking at the bankruptcy and receivership filings of IndyMac and WAMU respectively the nature of the fraud was obvious and born out of pure arrogance and apparently a correct perception of invincibility.

All such bankruptcy proceedings and receivership require schedules of assets right down to the last nickle in bankruptcy. Belanger simply looked at the schedule, knowing he never took the loan, and found without surprise that the bankrupt entity never claimed ownership of the debt, note or mortgage.

The big message here though is not just for those who are being pursued in collection for loans they never asked for nor received. The message here is to look at those schedules to see if your debt, note or mortgage is listed. Lying on those forms is a federal felony punishable by jail. Those forms are the closest you are ever going to get to the truth. Odds are your loan is nowhere to be found — even if you did get a loan.

And the second takeaway is the nonexistence of the “trust.” In most cases it never existed. Your “REMIC Trust” was almost certainly formed under the laws of the State of New York or Delaware that permit common law trusts (i.e., trusts that don’t need to be registered with the state in order to exist). BUT uniform trust laws adopted in virtually all states require for the trust to be considered a “person” it needs to have these elements — (1) trustor (2) trustee (3) trust instrument (PSA) and (4) a “thing” (res in Latin) that is committed to the trust by someone who owns the thing. It is the last element that is wholly absent from nearly all REMIC “Trusts.”

And now, David Belanger’s email:

JUST WANTED TO TELL YOU ALL SOMETHING,  THAT I JUST GOT DONE , FROM MERSCORP!  ON OUR PROPERTY THERE WAS A 2d MORTGAGE ON IT, IT WAS A LINE OF CREDIT THAT WE DID NOT DO, AND WE DID REPORT IT TO THE RIGHT AUTHORITY’S, BACK IN 2006/2007. NOW THE COMPANY WAS GMAC MORTGAGE CORP.

OVER THE YRS, FROM 2006 TILL NOW, IT REMAINED ON PROPERTY, UNTIL JUST LAST WEEK, WHEN I DEMANDED THAT MERS DISCHARGE IT.  AND AFTER THEY FOUND OUT IT WAS NEVER ASSIGNED OUT OF MERS, THEY HAD TO DISCHARGE IT. BECAUSE GMAC MORTGAGE IS DEAD.  NOW THIS GO TO WHAT WE ALL HAVE SAID HERE.

ANY ASSIGNMENT THAT HAS NOT BEEN DONE, OR RECORDED AT REGISTRY OF DEEDS, OUT OF MERS, AND THE MORTGAGE COMPANY IS A DEAD MORTGAGE COMPANY. THEN MERS WILL DISCHARGE IT . I HAVE A COPY OF THE DISCHARGE IN HAND.

AM STILL FIGHTING, BECAUSE OF THIS NEWS,  I HAVE ASK MY ATTORNEY TO NO AVAIL TO DO A QWR ON THE COMPANY THAT RECORDED AN ASSIGNMENT IN 2012, EVEN THOUGH GMAC MORTGAGE CORP WAS IN BK AND AFTER GOING THROUGH ALL BK RECORDS OF EACH ENTITY, THAT HAD TO FILE ALL ASSET OF THERE COMPANY, AND FOUND THAT NO ONE IN GMAC HAD THE MORTGAGE AND NOTE, 3 MONTHS PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNMENT BEING PUT ON MY RECORD.
https://www.kccllc.net/rescap/document/1212020120703000000000033

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW …
http://www.kccllc.net
Southern District of New York, New York In re: GMAC Mortgage, LLC UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT Case No. 12-12032 (MG) B6 Summary (Official Form 6 – Summary) (12/07)

THIS IS AGAIN THE REASON, THIS FRAUD TRUST  DOES NOT EXIST, AND I DO HAVE ALL SECRETARY OF STATES, INCLUDING ALL STATING THAT  THIS FRAUD TRUST IN FACT HAS NEVER
BEEN REGISTERED IN ANY STATE. LET ALONG THE STATE OF DELAWARE, THE STATE THEY SAY IT IS REGISTERED IN.  THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID NO. AND HAS NEVER BEEN A LEGAL OPERATING TRUST, EVER. SIGNED AND NOTARIZED BY THE SECRETARY. THE FRAUD TRUST NAME IS AS FOLLOWS.
GMACM MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2006-J1,

Wells Fargo CEO Forced Out Over Scam Customer Accounts

What is important to recognize is that the presumptions from the bench that the banks would not intentionally commit crimes or violations is wrong. It is important because all legal presumptions are predicated upon the supposition of trustworthiness of the party proffering evidence. This presumption is wrong. The banks have been fabricating accounts, “business records” and claims for years throwing the mortgage market and the economy into a deep recession from which we have still not recovered. We can;t recover until the fraud stops.

see http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/compliance-regulation/wells-fargo-ceo-john-stumpf-steps-down-1088708-1.html

It was the CFPB who uncovered this fraud committed by Wells Fargo. AND by the way the CFPB was NOT ruled unconstitutional. The judge merely declared its structure to be unconstitutional because it was not subject to proper oversight. The same judge in the same opinion said that the agency would continue under oversight of the President.

The well-publicized case of Wells Fargo misconduct doesn’t prove anything as to any particular pending case. But it does point to the fact that Wells Fargo (like other TBTF banks) was and is perfectly willing to engage in false representations and creation of fabricated, forged and false documentation in order to increase the value of its stock. Apparently Wells Fargo decided that its stock price is more important than its brand. Other TBTF banks have done the same.

The creation of false accounts for retail bank customers is identical to the creation of false accounts from institutional investors who were led to believe that their money was being used to fund a new entity (an IPO) into which their their money would be placed for management. The entity was mostly a REMIC Trust that existed only on paper and never received the proceeds of sale of MBS instruments. The REMIC was supposed to acquire loans that had been properly originated and subject to the same underwriting standards as the banks would do if they were lending the money themselves. None of that happened.

The money from the MBS purchasers was instead diverted from the REMIC and used to secretly fund loans and to create the illusion of trading profits that were in actuality theft from those investors. The exorbitant fees arising out the “closing” of each mortgage loan was never disclosed. Had the MBS purchasers and homeowners known the truth, they would have known that the investment bank that created this illusion was diverting trillions of dollars away from the economy and which would be lost forever to both the MBS investors and the homeowners who were pawns in this scheme.

MBS purchasers believed they had accounts with their share of MBS issued by Trusts that were funded with investor money and which then acquired loans. In fact, all that happened, was that false end of month statements were delivered to the MBS purchasers lulling them into a sense of false security. The “closing” documents on the “loans” gave the MBS purchasers no interest in the debt, note or mortgage or deed of trust. The investors were left naked in the wind. The payments they were receiving were coming from part of their own money plus the part of the payments of borrowers. The investment bank and its chain of conduits reaped huge fees for these fictional accounts.

Ditching the CEO is just more PR. He still walks away with a king’s ransom.

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