Tonight! DISAPPEARING LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS on the Neil Garfield Show 6PM EDT With Charles Marshall, Esq. and Bill Paatalo

Just the Facts, Ma’am!

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Charles Marshall, California attorney and Bill Paatalo, private investigator, discuss the implications of two Hawaii cases that are mirroring other decisions across the country.

Hawaii Schranz Case

Hawaii St. John Case

The above links go to two recent Hawaii cases dealing with legal standing. The fundamental fact of law is that standing must be ACTUAL NOT PRESUMED.

Specifically the issue is whether the foreclosing party actually had the original note at the time the foreclosure was commenced. Reasserting that standing is jurisdictional and therefore must be proven (with actual facts) present before a party takes any action, the courts here reversed (not for publication) Summary Judgments in favor of U.S. Bank and BONY Melon respectively.

The basis of the ruling is really that summary judgment could not have been granted based upon the submissions of so-called trustees of the probably nonexistent trust that never owned the debts. These decisions can be read as brushing aside presumptions and requiring actual proof of the facts that were heretofore assumed or presumed. The reason is simple. Standing is jurisdictional. Since any case that proceeds without jurisdictional is void and subject to being vacated, the proof must be actual and not presumed.

The interesting reasoning in these decisions is that many courts, including these decisions in Hawaii are starting to rethink their formal and informal presumptions. At the height of the tidal wave of foreclosures the courts took to the notion that the foreclosing party would not have filed if they were not the creditor or at least the possessor of the note with rights to enforce. The giant leap that came thereafter was a ruling that presumed the foreclosing party had possession of the note and the right to enforce it.

These decisions show that there is more movement toward requiring proof rather than the sue of legal presumptions. In plain language the courts are beginning to distrust the banks who bring these actions on behalf of alleged trusts.

Since there was question of fact, the summary judgment could not be granted. Thus the court decisions lay out the procedure, requiring actual proof of contested facts rather than resolving them strictly on the basis of applying legal presumptions which we all know leads to erroneous factual and legal conclusions.

NY Monroe Case: Default entered against homeowner — CASE DISMISSED on Standing — US Bank Never refiled.

multiple choice robo-pleading

NO PLEADING: HOMEOWNER WON ANYWAY

I have held off on discussing this case until some time passed. As far as I now know US Bank, like several cases I won, has not refiled for foreclosure. There is a good reason for that. US Bank is not the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff is named as a REMIC Trust, for which the attorneys claim that US Bank is the Trustee.

As such the Plaintiff does not own nor have any interest in the loan either as owner or servicer. Hence the named trustee (U.S. Bank) is named but it has nothing to do since the trust is nonexistent and in all events no attempt has ever been made to entrust the subject mortgage into the fiduciary hands of U.S Bank.

And THAT is because the only party with an equitable interest in the debt is a group of investors whose money was used to fund the origination or acquisition of the loan. The investors meanwhile think that their money was placed in trust and then used to purchase, not originate, loans.

Every once in a while a wily judge catches on from the face of the documentation. This judge ruled against US Bank as Trustee for a named REMIC Trust because he didn’t believe US Bank or the Trust was actually related to the subject loan. He gave them a chance to correct their pleading, but apparently out of fear of perjury, the lawyers for the nonexistent trust backed off, apparently permanently.

Let us help you plan your foreclosure defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.

Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===========================

see Memorandum and Order – USBank Trust NA as Trustee for LSF9 MPT v Monroe

Quoting from the complaint field by lawyers for their supposed client, a nonexistent trust with a completely denuded trustee, the court includes their own allegation in its ruling:

2 (“Plaintiff is the owner and holder of the subject Note and Mortgage or has been delegated authority to institute this Mortgage foreclosure action by the owner and holder of the subject Note and Mortgage.”);

What does that even mean? This is a perfect example of multiple choice robo-pleading. Either the Plaintiff is the owner and holder of the subject note or mortgage or they are not. If they own the debt,  they don’t say as much and certainly didn’t offer any proof at their uncontested hearing on damages. It’s pretty hard to lose an uncontested hearing but US Bank has done it multiple times, as reported in this case.

If they have been delegated authority by the owner and holder of the subject note and mortgage, they fail to say who delegated that authority and how the delegation occurred. Since the express purpose of the trust was to own the debt, note and mortgage and make payments to investors based upon the trust’s ownership of the debt, note and mortgage, Demoting the trust to the status of a conduit or agent would be completely adverse to the express wording and authority granted in the trust.

Actually that kind of wording is exactly what enables the players to claim interest in notes and mortgages adverse to the interests of the parties whose money was directly used to fund the origination and acquisition of loans.

 

Here are some revealing quotes from the District Judge:

The Complaint does not contain any details concerning U.S. Bank’s role as trustee or the powers it has over the trust property (including the mortgage here). (e.s.)

The party asserting subject matter jurisdiction carries the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. E.g., Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113; Augienello v. FDIC, 310 F. Supp. 2d 582, 587–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). This is true even on a motion for default judgment, since the principle that a default deems the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint to be admitted is inapplicable when a court doubts the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Transatlantic Marine, 109 F.3d at 108.

2 While some of these issues were discussed elsewhere by U.S. Bank’s counsel, e.g., Dkt. No. 7, they were not included in the affidavit filed in support of default judgment.

“When a default is entered, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the well- pleaded factual allegations in the complaint pertaining to liability.” Bravado Int’l Grp. Merch. Servs., Inc. v. Ninna, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 2d 177, 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992)). “While a default judgment constitutes an admission of liability, the quantum of damages remains to be established by proof unless the amount is liquidated or susceptible of mathematical computation.” Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 1974); accord, e.g., Bravado Int’l, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 190. “[E]ven upon default, a court may not rubber-stamp the non-defaulting party’s damages calculation, but rather must ensure that there is a basis for the damages that are sought.” United States v. Hill, No. 12-CV-1413, 2013 WL 474535, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2013)

In the past year, U.S. Bank’s attorneys—Gross Polowy—have repeatedly failed to secure default judgments in similar foreclosure cases before this Court. E.g., U.S. Bank Tr., N.A. v. Dupre, No. 15-CV-558, 2016 WL 5107123 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2016) (Kahn, J.); Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Moody, No. 16-CV-279, 2016 WL 4203514 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2016) (Kahn, J.); Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Pignataro, No. 15-CV-1041, 2016 WL 3647876 (N.D.N.Y. July 1, 2016) (Kahn, J.); cf. Ditech Fin. LLC v. Sterly, No. 15-CV-1455, 2016 WL 7429439, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2016) (denying a motion for default judgment due to a defective notice of pendency); OneWest Bank, N.A. v. Conklin, No. 14-CV-1249, 2015 WL 3646231, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 10, 2015) (same). In each case, Gross Polowy’s motion was denied for one of two reasons: either the complaint failed to sufficiently allege subject matter jurisdiction, e.g., Dupre, 2016 WL 5107123, at *2–5, or the motion for default judgment failed to meet the requirements of the Court’s Local Rules, e.g., Moody, 2016 WL 4203514, at *2. Here, both of these failures are present.

The Complaint also includes no allegations concerning U.S. Bank’s ability to proceed under its own citizenship, despite bringing this case on behalf of the “LSF9 Master Participation Trust.” Compl.

While U.S. Bank is the nominal plaintiff in this case, it is longstanding federal law that “court[s] must disregard nominal or formal parties and rest jurisdiction only upon the citizenship of real parties to the controversy.” Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 461 (1980). “Where an agent acts on behalf of a principal, the principal, rather than the agent, has been held to be the real and substantial party to the controversy. As a result, it is the citizenship of the principal—not that of the agent—that controls for diversity purposes.” Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Damornay Antiques, Inc., No. 99-CV-4883, 1999 WL 959371, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1999) (citing Airlines Reporting Corp. v. S&N Travel, Inc., 58 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1995)). At issue here is the application of this rule in lawsuits brought by a trustee on behalf of a trust. —3 Gross Polowy should be aware of this rule because they were “foreclosure counsel” for the plaintiff-appellee in Melina, 827 F.3d at 216–17, though in fairness it seems they were replaced by Hogan Lovells for both the subject matter jurisdiction issue and the subsequent appeal, id. at 216; OneWest Bank, N.A. v. Melina, No. 14-CV-5290, 2015 WL 5098635 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2015), aff’d, 827 F.3d 214.

In Navarro, the Court held that trustees can be the real parties in controversy—regardless of the type of trust—provided that they “are active trustees whose control over the assets held in their names is real and substantial.” 446 U.S. at 465; see also Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 191 (1990) (noting that, if the trustees are “active trustees whose control over the assets held in their names is real and substantial,” they are brought “under the rule, ‘more than 150 years’ old, which permits such trustees ‘to sue in their own right, without regard to the citizenship of the trust beneficiaries’” (quoting Navarro, 446 U.S. at 465–66)). The continued validity of this rule was endorsed by the Court in Americold. 136 S. Ct. at 1016.

If U.S. Bank wishes to proceed in federal court, it must, within thirty (30) days, move to amend its Complaint to address the deficiencies identified in this order. This motion to amend must be prepared in accordance with Local Rule 7.1(a)(4), which establishes the form for such a motion and lists the required papers. With that motion, to resolve the Court’s doubts concerning subject matter jurisdiction, U.S. Bank must also provide its articles of association (along with any other documentation required to establish the location of its main office), the trust instrument for the LSF9 Master Participation Trust,4 and any other documentation required to show that U.S. Bank’s control over the trust assets is real and substantial. Failure to comply with this Memorandum-Decision and Order when moving to amend the Complaint may result in the denial of the motion or sanctions. L.R. 1.1(d).

 

4 In the Dupre case discussed above, U.S. Bank also was instructed to file the trust instrument for the LSF8 Master Participation Trust (presumably another securitization vehicle for mortgage debt) in order to establish subject matter jurisdiction. 2016 WL 5107123, at *2. When it did file the trust instrument, “the text . . . was almost entirely redacted,” and the only visible portion seemed to oppose the notion that U.S. Bank was an active trustee with real and substantial control over the trust assets. Id. at *2, *4. This failure should not be repeated here, and filing documents under seal or with redactions requires advance permission of the Court. L.R. 83.13; see also Lugosh v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2006) (describing the standard for restricting public access to judicial documents).

 

Questions to Ask About the Trust and the Trustee

In the final analysis you are looking for evidence of absence of any real events currently presumed as facts in any foreclosure case.

The trustee issue is a jurisdictional issue. If the Plaintiff Trust does not exist, then it has no standing to make or pursue any claims. If the named Trustee is not engaged in the active management of active trust affairs on behalf of the beneficiaries of a trust, then it is not a trustee imbued with the powers to administer assets that have not been conveyed and entrusted to the Trustee.
 *
If the named beneficiaries have received a promise from the named “Trust” and the beneficiaries have expressly disclaimed any interest in the “underlying” loans, notes, mortgages or debts, then they are not beneficiaries and the entity is not a trust. (That fact pattern describes individual contracts with each investor who purchased a promise to pay executed by someone allegedly on behalf of an entity self proclaimed as a trust. If the named entity does not exist then the party who executed the isntruments may have liability for the promise).
 *
Since the Trust has not been identified as having been organized and existing under the laws of any jurisdiction, it is entirely appropriate to ask questions about the existence of the trust and its right to do business in the state or the courts. The second jurisdictional issue is subject matter jurisdiction in which the question is whether the trust owns the indebtedness. I frequently deal with these issues in drafting the substance of documents to be filed with the court, subject to opinion of local counsel.
 *
If prior demands for discovery are clear the appropriate strategy is to force the issue through a motion to compel. Filing an “amended” request fro discovery probably starts the clock all over again. By the time you get to a demand for sanctions for contempt the case could be over. If it is denied she should consider an interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether the record contains assertions or evidence of the existence of the trust. The only prejudice that could exist would be that the trust doesn’t exist and that “they” (actually the lawyers) would be “prejudiced” because they couldn’t foreclose using the trust name.
 *
There is no doubt in my mind that one or both narratives are true: (1) the trust doesn’t exist and never did and (2) the loan (i.e., the indebtedness) was never purchased by the trust, acting through tis alleged trustee.
 *
One of the problems here is that it would be wise, although not essential, to notice the named Trustee for deposition duces tecum. That’s often a problem because most homeowners not appear to have anyone competent to conduct the deposition. In a normal deposition, one MUST ask the witness identifying questions like
  1. What’s your name?
  2. Who do you work for?
  3. What is the relationship between your bank and this trust?
  4. Besides the alleged Prospectus and the alleged PSA, what agreements exist wherein the Trustee bank is obligated to do or receive anything from the trust, directly or indirectly. [This one should be broken up into parts].
  5. Under what jurisdiction was the trust organized?
  6. Under what jurisdiction is the trust now existing?
  7. Who is the trust officer for the trust?
  8. In which department(s) are trust matters generally handled in the Trustee Bank?
  9. In which department(s) are trust matters usually handled in the Trustee Bank for this trust?
  10. Has the Trustee bank published any memos or guidelines concerning the administration of securitization trusts?
  11. Assuming that the word “loan” means the indebtedness of the homeowners here in this case, on what date did US Bank as trustee purchase this loan to hold in trust?
  12. Who was the seller of the debt in that transaction?
  13. Was payment for the loan performed through a financial account held in the name of the Trustee for the alleged trust?
  14. How did US Bank as Trustee for the alleged trust perform due diligence to confirm the existence and ownership of the debt?
  15. Who are the beneficiaries of the alleged trust?
  16. Who is the trustor or settlor of the alleged trust?
  17. What is the date and name of the instrument that purports to create the trust?
  18. Describe the current functions of US Bank as trustee of the alleged trust.
  19. Describe the current assets of the alleged trust.
  20. Describe date and content of the last financial report received by US Bank as trustee for the alleged trust.
Most likely opposing counsel will object to the question’s relevancy at the time deposition is taken. But relevancy is not even a question at deposition which is by nature a fishing expedition. Even if opposing counsel was right that the question does not directly relate to proof of a fact asserted at trial, you are still entitled to inquire because it might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

No Surprise: Ocwen & US Bank Hit by $3.8 Million Verdict in Chicago Federal Trial For Violations in Fake Foreclosure

“The jury, after deliberating for approximately 7 hours, determined that Ocwen breached its contract, violated RESPA for failing to adequately respond to Saccameno’s Qualified Written Request, violated the FDCPA and committed both unfair and deceptive acts in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.  Monette Saccameno was awarded $500,000.00 in compensatory damages, $70,000.00 in non-economic damages, $12,000.00 in economic damages and $3,000,000.00 in punitive damages. Nicholas Heath Wooten, Esq.Ross Michael Zambon, Esq., and Mohammed Omar Badwan, Esq. led the litigation team on behalf of Saccameno.”

And I ask again: WHY DO OCWEN DOCUMENTS AND “BOARDING PROCESS” GET ANY LEGAL PRESUMPTION ON SCANT TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE THAT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED AS FOUNDATION IN ANY COURT OTHER THAN ONE IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS? With this verdict and dozens of other verdicts, settlements, lawsuits and whistleblower  news stories has establishing a crystal clear pattern of conduct of fake foreclosures based upon false documentation, false posting of payments and a clear mission to seek foreclosure whether the homeowner is current in payments or not.

The many cases akin to this one against OCwen and US Bank should be served up to judges hearing foreclosure cases with a single message: the foreclosures you are allowing are wrongful. Your decisions are giving rise to many lawsuits for damages.

GO TO LENDINGLIES to order forms and services

Let us help you plan your answers, affirmative defenses, discovery requests and defense narrative:

954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult. You will make things a lot easier on us and yourself if you fill out the registration form. It’s free without any obligation. No advertisements, no restrictions.

Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.

Get a Consult and TERA (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 954-451-1230 or 202-838-6345. The TERA replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

GO TO WWW.LENDINGLIES.COM OR https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===========================

Hat Tip Greg da’ Goose

Case Number: 1:16-cv-05278
Court: Illinois Northern
Nature of Suit: 423(Bankruptcy Withdrawl)
Companies:
Ocwen Financial Corporation
U.S. Bancorp

see OCWEN BANGED WITH $3.8 MILLION VERDICT

This case shows that juries are still angry about the 2008 meltdown and that the entire burden was shifted to homeowners and taxpayers — who “bailed out” financial institutions that had no losses.

And it also shows that lawyers can get rich by charging contingency fees in wrongful foreclosure actions that most lawyers avoid or rush to settlement. It provides ample encouragement for homeowners to sue and for lawyers to take the cases.

So for those of you who are  contemplating filing a wrongful foreclosure action against Ocwen, or U.S. Bank or any of the other players that are acting in concert with Ocwen, here is a case that no doubt will be settled under “seal of confidentiality” (like thousands of others). I think it is high time for borrowers to pool their complaints in either a class action or mass joinder action.

And here are some of the causes of action that could be filed that a federal jury found were reasons enough to award $500,000 in compensatory damages and $3 Million in punitive damages:

  1. Breach of contract
  2. RESPA violation (failure to respond to QWR)
  3. FDCPA violations
  4. Violation of state law — Illinois Consumer Fraud Act: Unfair and deceptive acts.

There are many other causes of action that could be filed. Each case needs to be evaluated as to which causes of action are most appropriate for the subject “loan”, most of which have resulted in substantial verdicts.

And don’t forget the role of US Bank whose name is used as trustee of a trust that  either doesn’t exist, doesn’t own the debt or both. US Bank is paid a fee to pose as trustee not to BE trustee.

See also

https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/atlas-consumer-law-secures-3-582-000-jury-verdict-obtained-by-monette-saccameno-a-resident-of-cook-county-illinois-and-against-ocwen-loan-servicing-llc-a-national-mortgage-loan-servicer-300628541.html

https://cookcountyrecord.com/stories/511388869-jury-awards-3-5m-to-woman-who-claimed-loan-servicer-mishandled-mortgage-during-after-chapt-13-bankruptcy

Ocwen (OCN) Receives Daily News Sentiment Rating of 0.15
https://www.thelincolnianonline.com/2018/04/13/ocwen-ocn-receives-daily-news-sentiment-rating-of-0-15.html

https://www.leagle.com/decision/infdco20180410901

Saccameno v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC et al, No. 1:2015cv01164 – Document 265 (N.D. Ill. 2018)
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW Document #: 265 Filed: 04/09/18
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ilnd-1_15-cv-01164/pdf/USCOURTS-ilnd-1_15-cv-01164-3.pdf

Saccameno v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC et al, No. 1:2015cv01164 – Document 231 (N.D. Ill. 2018)
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 3/9/2018
https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/1:2015cv01164/306387/231/0.pdf?ts=1520678019

Saccameno v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC et al, No. 1:2015cv01164 – Document 152 (N.D. Ill. 2017)
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 11/8/2017
https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/1:2015cv01164/306387/152/0.pdf?ts=1517249686

Saccameno v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC et al, No. 1:2015cv01164 – Document 75 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 11/19/2015
https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/1:2015cv01164/306387/75/0.pdf?ts=1448015323

US Government Publishing Office
15-1164 – Saccameno v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC et al
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCOURTS-ilnd-1_15-cv-01164/USCOURTS-ilnd-1_15-cv-01164-0

Fact Check: Robo-witness knows nothing

Information is admitted in evidence only after a proper foundation has been laid. If the witness knows nothing about the foundation the evidence should not be admitted as evidence. Appellate courts will usually reverse a trial court’s error in ruling on evidence UNLESS the appellate panel decides that the error would not have made any difference in the outcome. The fundamental fact at the root of all foreclosures is that the homeowner owes a debt to the foreclosing party and has not paid.

In the passage below a witness supposedly employed by US Bank displays a lack of personal knowledge on anything that would contribute to foundation for establishing the standing of the foreclosing party. I have inserted in brackets the significance of each answer of an actual witness in a court proceeding.

Let us help you prepare for deposition or trial: 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Hat tip Bill Paatalo

Videoconference deposition of JOHN G. RICHARDS,II

Would you please provide your official title for
11 the record.
12 A Yes, I’m the vice president at U.S. Bank within
13 the global corporate trust services group. [The problem that was overlooked here is that his title is not foundation for establishing the existence of a trust that is managed by US Bank as Trustee. Additional questions regarding the existence of any account that is under trust management by US Bank would have revealed lack of knowledge because the witnesses are not given any information that could be used by the homeowner or counsel for the homeowner. In truths I have repeatedly pointed out, if you proceed under the assumption that there is no “account” in existence under which Trust assets are managed for the benefit of beneficiaries, all the pieces fall into place. There is no Trustee because there is nothing that has been entrusted to the trustee for the benefit of beneficiaries. Thus parties claiming authority “from the Trust” to serve as services or master servicers lack any foundation to support the assertion of that authority. This is why no modification is signed by anyone other than the servicer acting as attorney in fact for the purported Trust or other foreclosing party.]

——————

Q I see. Do you know who the beneficiaries are of

10 the WaMu trust?

11 A I do not know the specific beneficiaries — or I

12 would call them certificate holders. I don’t know the

13 identity of those investors or certificate holders. [Here is US Bank whom the attorneys have named as the foreclosing party. The witness is supposedly someone who knows about the USB trust arrangement for a REMIC Trust. Yet on the most basic questions about the existence of a trust — the existence of beneficiaries, he is unable to answer the question regarding their identity. A trust without beneficiaries is not a trust   — i.e., it is not an legal entity. In fact he is saying that there are no beneficiaries but that there are certificate holders. He can’t identify either the beneficiaries or the certificate holders. Note also that he knows nothing about the “certificates, which in most cases expressly state that the holder is NOT entitled to an interest in the loan, debt, note or mortgage. What they have is a promise to pay them money coming from a nonexistent trust.]

14 Q That’s fine. And because you don’t know, do you

15 know who would know or is there a list?

16 A I do not know specifically if there is a list

17 that would have the names of actual individuals or

18 entities who are certificate holders. [This further erodes the foundation for proving that the trust exists, the beneficiaries exist or the certificate holders exist. More importantly it is an admission that even a list of the certificate holders might not exist — thus corroborating a central point on this blog — that the money never went into the trust and that instead it was commingled with the money of other investors in a different entity altogether. I have referred to this scenario as a dark pool or slush fund in which the underwriting banks (who appoint themselves as Master Servicers) take charge of the investor funds instead of the money being administered by a Trust. Remember that in 2008-2009, the banks and servicers were asserting that such Trusts did not exist. That was probably a true statement in that the Trust was never an active trust and the trustee was never an active trustee.] 

19 It is common for many of these certificates to

20 be held. I’m not sure the exact way to hold it, but

21 something that is significant amount to brokerage or some

22 other place for the general holding of investment

23 securities. [He is referring to the practice of holding securities in street name — i.e., in the name of the brokerage house that allegedly completed the transaction on behalf of the investor. This enables the investment banking entity to assert ownership of the certificates for title purposes while supposedly holding the certificates for investors, the only evidence of which would be the end of month brokerage statement telling the investors that they own the rights to certificates even though the certificates are not in their name. Of course the rub here is that most certificates are uncertificated — merely computer entries. But that doesn’t mean that there isn’t a master certificate in electronic or paper form. The witness is saying he doesn’t know where such certificates are held, by whom or for what purpose] It’s a company called DTC that serves that

24 function just generally in the industry. But I don’t

25 have information about the identity of the specific certificate holders.

2 Q So you’re saying that this entity, DTC, holds

3 that information who would know?

4 MS. DARNELL: Objection. Calls for speculation.

5 THE WITNESS: I don’t know. I think I’m using

6 that as an example of sort of how these certificates are

7 commonly held and the entity that might be positioned to

8 communicate with actual certificate holders.

Q So does the trust actually communicate directly

11 with the certificate holders?

12 A I am not familiar with the — with any direct

13 communication between U.S. Bank as trustee for this trust

14 and certificate holders on an individual basis. I’m not

15 familiar with that at all. [This is as close as you will get to the admission that there is no active Trustee and there is no active Trust. If there is no communication or no knowledge of communication between the Trustee and the certificate holders then it is an inescapable conclusion that there is no activity in the alleged REMIC Trust. If there was such activity within the Trust it would need to be disclosed to the “beneficiaries” or “certificate holders.” There isn’t. The master servicer sends out a distribution report with the disclaimer that none of the information on the distribution report has been verified and could be entirely wrong.]

———————

23 Q So with respect to it being vague and

24 ambiguous — and I just want to clarify. Do you manage

25 Chase as the servicer of the trust?

A I would not describe that there is any kind of

2 management or oversight role by the trustee of a servicer

3 in this trust or any other. [So the party claimed to be the servicer is not managed by and need not report to the party named as the Trustee — thus further establishing that the Trustee is inactive and the “trust” is a sham. If there is no “kind of management or oversight role by the trustee of a servicer” then who directs the “servicer” on the distribution of the money collected from homeowners? Some document must exist that is not being produced in court. It would be a document that establishes the duties and responsibilities of the subservicer. It would be executed by the “Servicer” and the Master Servicer but kept secret because the document would establish, once and for all, that for all purposes other than foreclosure the parties conduct business as though the trust did not exist.]

Given the above testimony and commentary, the testimony of the witness should not be admitted into evidence at trial. The reason is lack of foundation. Proper objections on foundation, leading, and hearsay must be repeatedly raised or else the testimony, however riddled with untruth, will be admitted because the objection was” waived” by failing to raise it timely. If the objections are sustained and the witness has managed to spew out an answer as you were objecting then a motion to strike is absolutely required lest the objectionable testimony remain in the record. As Plan B, bring these things out in cross examination and then move to strike the testimony.

 

 

Trustee v Active Trustee US Bank Fails to show or even attempt to show it is an active trustee

CASE DISMISSED,WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. US BANK DECLINED TO AMEND. CASE DISMISSED.

Even where there is a clerk’s default “The burden is on the plaintiff to establish its entitlement to recovery.” Bravado Int’l, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 189.

Here is an example of how lawyers purport to represent US Bank when in fact they are creating the illusion that they represent a trust and in reality they are representing a subservicer who is receiving orders from a master servicer of a nonexistent trust. As Trustee of the nonexistent trust USB had no active role in the nonexistent trust. As the inactive Trustee for a nonexistent Trust, no right, title or interest in the debts of homeowners were within any scope of authority of any servicer, subservicer or master servicer. Each foreclosure is a farce based upon assumptions and presumptions that are exactly opposite to the truth.

Given the opportunity to amend the complaint, lawyers for USB chose not to amend — because they could not plead nor prove the required elements of an active trustee. Because of that USB lacked standing to bring the action except as agent for an active trust or on behalf of the trust beneficiaries. But where the certificates show that the certificate holders do NOT have any interest in a mortgage or note (true in about 70% of all cases), then they too lack of standing. And if the Trust is not an active Trust owning the debt, note or mortgage then it too lacks standing.

Let us draft your motions and do the research necessary to draw the attention of the court to the fraud taking place under their noses. 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Hat tip Bill Paatalo

see Memorandum and Order – USBank Trust NA as Trustee for LSF9 MPT v Monroe

See Judgment – USB Trust for LSF9 v Monroe –

While this case discusses diversity and other issues concerning US Bank “as trustee” the reasoning and ruling clearly expose the truth about pleading irregularities by attorneys who purport to represent US Bank or a REMIC Trust.

A debt is an asset to anyone who owns it. Industry practice requires that for transfer of ownership, there must be an agreement or other document providing warranty of title, confirmation of the existence and ownership of the debt and proof of authority of the person executing the document. Go into any bank and try to borrow money using a note as collateral. The bank will require, at a minimum, that the debt be confirmed (usually by the purported debtor) and that each party in the chain show proof of purchase.

Without consideration, the assignment of mortgage or endorsement of the note is just a piece of paper.

When there is an assertion of ownership of the loan, what the banks and so-called servicers are actually saying is that they own the paper (note and mortgage) not the debt. In the past this was a distinction without a difference. In the era of patently f false claims of securitization, the debt was split off from the paper. The owner of the debt were without knowledge that their money was not under Trust management nor that their money was being used to originate or acquire loans without their knowledge.

The securitization sting is accomplished because the owners of the debt (the investors who sourced the funds) are unaware of the fact that the certificate they are holding is merely a promise to pay from a nonexistent trust that never was utilized to acquire the debts and whose ownership of the paper is strictly temporary in order to foreclose.

The failure to make that distinction between the real debt and the fake paper is the principal reason why so many people lose their homes to interlopers who have no interest in the loan but who profit from the sale of the home because a judgment was entered in favor of them allowing them to conduct a foreclosure sale. 

This case also sets forth universally accepted legal doctrine even where there is a clerk’s default entered against the homeowner. The Judge cannot enter a judgment for an alleged debt without proving the debt — even if the homeowner doesn’t show up.

“When a default is entered, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the well- pleaded factual allegations in the complaint pertaining to liability.” Bravado Int’l Grp. Merch. Servs., Inc. v. Ninna, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 2d 177, 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992)). “While a default judgment constitutes an admission of liability, the quantum of damages remains to be established by proof unless the amount is liquidated or susceptible of mathematical computation.” Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 1974); accord, e.g., Bravado Int’l, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 190. “[E]ven upon default, a court may not rubber-stamp the non-defaulting party’s damages calculation, but rather must ensure that there is a basis for the damages that are sought.” United States v. Hill, No. 12-CV-1413, 2013 WL 474535, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2013)

“The burden is on the plaintiff to establish its entitlement to recovery.” Bravado Int’l, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 189.

 

US Bank v Mattos: Ocwen’s Witness unable to collaborate U.S. Bank’s Records

Thanks to Investigator Bill Paatalo of BP Investigative Agency for the heads up on this case.  Furthermore if you are suing U.S. Bank please note that THERE ARE NO RECORDS KEPT BY US BANK OF ANY KIND other than receipt of a monthly fee.  Bill Paatalo will be dropping a bombshell on these findings in the next month.

Please see ruling:  US Bank v Mattos – No Standing 06-06-17

The Supreme Court of Hawaii on certiorari to the Hawaii Court of Appeals reversed a prior summary judgment when it was determined that Ocwen’s witness was unable to speak for the validity of U.S. Bank’s records.   Hawaiian attorney Gary Dubin did an exemplary job demonstrating why the fraudulent assigments were void, not just voidable and that US Bank could not prove standing to foreclose.

The Defendants complained that the circuit court improperly granted summary judgment when there were genuine issues of material fact including two mortgage assignments that were robosigned by persons with insufficient authority or personal knowledge as to what they swore to.  There were also two assignments to the securitized trust in the chain of US Bank’s alleged ownership that were only supported by hearsay declarations inadmissible pursuant to Hawaii’s Civil Procedure Rule 56 and Evidence Rules.  Therefore, the court ruled that the Defendant’s loan violated the requirements of the securitized trust’s Pooling and Servicing agreement.

U.S. Bank’s declarants also had no idea how earlier business records had been compiled in regards to the two invalid mortgage assignments allegedly assigned to the securitized trust.

It was ruled that the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) incorrectly concluded that the declaration of Richard Work, the Contract Management Coordinator of Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”), rendered him a “qualified witness” for U.S. Bank’s records under the Hawai‘i Rules of Evidence Rule 803(b)(6)- hearsay exception for records of regularly conducted activity.  In addition, U.S. Bank failed to establish that it was a holder entitled to enforce the note at the time the foreclosure complaint was filed(see Bank of America, N.A. v. Reyes-Toledo, 139 Hawaii(2017)).

 

Unfortunately in regards to the first issue on certiorari, the court was unfamiliar with the term “robosigning” and ruled that since the legal effect of “robo-signing” was not necessary to  the determination of the case, the court sidestepped the issue and set aside the ICA’s holding that, “conclusory assertions that fail to offer factual allegations or a legal theory indicating how alleged “robo-signing” caused harm to a mortgagee” are insufficient to establish a defense in a foreclosure action.

 

Addressing the factual allegations underlying the “robo-signing” claim, however, the court concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ocwen had the authority to sign the second assignment of mortgage to U.S. Bank. With respect to the second issue on certiorari, the court affirmed the ICA in part and followed the majority rule in U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Salvacion (Hawaii App. 2014) and held that, “a third party unrelated to a mortgage securitization pooling and servicing agreement lacks standing to enforce an alleged violation of its terms unless the violation renders the mortgage assignment void, rather than voidable.”  However the court limited the holding to the judicial foreclosure context not impacting non-judicial foreclosures.

 

The court issued a reversal and vacated the prior March 9, 2016 Judgment on Appeal, as well as the circuit court’s August 26, 2014 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure against all defendants and remanded the case back to the circuit court.

It is unfortunate that the circuit court and Intermediate Court of Appeals were so obviously biased towards the homeowner that they refused to apply prior rulings of law that would have quickly resolved this case.  However, part of the MegaBank-Lower Court game is to exhaust the homeowner of financial resources, while abusing them with delay strategies, discovery deficits and the misapplication of established law.  When these unethical methods are employed and a homeowner is forced to return to the lower courts and start all over again, the banks and courts should immediately be held responsible for violations of due process and the deliberate use of legal abuse tactics. The homeowner should in time be compensated for the stress incurred, emotional trauma, any lost earnings, and any resulting physical and mental health degradation.  Only when there is a sufficient financial penalty will the banks and courts consider following the rule of law.

 

 

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