Another Glitch from Wells Fargo Admitted by WFB (oops 570 homes foreclosed.)

Wells is trying to buy its way out if this one with offers of $25,000 to people who lost homes worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. This is the tip of the iceberg of liability for WFB, Citi, BofA, Chase and others who have very soft and porous balance sheets where liabilities are reported. Sure they have unreported trillions offshore, but the current reporting doesn’t come close to the actual liabilities of these predatory entities.

see Yes Another “Glitch” by Wells Fargo

To find out if you were one of the 570 start with finding out if Wells caused your foreclosure and the start digging to see how to determine whether your home was one of those foreclosed. We can probably help, first fill out our intake registration form. (FREE) CLICK HERE TO SUBMIT REGISTRATION. 

It may seem like free money but actually it is blood money. They owe you a lot more than $25,000 from what I can see here. Check with counsel before you go accepting pennies on the dollar of a valuable claim. 

 

Bank Fraud News: The reason why banks and servicers should receive no presumption of reliability

The following is but a short sampling supporting the argument that any document coming from the banks and servicers is suspect and unworthy of any legal presumption of authenticity or validity. Judges are looking into self-serving fabricated documentation and coming to the wrong conclusion about the facts.

Chase following bank playbook: screw the customer

“Chase provided no prior notice to its cardholders that their crypto ‘purchases’ would be treated as ‘cash advances’ on a going forward basis,” according to the suit.

Tucker claims he was hit with about $140 in fees and a “sky-high” interest rate of 26 percent without warning after Chase reclassified his purchases as cash advances, a violation of the Truth in Lending act.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Stealth: Hiding the elephant in the living room

Its never been a secret that Freddie Mac’s business policy is to remain stealth in any chain of title if possible, and to rely on the servicers to keep its presence a secret in foreclosure proceedings. In fact, this PNC case which was overturned against PNC, involved the Defendant’s assertion that PNC was concealing Freddie Mac’s interest in the loan. Freddie Mac’s business policy appears to rely upon nothing more than handshakes with the originators and servicers. Here is some verbiage from a “Freddie Mac – Mortgage Participation Certificates” disclosure (See: Freddie Mac – Mortgage Participation Certificates):

Deutsch files lawsuit against private mailbox troller following the Deutsch playbook of foreclosure

“Defendants, and each of them initiated a malicious campaign to disrupt the chain of title to prevent Plaintiff from enforcing its contractual rights in the 2006 DOT by way of recording fraudulent documents to purportedly assign the rights under the 2006 DOT without the consent of Plaintiff, and otherwise thereafter fraudulently transfer all rights via a trustee deed upon sale, even though no trustee sale was ever conducted. All subsequently recorded or unrecorded transactions are therefore null, void, and of no effect.”

EDITOR COMMENT: So Deutsch is admitting that its practice of recording fraudulent documents are “null, void and of not effect.” In order to get to that point Deutsch is going to be required to prove standing — i.e., definitive proof that it paid for the debt, which it did not. Deutsch is on dangerous ground here and might deliver a bonus for homeowners. As for the defense, is it really a crime to steal a fraudulent deed of trust supported by fraudulent assignments and endorsements?

Barclays Bank settles for $2,000,000,000 for fraud on investors

Barclays’ offering documents “systematically and intentionally misrepresented key characteristics of the loans,” and more than half of the loans defaulted, federal officials said.

Additionally, the Department of Justice reached similar settlements with two Barclays’ employees involved with subprime residential mortgage-backed securities. They will pay $2 million collectively.

The agreements mark the latest in a string of U.S. settlements with major banks over sales of tainted mortgage securities from 2005 to 2007 that helped set the stage for the real estate crash that contributed to the financial crisis.

Deutsch Pays $7.2 Billion for Fraudulent securitizations

Confirming settlement details the bank disclosed in late December, federal investigators said Deutsche Bank will pay a $3.1 billion civil penalty and provide $4.1 billion in consumer relief to homeowners, borrowers, and communities that were harmed.

The federal penalty is the highest ever for a single entity involved in selling residential mortgage-backed securities that proved to be far more risky than Deutsche Bank led investors to believe. Nonetheless, the agreement represents relief of sorts for the bank and its shareholders, because federal investigators initially sought penalties twice as costly.

Credit Suisse‘s announcement said it would pay the Department of Justice a $2.48 billion civil monetary penalty. The bank will also provide $2.8 billion in consumer relief over five years as part of the deal, which is subject to negotiations over final documentation and approval by Credit Suisse’s board of directors. [Credit Suisse owns SPS Portfolio Servicing.]

Ocwen Settles with 10 States for Illegal Servicing

“The consent order provides that Ocwen will transition its servicing portfolio off of its current servicing platform to a platform better able to manage escrow accounts and establish a new complaint resolution process,” the Georgia Department of Banking and Finance said in a press release. “Ocwen shall hire a third-party firm to audit a statistically significant number of escrow accounts in high-risk areas of the portfolio to determine whether problems continue to exist around the management of escrow accounts and to identify the root cause of those problems.

“Ocwen has faced many legal and regulatory challenges in recent years. In December 2013 it reached a settlement over foreclosure and modification processes with the CFPB and state regulators. A year later, it made a separate agreement with New York regulators that removed company founder William Erbey as CEO.

Wells Fargo Whistleblower is Fired Among Others Who refused to Lie to Customers

In 2014, according to Mr. Tran, his boss ordered him to lie to customers who were facing foreclosure. When Mr. Tran refused, he said, he was fired. He worried that he wouldn’t be able to make his monthly mortgage payments and that he was about to become homeless.

Joining a cadre of former employees claiming they were mistreated for speaking out about problems at the bank, Mr. Tran sued. He argued in court filings that he had been fired in retaliation for blowing the whistle on misconduct at the giant San Francisco-based bank. Mr. Tran said he didn’t want his job back — he wanted Wells Fargo to admit that it had been wrong to fire him and wrong to mislead customers who were facing foreclosure.

 

 

 

Wells Fargo “Lending” Securities It Didn’t Own

Translation: WFB was the “custodian” of alleged “mortgage-backed” certificates issued for the benefit of investors who paid billions of dollars for ownership of the certificates. WFB “Loaned” those alleged securities to brokers. The brokers in exchange provided “collateral” the proceeds of which were reinvested by WFB. In short, WFB was laundering the investors money for the sole benefit of WFB and not for the investors who owned the certificates and certainly to the detriment of the brokers and their buyers of derivative instruments based upon the loan of the securities.

This case reveals the flowering of multiple levels arising from false claims of securitization. First WFB issues certificates from a fictitious trust that owns nothing. Then it keeps both the money paid for those certificates and it keeps the certificates as well. On Wall Street this practice is called holding securities in “street name.” Then WFB engages in trading on securities it doesn’t own, but which are worthless anyway because the certificates only represent a promise from the REMIC trusts that exists only on paper.

It is all based upon outright lies. And that is why the banks get nervous when the issue of ownership of a debt, security or derivative becomes an issue in litigation. In this case the bank represented the trades as ownership or derivative ownership of “high grade money market instruments” such as “commercial paper or bank time deposits and CDs.”

None of it was true. WFB simply says that it thought that the “instruments” were safe. The lawsuit referred to in the linked article says they knew exactly what they were doing and didn’t care whether the instruments were safe or not. If the attorneys dig deeper they will find that the certificates’ promise to pay was not issued by an actual entity, that certificates were never mortgage-backed, and that WFB set it up so when there were losses it would not fall on WFB even though WFB was using the named trust basically as a fictitious name under which it operated.

So I continue to inquire: why does any court accept any document from WFB as presumptively valid? Why not require the actual proof?

Let us help you plan your defense strategy, discovery requests and defense narrative: 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

Purchase now Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar including 3.5 hours of lecture, questions and answers, plus course materials that include PowerPoint Presentations. Presenters: Attorney and Expert Neil Garfield, Forensic Auditor Dan Edstrom, Attorney Charles Marshall and and Private Investigator Bill Paatalo. The webinar and materials are all downloadable.

Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!

THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.

===========================

Hat Tip Bill Paatalo

see  WFB Securities Lending Scheme

The investments by WFB went into “mortgage backed assets.” Really? So let’s see how that works. First they create the certificates and sell them to investors even though neither the investors nor the trust have any interest in mortgage assets. Then they “loan” the same certificates to brokers, who provide collateral to WFB so that WFB can “reinvest” investor money using commingled investor money from a variety of sources.

Then derivatives on derivatives are sold as private contracts or insurance policies in which when the nonexistent trust assets are declared by WFB to have failed, in which WFB collects all the proceeds. The investors from all layers are screwed. And borrowers, as was originally planned, are screwed.

The lender to the borrower in the real world (where money is exchanged) are be the investors whose money was in the dynamic dark pool when the loan of money occurred. But the investors have no proof of ownership of the debt because of the false documents created by the “underwriter” bank.  The money from the second tier of investors is used to “purchase” the certificates WFB is “printing”. And then derivatives and hybrid derivatives and synthetic derivatives are sold multiplying the effect of every certificate issued. Such has the control over currency shifted from central banks who control around $8 trillion of fiat currency to the TBTF banks who boast a shadow banking market of $1 quadrillion ($1,000,000,000,000,000.00).

This every loan and every certificate is multiplied in the shadow banking market and converted into real money in the real world. Based upon prior securities analysis and review of disclosures from the publicly held banks it thus became possible for a “bank” to receive as much as $4.2 million on a $0.1 Million loan (i..e, $100,000). But in order to maintain the farce they must foreclose and not settle which will devalue the derivatives.

Then having done all that through control of a dynamic dark pool of investor money they must of course create the illusion of a robust lending market. True this particular case involves a business acquired when WFB acquired Wachovia. But WFB acquired Wachovia because it was the actual party in control of a false securitization scheme in which Wachovia acted primarily as originator and not lender.

WFB barely cares about the interest rate because they know the loans that are being approved won’t last anyway. But its trading desk secures extra profits by selling loans with a high interest rate, as though the loans had a low interest rate thereby guaranteeing two things: (1) guaranteed defaults that WFB can insure and (2) buying low (with investor money) and selling high (to investors).

All of which brings us back to the same point I raised when I first wrote (circa 2007) about the systemic fraud in securitization not as an idea, but in the way it had been put into practice. Using established doctrines in tax litigation there are two doctrines that easily clear up the intentional obfuscation by the banks: (1) The single transaction doctrine and (2) the step transaction doctrine. Yes it is that simple. If the investors didn’t part with their money then the loan of money would have never reached the desk of the closing agent. If the homeowners had not been similarly duped as to who and what was being done, they would never have signed on the dotted line.

To assume otherwise would be the same as assuming that borrowers were looking for a way to waste money on non-deductible down payments, improvements and furniture in exchange for a monthly payment that everyone knew they couldn’t afford.

 

Royal Bank of Scotland Trained Employees on How to Forge Signatures

Fraud for the first time in history has been institutionalized into law.

It is foolishness to believe that the banking industry is trustworthy and that they have the right to claim legal presumptions that their fabricated documents, and the forged documents are valid, leaving consumers, borrowers and in particular, homeowners to formulate a defense where the banks are holding all the information necessary to show that the current foreclosing parties are anything but sham conduits.

Here we have confirmation of a practice that is customary in the banking industry today — fabricating and forging instruments that sometimes irreparably damage consumers and borrowers in particular. Wells Fargo Bank did not accidentally create millions of “new accounts” to fictitiously report income from those accounts and growth in their customer base.

Let us help you plan your narrative : 202-838-6345. Ask for a Consult.

Video available now for Neil Garfield’s Mastering Discovery and Evidence in Foreclosure Defense webinar.

Get a Consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).

https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Across the pond the signs all point to the fact that the custom and practice of the financial industry is to practice fraud. In fact, with the courts rubber stamping the fraudulent representations made by attorneys and robo-witnesses, fraud for the first time in history has been institutionalized into law.

RBS here is shown in one case to have forged a customer’s signature to a financial product she said she didn’t want —not because of some rogue branch manager but because of a sustained institutionalized business plan based solidly on forgery and fabrication in which employees were literally trained to execute the forgeries.

The information is in the public domain — fabrication, robo-signing and robo-winesses testifying in court — and yet government and the courts not only look the other way, but are complicit in the pandemic fraud that has overtaken our financial industries.

Here are notable quotes from an article written by J. Guggenheim.

Once upon a time, in a land far, far away- forgery, fabrication of monetary instruments, and creating fake securities were crimes that would land you in prison.  If you forged the name of your spouse on a check it was a punishable crime.  The Big Banks now forge signatures and fabricate financial instruments on a routine basis to foreclose on homes they can’t prove they own, open accounts in unsuspecting customer’s names, and sign them up for services they don’t want.  If this isn’t the definition of a criminal racketeering enterprise- what is?

RBS, following the Wells Fargo Forgery model, conceded that a fake signature had been used on an official document, which means a customer was signed up to a financial product she did not want.  RBS’s confession comes only two weeks after whistle-blowers came forward claiming that bank staff had been trained to forge customer signatures. [e.s.]

The confession comes only two weeks after The Scottish Mail on Sunday published claims by whistle-blowers that bank staff had been trained to forge signatures.

At first, RBS strenuously denied the allegations, but was forced to publicly acknowledge this was likely a widespread practice. [e.s.]  The bank was forced to apologize publicly after retired teacher Jean Mackay came forward with paperwork that clearly showed her signature was faked on a bank document.  The great-grandmother was charged for payment protection insurance (PPI) back in 2008 even though she had declined to sign up for the optional product.

At first the bank refunded her fees but refused to admit the document was forged.  [e.s.]A forensic graphologist confirmed the signatures were ‘not a match’, forcing the bank to concede and offered her a mere £500 in compensation for their fraudulent act.

Forensic Graphologist Emma Bache, who has almost 30 years’ experience as a handwriting expert, examined the document and said the fundamental handwriting characteristics do not match.

The Banks in Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, along with the United States include forgery and fabrication in their business models to increase profits.  Why shouldn’t they?  There is NO THREAT because they know they will not be held accountable by law enforcement or the courts- so they continue to fleece, defraud, and steal from their customers.

Homeowners must force an urgent investigation into claims of illegal practices by the banks.  Wells Fargo is not doing anything that CitiBank, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America and others aren’t doing.  To remain competitive in an unethical marketplace, you almost have to resort to the same fraudulent tactics.[e.s.]

However, whistle-blowers have now revealed that managers were coached on how to fake names on key papers.  Whistle-blowers said that staff members had received ‘guidance’ on how to download genuine signatures from the bank’s online system, trace them on to new documents then photocopy the altered paperwork to prevent detection.  When in fact the bank taught its employees how to engage in criminal conduct.

Although clearly against the law, the whistle-blowers claim it was “commonly done to speed up administration and complete files.”  Just like American banks forge notes and assignments to ‘speed up foreclosures and complete files.’  They claim the technique was also used to sign account opening forms – and even loan documents. [e.s.]

Forgery

According to Justia.com, the “criminal offense of forgery consists of creating or changing something with the intent of passing it off as genuine, usually for financial gain or to gain something else of value.” This often involves creation of false financial instruments, such as mortgage notes, assignments, checks, or official documents. It can also include signing another person’s name to a document without his or her consent or faking the individual’s handwriting.  Forgery often occurs in connection with one or more fraud offenses. 

Wells Fargo “Explains” Securitization

YOU NEED AN INFINITE NUMBER OF BASES AND PLAYERS TO PLAY BALL WITH THESE GUYS: The Trustee controls the trust as trustee. Oops, wait, it is the Master Servicer who has all the control. No, wait again, it is the subservicer who has the right to administer the loan. But actually if there is an alleged default it is the special servicer who has exclusive authority over decision making. Except that the “Controlling Class” has the last say in the matter. But actually it is the Controlling Class Representative who has the last word.

I have always felt that there must be some way to force the other side into approving a modification or at least providing access by the borrower to the “lender” to discuss or negotiate the matter. I still believe that. Maybe this article will help spur some ideas. Information is leverage, especially in the world of false claims of securitization.

 

Let us help you prepare your narrative (blue print) for litigation: 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

Hat Tip Bill Paatalo

see Wells Fargo Document – No Lender in Remics

Essentially the banks would have us believe that by magic they created loans without owners or holders in due course. So it might as well be the banks who foreclose under any pretense they choose to offer. The political decision was to let them do it for fear that the banks would bring down the entire system. But if that were true, the bank’s capital would be worthless as would every world currency including the dollar. They bluffed Presidents Bush and Obama and the Presidents blinked. Millions of foreclosures followed because the ordinary guy is just not that important even if it involves a substantial portion of a population.

I will provide my comments and suggestions for discovery or cross examination along with each statement in the above cited article. Keep in mind that the entire article is an exercise in deceit: It is assuming that securitization actually happened. If that were true then they would be more than happy to show that the subject loan was purchased on a certain date by the payment of value to a specific seller by a trust. The trust would then be a holder in due course. But as we have seen numerous times nobody ever refers to the trust as a holder in due course which can only mean there was no such purchase.

The indented portions are direct quotes from the WFDb article cited above.

The thing most borrowers fail to realize about conduit loans is that once a loan has been securitized, they are not working with a “lender” anymore.

That’s the first sentence of the “explanation.” And the first thing that pops out is “conduit loans.” What is a conduit loan? Is the subject loan a conduit loan? In what way is the subject loan a conduit loan? [This also corroborates what I have been writing for years — that Matt Taibbi (Rolling Stone Magazine) got it right when he describes securitization as a monster with multiple tentacles.]

There is no legal definition for a conduit loan. The banks would have us believe that if they present any tentacle, that is sufficient for them to foreclose on a loan. But that isn’t legal standing — it is fraud on the court. A loan is a loan, but Wall Street banks don’t want you thinking about that. But by calling it something different it immediately plays into the bias of the court assuming that the big banks know what they are doing and that only they can explain what is going on.

Corroborating my description of the “Conduit”: remark, WFB explains that you are not dealing with a lender anymore. Is that supposed to make us feel better? There is no lender? Was there ever a lender? If, yes, then please identify the party who loaned their money to the borrower.

Now this on servicer advances:

If a loan becomes delinquent, the Master Servicer is usually obligated to make the first three or four payments to the certificate holders as well as pay trust expenses on delinquent assets…

The Master Servicer is reimbursed when the borrower makes up the payment or when the property goes into foreclosure and is later sold.

So we are being told that the Master Servicer is making payments to investors regardless of whether the borrower makes any payment. First, the payments to investors are made by the Master Servicer because they are the only one with access to a giant slush fund or dark pool created out of money that should have a gone to each trust and been maintained as a trust account, administered by the trustee.

But it is true that the Master Servicer gets paid for the “servicer advances” when the property is sold. So if the investors received 12 months of payments (of at least interest), even though it was taken out of a reserve pool (read the prospectus) consisting of their own money, the Master Servicer gets paid as though it was a reimbursement when in fact it is a windfall. Needless to say the incentive is to let the case languish for years before foreclosure and sale take place.

The longer the time period between the alleged default and the sale of the property, the more money is received by the Master Servicer as “reimbursement” for money it never advanced.

The Special Servicer makes all final decisions about dispositions of defaulted property and Real Estate Owned (REO). Often they are also the holders of the “first loss pieces” of the pool. Because they are taking the most risk, as part of their agreement to take that risk, they usually insist on being the Special Servicer as a requirement of their investment. There are only a handful of special servicers in the country.

Really? So the Master Servicer, the subservicer and the Trustee of the alleged REMIC trust have no say in whether to work out or modify a loan that is economically not feasible but which could be feasible if there was a workout or modification. What is a first loss piece of the pool? What is the account name of the pool supposedly held in a bank somewhere? Does the account name match the alleged REMIC trust in any way? Is there an account administered by the Trustee? Does the Trustee get performance reports or end of month statements?

Oops wait! There are other people with special powers —

The PSA also designates a “Controlling Class” who will provide input on recommendations for Special Serviced Loans and REO.

If the Special Servicer is willing to extend the loan, they have to get permission from the Controlling Class Representative (CCR), who is a fiduciary for all the certificate holders.

Anyone who has seen that famous but from Abbot and Costello in the 1950’s understands what is happening here. The Trustee controls the trust as trustee. Oops, wait, it is the Master Servicer who has all the control. No, wait again, it is the subservicer who has the right to administer the loan. But actually if there is an alleged default it is the special servicer who as exclusive authority over decision making. Except that the “Controlling Class” has the last say in the matter. But actually it is the Controlling Class Representative who has the last word.

So in discovery ask which of those entities was contacted about modification and why the borrower was instructed to send the application and documents to the subservicer when the subservicer had no authority?

And let’s not forget the fact that the certificate holders have no right, title or interest in the loans, the debt , the note or the mortgage. So their “Fiduciary” (who apparently is not the Trustee of the alleged Trust) does what?  How do we contact these intermediaries to whom powers and obligations of a trustee are passed around like free money? How do we know if the subservicer is telling the truth when it reports that the “investor” turned down the settlement or modification.

And by the way, why do we not have recording of the modification agreement? Why does not the Trustee of the REMIC Trust sign the modification agreement? Instead it is ALWAYS the signature of the servicer who, as we already know, has no power to accept or deny requests for modifications — and of course it is never recorded in county records. Why?

Remember, there are no “pockets of money” to use for refinance. Special Servicers, although legally allowed by the PSA to forgive any portion of the debt, rarely do so because often that would negatively affect one or more of the bondholders at the expense of the others. Instead, the Special Servicer, on behalf of the conduit, will almost always foreclose and sell the asset.

Hmmmm. So the Special Servicer (and the CCR?) ordinarily chooses to drive down the price of the collateral and take a larger loss on the subject loan because it “would negatively affect one or more of the bondholders at the expense of the others.” But the principal reduction would positively affect some bond holders more than others by saving the collateral. So exactly what are they saying as Wells Fargo Bank about the roles and rules of securitization?

And lastly, why did WFB task authors to write about this when their experience is limited to manufactured home communities? Probably the same reason why robo-witnesses know nothing.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Wells Fargo, Ocwen and Fake REMIC Trust Crash on Standing

What is surprising about this case is that there was any appeal. The trial court had no choice but to dismiss the foreclosure claim.

  1. A copy of the note without an indorsement was attached to the complaint. This leads to the presumption that the indorsement was attached after the complaint was filed. Standing must be proven to ex isa at the time the suit was filed.
  2. The robo-witness could have testified as to the date the indorsement was affixed but he said he didn’t know.
  3. The robo-witness was unable to testify that the default letter had been sent.
  4. It didn’t help that the foreclosure case had been brought before by two different parties and then dismissed.
  5. Attorneys attempted to admit into evidence an unsigned Pooling and Servicing Agreement that could not be authenticated and was merely “a copy of a printout obtained from the SEC website”. This is an example of how court’s are rejecting the SEC website as a government document subject to judicial notice or even introduction into evidence without competent testimony providing the foundation for introducing the PSA for a fake trust.
Let us analyze your case and give you ammunition for the court battle: 202-838-6345
Get a consult and TEAR (Title & Encumbrances Analysis and & Report) 202-838-6345. The TEAR replaces and greatly enhances the former COTA (Chain of Title Analysis, including a one page summary of Title History and Gaps).
https://www.vcita.com/v/lendinglies to schedule CONSULT, leave message or make payments. It’s better than calling!
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT A LEGAL OPINION UPON WHICH YOU CAN RELY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. HIRE A LAWYER.
—————-

see Wells Fargo, as trustee v Madl

Note that the style of the case shows that Wells Fargo was never the Plaintiff. The purported or implied trust was the named Plaintiff. But as Wells Fargo explained in its own article, the Trust is not the Plaintiff and neither are the certificate holders the Plaintiff because their certificates most often expressly state that the holder of the certificate does NOT have any right, title or interest in the “underlying” loans.

In fact if you read it carefully you will see that no trust is actually named or mentioned. AND the failure of the “trust instrument” (the PSA) shows that the trust was never created and never existed. An unsigned, incomplete document downloaded from a site (SEC.gov) that anyone can access to upload documents is not evidence.

Gretchen Morgenson: Tide Turning as Judges Get Irritated by Bank and Lawyer Behavior

“Two recent rulings — one in New York involving Bank of America and one in Massachusetts involving Wells Fargo — serve as examples. In the Wells Fargo case, a ruling on Sept. 17 by Judge William G. Young of Federal District Court was especially stinging. In it, he required Wells Fargo to provide him with a corporate resolution signed by its president and a majority of its board stating that they stand behind the conduct of the bank’s lawyers in the case.”

Editor’s Comment: As I am litigating directly now I see evidence of the same trends discussed in the New York Times article. I adopted a different stance than most foreclosure defense attorneys whose strategies are not less valid than my own. They just don’t suit me. I am accustomed to being the aggressor. So I enter a cases in which the bank has been delaying prosecution of the foreclosure case and step up the pace. The Judges here in Tallahassee and elsewhere are taking note — that the banks are curiously opposing our attempts to move the case along. The resulting shift in perception is palpable. Judges are looking at the files and realizing that it is not because of borrowers who frankly did nothing in the file, but because of the banks who never prosecuted the case.

We ask for expedited discovery and a trial order. The bank attorneys inevitably back pedal and state they cannot agree to expediting the case — which has led the Judges to muse aloud about who is the Plaintiff and who is the defendant.

You would think that the bank would be anxious to produce its witnesses and exhibits for discovery. They are not. In one case the bank has been thwarting the deposition of the person who verified the complaint for over three months.  We only asked for the documents upon which the witness relied when she verified the complaint — something that obviously had to exist before they could file the complaint. So far, no witness nor documents.

When I was representing banks in foreclosures, if someone raised any kind of defense or objection I went out of my way to produce the records custodian,and all the records and proof of the receipt of the money including canceled checks and the bookkeeping records of the banks so there would be no mistake about the existence of the default. I would carefully confirm the figures and history of the borrower before I sent the notice of default, acceleration and right to reinstate because all my figures had to be correct — or else the notice was defective and I would have had to start all over again (something I learned the hard way).

Judges are sensing a disconnect between the banks and their alleged lawyers, and they are right to question that. The assignment usually comes from LPS and the Plaintiff bank usually has no direct knowledge of the action because LPS fabricates most of the documents. That is why Judge Young said that if you want to proceed, I want to see a resolution of the Board of Directors of Wells Fargo bank that they ratify and accept the actions taken by the the attorneys supposedly representing them.

You can almost feel the vibrations of a ship groaning as it makes a turn. The banks are in for a rude awakening.

Fair Game

Why Judges Are Scowling at Banks

By GRETCHEN MORGENSON

District court judges are not generally known as flamethrowers, but some seem to be losing patience with banks in cases involving lending practices.

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